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PEACE HANDBOOKS

VOL. X

MOHAMMEDANISM: TURKEY IN ASIA (I.)

1920

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PEACE HANDBOOKS

Issued by the Historical Section
of the Foreign Office

VOL. X

MOHAMMEDANISM: TURKEY IN ASIA (I.)

57. MOHAMMEDAN HISTORY

58. TURKEY IN ASIA (GENERAL)

59. ANATOLIA

60. SYRIA AND PALESTINE

162. ZIONISM

LONDON:
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920.

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

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It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 57

MOHAMMEDAN HISTORY

(1) THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

(2) THE RISE OF THE TURKS AND THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

(3) ISLAM IN INDIA AND AFRICA.

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THE RISE OF ISLAM

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

A. D.	
622	The *Hijrah* (the Prophet's flight to Medina).
623	Battle of Badr.
626	Siege of Medina.
629	The Prophet takes Mecca.
632	Death of the Prophet.
633	Moslem invasion of Persia.
634	Battle of Yarmuk.
635	Fall of Damascus. Moslem defeat of the Persians.
637	Fall of Jerusalem. Fall of Mada'in. Occupation of Mesopotamia.
638	Foundation of Kufah and Basra.
640	Khuzistan seized.
641	Moslem advance into Africa. Fall of Alexandria.
642	Battle of Nahawand. Fall of Tripoli.
643	Fall of Rayy.
658	First attacks on Sind.
666	Islamic force reaches Balkh.
669	Formation of province of Ifrikiyyah.
670	Expedition over the Oxus.
681	Invasion of northern Africa.
682	Death of Husain.
690	Byzantine imperial forces attack Carthage.
693	Caliphs begin to appoint Governors of Armenia.
705	Conquest of Transoxiana.
711	Moslems reach Farghanah.
712	Fall of Carmona, Seville, and Merida.
715	Invasion of Kashgar.
720	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Toulouse.
732	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Tours.
740	Moslems expelled from Provence.
753–5	Power of Moslems in northern Spain began to decline.
759	Moslems expelled from Narbonne.
808	Foundation of Fez.
827	Invasion of Sicily.
851	Commencement of systematic conquest of Armenia.
869–70	Malta seized by Moslems.

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A. D.

878	Fall of Syracuse.
914	Foundation of Mahdiyah.
936	Fall of the Eastern Caliphate.
969	Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt begins.
1001–26	Invasion of western Punjab.
1045	Foundation of Zirid Dynasty.
1057–85	Recovery of Spanish territories from Moslems.
1061	Robert Guiscard in Sicily.
1064	Fall of Ani (capital of Armenia).
1091	Roger Guiscard completes recovery of Sicily. He recovers Malta.
1203	Northern India under Moslem rulers.
1212	Alfonso VIII of Castile defeats Moslems at Las Navas da Tolosa.
1250	Emperor Frederick II deports Moslems from Malta and Sicily.
1492	Final expulsion of Moslems from Spain.
1517	The Caliphate passes to the Ottoman Sultans.
1519–20	Morocco seized by Sa'dian Sherif.
1550	Fez captured by Mohammed al-Mahdi.
1552	Extinction of the Ziyanid Amirate by the Turks.
1574	Turks capture Tunis.
1590–3	Foundation of Sudanese State with capital at Timbuktu.
1603	Death of the Sherif al-Mansur.
1659	Last Sa'dian Sherif killed.
1667	Mulay Rashid reunites the Sa'dian Empire.

THE RISE OF ISLAM

§ 1. *Place, Date, and Circumstances of its Rise*

ISLAM, or the Mohammedan religion, has now lasted for a period of 1,335 lunar years, the unit of its calendar being a group of twelve lunations, without accommodation to the seasons. Its official commencement synchronizes with the year 622 A. D., when its founder

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accepted an invitation from the people of Yathrib, ever since known as al-Medinah, 'the City' (of the Prophet), to undertake the government of the place—an event historically known as the *Hijrah*, i. e. emigration or flight. According to tradition, the Prophet had been promulgating his opinions publicly for some ten years; and for some three years previous to this communicating them privately in his native town, Mecca. If this be correct, the commencement of the system should be dated about the year 610. The name *Islam*, of which *Moslem* or *Muslim* is the participle, signifies in Arabic 'surrender', and (according to the Koran) was given by the patriarch Abraham to his community, the sense being surrender of the 'face', i. e. probably the person, to Allah (God). The community is sometimes called the *Hanifs*, a name which is also traced to Abraham; this has been thought to belong to a community at Harran (which existed so late as the eleventh century) called the Sabis, a word applied, according to the tradition, to the early Moslems by their neighbours. The recorded practices of this obscure sect exhibit agreement in some notable details with those of Islam.

Since Mecca has no trustworthy chronicles of its own, and has never aroused the attention of the outside world, except in connexion with the Prophet Mohammed and his system, a certain vagueness attaches to the circumstances wherein his mission arose. In Arabia there appears at the time to have been no considerable native state, but numerous settlements of tribes, while the Roman and Persian Empires had spheres of influence. Mecca appears to have been the settlement of a group of tribes in possession of a sanctuary, whither visitors brought goods which the Meccans, aided by their sacred character, conveyed to various regions. The sanctuary, thus bringing

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them comparative immunity from war, enabled them also to accumulate wealth. With regard to their religion, the Koran assumes that the citizens of Mecca were polytheists, idolaters, and addicted to various practices—some of them undoubtedly immoral—of which the Prophet disapproved. It further assumes that the existence of the Jewish and Christian religious systems was known in Mecca, but that few if any there had any acquaintance with those systems. That the Prophet himself was a native, not a foreigner, appears not only from the statements of the Koran, but from the part played in his life by numerous relatives, some of whom were adherents, others opponents, while some belonged to neither group. The names whereby he designated his office correspond with the Jewish *Prophet* and the Christian *Apostle*. The Arabic word for the former is identical with the Hebrew, but clearer in meaning, owing to the preservation of the family of words to which it belongs; it signifies *bearer of a message*, and is thus synonymous with Apostle, for which an Arabic word, also belonging to a well-known family, is employed. The message, or rather series of messages, which he claimed to deliver, came from the Supreme Being. These, singly or collectively, are the *Koran* or *Qur'an* ('reading').

Mohammed's notion of a prophet, then, was that of a channel whereby the Divine Being communicates his commands to mankind; hence, in the Koran it is the Deity who speaks, often addressing to the Prophet a command to say something to his fellows. Since the unity of God is the dominant doctrine of the system, His messenger acts as His representative before the whole world; and this most important inference was accordingly drawn by Mohammed. The Government of Mecca, of whose constitution our knowledge is hazy, appears to have recognized that

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Mohammed's claim involved dictatorship within the community; but the principle whereby responsibility attached to the tribe rather than to the individual prevented that Government from forcibly suppressing him so long as he was countenanced by the powerful tribe to which he belonged, while the justice of his claim was recognized by too few members of that tribe to permit of their endeavouring to enforce it on the group of tribes who shared the territory of Mecca. This enables us to some extent to understand the curious circumstance that in the Meccan period his followers, who from the point of view of civic standing were less favourably situated than he, suffered persecutions from which he himself was immune. These caused what is called the first migration—the flight of various early adherents of his system to Christian Abyssinia, with whose ruler Mohammed appears to have maintained friendly relations, though he did not put himself under that potentate's protection.

§ 2. *The Call to Medina and its Consequences*

The circumstances which led to the Prophet's receiving an invitation from the people of Yathrib to undertake the government of their city are incompletely known, but seem to be illustrated by cases in early Hellenic history, in which prophets were summoned to cure a community of the civic disease known as *stasis*, or chronic civil war. The territory called by the name Yathrib, which appears to be of Egyptian origin, was shared by two Arabian tribes which had long been involved in internecine war. With them there lived certain Jewish communities, of whose origin and history their brethren have no independent record; it is uncertain whether they were Judaized Arabs, or Israelites who had adopted Arabia as their

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country, learned the Arabic language, and accommodated themselves in a variety of ways to the customs of the land. They appear to have been drawn into the tribal wars, but their importance for the commencement of Islam lies chiefly in the fact that they probably familiarized their neighbours with the notion of prophetic revelation, rendering Mohammed's claims more intelligible to them than to other pagans in Arabia. The acquaintance of the people of Yathrib with Mohammed and his system is said, doubtless with truth, to have had its beginning in pilgrimages made by natives of the place to the shrine at Mecca called the *Ka'bah* or *House of Allah*. These pilgrims on their return home propagated the system, which was presently taught more authoritatively by an agent sent thither by Mohammed. Owing to the success of their efforts in attracting adherents, both the Prophet and his Meccan followers were assured of a welcome at Medina; and, after the migration of the latter, the Prophet himself took the historic journey from which Islam dates its era. It would appear that his arrival was at first welcome to all elements of the population, including the Jews; for the Jewish system was at that time reproduced with slight modifications in that of the Arabian Prophet, which, even in its ultimate shape, closely resembles Judaism.

From the date of the migration, Mohammed's career can be more clearly traced, since from this time the chief events of the years are kept distinct. Internal dissensions arose in Yathrib (Medina) shortly after his arrival, though not on the old lines of cleavage. His relations with the Jewish tribes became more and more strained; and, whether as the consequence or the cause of this, he resolved to make advances towards the older paganism, especially by enjoining believers to turn, in prayer, towards the Meccan sanctuary, and by making

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the pilgrimage thither part of his system; where he adopted Jewish institutions, he altered them, and he eventually freed himself from the neighbourhood of the Israelites by forcible means. He also had trouble with disaffected pagans, especially with chiefs jealous of the power which he had acquired; but in these cases he displayed patience and leniency. He sought to enter into friendly relations with neighbouring tribes, but seems to have made his chief object the subjugation of Mecca, towards whose Government he assumed an attitude of open hostility. An attack organized by him on a Meccan trading caravan led, in the year 2 A. H. (A.D. 624), to his first considerable battle, that of Badr. The Meccan forces are said to have been twice as numerous as those of the Moslems, but the discipline of the latter and the tactics of their commander were greatly superior; and, though the caravan originally aimed at escaped, Mohammed won a decisive victory. Attempts were made by the Meccans to avenge this defeat, culminating, in the year 5 A. H., in the siege of Medina by a hostile confederation. Owing to a variety of causes, among which the Prophet's skill as a captain and a negotiator seems to have been the chief, this attempt resulted in failure; and from that time, while the cause of Islam was progressing in Arabia partly by persuasion and partly by force of arms, the more enterprising and intelligent among the Meccans were deserting to the Prophet at Medina. For some time this migration had been a duty for converts, and Medina was growing into a vast camp. In the year 8 A.H. Mecca itself was taken by the Prophet, who seems at first to have had some idea of making it the seat of government. From this he was dissuaded, but he retained it in its rank of religious centre, thereby securing for his system an element of permanence; for, however far the political

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centre shifted, the religious centre has remained unaffected by the change.

From what we know of the history and antiquities of Arabia it appears that the taking of Mecca was speedily followed by the imposition of Islam on the entire country, partly by successful wars, partly by peaceful negotiation; but, even before Mecca was captured, the Prophet had come to think of his mission as addressed to the whole world, and is said to have dispatched to all the potentates known to him a summons to accept Islam if they wished to be safe. The records of these embassies are not altogether trustworthy; it seems clear, however, that the summons was courteously received in Egypt, but in Persia with contumely; tradition makes the Byzantine Emperor treat the summons with respect, though on consideration it was rejected.

The process whereby Mohammed, once installed in authority in Medina, became ruler of all Arabia is not difficult to follow; there are parallel cases, not in Oriental history alone, of men gifted with political and strategic ability rising after a small initial success to be heads of empires. Mohammed appears to have been especially felicitous in his assessment of ability and character, both in the case of adherents and in that of enemies; he seems to have made no mistakes in the choice of agents and the assignment of offices. He also possessed the gift of inspiring his adherents with loyalty. The process whereby he obtained his first following is far less intelligible. From the beginning he claimed to work a miracle, but this was of a peculiar kind. It lay in the production of the rhymed discourses which he called *Koran* (*Qur'an*). He claimed that this was the first instruction which his countrymen had ever received, and that he himself, before he began to receive it,

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had been illiterate. He also declared that the matter which he delivered was previously unknown to him, but that its correctness could be certified by an appeal to those who were in possession of 'the Book', i. e. Jews and Christians. Thirdly, he challenged his contemporaries to produce any composition which could rival his revelations. No other miracle seems to have played an important part in his career. It is perhaps surprising that during his lifetime the Koran was thought of much as we think of the sermons of a great preacher—as something living and continuous, not the limited contents of a volume. Little care was therefore at first taken to secure its preservation.

§ 3. *Theological, Moral, and Political Character of the System*

The system introduced by Mohammed seems to have differed very widely in theology from those which had previously dominated Central Arabia, since it substituted a rigid form of spiritual monotheism for a polytheism which apparently combined fetish-worship and star-worship. It also laid emphasis on the resurrection of the dead, future judgement, and future happiness and misery—doctrines which the earlier Meccans are represented as ridiculing. Of the practices which it introduced, viz. (1) prayer (involving certain ritual formalities), (2) fasting (i.e. abstention from all food, solid and liquid, from sunrise to sunset throughout the ninth month of the lunar year), (3) pilgrimage (i.e. a visit to Mecca once at least in a lifetime, with the observation of certain practices and the participation in certain rites), and (4) alms (i.e. the enforced contribution of a proportion of a man's annual produce or earnings for the benefit of the poor of the community), only the third would seem to have been taken over, with some slight modifications—and these perhaps of interpre-

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tation and nomenclature rather than of procedure—from the pagan system; there may have been something analogous to the second, of which the origin is obscure, whereas the first and the fourth were decidedly innovations. These practices, together with the creed of two propositions, form the 'five pillars of Islam'.

Moral reforms of considerable importance are to be found in the abolition of infanticide, with which the pre-Islamic Arabs are charged, and the prohibition of spirituous liquor and the form of gambling which seems to have been in vogue. Some hold that the relations between the sexes were also regulated somewhat more strictly than had previously been the practice; but the Koran makes no limitation to the permissible number of concubines, and only limits the number of wives to four. Other moral reforms seem to have been recommendations rather than enactments. Thus, whereas neither the institution of slavery nor that of the blood-feud was abolished, the manumission of slaves was recommended as a pious act, constituting atonement for certain offences; and attempts were made to mitigate the evils of the blood-feud. Notice should be taken of the licence to conceal religious opinions when danger is incurred by their open profession.

The Prophet's chief political innovation was the recognition of tolerated religions. Whereas paganism was to be exterminated, communities which had as the basis of their system a sacred book revealed by some recognized prophet were to be disarmed and compelled to pay tribute to the Islamic Government, but otherwise to be safe from interference. They were to enjoy the protection of the armed Moslem community, even, according to some, in the performance of acts which Islam forbade its adherents to commit. Thus property in wine and swine is recognized in the

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case of Christians, but not in that of Moslems, whose system prohibits both. Normally the Christian or the Jewish community was to be represented by its religious head, who was responsible to the Moslem Government for the payment of the tribute; interference, however, with the affairs of these protected communities could not in practice be avoided. An inference afterwards drawn by Islamic jurists, that only the testimony of Moslems can be received in Moslem courts, has proved disastrous. Its supposed ground is the charge which the Koran brings, perhaps rather against Jews than Christians, of corrupting the text of their sacred books. If, it is argued, they cannot be trusted to report God's words correctly, still less can they be trusted in the case of men.

§ 4. *Progress after the Prophet's Death*

At the Prophet's death there were still some Christian and Jewish communities in Arabia; but it was decided by his second successor that no religion save Islam was to be tolerated in the peninsula, and they were expelled. The Prophet's death was followed by numerous revolts among the Arab tribes, who disliked the five daily prayers, and still more the exaction of the tax called alms; but there appears to have been no recrudescence of pagan cults, though some of the revolts were headed by persons who claimed to be prophets similar to Mohammed. Historians naturally express surprise at the shallowness of the sentiments which the pagan deities of Arabia seem to have inspired. It might have been expected that their worship would in places have been maintained in private after it had been publicly inhibited, whereas it appears that after a very few years nothing more was remembered about them than what happened to be recorded in the Koran. As conquest pro-

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ceeded, the Prophet's programme of subjugating the world and exterminating all but believers in prophetic books underwent certain modifications. It was not found possible for many centuries to deprive the Byzantine Empire and various European, Asiatic, and African states of their independence; room had to be made for the Magians or Mazdians in the system of tolerated religions; and it was found impossible to exterminate the paganism of India when Islam made progress in that quarter.

§ 5. *Origin of the Divisions*

The Prophet's death was not at once followed by a war of succession, but the fact that he had left no son and given no authoritative instructions for the appointment of a successor was destined ultimately to occasion serious trouble. The notion of a community being ruled by instruction from the Divine Being communicated through an appointed channel would seem to require the constant presence of a Prophet. At his death Mohammed left one living daughter, Fatimah, with her two infant sons. Her husband, Ali, son of Abu Talib, was the cousin of the Prophet, had been one of his earliest adherents, and had displayed conspicuous bravery in the field; he was, however, set aside in favour of the Prophet's most constant companion, Abu Bakr, father of the Prophet's young wife, A'ishah. Abu Bakr, who died after a short reign, appointed as his successor Omar, who seems to have been intellectually the most capable of the Prophet's companions; and after Omar's assassination the choice of the Moslems fell on Othman, who had married two of the Prophet's daughters and been given honourable commissions by the Prophet. Othman was presently put to death by armed rebels, who installed Ali in his place. Ali immediately found himself involved in civil

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wars with parties who claimed to avenge his predecessor's death, and even with the party by which he had been enthroned; and by one of this party he was assassinated after a brief and turbulent reign. One of his rivals, the son of Mohammed's most capable opponent at Mecca, then established the first of the hereditary Islamic dynasties. The hereditary principle once established, it was natural that the Moslem world should desire a dynasty which represented the line of their Prophet rather than that of his foremost adversary. Consequently claimants belonging to the Prophet's line were constantly coming forward, the most celebrated of whom in the first Islamic century was his grandson Husain, son of Ali. Husain's death in the field in the year 61 A.H. (A.D. 683) is regarded as the greatest catastrophe that ever befell Islam.

The introduction of the hereditary principle was attended by a difficulty. According to the law of inheritance embodied in the text of the Koran, in default of a son the parents of the deceased or their representatives inherit; a daughter only gets an appointed share. Hence Fatimah (on the supposition that a prophet can have heirs, which is often denied) would not be heiress; on the other hand, her husband was excluded because his father, though the Prophet's uncle, was never a believer, and there is a maxim that unbeliever does not inherit from believer. The legal heir was in this case the Prophet's believing uncle, Abbas, who appears to have opposed the Prophet, though not very vigorously, until the latter's success was assured, when Abbas became a believer. This then is the process of reasoning whereby the claim of the Abbasids, who ousted the first hereditary dynasty, is established; but some of their supporters maintained that the sovereignty had been transmitted to this family by the representative of the first Mahdi, Mohammed, son of Ali

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and 'the Hanafite woman' (another wife than Fatimah), to whom it had been transmitted by Ali, who had received it from the Prophet. This represents an endeavour to secure for the Abbasids the rights of the family of Ali. The adherents of the cause of Fatimah would naturally disallow this claim as much as the other, holding that the sovereignty belongs to one of her descendants.

The claim of the Ottoman Sultan to the succession of the Prophet is derived from that of the Abbasids, whose dynasty lasted in theory from A. D. 750, when they overthrew the first hereditary dynasty (the Umayyads), to 1517, when Egypt was conquered by the Sultan Selim I, to whom the last of the Abbasids is supposed to have transmitted his claim. Of those who acknowledge the rights of the Abbasids, many deny that claims can be thus transmitted, holding that they are inherent in the Prophet's tribe, Quraish, according to a principle inferred by jurists of the fourth Islamic century from the facts of history up to that time. Those who maintain that they belong to the Prophet's descendants through his daughter are called the *Shiah* (party of the Prophet's house). They made many disastrous attempts to assert their claims and stirred up revolts against the Sunni Caliphs. Their supreme religious chiefs were the Imams, descended from Ali, each of whom transmitted his authority to his successor. In course of time disputes arose as to the succession. One sect, the Ismailis, recognized only seven Imams, the last of whom disappeared about A. D. 770; while another (to which the majority of Shiahs belong) recognized twelve, of whom the last disappeared and remains hidden from mortal sight, but will appear again as the promised Mahdi. Shiah dynasties were established in Tabaristan (864–928), in North-west Africa (the Idrisids, 791–922),

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in North Africa and Egypt (the Fatimids, 969–1171); and in 1502, under the founder of the Safavid dynasty, the Shiah faith became the national religion of Persia.

The name *Sunni*, whereby the adherents of the Abbasids and so of the Ottoman Sultan are generally, though not exclusively, designated, is derived from the word *sunnah*, 'practice' or 'law', and has the following history. The profession of faith which marks the adherent of Islam consists of two sentences, of which the first attests that Allah is the only God, the second that Mohammed is His channel of communication with mankind. Those communications in the Prophet's time took the form of revelations, either conveyed to his mind and then delivered by him to an audience, or uttered by him in trance and taken down by authorized reporters. The second article of the creed implies acceptance of these revelations as divine injunctions. Where, therefore, they abrogated an existing practice, that practice had to be abandoned, but other practices were maintained; hence some of the most characteristic institutions of Islam, e.g. circumcision, were taken on from the earliest usage of Arabia without being prescribed or confirmed by the Koran. No sufficient supplement to the occasional legislation of the Koran was provided to meet the rapid development of the Moslem community into an empire; and, since that work repeatedly enjoins obedience to the Prophet as well as to God, endeavours were made to obtain such a supplement from what could be remembered of the Prophet's sayings and doings. Simultaneously there arose a theory that the Prophet had secretly communicated to Ali and his family the necessary supplement, which in the opinion of some went far beyond jurisprudence.

The collection of traditions for this purpose appears

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to have begun shortly after the Prophet's death, the chief seat of the study being Medina. In the second Islamic century codes were elaborated, largely on the basis of this supposed practice of the Prophet; in the fourth century four of these systems obtained official recognition, and a *Sunni* might follow any one of the four. Of these, that which bears the name of Abu Hanifah, or the Hanafi system, is officially recognized by the Ottoman Empire, which, however, has largely restricted its application. The codes used by the Shiah communities differ only in minor points.

§ 6. *The Expansion of Islam*

The expansion of Islam began in the continent of Asia, and proceeded simultaneously in the directions of Syria and Persia. The long struggle between the Byzantine and Persian Empires weakened the forces opposed to Islam. The fate of the Byzantine Empire in Palestine and Syria was settled by the battle of Yarmuk (A.D. 634), followed by the taking of Damascus in the next year. Homs was taken in 635; Hamah, Laodicea, and Kinnisrin in the following year; and Aleppo and Antioch shortly afterwards. The conquest of Palestine was settled by the battle of Ajnadain in 636, after which Jerusalem capitulated, while the other important towns were either taken or surrendered; the last to hold out was Caesarea, which was taken by storm in 638.

Persian Empire.—The conquest of the countries which formed the Persian Empire began in 633, when the province called Arabian Irak was invaded by a Moslem force under Khalid, and the important city of Hirah seized. This was followed in the same year by the capture of Anbar on the eastern bank of the Euphrates; but the invasion did not proceed with

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uninterrupted success. The fate of the Persian Empire was determined, towards the end of 635, by the battle of Kadisiyyah, which resulted in a complete defeat of the Persian army by the Moslems, under the leadership of Sa'd Ibn Abi Wakkas. In 637 the royal city, Mada'in, fell; and in the same year Mesopotamia was occupied as far as Tekrit and Mosul. In 638 the new Moslem cities, Kufah and Basra, were founded and peopled with Arabian immigrants. In the following years the chief cities of Khuzistan were taken, Sus falling in 640. The resistance of the Persian king was finally crushed at the battle of Nahawand, in 642, followed by the fall of Rayy in 643. The provinces of Fars, Kirman, Mukran, Sijistan, Khorasan, and Azerbaijan were then successfully invaded and annexed to the Empire of the Caliphs.

Africa.—The Moslem advance into Africa began in 641, when 'Amr Ibn al-'As invaded Egypt by the route of al-'Arish. He took Alexandria in this year, and founded the city of Fustat, which in the fourth Islamic century was superseded by the neighbouring Cairo. The attempt of the Byzantines to recover Alexandria was defeated in a campaign which led to the retaking of that city by the Moslems in 646. This year should perhaps be regarded as the date of the commencement of the Moslem possession of Egypt.

The conqueror of Egypt advanced along the coast as far as Barca, while one of his officers raided the Fezzan. In 642 he took Tripoli. Under the third Caliph, in 647, preparations were made on a larger scale for the invasion of Africa, where an independent state had recently been set up by the *patricius* Gregory with Suffetula or Sbeitla for capital. Gregory was defeated by the Moslem general Abdallah ben Abi Sarh, and fell in battle; but the Moslems resolved temporarily to evacuate the province; they did not

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return till 665, under the Umayyad of the Caliph Mu'awiyah. After various raids a province (Ifrikiyyah) was constituted in 669, with Ukbah Ibn Nafi as governor. A new city, Kairawan, was founded as its capital. The province extended southwards as far as Jerid, but was subject to continual raiding from the west. In 681 Ukbah planned an expedition westward on a considerable scale, with the view of gaining for Islam the whole of northern Africa; he proceeded victoriously as far as Ceuta, whence he marched southward to the Sus, and eventually reached the Atlantic. Conversions on a great scale appear to have been effected among the Berber tribes who occupied these regions, but at the death of Ukbah on the return journey in 683, little in the way of permanent subjection of the Maghrib had been achieved. Owing to the civil wars which were raging in the East, even the province of Ifrikiyyah had for a time to be abandoned. In 697, however, the occupation was resumed and further conquest begun. The last attempt made by the Byzantine Empire to recover its African possessions was in 698, when a descent was made on Carthage, which had just been conquered by the Moslems; but the place could not be permanently held owing to the arrival of a Moslem fleet. The conquest of the Maghrib was consummated by Musa ben Nusair, who was sent as governor to Kairawan in 705. He took and garrisoned Tangier, and advanced southward as far as Sijilmasa. There was, however, no considerable immigration of Arabs at this time. Small garrisons were left in various places of importance, and missionaries were dispatched to various tribes to instruct them in the doctrines and practices of Islam.[1]

Spain and France.—It was from Africa that Moslem

[1] For an account of the later developments, see § 7 below, and *Islam in Africa*, Part (3) of this book.

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conquest extended to the European continent, though isolated raids had previously been made on various islands in the Mediterranean, especially on Sicily, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The invasion of Spain was commenced in 711 by Tarik, governor of Tangier, whose name is preserved in the Arabic Jebel Tarik ('mountain of Tarik'), whence the name Gibraltar is derived. An exploring party had been sent out two years before under Tarif, whose name is thought to survive in Tarifa. The advance of Tarik was exceedingly rapid; and he successively occupied Toledo (at that time the political capital), Granada, Malaga, and Elvira. Tarik was followed in 712 by the governor of Ifrikiyyah, Musa ben Nusair, who took Carmona, Seville, and Merida. A great part of the population adopted Islam, and the invaders soon reached the Pyrenees.

In A. D. 720 that mountain barrier was crossed, but a Moslem army was defeated under the walls of Toulouse. In 732 Abd al-Rahman, governor of Spain, made a fresh incursion into Gaul, burned Bordeaux, plundered Poitiers, and threatened Tours. But in the battle of Tours, fought in October 732, the Moslems sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of Charles Martel; and, though raids in Gaul continued for a time, the land beyond the Pyrenees was not destined to remain in their hands; they were expelled from Provence in 740, and from Narbonne in 759.

Meanwhile, the expulsion of the Moslems from northern Spain had begun; between 753 and 755 they had been driven south to a line stretching from Coimbra on the west to Pamplona on the east. A further stretch of territory was regained by Fernando I, King of Castile and Leon, in the years 1057 to 1064, and by Alfonso VI, King of Leon, Castile,

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Galicia, and Navarre, in 1080–5. The Moslem domination in Spain received its most serious blow in 1212, when the Almohad Caliph's forces were utterly routed at the battle of Las Navas da Tolosa by Alfonso VIII of Castile, aided by other Christian princes of the peninsula. But it was not till 1492 that the capture of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella finally emancipated the whole peninsula from the dominion of Islam.

Mediterranean.—Sicily was repeatedly raided by the Moslems of Africa, and in 827 was invaded by a considerable force sent by the Aghlabite (African Islamic) ruler of Kairawan. The conquest of the island was carried out by stages, and the fall of Syracuse in 878 brought the greater part of it into Moslem possession. In 1061 its reconquest was commenced by the Norman, Robert Guiscard, and was completed by his brother Roger, who by 1091 had obtained possession of all the Moslem strongholds.

Malta was taken by an Aghlabite fleet in 869 and 870; but it was recovered for Christendom by Roger Guiscard in 1091. In 1250 the Moslems who remained in these islands were deported to Apulia by the Emperor Frederick II.

The eastern shore of the Mediterranean passed out of Mohammedan hands after the Crusaders had conquered Jerusalem in 1099 and established a Christian kingdom in Palestine; but, when Saladin won the battle of Hittin in 1187, the collapse of the Christian power was so complete that three years later only Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch remained in Christian hands. The Crusaders made a great effort to recover the Holy Land, but the treaty of 1192 left in their hands little territory beyond the sea-board from Acre to Jaffa. During the next fifty years, in spite of fluctuations, the Latin power increased. They ex-

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tended their possessions farther inland, and Jerusalem was once more in Christian hands for a few years; but, after Baibars became Sultan of Egypt in 1260, he waged a series of successful campaigns against the Latins, and by the capture of Acre in 1291 brought the whole of Syria once again under Mohammedan rule.

Asia Minor.—Whereas the invasion of Europe from the south-west reached its limit in the eighth century, and from that time slowly receded, Islam continued to advance in other directions. In 693 the Caliphs began to appoint governors of Armenia, but the systematic conquest of the country did not begin till 851. In the following century Islam made great strides, partly through the raids of the governors of Azerbaijan, partly through the diplomatic methods employed by the Caliphs in their dealing with the Armenian princes. The capital of the Armenian kingdom, Ani, was taken in 1064 by the Seljuk Sultan, Alp Arslan; and the rest of Armenia was presently embodied in the empire of the Seljuks.[1]

Central Asia.—An Islamic force reached Balkh in 666; in 670 an expedition was sent across the Oxus, and remained for two years in the region of which Bokhara was the chief city. The methodical conquest of Transoxiana began in 705, and a systematic attempt was made to convert the inhabitants; by 711 the Moslem conquerors had advanced to Farghanah, the present Khanate of Khokand, and the Jaxartes was crossed. From that time Islam advanced fitfully in those parts, as also north of Azerbaijan, conversions at certain periods taking place on a large scale.

As the power of the Abbasid Caliphate declined in the ninth century, Transoxiana became independent, first under a Persian dynasty, the Sāmānids (874–999), and afterwards under a succession of Turkish rulers,

[1] Cf. *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

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the Ilik Khans (932–1165), the Ghaznavids (962–1186), the Seljuks (1037–1194), and the Khwārizm Shāhs (1150–1231), who were finally swept away by the Mongol invasion.

India.—Attacks on Sind began in the year 658, and in the eighth century this country was temporarily occupied by the Moslems. The invasion of India did not achieve success till the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, who in seventeen invasions between the years 1001 and 1026 subdued the western districts of the Punjab. When, in the latter half of the twelfth century, his dynasty was overthrown by the Ghoris, further conquest was contemplated, and by 1203 the whole north of India from the delta of the Indus to the delta of the Ganges was under Mohammedan rulers.[1] Under successive dynasties of the Sultans of Delhi, Mohammedan rule advanced as far south as the Deccan, and under the Moghul emperors attained its greatest extension.

East Indian Islands.—Islam is said to have been introduced into Java by missionaries in the fifteenth century; and its adherents, by the sixteenth century, had become sufficiently powerful to seize the reins of government both here and in the north and some other parts of the neighbouring island of Sumatra. The progress of Islam through the other islands of the Malay Archipelago was slow, and the early history of the movement is obscure; opposition to the political domination of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century reacted in favour of the rising Mohammedan power, but even to the present day Islam is chiefly confined to the more civilized races of the Archipelago and has made but little way among the lower races.

China.—Though there is a considerable Moslem

[1] For later developments, see *Islam in India*, Part (3) of this book.

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population in China, there appears at no time to have been an independent Moslem state in that country. According to the Arab historians, when in 715 Kashgar was invaded by a Moslem conqueror, the Chinese Emperor sent a deputation to obtain some information about the new religion, and in 755 the Abbasid Caliph is said to have sent a force to aid the Chinese Government against a rebel. The members of this force are thought to have formed the nucleus of the Moslem colony, which received considerable accessions to its numbers after the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century had opened up communications between China and western Asia. After the expulsion of the Mongol dynasty from China in the latter part of the fourteenth century, the Mohammedans, cut off from communication with their co-religionists in other countries, tended to become merged into the mass of the native population, through their marriages with Chinese women and their adoption of Chinese habits and manners. There have been several Mohammedan revolts against the Chinese Government, the first in the province of Kansu in 1648; these revolts, as well as the Panthay risings in Yunnan from 1855 to 1873 and the Tungan rebellion in Shen-si and Kansu in 1864–77 and 1895–6, were suppressed by means of wholesale massacres.

§ 7. *Islam in Africa*

After the spread of Islam along the northern coast of Africa, it continued to make progress towards the south, but the stages are only recorded in exceptional cases. It appears, indeed, that the successive founders of dynasties carried Islam, either by persuasion or by force of arms, farther and farther into the interior; this is recorded, for instance, of Idris, the founder of the Idrisid dynasty. In the first two centuries of the

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Hijrah the doctrines of the Kharijites, who confined the Caliphate to no particular family or tribe, won considerable favour among the African Moslems; and one of the subdivisions of that sect, called the Ibadis or Abadis, is still represented in some places. A dynasty which claimed descent from Ali, known as the Idrisid, was established near the end of the eighth century, and founded Fez in 808; another, which also claimed descent from Ali, founded Mahdiyah in 914, and in 969 got possession of Egypt, where it established a Caliphate called the Fatimid, which lasted some two centuries. By transferring its capital from Mahdiyah to Cairo it soon lost touch with the more westerly parts of northern Africa, and the history of the country from that time onwards was exceedingly troubled. In 1045 the deputy of the Fatimids at the former seat of their power declared himself independent, and founded a dynasty known as the Zirid; and the Fatimid ruler, in order to punish this proceeding, organized a fresh immigration of Arab tribes into northern Africa, who not only brought devastation on the country by their invasion, but, owing to their inability to remain constant to any sovereign, became a permanent source of disorder.

In the eleventh century an empire was founded by a religious enthusiast, with Morocco for its capital, which presently obtained control over Islamic Africa with the exception of Egypt, and even embraced Islamic Spain; but after a century it was displaced by another, also founded by an enthusiast, who took the title 'Mahdi'. This empire also had its head-quarters in Morocco. In the middle of the thirteenth century it was overthrown, and three states took its place—the Marinid, with Fez or Morocco, the Ziyanid, with Tlemsen, and the Hafsid, with Tunis, as their respective capitals. The history of northern

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Africa to the end of the fifteenth century is mainly concerned with the struggles, resulting from wars of succession, between these three states and their subdivisions.

Early in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Turks began to extend their authority along the coast of North Africa, and the three provinces of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were annexed to the Turkish Empire in 1519, 1568, and 1551 respectively. Thus the territories that had belonged to the Ziyanids and the Hafsids came under Turkish rule; but Morocco passed from the hands of the Marinids into those of the Sherifs, who claimed descent from Ali, and have remained in power down to recent times.[1]

Although religious reformers play a prominent part in the history of all Islamic countries, it is in Africa that they have had most political importance. Thus, whereas in the eastern Caliphate the successive hegemonies were established by military adventurers, in Africa the series of empires, those of the Ubaidids, Almoravids, Almohads, and afterwards the Sherifian, were founded by religious enthusiasts. The persons who, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, aim at founding empires are called Murabits, i. e. hermits, who win popular admiration by rigidity of doctrine and asceticism in practice. The reason for this phenomenon appears to lie mainly in the character of the population; but an additional reason is to be found in the struggle with Christian Powers, who were steadily regaining territory and menacing Islam in Africa, while particular Moslem sovereigns were allying themselves with Christian potentates in order to defeat their rivals, and employing Christian regiments in their armies. At times,

[1] For the later expansion of Islam in Africa, see below, Part (3) of this book.

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too, Islamic states accepted the humiliation of being tributary to Christian kings. These fundamental violations of Islamic law formed a permanent source of discontent, which provided a following for any enthusiast who aspired to remove them.

§ 8. *Relations with Subject Peoples*

The Prophet is said to have introduced in the year 8 A. H. the principle whereby certain religious communities, whose systems were based on a sacred book, were to enjoy toleration on consideration of paying tribute[1]; they were, however, to be disarmed, and to accept a position of inferiority to the Moslems. The form taken by the tribute was theoretically a poll-tax; as, however, the collection of this was ordinarily left to the responsible heads of the communities, and the persons who paid it were largely engaged in agriculture, the distinction between this tribute and the land-tax had a tendency to be obscured, and the name, which properly signifies land-tax, was from an early period applied to the poll-tax. Though in many cases the amount to be levied was fixed by an original contract, it was often increased by the caprice of individual governors; and the condition of the subject populations was in most states subject to alternations of mildness and severity. A code supposed to go back to the second Caliph, Omar, enjoined a variety of hard and humiliating conditions, which seem rarely to have been enforced for any considerable period, though the historians often record occasions on which they were restored by Moslem rulers in response to popular clamour. The difficulty of enforcing them lay in the fact that the civil service, as it might be called, was at all times very largely recruited from persons who belonged to the Christian, Jewish, or Sabian religions;

[1] Cf. above, p. 12.

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the medical profession also was very largely in their hands; and the influence which these professional men could bring to bear on the Caliphs and Sultans was too strong to be overcome by the spasmodic efforts of fanatics. Examples of Moslem rulers who compelled all their subjects to adopt Islam are rare, though some are afforded by the history of Egypt and Africa.

§ 9. *Mohammedan Law*

The great difference between Mohammedan and European law lies in the fact that the former recognizes no distinction between canon law and the law of the State. The sources of law are the Koran, the Tradition, Consensus, and Analogical Deduction. On the basis of these, codes were compiled in the second and third Islamic centuries, dealing with ritual and with civil and criminal jurisprudence; three of these systems—those of Shafi'i, Malik, and Abu Hanifah—have become the law of different Islamic communities.[1] In Sunni countries the jurists can give opinions on cases which do not appear to be provided for, but theoretically no one is competent to alter the law. The codes adopted by heretical communities, such as those of the Ithna'shari Shiahs (of Persia and India), the Zaidis (of Yemen), and the Abadis (of Oman and some places in Africa), differ very slightly in content from the Sunni codes, and the theory held about them is the same. This principle has doubtless interfered, more than any other feature, with the progress of Islam.

The influence of the *'ulamā* ('the learned' both in law and theology) has therefore been as a rule conservative or reactionary, since the existence of their profession depends on the maintenance of the ancient

[1] See above, p. 18.

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system; they have ordinarily protested against the theory that all subjects of a Moslem Empire are equal, and have exercised their influence in favour of maintaining the *jihad* against non-Moslem states. The modern sect of Ahmadis, whose head-quarters are at Qadian in the Punjab, claim that their leading tenet is the duty of loyalty to the Government of which a Moslem happens to be a subject, and that the *jihad* is to be interpreted as war against the evil propensities of one's own nature. It would not be easy to find the former principle maintained in authoritative text-books of earlier times, wherein a Moslem is usually advised to migrate from *dar al-harb*, 'the hostile region' (*partes infidelium*), to Islamic territory; and this seems to be the leading maxim of the modern Senussi sect.[1] For the spiritual interpretation of the *jihad* there is some ancient authority.

The fact that the law is independent of the sovereign has at times somewhat limited the arbitrariness of a ruler. Cases occur in the chronicles wherein autocrats have submitted to trial before the tribunals or expressed approval of disobedience to their orders, when it could be shown that such orders contravened the sacred law; but such cases are likely to have been rare.

The judicial system of the Mohammedan State has generally laid down a clear distinction between the functions of (*a*) the *qadi* (cadi), and (*b*) the *mufti*.

(*a*) The *qadi* is a magistrate appointed to administer the law and pronounce sentence in cases brought before him, both criminal and civil; he is a Government official, appointed by the ruler and dismissible at will; and, as such, his decisions are often given in accordance with the custom of the country or the will of the ruler.

(*b*) The *mufti* is a jurist, who gives formal legal

[1] See *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

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opinions on questions submitted to him by a magistrate or by a private individual; on the basis of such an opinion the magistrate may decide a case, or the individual may regulate his personal life. His position is much like that of a Legal Remembrancer, and in Constantinople he exercises a function similar to the highest office of the Supreme Court in the United States of America—the power of defending the Constitution. The mufti has often been like a canonist, interested only in legal speculation and living aloof from administrative details; but in other instances he regularly assists the qadi, by means of his expert knowledge of law. Under the Abbasid Empire muftis were sometimes received into the service of the State; and under the Turkish Government they were organized into a separate department, and, particularly after the conquest of Constantinople, occupied positions of great importance and influence.

Mohammed II bestowed upon the mufti of the capital the title of *Sheikh ul-Islam*, which in later times became his ordinary designation. He had the right to appoint and promote all the other muftis of the empire, and in later times he appointed the qadis also; his department included the *Fatwā-khānah*, a bureau for the promulgation of formal legal decisions, either on matters of State, such as the declaration of war or peace, the validity of a proposed legislative enactment, &c., or on matters of personal law, concerning private individuals. He had no tribunal of his own, nor any temporal authority, and took no active part in affairs; his importance arose from his being the head of the legislature and the authoritative exponent of the law, which, being of divine origin and based upon the revealed Word of God, the Koran, demanded the obedience even of the Sultan himself. Accordingly, at times the Sheikh ul-Islam has resisted the authority

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of the Sultan, and has even issued a *fatwa* deposing the Sultan, as was done in the case of Selim III (1808), Abdul Aziz (1876), and Abdul Hamid II (1909).

The Sheikh ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier took rank as the two highest functionaries of the Empire, and were the only officials who were invested by the Sultan in person; but, just as he was appointed by the Sultan, so the Sheikh ul-Islam might be degraded from his high office and sent into exile. In spite of the deference paid to his opinion, he is nevertheless a functionary of the Turkish Government, dependent for his appointment and continuance in office on the goodwill of the Sultan. It would appear, therefore, that unnecessary recognition was given to the authority of the Sultan when (*a*) the Austrian Government in 1909 agreed that the president of the Curia of the 'ulamā, who control Moslem ecclesiastical affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should, after having been appointed by the King-Emperor, receive a diploma of investiture from the Sheikh ul-Islam in Constantinople; and when (*b*) the Italian Government, in the Treaty of Lausanne (1912), agreed that the chief qadi of Libya should be nominated by the Sheikh ul-Islam at Constantinople. In both cases the misunderstanding appears to have arisen through the attribution of spiritual authority to the Sheikh ul-Islam or to the Sultan as Khalifah, through a false analogy with spiritual functions in Christendom.

The civil authority has often found itself strong enough to disregard the religious authority of the Moslem legists; and from an early period there has been in operation a customary law (*'urf*, *'āda*), which finds no sanction in the canon law; while the authoritative works of Mohammedan law represent in many respects an academic code of law, parts of which have been obsolete for centuries. There has thus arisen in several

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Mohammedan countries a system of civil law different from the canon law, while pressure from outside, exerted by the European Powers, has produced many reforms of legal practice in Mohammedan countries. This has led to the decline of the power of the mufti; e. g. in the Turkish dominions there are civil tribunals which administer justice according to the Ottoman Civil Code (*Mejelle*), and are independent of the judicial organization under the Sheikh ul-Islam's department; and since the revolution of 1909 the authority of the Sheikh ul-Islam has been still further diminished. Of course, in Mohammedan countries that have come under European rule, the application of the Moslem canon law has suffered still further limitations.

§ 10. *Political Conditions*

The form of Mohammedan states has rarely got beyond that of an autocracy, though we hear occasionally of experiments in other forms of government; thus from 1460 to 1510 African Tripoli was governed by a council of notables, who, it is supposed, were elected, with a sheikh as their president. Such experiments have, however, been uncommon; and, when Islamic states have enjoyed internal tranquillity and good government, it has been due to the rise to power of a competent despot, usually the founder of a dynasty. The political philosopher of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, suggested 120 years as the normal duration of a dynasty, as he supposed that by the third generation the qualities which had secured the domination of the founder would be exhausted; and this figure, which was deduced from the data furnished by eight centuries of Islam, suits the facts reasonably well. The greater stability of the Ottoman Empire is due to special causes.

That the whole Islamic world should be under the rule of one person, the successor or substitute for the Prophet

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(the meaning of the word *Khalifah*), is probably agreed ; the second of these successors is said to have been the inventor of the alternative title, *Amir al-mu'minin* (' Prince of the Believers '). Another name used by jurists for the holder of this office is *Imam* (' sovereign '). Though the ruling Caliphs, from the time of the fourth Caliph, if not from that of the first, had rivals who aspired to dispossess them, it would seem that the simultaneous existence of two Caliphs in different parts of the territory covered by Islam first occurred in 789, when Idris Ibn Abdallah, a descendant of Ali, established himself in north-west Africa with the above-mentioned titles, while Eastern Islam recognized the Abbasid ruler of Baghdad. Though the latter, Harun al-Rashid, got rid of his rival by poison, the dynasty continued for a time. In 932 these titles were also assumed by the Umayyad ruler of Spain ; and since then there have always been several sovereigns claiming these names simultaneously in different regions.

Till the middle of the third Islamic century the Khalifah was also *de facto* autocrat. In the middle of that century the institution of a foreign body-guard in Baghdad or Samara, which for a time was the metropolis of the Eastern Caliphate, rendered it possible for the commander of the guard to depose and institute Caliphs at pleasure ; but the definite fall of the Eastern Caliphate dates from 936, when the Caliph of the time delegated his powers, with the title ' Prince of Princes ' to an official, who, in consequence of this delegation, became *de jure* as well as *de facto* autocrat. Owing to the division of the lands of the Caliphate at that time into numerous states, some nominally, others actually independent of the authority in Baghdad, the autocrat of that city was not recognized in all the provinces which professed to pay homage to the Caliph. Within each province the *de facto* ruler was autocrat; and the

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title 'Sultan', which for the first four centuries of Islam was used for the Caliph in the sense of 'the Government', was towards the end of the fourth taken by provincial rulers. The right of the Caliph to appoint Sultans was maintained even when he had lost all his other rights, as was the case with the Abbasids of Egypt. And, since the astutest of the Mamluk Sultans thought it worth while to keep up the office for this purpose, it must be supposed that there were classes of Moslems whom the title impressed, even when its owner was absolutely in the power of the Sultan to whom he was supposed to have delegated his authority.

The rights most usually associated with the title 'Caliph', and indicating that his authority was recognized, were those of the *khutbah* (i. e. being mentioned in the prayer of the Friday sermon) and the *sikkah* (i. e. having his name inscribed on coins). So early as the third century of Islam it would appear that both rights were either usurped by, or conferred upon, provincial governors as well. This is symptomatic of the decline of the power of the Abbasid Caliph, which coincides with the moment when he ceased to occupy the pulpit himself.

For a right understanding of the term *khalifah* as used in the Mohammedan world, it is important to avoid misleading analogies drawn from the Holy Roman Empire, in which the Emperor claimed to be the head of a secular organization, the origin of which went back to a period anterior to Christianity, and which was based upon a political theory independent of religious dogma; it was accordingly possible in Christendom to draw a clear distinction between the temporal and the spiritual power. But in the Mohammedan system, the Caliph was the successor of Mohammed in all his functions, imperial and religious

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(except that of the prophetic mission, which ceased with the life of 'the seal of the prophets'); and the Koran, the Word of God, was held to be the basis, not only of the dogmas of the faith, but also of the principles of civil administration and statecraft.

In Moslem theory, therefore, the Christian distinction between the spheres of temporal and religious power does not arise; though, in historic fact, the one or the other aspect might receive more or less emphasis at different periods. Thus we find that the early Caliphs always led the prayers in the mosque; and even the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu'awiyah, was in the habit of preaching in the mosque and leading the Friday prayer. He exercised his authority both in religious and in temporal matters; but, under the later and more scandalous Umayyads, religion was apt to be thrust into the background. The Abbasids took advantage of the religious reaction against the godlessness of the Umayyads to displace this dynasty, and accordingly emphasized the hieratic character of the dignity. In proportion as their imperial power declined, this hieratic character of the Caliph as Imam received increasing emphasis; and titles such as 'Khalifah of God' (which occurs even in the earliest period of Islam) and 'shadow of God on earth' came more commonly into use.

According to the theory of the Mohammedan jurists (such as al-Māwardī, *ob.* 1058), the Khalifah must possess the following qualities: (i) a blameless character, (ii) a sufficient knowledge of law to give a legal decision in difficult cases in regard to which a logical deduction has to be drawn from existing statute law, (iii) knowledge of rhetoric, (iv) soundness of hearing, sight, and speech, (v) sufficient intelligence for the conduct of State business, (vi) courage for waging holy war, and (vii) descent from the tribe of the Quraish. His duties

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are defined as: the defence of the faith, the decision of legal disputes, the preservation of public safety, the punishment of wrongdoers, the defence of the frontiers, war against those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit to Moslem rule, the collection and administration of taxes, the payment of salaries, the appointment of competent officials, and personal attention to the details of government. These principles, of course, represent only an ideal; and in practice most of these functions were delegated to officials who by theory were supposed to derive their authority from the Khalifah.

§ 11. *Sufism*

This is a name for Islamic mysticism and asceticism, which at times have kept within modest limits, but often have been pursued to extravagance. It is clear that, whereas the early conquests of Islam led to the accumulation of wealth and the desire for luxury, there were persons who disapproved of such indulgence, and endeavoured to impart to the new religion a more spiritual character; and such persons distinguished themselves either by excessive abstinence and devotion, or by efficiency as preachers and reformers. The fact that celibacy rarely if ever formed part of the equipment of a Moslem saint rendered complete renunciation of property on the part of the ascetics difficult, if not impossible; and, while the term 'Sufi' seems properly to have denoted the conspicuous devotee and revivalist preacher, such persons were not always easily distinguished from the official students and expounders of the sacred code. Constant meditation on the text of the Koran, accompanied in many cases by ascetic practices, led to the development of a theology which bears little resemblance to the ostensible message of that work; and the

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robe of Sufism was not unfrequently used to cover schemes which aimed at the subversion of established authority in favour of some ambitious adventurer, or at something like complete abrogation of the Islamic system. In the third Islamic century the Sufis are thought of chiefly as the authors of impressive sayings; in the fourth they also attract attention as wonder-workers; they claim that command over nature is to be acquired by the practice of particular forms of abstinence or other religious exercises. There are references in the literature of this century to societies formed by, or called after, some particular saint, and these at times have political importance; doubtless they must have had some form of organization, though details are not apparently recorded.

At what time the Sufic doctrine became associated with Pantheism, i. e. identification of God with nature and of subject with object, cannot be stated with precision; if the documents which we possess are correctly dated, this system had reached its extreme development in the fourth Islamic (our eleventh) century. Owing to the danger of association with heretical doctrine, neophytes were only admitted to the mysteries step by step, and to the extent to which their loyalty could be trusted; it is therefore natural that we should be in the dark as to the extent of the organizations and the nature of many of their doctrines.

Of Sufic Orders we hear little prior to the latter half of the sixth Islamic century, when fame was acquired in Baghdad by Abd al-Qadir of Jilan, whose Order is usually regarded as the model for the others. He himself appears to have been a revivalist preacher. After his time the theory of an Order implies the use of a definite ritual in addition to the ceremonies which the Islamic law prescribes; and such Orders usually possess oratories, meeting-houses, and hostels, erected

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and endowed by the liberality of the pious. Where they have succeeded in attracting many adherents in wide areas, the needs of administration have rendered some sort of hierarchy of officials necessary. Since membership of an Order is usually conferred only after a period of probation, there is a closer relation between members of the same Order than exists between ordinary Moslems; hence there is a possibility of utilizing these organizations for political schemes. In the case of the most recent of notable Orders, that of the Senussis, this has been accomplished; and attempts were made at such utilization prior to the existence of this confraternity. Normally it would appear that adherents are occupied with devotion, and are persons whose religious needs are not adequately supplied by the ceremonial prescribed in the law-books.

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THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1838–96. Jamal al-Din.
1870 (*c.*). League for uniting Islam formed in Bokhara.
1878 (*c.*). Abdul Hamid adopts the principles of Pan-Islamism.
1881–2. First use of the phrase 'Pan-Islamism' in the West.
1884. *The Firmest Handle*, started by Jamal al-Din at Paris. Mohammed Abdo's articles published.
1891 (?)–6. Jamal al-Din at Constantinople.
1897. The Sherif of Mecca supports the doctrine.
1898. The German Emperor's visit to Constantinople and Syria.
1902. Death of Abdul Rahman Kawakibi.
1903. Pan-Islamic Society founded in London.
1904. Ata Bey Hasani's declaration.
1908. Young Turk Revolution.
1910–11. Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika.
1911. The Tripolitan War. The Young Turks definitely adopt Pan-Islamism.
1911–14. Growth of Pan-Islamic ideas in Constantinople.
1914 (?). Publication of *The New Nation*.

§ 1. *Historical Basis of the Movement*

IT is evident that the original success of Islam was due to the close co-operation which the Prophet secured among his followers, and their readiness to set above all other obligations that which their religious brotherhood imposed upon them. Forcible measures were at times adopted by the Prophet for the suppression of older associations and alliances; and in some Islamic institutions there are signs of a desire to render the system irreconcilable with others, the dis-

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tinction of non-Moslems from Moslems by their dress having often been enforced by Mohammedan rulers. During the Prophet's lifetime there were some dissensions among his followers, but these were checked by his authority. For a quarter of a century after his death the Moslems all recognized one head, at least in public; but since the murder of his third successor in A. D. 656 there has always been division, which, since the fall of the Umayyads in 750, has been sufficiently serious to break up the community into separate states. While the religious area of Islam continued to widen, its political divisions increased; and by the year 325 A. H. (A. D. 937) the Islamic world consisted of a score or more of independent states, whose mutual struggles led to frequent re-grouping. The theory that Islam could have only one legitimate successor or representative of the Prophet still held, but the title was claimed for more than one person simultaneously. Recognition of the claim was often merely formal, and in no way affected the independence of the sovereign who chose to make it.

The reunion of the Islamic world has naturally been the dream of many Moslem potentates, notably of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (A. D. 1512–20), whose conquests, added to those of his predecessors, brought this dream to partial realization; still, large areas both to the east and to the west were inhabited by Islamic peoples forming states which were completely independent of the Ottoman Sultan. Moreover, whereas during its first expansion Islam had forced its adherents to adopt the language of the Koran, Arabic, though retained as the ecclesiastical language, proved in many places otherwise unable to displace the national speech; and the retention of these national languages, though written in varieties of the Arabic script, placed a barrier in the way of any such fusion

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of the Moslems into a nation as had taken place in the earliest centuries of the system.

Since the Peace of Carlowitz, at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire has ceased to be a menace to Europe; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries great expanses of territory largely inhabited by Moslems, some of which had at one time belonged to the Ottoman Empire, came under the rule of Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France. In the nineteenth century Turkey not only lost some of her European possessions and some of her territory in Asia, but was subjected to European influence at the capital; and no other Islamic state was so strong as Turkey. Meanwhile the growth of the means of communication and the establishment of printing-presses and schools, largely through Christian missionary effort, in most Islamic countries aroused greater interest in, and spread more accurate knowledge of, contemporary events than had been possible before. It became evident that the Islamic communities were becoming more and more dependent politically on the European Governments, adherents of the Christian Faith. These Governments, though they tolerated the Moslem religion, prohibited much which it enjoins; and its founder had by no means contemplated toleration for it, but domination over the world.

Now, though the Moslem communities are divided by race, language, and sect, and though even such terrible dangers as the Crusades and the Mongol invasion were unable to produce co-operation between them, they have a bond in the possession of one Sacred Book—the Koran—in the common name Moslem, and in the history of the period when they were united and swept all before them. This bond is sufficient to make them take pride in each other's successes and sympathize in each other's misfortunes. And the pious at least

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among them everywhere look back with regret to the time when the Islamic sovereign could aspire to be the ruler of the world. It is natural that some should assume that disunion is the cause of their political weakness, and hold that, if unity could be restored, Islam would again become politically formidable.

§ 2. *The Pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II*

The notion of uniting the Islamic communities for the purpose of resisting European aggression and ultimately ousting European rulers from Asia and Africa is expressed in Arabic and Turkish by a phrase meaning 'Islamic union'. Pan-Islamism, a translation of this phrase, first appeared in English (it would seem) in an article published in *The Times* of January 19, 1882, agreeing in most points with, though apparently independent of, one by M. G. Charmes which had appeared a few months before in the *Revue des deux Mondes*,[1] where the word occurs for perhaps the first time in French. The French writer traces the movement to a league originally founded about 1870 in Bokhara, of which Khudayar Khan, ex-ruler of Khokand,[2] served as emissary in Arabia; he preached to various Arab, Kurd, and Indian sheikhs and Mullahs the necessity of a Holy War against Russia and England. Owing to the humiliating conditions imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin, the league desired to place at the head of the Islamic confederation, not the Ottoman Sultan, but rather the Sherif of Mecca, Husain, who was appointed in 1877 and assassinated in 1880.

The notion, however, that the religious headship of Islam might be politically utilized was adopted by

[1] 1881, vol. xlvii, p. 924.

[2] His fortunes are traced down to the year 1875 by Schuyler, G., *Turkistan*, 2 vols. (London, 1876).

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Abdul Hamid II, who had not, like his predecessor at the time of the Crimean War, received support from any Christian Power against Russia. The persons supposed to have impressed him with this idea are Si Mohammed Zafir, a Marabout of Tripoli who had foretold his accession, this Marabout's cousin, Sheikh Asad, and a certain Abu'l-Huda Effendi; they persuaded him that his predecessors had been mistaken in cultivating the friendship of European Christian Governments, and that his true course was to attempt to reunite Islam against Christendom. It is asserted that he sent agents and emissaries to different parts of the Islamic world with this object; and we possess detailed accounts of some of these operations. Brahim as-Senusi was sent to the Sultan of Morocco with presents and an invitation to join in the *jihad*; with the aid of the British consul at Tangier he obtained an audience, but only an evasive answer, and one which could not be presented, because the Sultan of Morocco, being unable to set his seal to the document without claiming superiority or acknowledging inferiority to the Sultan of Turkey by the place where he set it, disregarded that formality, and an unsealed letter was valueless.[1] Hamzah, the brother of Sheikh Zafir, was sent in 1882 on a mission to Tripoli, which also failed.[2] Since these missions were from their nature secret, it is natural that they should only be known by hearsay.

It appears that throughout his long reign Abdul Hamid II adhered to the policy of figuring as the head of Islam; and the official French account of the Islamic Orders in North Africa asserts that some of these

[1] See Le Chatelier, A., *Les Confrèries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, (Paris, 1887), pp. 114 sqq.

[2] An account of it is given in Charmes, G., *La Tunisie et la Tripolitaine* (Paris, 1883).

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organizations were employed by the Sultan for the propagation of the Pan-Islamic idea, especially the Rifa'i Order, of which Abu'l-Huda was the head, and the Madani Order, of which the Sheikh Zafir was the head.[1] These organizations were (1897) aided by the Sherif of Mecca, who appointed as guides to the pilgrims persons willing to circulate the doctrine. Abdul Hamid's Turkish biographer observes that his construction of the Hejaz railway was undertaken with the idea of conciliating the Moslems throughout the world; the same motive is found in various pointless acts of aggression, though some suppose the Sultan's action in these matters to have been intended to impress his own subjects rather than those of other Governments. To the end of his reign he was in the habit of sending embassies to Moslem communities outside Turkey, such as those in China and Afghanistan.

It is clear that his policy of uniting Islam differed widely from that of his predecessor Selim I, whose idea was to annex to his empire by force of arms all Islamic states that were outside it; the number of Moslems who in Selim's time were subject to non-Moslem rulers was still insignificant. It is not probable that Abdul Hamid ever contemplated leading a confederation of Moslem states to war against Christendom; his endeavours to enter into friendly relations with European Powers, especially with Germany, render this unlikely. Still, by representing himself as the natural champion of Moslems who were subject to Christian Governments, he hoped to render himself formidable to those Governments; and, as Germany had far fewer such subjects than Great Britain, France, or Russia, his policy was regarded as helpful to Germany. Within his empire, however, his claim

[1] Depont, O., and Coppolani, X., *Les Confrèries Religieuses Musulmanes*, pp. 261 sqq. (Algiers, 1897).

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to be Pontiff of Islam was disputed in many quarters; and, outside it, India appears to be the country where it gained most adherents.

§ 3. *Theory of the Movement current in the East*

Oriental writers hold that the inventor of Pan-Islamism—i. e. the person who thought that by the restoration of unity among the Moslem communities European aggression might be stopped, and lost territory ultimately regained—was a certain Sayyid Jamal al-Din, who lived 1838–96. He is known as 'the Afghan'; but according to the most recent account of him[1] he was born in a village of Persia, near Hamadan, was educated at Nejef, and resided for some years in Afghanistan, whence he took the name *Afghani*. He was with Dost Mohammed when he took Herat in 1863. In the civil war which broke out shortly afterwards he was in the employ of Azim Khan. But after this prince's defeat by Shir Ali in 1869 he thought it unsafe to remain in Afghanistan, and proceeded to India, where the British Government would not permit him to stay; and it would seem that his belief that his master's downfall had been engineered by Great Britain made him a bitter enemy of this empire. He travelled and taught in Egypt and Constantinople, whence he was expelled in 1871 on the ground of unorthodoxy. Returning to Egypt, he was granted a small monthly allowance by Riyad Pasha, but was expelled in 1879 for starting an anti-British propaganda. He then went to Hyderabad, but, owing to the outbreak of trouble in Egypt, was compelled by the British Government to reside in Calcutta until the Arabi revolt was over, so that he might be under observation.

[1] Sykes, Sir P. M., *History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1915), ii, 501. What follows is taken from the Sayyid's biography in Zaidan, G., *Mashahir al-Sharq*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1903).

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Jamal al-Din subsequently took up his abode in Paris, where in 1884 he started an Arabic journal called *The Firmest Handle*, containing violent attacks on England as the European Power which had under its sway the largest number of Moslems and was, according to him, the implacable and treacherous enemy of Islam; her political programme was, he asserted, to deprive all Moslems of their independence, seize their possessions, and generally humiliate them. After a time the publication of this journal was stopped; but it had attracted the attention of the Shah Nasiru'd Din, who invited Jamal al-Din to Persia, and made him Minister of War. Presently he suspected the intentions of the Shah and left Persia to travel in Europe; but, meeting the Shah at Munich in 1889, he accepted an invitation to return to Teheran, whence, owing to his endeavour to spread revolutionary ideas, he was expelled in 1890. He then came to London, where, according to his biographer, he tried to influence the Government to obtain the deposition of the Shah—notwithstanding his disapproval of European, and especially British, interference with Islamic concerns.

While in England he received an invitation to Constantinople, which he accepted; and there he lived in the enjoyment of the Sultan's favour till his death in 1896. During these years he is said [1] to have made an attempt to induce the Persian Shiahs to recognize the Caliphate of Abdul Hamid. Hundreds of letters were written by him and by his colleague, Ruhi Effendi, to persons of eminence and learning, whose acquaintance Jamal al-Din had made during his stay in Persia, urging that, if the Persians would acknowledge the Turkish Sultan's claim to the sovereignty of Islam,

[1] Hecquard, Ch., *La Turquie sous Abd al-Hamid II* (Brussels, 1901), pp. 123 sqq., is the authority for this statement; he appears to be well informed.

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Turkey and Persia united would be able to defy European aggression. The negotiations showed signs of leading to a successful result, when they were betrayed or somehow came to the knowledge of the Persian Government; and the execution of Ruhi Effendi presently resulted.

The most celebrated of Jamal al-Din's assistants was the Sheikh Mohammed Abdo, afterwards a Mufti in Egypt, and friendly to the British occupation. The ideas which made up the Pan-Islamism of his master are expressed by him in two papers, first published in *The Firmest Handle* (1884), and reprinted in the Mufti's biography.[1] He shows that the political subordination of any Islamic community to non-Moslems is a violation of the Islamic religion, which enjoins on its followers not only to shake off all foreign yokes, but also to defy all Powers that are not Islamic. He attributes the actual subjection of the great majority of Moslems to non-Moslem Governments to the neglect by Moslem rulers of their duties and to the private quarrels of these potentates, who invoked the help of outsiders to settle them; these outsiders ultimately becoming masters of the situation. These princes and governors, who thus sacrificed the interests of Islam to their petty interests, 'had become chains on the necks of those lions (the Islamic warriors), keeping them from their prey, nay, making them the food of foxes'. Still there was no occasion to despair. Between Adrianople and Peshawar there was a continuous chain of Moslem states, all united in their belief in the Koran, numbering not less than 50,000,000, distinguished above all other races for their bravery; could they not unite in self-defence, and by co-operation divert from themselves the torrents that were rushing upon them from all sides? The writer concluded by expressing the hope

[1] Two volumes (Cairo, 1324 A. H.), ii, pp. 279 sqq.

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that the call to such union and co-operation would come in the first place from the most exalted of the Islamic potentates.

In a second paper he urged that the two essentials for success in a nation were unity and imperialism. The desire for conquest in a people was like that for food in the frame of the individual; but unity was essential before conquest could be contemplated. These principles were not only taught by experience, but were inculcated in the Koran. It was, however, necessary to arouse the Moslems, who appeared to have forgotten them; and in the sanctuary to which every true Moslem goes on pilgrimage there was a centre where joint effort could be made the subject of deliberation and practical plans devised.

As has been seen, the idea of utilizing Mecca for this purpose had been anticipated (see § 2, p. 46), and the organization of the religious orders was already being turned to account. Abdul Rahman Kawakibi, whom some name with Jamal al-Din among the chief promoters of Pan-Islamism, but who appears to have been no friend of Abdul Hamid, proposed holding a Pan-Islamic Congress in Mecca, for which apparently the Sultan's consent could not be obtained. He died in the year 1902.

§ 4. *Pan-Islamism as a Religious Revival*

Whereas Jamal al-Din's expedients for restoring the political dominance of Islam were decidedly drastic, his followers wished to prepare the way by founding Islamic colleges, newspapers, and societies. In 1903 a Pan-Islamic society was founded in London, of which the objects were thus enumerated:

'1. To promote the religious, social, moral, and intellectual advancement of the Mussulman world.

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2. To afford a centre of social reunion to Moslems from all parts of the world.

3. To promote brotherly feelings between Moslems and facilitate intercourse between them.

4. To remove misconceptions prevailing among non-Moslems regarding Islam and the Mussulmans.

5. To render legitimate assistance to the best of its ability to any Mussulman requiring it in any part of the world.

6. To provide facilities for conducting religious ceremonies in non-Moslem countries, and to found centres of Moslem thought.

7. To found branches of the Central Pan-Islamic Society in different parts of the world, hold debates and lectures, and read and publish papers likely to further the interests of Islam.

8. To collect subscriptions from all parts of the world in order to build a Mosque in London and endow it.'

It was suggested by the Egyptian translator of this document that four more objects should be added:

'9. To support the Ottoman Caliphate.

10. To carry on propaganda in this sense till all Islamic potentates and authorities are agreed about it.

11. In return for this, to obtain the support of the Ottoman Caliph for the Islamic communities, and his intervention with the European Governments in control of such communities for the redress of their grievances.

12. To call the attention of the Islamic Governments to cases wherein their measures violated Islamic law, when such measures affected the whole community and gave Islam a bad name.'

The London society presently changed its name from Pan-Islamic to Islamic, and seems to have conducted its operations on a modest scale. Other societies, schools, and newspapers were started. One Egyptian of eminence declared, in the year 1904,[1] that Pan-Islamism by no means signified anything like a crusade or union of the Islamic Powers under

[1] Ata Bey Hasani. His papers were collected under the title *Al-Nahdah al-Sharqiyyah* (Cairo, 1906), p. 84.

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one banner for the purpose of fighting Europe; what it did mean was not, however, apparently very different, *viz.* the establishment of a bond of unity and friendship between the Moslems of the world, to help each other morally, materially, and politically, and to group themselves round the Ottoman Caliphate as representing the greatest Moslem Power. Should such a bond be realized, it would be difficult for the European to continue to appropriate Moslem lands and the produce of Moslem toil.

One English convert to Islam tries harder than many others to avoid the consequence that, if Pan-Islamism is to effect its object, it must enter the service of the Ottoman Empire; but the result is obscure:

'Instead of being a danger to Europe or civilization, Pan-Islamism is a movement that should have the support of every lover of peace and civilization. If the world at large is ever to see that higher and truer civilization of which it is capable, the Powers must abandon that lust of conquest which is but a drag on all true progress; they must cease to look on the interest of each as a claim to which the interests of all others must yield, and combine to seek the benefit of all. The more nearly that ideal is reached, the more important will it be that Islam should be prepared to take its fitting place in the grand scheme of regeneration. That it should do so it must follow now and for ever the ideas that are the mainspring of Pan-Islamism.'[1]

This seems to confuse Jamal al-Din's programme with that of a reformed Islam, which is at times associated, but appears to have no essential connexion, with it. As in other religions, so in Islam, the earnest adherents are as much attached to what divides the sects as to what unites them; it seems impossible to loosen the tie of the sect without loosening the bond of the religion.

[1] Browne, Hajji A., *Bonaparte in Egypt* (London, 1907), p. 324.

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Since Pan-Islamism, after being discussed for close on thirty years, by 1908 had produced no result, Oriental writers of authority began to declare that it had no existence. One of them defined it as 'a phantasm abstracted from the Moslem profession of religious fraternity, and magnified by the European imagination'. Another declared that the notion of a Pan-Islamic movement was an invention of European politicians, whose purpose was to excite animosity against the Moslems and so justify fresh attempts against such independence as any of them still possessed; and, though the Oriental press greatly exaggerated the alarm which the word excited in Europe, there is no doubt that much was attributed to Pan-Islamism that was not really connected with it. Inquiries addressed to missionaries in various Islamic countries, including one from the German Emperor, failed to elicit evidence of any considerable organization with a practical scheme of operations. The division of the Islamic world between the European Governments proceeded apace; and, though the Italian invasion of the Tripolitaine, the arrangement of Moroccan affairs in the interest of France, and the division of Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence, seriously wounded Islamic susceptibilities throughout the world, the co-operation between the Moslems of different countries on these occasions scarcely went beyond the sending of subscriptions, the occasional enlistment of recruits, and the holding of indignation meetings where such were permitted. This was used by Moslem writers as evidence that Pan-Islamism was not organized; that the strength of the sentiment which it represented had been greatly overrated; and that the spirit of aggression was confined to European Christianity, and could not with justice be attributed to the Islam of Asia and Africa. It was pointed out that,

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centuries ago, the far more terrible menaces of the Crusades and the Mongol invasion had failed to produce co-operation among the Moslem communities, some of which aided the common enemy; and that it was not to be expected that the milder prospects which European aggression held out would have the power to produce it. Further, the fact, established by statistics though not readily acknowledged, that Islam spreads faster in Asiatic and African countries protected by European Governments than in independent states is calculated to discourage the efforts of intelligent Moslems in the direction of realizing Jamal al-Din's plans. Reformers complain that their efforts to elevate Islam are thwarted mainly by Moslems.

§ 5. *Pan-Islamism and the Young Turks*

The proclamation of the Turkish Constitution in 1908 was at first regarded as unfavourable to Pan-Islamism. Since that Constitution gave equal rights to all religions and sects, it was supposed that no Sultan in the future would be able to proclaim a Pan-Islamic crusade, and that the fanatical tribes of Asia and Africa would be slow to accept the counsels of a Sultan at the head of a free, self-governing, civilized people. Further, of the two persons who had been most prominent in effecting the reform, whereas Niyazi states that, before the Constitution could be launched, the Turks had with difficulty been induced to abandon their rights as conquerors, Enver Bey (since Pasha) was quoted for the declaration that the new constitution would have nothing to do with Pan-Islamism.[1] The views of the Young Turk party were thus expressed by one of their organs:

[1] Jessup, H. H., *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (2 vols., New York, 1910), ii. 791.

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'We Ottomans belong to a race sufficiently intelligent and practical to understand that the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries would be contrary to our dearest interests.'[1]

It was pointed out that the Young Turks had expressed little sympathy with Egyptian nationalism, which had a Pan-Islamic bias. And indeed the fact that the proclamation of the Constitution involved the arming of the non-Moslem subjects of the Porte seemed to preclude it from favouring Pan-Islamic projects.

The course of events led to a change in that matter. Equality between members of all cults is without doubt an infraction of Koranic law, and very shortly after the proclamation we hear of a *Mohammedan Confraternity Society* at Constantinople, ostensibly for the restoration of the sacred law; it was joined by great numbers in the capital, and soon had ramifications in all the provinces. Nor does there appear to be any doubt that, by the year 1911, the Committee of Union and Progress had definitely adopted the Pan-Islamic programme,[2] and was employing agents in various countries with the object of exciting the Moslem subjects of non-Moslem rulers to look to the Sultan of Turkey as their legitimate sovereign.

The Times of December 27, 1911, stated that the following decisions were among those arrived at by the Salonika Congress (1911) of the Committee of Union and Progress:—

MEASURES OF PAN-ISLAMISM

'A Congress of delegates, summoned from all the Moslem countries of the world, ought to meet annually in Constanti-

[1] Knight, E. F., *The Awakening of Turkey* (London, 1909), p. 64. See also *The Pan-Turanian Movement*, Part (2) of this book.

[2] That is, in foreign policy.

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nople, to discuss questions of interest to the Moslem world. Branches of the Committee should be formed in all Moslem countries, especially in Russia and in Persia. The Mohammedans of Russia ought to be persuaded to make revolutionary propaganda among Russian soldiers. As many Tartars as possible should be induced to become members of the seven branches of the Committee which already exist in Russia. Efforts should be made to bring about an understanding between Persia and Turkey, with the ultimate object of effecting a political and economical union between the two countries. The Turks in Bulgaria and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who should be advised not to emigrate, should be organized in such a way that they would be in touch with the Committee of Union and Progress. Large numbers of Turkish boys from Bulgaria ought to be educated in Turkey, and subsequently sent back as masters to the Bulgarian schools. Schools must be opened with the object of pushing the Turkish language among the Pomaks (Moslem Bulgarians), in the hope of making them forget the Bulgarian language. Turkish teachers should be also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attempts made to persuade the Turks in these provinces not to favour the Serbian aspirations and to learn German rather than Serbian in the schools.'

The *Times* correspondent had, indeed, little sympathy with the Young Turks; but M. René Pinon, who is one of the most competent and most impartial judges of Eastern affairs, in his treatise on *Europe and Young Turkey*,[1] published in the autumn of 1911, has a paragraph which is in agreement with the statements of *The Times*:—

'The Young Turks have undertaken the noble task of restoring Ottoman patriotism, but the notion of country correlative to that of nation has had hitherto no existence in the Empire. Among the Turks, who have never known any other than religious patriotism, the awakening of national patriotism could only result in an outburst of Pan-Islamism. If this word is of Western invention, the idea is Eastern and Moslem.

[1] *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie* (Paris, 1911), p. 134.

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The Moslem is a brother, the Christian an enemy, the Sultan the master. This was the naïve conception of politics in the breast of the good Turkish peasant. A long series of years must pass before it can be modified. The Young Turks, then, will do well to watch carefully the Pan-Islamic intrigues which certain subordinate agents would like to conduct. At the Congress of Salonika in 1911 there was a talk of sending Turkish emissaries to the Indian and Caucasian Moslems; it is certain that an active anti-French propaganda is carried on among the Algerians established in Syria, and that agents have been sent into Algeria. Permanent relations have been established between certain Young Turkish clubs and the Young Egyptian societies. Our officials, who after so many efforts have secured the peace and safety of the Sahara, find the traces of Turkish intrigues in the Sahara, and as far as the oases of Kwar and Bilma. Under pretence of a dispute about frontiers, the Turks have occupied part of Azerbaijan, the importance of which has always been considerable from the point of view of communications between Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus. On this subject a Turkish journal made the statement: "We have the right to interest ourselves in Persian affairs because Persia is a Moslem power."'

This last assertion was repeatedly made in Turkey by authorized persons after M. Pinon wrote, and especially in connexion with the Russian complication.

That the Committee of Union and Progress could be earnest in its Pan-Islamic policy has been denied on various grounds. In the first place it has been pointed out that the leaders of that Committee are, without exception, Freemasons; and such religious fanaticism conflicts with the principles of the Masonic Society. Secondly, it has been observed that the Pan-Islamic policy has been discouraged in regions where it might endanger Turkish authority. Thus in Syria the Turks have to face the movement of Pan-Arabism, which supports the fusion of all Arabic-speaking countries into an independent political unit; and, since such a state would be likely to have for its head an Islamic

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religious leader, it is to the interest of the Turks in Syria to emphasize the undenominational character of the Ottoman Constitution, which an Arabian state could not easily share.

It has also been urged that the endeavour of the Young Turks to make Turkish the national language of the Ottoman Empire, even at the expense of Arabic, is an anti-Islamic measure; to which it has been replied that the ostensible Turkification of the Empire was a temporary measure meant to impress the Turkish or Tartar subjects of Russia, and to win them over to the interests of Turkey.

Another view that has been taken is that the experiences of the Tripolitan War convinced the rulers of Turkey that the Pan-Islamic bond was much stronger than they had believed it to be, since both the resistance of the Arabs of Tripoli to the Italian invasion and the contributions which flowed in from Islamic societies throughout the world to aid Turkey in this war exceeded all expectation. This indicated the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic feeling for a variety of purposes, such as obtaining money for the ostensible defence of Islam, silencing the anti-Turkish agitators in the Arabic-speaking provinces, and conciliating the Turkish and Tartar subjects of Russia. Hence the Young Turks subsidized the Pan-Islamic press of Egypt and Constantinople.

The history of Turkey from 1911 to the outbreak of the War appears to show a gradual increase of Pan-Islamism among the members of the Turkish Government. The exile Sherif Pasha asserted that there was a great Pan-Islamic league, called *Jam'iyyet Hairiyyeh Hamiyeh*, which was identical with the Committee of Union and Progress; 'the last meeting was attended by five Indians.'[1] Declarations that any real tolera-

[1] *Mecheroutiette* (Paris), December 1913, p. 58.

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tion by Islam of other religions and any progress of the Moslem world in the direction of European civilization were impossible are quoted by a collaborator of Sherif Pasha from the writings of a member of both these bodies, the Sheikh Abdul Haqq of Baghdad;[1] and apparently the Comtist Ahmad Riza, first President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, came round to the view that the Moslem religion was the only force capable of uniting the different elements of the Ottoman Empire, and that the theory of such a double personality as that with which the Turkish Constitution invested the Sultan could not be maintained. It was the duty (he held) of all Moslems to labour to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Islam was a great international family; it was the Caliph's business to facilitate the relations of its members, and rally the believers under his priestly banner. The question whether this 'unification of the Islamic Empire under the spiritual power of the Sultan' would be a danger to Christian states would depend on the attitude which the latter adopted towards it; he hoped that the Moslem attitude would continue to be purely defensive, but, if attacked, they would exchange it for another.[2]

This view, *viz.* that the unification of the various elements which constitute the Ottoman Empire can only be on the religious basis of Islam, and that consequently, if the Turkish Government is to survive, it must be Pan-Islamic, is argued by other writers representative of thought in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in a political treatise published in Constantinople a few months before the War broke out, it is urged that, whereas in Europe nationality takes precedence of religion, in the East religion takes precedence of nationality; an

[1] *Ibid.*, August 1912, pp. 12 sqq.

[2] Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 17, from Ahmed Riza, *La crise de l'Orient* (Paris).

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Afghan, Turk, or Tunisian is a Moslem first, then a member of a particular nation or tribe; and this difference between East and West is too deeply rooted to be left out of consideration. This author's ideal was therefore a confederation of the Moslem peoples, with Turkey occupying therein the place occupied by Prussia in the German Confederation. In Turkey itself he would grant no political rights to others than Moslems, and no full rights to others than Turks.[1]

Evidence was adduced by Sherif Pasha to show that, during the Italian War, Pan-Islamic opinions and publications were encouraged by the Ottoman Government, and the rights of Christians accorded them by the Constitution in various ways infringed.

Shortly before the beginning of the war there appeared in Constantinople a book bearing the title *The New Nation*, representing the views of the advanced section of the Committee of Union and Progress. Its author argued that by abandoning the *jihad*—i. e. by failing to enlist in the Ottoman army for the purpose of fighting the infidels and reconquering the provinces which they had wrested from the believers—all Moslems, with the exception of such as could show some excuse from the Koran, had incurred the reproach of apostasy, which Islam punishes with death. They could only recover their title to be regarded as Moslems if they contributed half their goods to the Islamic Government for the purpose of such a religious campaign, and enlisted with the view of taking part therein. This, he asserted, represented the policy of the Party of Union and Progress, which regarded the essence of Islam as consisting not in its ceremonies but solely in the *jihad*. The mere fact of Moslems being regarded by Christian rulers as loyal subjects indicated that

[1] Jalal Nuri, *Ta'rikh Istiqbal* (3 vols. Constantinople, 1332 A. H.), i, pp. 154 sqq.

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such Moslems were apostates. This epithet might with justice be applied to all Moslems within the Ottoman Empire who did not join the forces of the Turkish commanders, and all outside it who did not hasten to help the Caliph. Examples of such apostates were to be found in the Albanians who had rebelled, and in the Egyptians, Indians, natives of Bokhara, Tartars, inhabitants of Fez, Tunis, and Algiers, and the people of Hejaz and Nejd, who sent no subscriptions to the Sultan. It is true that the view of Islam taken by this writer differs widely from that held in orthodox circles, since he rejects as unimportant everything but the duty of supporting the Ottoman Caliph and his army.[1] Apparently the party which he represents is aware that the conditions of modern warfare put those who adhere to the beliefs and observances of old-fashioned Islam at a disadvantage, while religious enthusiasm is a valuable asset, and hopes in this way to profit by the enthusiasm while eliminating the disadvantage.

Although Pan-Islamism has had, as we have seen, little positive effect, it appears to have done something to keep the Ottoman Empire together prior to the war; and, although the notion of an independent Arabic state seems to have been in circulation from the time of Midhat Pasha's government of Syria (1879–1880), it is asserted that the leading men in Syria and Mesopotamia refrained from taking any step against the Ottoman Government for fear of weakening the only powerful Islamic Empire that remained, their dread of European aggression being shared by their Christian fellow-subjects. From this loyal attitude they were driven by the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was resolved

[1] Long extracts in an Arabic translation are given in the *Manar* Cairo, 1332 A.H.), xvii, pp. 539 sqq.

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on the Turkification of the whole Empire; for they held that Islam was too intimately bound up with the Arabs and the Arabic language to be able to survive the effects of this policy. The entry of Turkey into the war was signalized by violent persecution of the Arabs in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hejaz[1] which however diminished when the Sherif of Mecca declared his independence. Nevertheless, the hostility of the Arabs to the Turks has been increased to a degree which renders reconciliation of the former to the rule of the latter unthinkable; whence the chance of a Pan-Islamic combination against Europe seems to have been reduced to zero. And indeed, however the war may end, it is not easy to see how this particular result can be altered.

[1] The statements in this paragraph are taken from an article in the *Manar*, 1918 (1335 A. H.), XX, pp. 33 sqq.

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(2) Pan-Islamism

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THE RISE OF THE TURKS
AND
THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

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THE RISE OF THE TURKS

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

B. C.
1400. First mention of Hsiung-nu.
c. 250. Great Wall of China built.
A. D.
c. 430. Settlement of the Tú-Küeh.
567. Turkish Embassy to the Emperor Justin II.
582. Division of Tú-Küeh into northern and western Turks.
630. Northern Turks conquered by Chinese.
659. Western Turks conquered by Chinese.
c. 680. Northern Turks regain their independence.
c. 714. Transoxiana becomes Mohammedan.
c. 750. Northern Turks conquered by Uighurs.
c. 1000. Uighurs converted to Islam.
c. 1050. The Seljuk leader Toghrul restores and seizes the temporal power of the Caliphate.
1071. Alp Arslan defeats the Emperor Romanus at Manzikert.
1092. Death of Malik Shah. Seljuk Empire falls into eastern and western divisions.
1219. Mongols under Jenghiz Khan overrun eastern Seljuk principalities.
1227. Ertoghrul settles near Erzerum.
1243. Defeat of the western Seljuks at Kuzadag.
1300–26. Osman reigns as an independent monarch.
1326. Orkhan captures Brusa.
1328–38. Orkhan captures Nicaea and Nicomedia.

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

1. The Tú-Küeh

In general usage the word 'Turk' denotes the Turkish element of the Ottoman Empire. With greater accuracy, however, all who talk one of the dialects of the Turkish language may be called Turks. The Turkish-speaking peoples extend, at present, roughly from the Great Wall of China on the east to the limits of Turkey in Europe in the west, to northern Persia in the south, and the neighbourhood of the Arctic in the north.

Chinese annals from 1400 B.C. to 200 B.C. make frequent mention of the Hsiung-nu, vigorous and

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barbarian nomads who wandered over the area north of the Chinese frontier. In the third century B.C. the Great Wall of China was built as a protection against the incursions of these warriors. In the first half of the fifth century A.D. a subdivision of the Hsiung-nu called Turks (in Chinese Tú-Küeh) moved eastwards and settled down in the service of another tribe, known as the Juan-juan (avares). The Turks soon revolted against their masters, and, with a remarkable rapidity, spread their conquests to the northern boundaries of Persia. It is interesting to notice the progress in civilization attained by the Turks between the earliest mention of the Hsiung-nu, who knew neither of writing nor of agriculture, and the sixth-century Turks, who had a script, a system of ranks, and emblems of royal authority for taxation or the levying of troops. The Turks were, in the main, warriors. A Chinese pilgrim who was entertained by the Khan of the western Turks in A.D. 630 and has left a description of the organization of the Khan's head-quarters, makes it clear that the Turks lived in camps, built no cities, and would not settle in any that they conquered. But the Turkish embassy to the Emperor Justin II in 567 had in view the opening up of the silk trade, and it would therefore appear that the Turks must have paid some attention to commerce. As in their later history, they were a means of communication between forms of civilization greater than their own; through them Nestorian Christianity and Zoroastrianism passed to China, and Chinese Buddhism was kept in contact with India.

2. The Northern and Western Turks[1]

In 582 the people divided into two communities, known as the northern and the western Turks. The inscriptions discovered during the last century on the Yenisei and Orkhon rivers, in the neighbourhood of Lake

[1] These early 'western Turks' should be kept distinct from the Seljuks and Osmanlis who became 'western Turks' as opposed to the Turks of Transoxiana and Kashgar.

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Baikal, give a first-hand account of the northern Turks; while a great deal is known of the other branch from Chinese, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian sources.

The western Turks were, after a period of civil war, annexed by the Chinese in 659; but neither Turks nor Chinese held their territory strongly, and Transoxiana was conquered for Mohammedanism at the beginning of the eighth century. The direct consequence of this was the gradual conversion to Islam of the whole Turkish stock. The negative character of the Turkish paganism, the absence of a hierarchy and a priestly code, as well as the coincidence of the good points of Mohammedanism with the particular excellences of the Turkish temperament—'energy, obedience, and fighting spirit'—facilitated such a conversion.

The northern Turks were conquered and enslaved by the Chinese in A.D. 630. They recovered their independence fifty years later; but about A.D. 750 a coalition of three Turkish tribes, chief of whom were the Uighurs, occupied all their country.

3. The Uighurs

The Uighurs attained a very high level of culture, and recent archaeological research has brought to light a vast amount of Uighur literature and art from which we learn that Christianity, Buddhism, and Manichaeism were all practised in their kingdom, the utmost tolerance being observed. The Uighurs were certainly the most civilized of all the northern neighbours of China; their kingdom was temporarily destroyed in 847 by the Khirgiz, a northern Turkish tribe, but recovered under its greatest ruler, Bogra Khan. During the latter's reign, at the end of the tenth century, the people were converted to Islam. Up to the fifteenth century small Uighur principalities and states are found, while the Uighurs were extensively employed in Mohammedan chancelleries, playing much the same rôle in the government offices of Turkistan as the

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Hindus under the Delhi Moghuls and the Bengalis under the British in India.

The Uighur language bears the closest resemblance to the Turkish of the Orkhon inscriptions, and continued to be employed as a literary medium at any rate down to the twelfth century. But prior to the conversion of the Uighurs to Mohammedanism their language had been widely used for the translation of Buddhist, Christian, and Manichaean works which have only been brought to light in recent years.

4. The Seljuks

Of greater importance to history than the Uighur Kingdom is the rise of the Seljuks. The latter were the ruling family of a branch of the group of tribes known as Ghuzz (Οὔζοι). They migrated first from the Khirgiz Steppes to Bokhara, where they embraced Islam in its orthodox form. They then moved westwards at the invitation of the weak Abbasid Caliphate; and in the middle of the eleventh century the Seljuk leader, Toghrul, expelled the Persian Viziers, and restored the temporal power of the Caliphate, only to take it for himself. Alp Arslan, the successor of Toghrul, conquered Egypt from the schismatic Fatimite Caliphs, and defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus at Manzikert (1071). The empire of his son, Malik Shah, was bounded on the east only by China. The contrast between these two warrior princes and their minister, Nizam ul-Mulk, a statesman of great learning, who founded numerous universities and is said to have been a friend of Omar Khayyam, marks the transition (never perhaps completely accomplished) between the wandering militant Turkish tribes and a settled non-Christian State. After Malik Shah's death in 1092 the unwieldy empire fell into eastern and western divisions. The eastern principalities were swept away by the hordes of Jenghiz Khan (1219), though the Turkish conquests of the latter kept their Turkish speech and customs. Numerous minor Turkish dynasties rose and fell. In an unpublished Persian MS. of the thirteenth

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century the following curious account of the Turk occurs:

It is common knowledge that all races and classes while they remain among their own people and in their own country are honoured and respected; but when they go abroad they become miserable and abject. The Turks, on the contrary, while they remain among their own people are merely a tribe among many tribes, and enjoy no particular power or status. But when they leave their own country and come to a Mohammedan country (the more remote they are from their own homes and relatives, the more highly they are valued and appreciated) they become Amirs and Generalissimos. Now from the days of Adam down to the present day no slave bought at a price has ever become King except among the Turks; and among the sayings of Afrasyab, who was King of the Turks, and was extraordinarily wise and learned, was his dictum that the Turk is like a pearl in its shell at the bottom of the sea, which only becomes valuable when it leaves the sea and adorns the diadems of kings and the ears of brides.

The western Seljuk power grew at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. Konia became its capital; and, but for the pressure of the Mongols, it is possible that Byzantium would have fallen to the Seljuks rather than the Osmanlis. The hordes of Jenghiz Khan did not touch Konia; but, even before the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mongols came into touch with the Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultan was defeated at Kuzadag in 1243.

5. The Ottoman Turks

It was during the subsequent struggles between Seljuks and Mongols that the Ottoman Turks first came into prominence. 'Viewed from Europe, they appear like the matador in the bull-fight, appointed to slay an animal maddened and weakened by the attacks of numerous foes. Viewed from Asia, they are merely another instance of the sudden rise of a small clan to eminence and empire.'[1] Tradition makes Khorasan the home of Suleiman, the founder of the family. His son Ertoghrul settled first at Erzerum, and then moved westwards in order to serve under the Seljuks of Konia. His service against the Mongols proved

[1] "Odysseus" [Sir C. Eliot], *Turkey in Europe*, p. 84.

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valuable enough to secure him the fief of Eskishehir. Suleiman's grandson Osman (whence 'Osmanli' and 'Ottoman') proclaimed himself independent of the Seljuks; and his son Orkhan took Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia from the Byzantine Empire. On the complete break-up of the western Seljuk Empire in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman chiefs were lords of the province of Khudavendigyar, the modern official Turkish name for the vilayet of Brusa. Thence they spread their conquests over Turkey in Europe and Asia.

Note on the Words 'Tartar' and 'Mongol'

The word 'Tartar', or 'Tatar', is probably derived from the Chinese word 'Ta-ta', or 'Ta-tse', which first appears in the Christian era and corresponds more or less to the Greek term 'barbaros'; it was applied by the Chinese to the nomads beyond their northern frontiers much in the same way as the Turks were in the habit of classing all Europeans under the general name of Franks. The name 'Tartar' is now only used by and applied to the Turks of the Volga and Caucasus, the descendants of those Tartars who for several centuries ruled over central and southern Russia.

The names 'Mongol' and 'Moghul' have of course a common origin; and the Mongolians have survived as a race since the days of Jenghiz Khan. In the fifteenth century Russian Turkestan was known to Mohammedan writers as Moghulistan; and the famous Emperors of Delhi, the descendants of Tamerlane, were known as the Great Moghuls, though they were in reality not Moghuls, but Turks. The Ghaznavid dynasty of the tenth to the twelfth centuries, which preceded them in northern India, were, however, avowedly Turks, while the Slave dynasty which ruled over northern India from 1206 to 1290 was founded by a Turkish slave named Kutb-al-Din. The reason why the Delhi Emperors called themselves Moghuls rather than Turks was probably not unconnected with their desire to claim descent from the great Jenghiz Khan as well as from Tamerlane.

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THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

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THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

1. Origin of the Name 'Pan-Turanian'

Turan is a Persian word. In Persian mediaeval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The 'people of Turan' are the nomads (of many different languages and races) who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago.

Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are 'agglutinative' in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass. 'Turanian' research was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic peoples of Europe. A mediaeval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the Ural region; and during the European War Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. Magyar Pan-Turanianism has followed in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. The Hungarian savant, Vambéry, was led by this Turanian idea to prosecute research among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the Magyars addressed themselves chiefly to the Osmanlis. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1848 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees found an asylum at Constantinople. In 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in

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the newly-constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875–8 the Magyars were strongly pro-Ottoman; and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. It rested not on a common consciousness of 'Turanianism' but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives led people in Bulgaria to accept the Turanian label when the Bulgarian Government intervened against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars rank to-day among Slavonic peoples. The original founders of the Bulgarian State, thirteen centuries ago, were certainly 'Turanian' nomads from the steppes; but they left only slight traces on the Slavs whom they subdued.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is at once artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and Magyar to fight his battles, subscribe to his loans, give his young men technical instruction, and supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe;[1] and his principal object in the European war was to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are 'Central' or 'Entente', 'Turanian' or 'Teutonic'.

[1] This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from 'Tekin Alp': 'It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream.'

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2. Pan-Turanianism as Pan-Turkism

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family; but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to any one. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers, mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey in Europe through Anatolia, Transcaucasia, northern Persia, and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, the Dobruja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean. They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs; and the different Turkish dialects are as readily intelligible to all Turks as the different Slavonic languages are to any speaker of one of them. It was therefore only natural that, as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

3. Turkish Nationality in the Ottoman Empire

The consciousness of nationality, like the word 'Pan-Turanian', has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who

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inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish states in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their most formidable rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes; and that was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the 'home country' of the Ottoman Empire; for, while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912–13; the process of centralization in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and Progress since the Treaty of Bucarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish army is organized on the nineteenth-century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Moslem population of the Empire; and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the

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Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilized on the most threatened frontiers, which till the recent war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Moslem Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army, affording its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers; and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralized Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

4. The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms (Czech nationalism for instance), it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory; and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms, and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and

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this 'Pure Turkish' movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed; and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutbah (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques; but they had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.[1]

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912–13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, so far unpolitical in character. Our chief information about it comes from *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*, by 'Tekin Alp',[2] a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of Albert Cohen, a Salonika Jew.[3] This work illustrates the artificial origins of the movement and its prospects of success. The Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress; and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders. Cohen evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarization. But his book has to be used with caution; for, though it was written after the Committee of Union and Progress had taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represents the Committee of Union and Progress policy. On the whole it is safer to take 'Tekin Alp' as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] Published as Part II of *Deutsche Orientbücherei* (edited by E. Jäckh) by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915.

[3] Salonikan by residence only and not by origin, to judge by his forename. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

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5. The Effects of the Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, emancipation of women, and other really constructive aims; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Evkaf (or Religious Endowments) has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressehs—the reactionary Moslem ecclesiastical seminaries; and, during the recent war, the Government challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active 'Unionist'; and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government, calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.[1]

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan states, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from them another idea—irredentism.

'Observers,' Tekin Alp writes, 'who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an

[1] See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stürmer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Lausanne. English translation, *Two Years of War in Constantinople*. London, 1917). The incident is referred to in Chapter VIII.

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intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause.'

He proceeds to sketch the life-history of several young Macedonian Christians, who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent 'Tekin Alp's' personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912–13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

6. The Policy of the Committee of Union and Progress

Irredentism gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey group; for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee of Union and Progress were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe; and in this they agreed with Abdul Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means, for, while Abdul

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Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee of Union and Progress held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' would be proclaimed; all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to the State as free Ottoman citizens, just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsatians rallied to the French Republic after 1789; and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened during the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new regime to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognized that secession was impossible, but strove just then to defend their national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralization, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

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7. Turkish Aims in the European War

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: (*a*) to purify and strengthen the Turkish nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and (*b*) to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by a private group of 'Intellectuals', and promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But, while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee of Union and Progress it was only an instrument. They would not give up movements like Pan-Islamism, that conflict with it, if these movements could still serve their turn; and they would not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, for instance in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress [1] can be summed up as follows:

(*a*) The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the Turkish language and culture from foreign (i. e. chiefly Arabic) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion.

The first aim of the Committee of Union and Progress is to purge the Turkish State from foreign (i. e. chiefly European) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the Committee of Union and Progress are far too prudent to do so, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and

[1] Of course some Committee of Union and Progress leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form.

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denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a 'language ordinance' making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.[1]

(*b*) The doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee of Union and Progress's method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to 'Muhajirs' (Moslem refugees from the provinces lost in 1912–13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Moslems from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities was to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim; and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Moslem fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

(*c*) 'Tekin Alp' seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to 'liberating' kindred Turkish populations in Russia and central Asia.

For the Committee of Union and Progress it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population, and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hoped to compensate or even outbalance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here we have a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians are an alien *bloc* separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Tatars of northern Persia and Russian Transcaucasia.

[1] The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

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8. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism

The opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress appears most clearly in their attempt to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The Committee of Union and Progress are devotees to neither, but exploit them both.

Pan-Islamism is not really a religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahhabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and infidels; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were (*a*) Arabs, (*b*) uncivilized, and (*c*) independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilized Moslem populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia.[1] These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Moslem State which already realized their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped to become themselves, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these

[1] See above, pp. 54–62 of this book.

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lines were perceived by Abdul Hamid, and he exploited them cleverly. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful in foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy; and this diplomacy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Pasha succeeded in winning over native sympathies. The Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader; and even the Senussi has made common cause with him during the recent war. In Asia the Committee of Union and Progress have posed as the liberators of Moslem States caught in British or Russian toils. They sent a mission to the late Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they persuaded the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support. They have suggested a triple alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, based on the idea of political independence for Islamic States. The 'Holy War' proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh ul-Islam [1] in October 1914 has turned out a fiasco, but that is because Turkey has suffered military defeat. The presupposition of the Pan-Islamic policy is Ottoman military prestige. If Turkish armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo, and Teheran, and if the Allies had never driven them out of Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo, nor occupied Constantinople, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political effects; even now it is by no means bankrupt.

But this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be ruined at once by a logical following out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire assumes the rôle of a Turkish National State instead of that of an Islamic Great Power, and if the party that brings about this

[1] The same who afterwards resigned over the question of legal reforms.

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change regards Turkish Nationalism and Islam as ultimately irreconcilable, the moral links between Turkey and the Moslem populations of other States are thereby broken. There is no more salvation for non-Turkish Moslems in Turkey than in Britain or Russia or France; and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee of Union and Progress realize this very well, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. There have been anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers, and acts of tyranny and repression by Committee of Union and Progress officials in the Arab provinces, which have produced resentment and driven Arab military forces to join the Allies. Nevertheless it would be difficult to convict the Committee of Union and Progress, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress is to exploit both movements at once, and of the two Pan-Islamism is the more useful to them abroad; but at the same time it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organized militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Committee of Union and Progress Congress of October 1911:

'The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organization, for decentralization and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of con-

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firming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.'

This illustrates how the Committee of Union and Progress try to combine the two ideas in their internal policy, and shows on which of the two they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities 'may keep their religion but not their native language', is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan religion.

9. Prospects of Turkish Irredentism Abroad

On the other hand, in estimating the possibilities of Pan-Turanian propaganda among Turkish populations outside the Ottoman Empire, it may be assumed that no Ottoman Government will pursue a policy in any way prejudicial to the Pan-Islamic idea. It may also be assumed now that, if the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race becomes a practical possibility (which it is not at present), this will come about not through Ottoman military victories, but through the internal disruption of Russia. This disruption of Russia was frankly hoped for by 'Tekin Alp'—in fact it was the presupposition of his irredentist programme—but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only looked forward to its being achieved from outside by Turkey and the Central Powers.

The following are the chief groups of Turkish-speaking population outside Turkey which come into consideration:

(*a*) *The Tatars of Kazan* (*about* 1½ *millions*) [1]

These live along the middle course of the Volga, between Nizhni Novgorod and Samara. They are an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians

[1] Including the Tatars of Astrakhan, along the lower Volga.

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on the west and Finnish tribes[1] on the north and south. They are also intermingled with Russians in Kazan itself. They have been under Russian government more than three hundred years; and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline rather to follow their lead, and in the last few years their printing-presses have spread their influence widely through the Mohammedan world. The success or failure of Pan-Turanianism as an Ottoman-Turk irredentist movement largely depends on the attitude which the Kazan Tatars adopt towards it; and this in turn depends upon the political evolution of Russia.

The Kazan Tatars sent Red Crescent workers and relief funds to Turkey during the Balkan War, but geography and material interests bind them to Russia; and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries. They naturally objected to the Tsarist regime, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.[2] But they agreed neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets came to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated from the Tatars of the Crimea and the Caucasus. They would almost certainly have declared for national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic; for, if Russia could have been successfully reorganized on this basis, they had a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic state con-

[1] Nominally Christian, virtually still pagan, without a culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians —whichever have the final ascendancy in this region.

[2] That is, in internal policy. In foreign policy they were violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desired.

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taining a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world (about 16 millions out of about 27 millions altogether, whereas there are probably less than 8 million Turks in the Ottoman Empire).

(*b*) *The Tatars of Crimea* (*under* 200,000)

and

(*c*) *The Tatars of Western Siberia* (*about* 50,000)[1]

Both these are likely to follow the lead of Kazan

(*d*) *The Tatars* (*Azerbaijanis*) *of the Caucasus* (*over* 2,000,000)

These have also felt the influence of Kazan. On the other hand, they have been under Russian government for less than a century, they live close to the Ottoman frontier, they have virtually adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (i. e. newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914–15, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the army, and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. But the Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus; and the only Russian subjects who sided with them were the Adjars, a Moslem tribe of Lazo-Georgian nationality in the district of Batum.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national

[1] There are also in Western Siberia about 100,000 semi-Tatarized Ugro-Finns.

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autonomy for the Caucasus and Ottoman Armenia has been revived, on the basis, firstly, of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey, and subsequently of complete independence. But the delimitation of national frontiers affords room for endless disputes; and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adjars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars on that of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which in the Caucasus is as important as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian has appeared again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward in civilization, and are hampered by their sectarian division into Shiahs and Sunnis. If there had been a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they would have remained loyal to Russia; in which case Baku would probably have ultimately superseded Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oil-fields, has a greater industrial future; and, while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic *bloc* (*via* the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it. But the prospects of Baku depend upon the future of Russia.

(*e*) *The Turkish-speaking Populations in Persia*

The migrations from Central Asia, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A. D., which carried

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Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan.

These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shiahs, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers; and, as a matter of fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the Persian Nationalist movement.

Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a 'Turkish soul', and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress has shown no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war was to support Persian Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian regime. They were playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.

Apart from this, the Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914–15, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive. The Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier, and are closely connected with them in economic and other ways.

(*f*) *The Turkish-speaking Population in Afghanistan*

The provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are inhabited by a predominantly Turkish population. They were formerly independent Turkish (Uzbeg) khanates like Khiva and Bokhara. They were only annexed by Afghanistan in 1850–59.

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The situation is the same as in Persia. Pan-Turanian doctrinaires might like to rouse these Uzbegs to a sense of Turkish nationality; the Committee of Union and Progress would prefer to draw the State of Afghanistan into the Ottoman political orbit.

(g) *The Turks of Central Asia (about* 13 *millions,* 12 *millions of whom are under Russia)*

Turkish-speaking Central Asia is one of the largest continuous language areas in the world—larger than the Great-Russian area and almost as large as the English or the Spanish-speaking area in America. It is bounded roughly by the Volga and Caspian on the west, the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north, the Altai Mountains on the east, the Kwen-Lun and the Pamirs on the south. The whole of it except the Tarim basin ('Chinese' or 'Eastern' Turkestan) has hitherto belonged to Russia.[1] The continuity of its Turkish-speaking population is only broken by some Cossack settlements in the north, and by the Persian-speaking Tajik peasantry and townspeople along the Oxus and upper Syr Darya.

Within this area there are great economic and cultural contrasts. The Bashkirs in the Ural district are in transition from nomadism to agriculture. The Khirgiz, south of them, are still nomads, scattered over vast steppes. The Turcomans of the Trans-Caspian province (such as have survived the Russian conquest) are not only nomads but are still predatory when they have the chance.[2] South-eastward, on the other hand, along the rivers, there is a fairly dense agricultural population. In Ferghana, Samarkand, and Tashkend, the Russians have accomplished a great deal of irrigation during the last fifty years, and have successfully fostered the

[1] The people of the Tarim basin rebelled against China in the sixties of last century, and maintained their independence for several years. During the last half-century they have been held down by force by Chinese garrisons.

[2] In the case of the Turcomans, civilization has produced degeneration. The Russian conquest overtook them in a more primitive stage than most other Turkish stocks in Central Asia.

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cultivation of cotton. In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organization has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

To set against these differences, there are powerful factors that make for unity—the common language, a common religion (for all these populations are devout Sunnis), and the common government and better communications that the Russian conquest has brought. The provinces along the Oxus and Syr Darya, for example, which are the heart of Turkestan, are now linked up directly with Kazan by the Russian railway from Orenburg to Tashkend across the Khirgiz Steppe, and with Baku by the Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamship service across the Caspian Sea.

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution and the consequent disruption of Russia have made it imminent.

We have little direct information concerning the effect which the Revolution has had here. There is said to have been a rising in the autonomous khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, to extort a constitution from the Khans. Religious outbreaks are a more serious probability. Before the Russian conquest Central Asia was a hotbed of Sunni fanaticism. Khiva and Bokhara, which have never been brought directly under Russian administration, are likely to be fanatical still; and a spark struck here might set the whole region ablaze. Russia having fallen to pieces, Central Asia will probably break away. It is linked with Russia by Tashkend and Trans-Caspian Railways, but otherwise isolated from it by a difficult belt of steppe and desert.

The disruption of Russia thus opens greater opportunities for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other. The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem State, but a recent Christian conqueror. If Russia vanishes as a power

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from Central Asia, it might still be open to Ottoman diplomacy to work for a Turkish-Islamic State in Central Asia, which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

(*h*) *The Yakuts* (*about* 250,000)

The Yakuts are a Turkish-speaking tribe thinly scattered over an immense area in the basin of the River Lena, extending to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. They are quite outside the range of any Pan-Turkish movement, for, in the first place, they are either pagans or nominal Christians, not Moslems; and, secondly, they are separated from the other branches of the Turkish race by a broad belt of non-Turkish populations—pagan Tungus and Buddhist Mongols.

10. Prospects of Turkification in the Ottoman Empire

A survey of the Turkish-speaking world outside Turkey seems to show that Ottoman Irredentism has become a serious possibility through the break-up of Russia. It remains to examine the other aim of Pan-Turanianism—the Turkification of the non-Turkish nationalities inside Ottoman Asiatic territory, which now seems likely to be confined to Anatolia.

The Turkish language possesses great vitality. Wherever Turkish-speaking peoples go, they impress themselves on the landscape; Turkish names of mountains, rivers, and villages (monotonous and unimaginative though they are) tend to drive out the ancient nomenclature; and the conquered populations begin to use Turkish as their household language, even though they do not intermarry with the Turks, and though they adhere jealously to their ancestral culture and religion. This process was taking place peacefully in Anatolia before the war. Among the Armenians in the Cilician Highlands it was practically complete. Their vernacular language had become Turkish instead of

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Armenian; and the dialect of the Greek enclaves in the Kaisaria district was in a curious stage of transition from Greek to Turkish. The first translations of the Bible which the American missionaries found it advisable to make were into the Turkish language, written in Greek and Armenian characters; and that was early in the nineteenth century. Even without the racial war of extermination which the Committee of Union and Progress waged in Anatolia and Armenia from the spring of 1915—first against the Armenians and then against the Greeks—the Turkish language would before long have become the universal vernacular speech of the Anatolian peninsula, from the Aegean to the Euphrates.

But the recent massacres and deportations have swept away not only non-Turkish languages, but non-Turkish cultures. The Turkish-speaking or semi-Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia, with their religion, literature, education, industry, and economic efficiency, have been to a large extent removed; and their places have been taken by Muhajirs—Moslem emigrants from the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe, who are perhaps on a higher level than the native Turks of Anatolia, but are also brutalized by hardships and made fanatical by their exile. The Muhajirs are quite incapable of compensating for the lost Greeks and Armenians as a factor of civilization; and as (in Anatolia at any rate, whatever may happen in Armenia east of the Euphrates) there seems little prospect of repatriation for the Armenians still surviving in the Syrian and Mesopotamian exile-camps, the country will presumably have to start after the war from the low-water mark of Turkish barbarism.

The native Anatolian Turk, diluted with the Rumelian Muhajir, will be the material on which the Turkish national movement will have to work. What are its prospects? If the Ottoman State is confined to Anatolia, the constructive side of nationalism—represented in the Pan-Turanian movement by figures like Halidé Edib Hanum—may come to the fore.

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A Turkish National State in Anatolia may go through the same course of development which the Balkan nationalities have gone through since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. There is no reason to suppose that the Anatolian Turk is ultimately less capable of civilization than the Balkan peoples. There is very little in him of the real Turkish blood from Central Asia; the strongest strain in his race is the aboriginal Anatolian peasantry, which turned Turk *en masse* after the Seljuks had overrun the country in the eleventh century A. D. The ancient Anatolian was able to assimilate the civilization of Greece and Rome; why should his descendants not assimilate that of Modern Europe? Only the process will be slow, for the Turk now is much more backward than the Greek and the Serb a century ago; and Islam does not assist the growth of a nation, as the Orthodox Church has done in the Balkans.

11. Conclusions

(*a*) The Ottoman Turk has no 'Pan-Turanian' sense of kinship with any nation in Europe. The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress towards Europe has been quite unsentimental; it has aimed at the maximum of European assistance to Turkey combined with the minimum of European control.

(*b*) The power of the Ottoman Empire rests *de facto* upon the Turkish population in Anatolia; and there is a very obvious linguistic kinship between all the Turkish-speaking populations in the world. It is therefore natural that a Turkish national consciousness should arise among the Osmanlis, and that this should be accompanied by a 'Pan-Turkish' consciousness as well.

(*c*) Nationalism was stimulated among the Osmanlis by the shock of the Balkan War, but it is important to distinguish between the doctrinaire nationalists and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee

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of Union and Progress always think in terms of the Ottoman State rather than of the Turkish nationality.

(*d*) Above all, the Committee of Union and Progress are not likely to sacrifice their Pan-Islamic policy either to Turkish Nationalism at home or to Turkish Irredentism abroad, except in so far as the disruption of Russia opens opportunities for the latter in the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Russian Empire.

(*g*) If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a Great Power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia.

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APPENDIX

I

STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS [1]

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars [2]	50,000 [2]	
Crimean Tatars	200,000	
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Khirgiz	4,692,000	
Turcomans	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000 ±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)		8,000,000 –
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe		2,000,000 ±
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000 –	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000 ±	
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±

[1] Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

[2] Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarized aliens (mostly Ugro-Finn

ADDENDUM. In 1909 the Moslem Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old regime, exercised authority over the Moslems of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea, and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Moslems under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes, and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Khirgiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

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II

THE KURDS

From the Pan-Turanian point of view the Kurds have considerable importance as a negative factor. They are an Iranian people, speaking dialects of Persian, and their original home is in the mountain ranges which separate the plateau of Persia from the basin of Mesopotamia. South-eastward they are adjoined by kindred mountain populations—the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—and their expansion has been principally in the opposite, or north-westerly, direction.

This expansion has been closely connected with the Turkish migrations. When the Turks made their way from Central Asia into Northern Persia, in the eleventh century A. D., they did not dislodge the Kurds, who had occupied the western ramparts of the Persian plateau for about 3,000 years. They avoided the Kurdish mountains, and turned northwards into Azerbaijan, up the valley of the Araxes, and so into Armenia and Anatolia by a route that left Kurdistan untouched. Anatolia was their goal and Armenia their high road, with the result that, after migrations which went on intermittently for five centuries, Anatolia had become the seat of a new Turkish nation, while Armenia was left depopulated and half desolate. This was the Kurds' opportunity. Kurdish tribes drifted into the vacuum which the Turks had made, and they have gradually spread over the lake country of Urmia and Van, and the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, till they have come almost within sight of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of 'Pan-Turanian' geography, they have thus possessed themselves of a strategical position. Stretching in a broad arc from a point north of Aleppo to a point east of Baghdad, they form an almost continuous buffer between the Turkish-speaking populations of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other. And what is still more important, they combine with the Armenians, and with certain indigenous mountain tribes of Armenia now classed as Kurds,[1] to cut off the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks from all the Turks farther east. During the Armenian massacres of 1915, a Turkish gendarme said to a Danish Red Cross Nurse :[2] 'First we kill the Arme-

[1] Chiefly in the Dersim highlands, between the two branches of the upper Euphrates.

[2] They were travelling from Erzerum to Sivas, along the ancient route of the Turkish migrations. (See Blue Book, Misc. 31 (1916), p. 253.)

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nians, then the Greeks, and then the Kurds'; and so far as the Pan-Turanian idea was a motive for the treatment of the Armenians by the Committee of Union and Progress, the gendarme was stating the logical consequences of his superiors' policy.

On the other hand, under the old regime, before the Ottoman Empire began to be either a centralized or a nationalistic state, the Kurds were the most faithful and favoured supporters of the Ottoman Government; and their expansion towards the north and west was in great part due to Ottoman encouragement.

When the Osmanlis conquered Armenia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, their main concern was to establish a bulwark against Persia, and the Kurdish tribes served excellently for the purpose. Notwithstanding their Persian dialect, the Kurds have not, and never had, a vestige of Persian national feeling. Their social consciousness is limited by the tribe, the sole object of the tribal policy is to evade external control, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Persian Government, which was near and powerful, seemed a more immediate menace to tribal independence than the distant Ottoman Government at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government was content with a nominal suzerainty over the Kurdish chiefs, and in return the Kurds guarded the Ottoman Empire's Persian frontiers—playing the same rôle here as the Bosniaks and Albanians in the Balkans.

Friction between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government began in the early nineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud reduced the semi-independent Kurdish chiefs in Armenia and Kurdistan, and set up the beginnings of an official Ottoman administration in their place.[1] This centralizing policy was reversed about 1890 by Abdul Hamid, who hoped to keep his various subjects in subjection by playing them off against each other and weakening them all. Abdul Hamid gave the Kurds rifles, and their chiefs the title of commanders of Hamidié gendarmerie, and let them loose on the Armenians; but Ottoman policy was reversed again in 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress, who hoped to regenerate the Empire by unity and internal strength. The Committee of Union and Progress attempted to call the Kurds to order, and they had a notable success in subduing the practically independent Milli Confederation built up by Ibrahim Pasha. But they could

[1] This was the Sultan who destroyed Ali Pasha of Janina and lost Greece; and it is notable that the Committee of Union and Progress, in pursuing the same policy from 1908 to 1913, were also successful against the Kurds (breaking up the power of Ibrahim Pasha), but failed to reduce Albania and lost Macedonia.

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not call in the arms which Abdul Hamid had given out, though they improved the situation by allowing the Christian population to bear arms too.

As soon, however, as they intervened in the European War, the Committee of Union and Progress went back deliberately to Abdul Hamid's policy. They distributed more arms to the Kurdish tribes, encouraged them to take part in the invasion of Azerbaijan, and incited them against the Christians. From April, 1915, onwards, the massacres of Armenian convoys in course of deportation were generally carried out by Kurdish bands, reinforced by released criminals and Ottoman gendarmes. But not all the Kurds took the Government's side. In Cilicia, for instance,[1] the Kurds deplored the treatment of the Armenians, as did the rest of the Moslem population ; and in the Dersim highlands the Kurdish or pseudo-Kurdish tribes have given shelter to Armenian refugees from Kharput and elsewhere.

The Kurdish sense of independence has been galled by the Ottoman conscription, and the percentage of Kurd deserters has notoriously been higher than that of Armenians, not to speak of Turks. Many of the Dersimli tribes refused altogether to supply recruits, and the Ottoman military authorities have failed to send punitive expeditions against them.

Russian influence among the Kurds dated from the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, for, except in the Erivan district, there were practically no Kurds in the Caucasus provinces under direct Russian sovereignty. The occupation of Azerbaijan increased Russia's political prestige among the Kurds, and roughly coincided with the fall of Abdul Hamid and the substitution of a regime in Turkey hostile to Kurdish privileges. The Russian Government, as a power making for disorder from outside, was more congenial to many Kurds than the Committee of Union and Progress in its first genuine enthusiasm for order and good government.

During the War the partisanship of the Kurds varied with the military situation. They were pro-Turk when the Turks were on the offensive in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus ; they turned pro-Russian in the Ottoman territories which the Russians subsequently occupied. The Russian military authorities treated these Ottoman Kurds with extraordinary favour, left them their arms, and connived at their raids, not only upon returned Armenian refugees, but even upon the Russian line of communications. The Kurds were naturally a more congenial element than the Armenians to the Tsarist Government; but the Armenians complained that even after the Revolution

[1] Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 498.

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the Russian military authorities continued their pro-Kurdish policy.

But the future of the Kurds lies less in Armenia (under whatever regime Armenia may come) than in Northern Mesopotamia, which is certainly on the eve of economic development. So long as it lay fallow, the steppe-country between Aleppo and Mosul was an Arab domain—though the Kurds drove their flocks thither for the winter, and Ibrahim Pasha, the last great Kurdish chieftain, made his head-quarters at Viranshehr, on the edge of the plain.[1] But agriculture is now following the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo towards the east; and, where Kurd and Bedawi have taken to the land, the Kurd has shown himself so far to be the better man. If therefore the agricultural development of the country proceeds gradually, and if the local population is not swamped by reservoirs of man-power from abroad, northern Mesopotamia seems destined to become Kurdish land; and here, freed from their tribal tradition and their nomadic habits, the Kurds will be more susceptible to the influences of civilization.

III

ANTI-ISLAMIC TENDENCIES IN THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

There are several distinct degrees of opposition to Islam in the Pan-Turanian movement:

(*a*) Ziya Bey's group first came into conflict with Islam over the language question. They probably thought of translating the Koran, &c., into Turkish because they knew that the translation of the Bible and the Christian liturgy into English and German at the Protestant Reformation had been the foundation of the modern English and German national literatures. The idea is not intrinsically contrary to the Mohammedan religion; but it is distinctly contrary to Islamic prejudice, and has therefore not been taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

(*b*) The opposition of the Moslem ecclesiastics to the translation of the Koran into Turkish led the Turkish Nationalists into an attack on Islam as an ecclesiastical institution. This secularist movement, too, is partly an imitation of Europe, as 'Tekin Alp's' use of the word 'clericals' shows; but it also embodies

[1] And the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar, though probably not Kurds by race, had already adopted the Kurdish language.

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sound and necessary reforms like the secularization of Education and the Law; and steps in this direction have been taken by the Committee of Union and Progress themselves. The chief difference on this head between the Committee of Union and Progress and the doctrinaires is that, while the latter trumpet their 'anti-clericalism', the Committee of Union and Progress try to carry secularization through with as little friction as possible, and without ever admitting that their measures are anti-Islamic.

(c) The Nationalists have also started a 'pre-Islamic' movement, and starting a cult of the pagan Turanian conquerors, like Jenghis Khan and Hulaku (both of whom, incidentally, were Mongols and not Turks). Members of the 'Turk Gyuju ('Turkish Power') Society—an association for the promotion of physical culture, probably modelled on the Slavonic 'Sokols'—have to take 'Turanian' club-names in place of Moslem (e.g. 'Oghuz' for 'Mohammed'); and a corps of Turkish boy-scouts has been instituted, who likewise take 'Turanian' scout-names, cheer for the 'khakan of the Turks' instead of the 'Padishah', and carry flags with the Turkish wolf on them, though the representation of living creatures in art is condemned by good Moslems. But there is no evidence that the 'Back to Paganism' movement has any influence over the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress.

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ISLAM IN INDIA

ISLAM IN AFRICA

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ISLAM IN INDIA

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ISLAM IN INDIA

Chronological Summary

712 A.D. Sind invaded by Mohammed ibn Kāsim.
1000–26. Raids of Mahmud of Ghazni into India.
1175–1206. Mohammed Ghori.
1206–1526. Sultans of Delhi.
1398–9. Invasion of Timur.
1526. Battle of Panipat. Moghul Empire founded.
1723–40. Independence of the Deccan, Haidarabad, Oudh, Bengal, and Rohilkhand.
1799. Storming of Seringapatam; end of Mohammedan domination in S. India.
1856. Oudh annexed by East India Company.
1857. Indian Mutiny.
1858. Self-governing Mohammedan states enlarged under British Crown.
1877. National Mohammedan Association founded.
1885. First Indian National Congress.
1906. First meeting of All-India Moslem League.
1909. Indian Councils Act.

I. Political History

Early Mohammedan Dynasties.—The introduction of Islam into India dates from the invasion of Sind in 712 by Mohammed ibn Kāsim. This led to a permanent occupation of the valley of the Indus about Multan, but the rest of India was unaffected, and it was not until the close of the tenth century that a fresh invasion began with the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni (1000–26); he overran a large part of Hindustan, but the province of Lahore was the only part of the country permanently occupied by his troops. The conquest of the rest of India dates from the campaigns of Mohammed Ghori and his generals (1175–1203); on his return to Ghazni he committed the charge of the military operations to Kutb-ud-din Aibeg, who became the first of the Sultans

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of Delhi. When Mohammed Ghori died in 1206, the greater part of India north of the Vindhyas had been subjugated by his Turkish officers, some of whom now became practically independent sovereigns. But the Sultans of Delhi claimed a suzerainty, which they were sometimes able to enforce, over the Moslem states. Thirty-four sultans reigned in Delhi from 1206 to 1526 —the Slave Kings, 1206–90; the Khaljis, 1290–1320; the Taghlaqs, 1320–1413; the Sayyids, 1414–51; the Lodis, 1451–1526. During this period the Mohammedan conquests were extended farther to the east and the south, in spite of frequent internal conflicts and revolutions, and the disasters caused by the inroads of Mongol hordes at intervals from 1223 to 1305, and by the invasion of Timur in 1398-9. Outlying provinces took advantage of the weakness of the suzerain power, and a number of independent kingdoms arose, which were ultimately absorbed in the Moghul Empire, e. g. Bengal (1338–1576), Jaunpur (1394–1500), Gujarat (1396–1572), and Malwa (1401–1530) in the north, and Khandesh (1370–1599) and Gulbarga (1347–1526) in the Deccan.

The (Mogul) Mughal Empire.—The invasion of Babur and his defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526 laid the foundations of the Moghul Empire, but his son, Humayun, was driven from his throne for fifteen years, and the Afghan Sher Shah established the Sur dynasty, which ruled in Delhi from 1540 to 1555. Humayun regained his kingdom in 1555, but died the following year. His son, Akbar, was engaged in warfare during the greater part of his long reign (1556–1605); he brought under his authority the Mohammedan kingdoms of Gujarat, Bengal, Kashmir, and part of the Deccan, and, after breaking down the opposition of the Rajputs, reconciled them to his rule by adopting towards his Hindu subjects the wise policy of conciliation. His son, Jahangir (1605–27), and his grandson, Shah Jahan (1627–58), kept intact the Indian dominions of Akbar; and Aurangzeb (1658–1707) brought the Moghul Empire to its greatest expansion by the

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conquest of the last of the independent kingdoms of the Deccan, Bijapur (1489–1686) and Golkonda (1512–1687). Aurangzeb thus subjected the whole of India as far south as Tanjore to his rule; but his intolerant policy towards the Hindus alienated the Rajputs, and the last twenty years of his life were spent in a vain attempt to crush the rising power of the Marathas. Under his successors, the Moghul Empire rapidly declined; the Marathas encroached upon one district after another, and during the reign of Mohammed Shah (1719–48) a general revolt of the provinces began, which resulted in the independence of the Deccan from 1723 under the Nizam of Haidarabad, of Oudh under Sa'adat Khan about the same period, of Bengal under Alivardi Khan in 1740, and of Rohilkhand under the Rohillas, an Afghan clan. Further, the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1738 struck a blow at the very centre of the Empire from which it never recovered; his successor to the throne of Persia, Ahmad Shah Durrani, invaded the Panjab and occupied Delhi in 1756–7; and though he joined with other Mohammedan forces in overthrowing the Marathas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, the ruin of the Moghul Empire was complete.

Relations with English.—Shah Alam (1759–1806), in an endeavour to assert his authority in Bengal, came into conflict with the English (1760–1), and having fallen under the power of Shuja ud-Daulah, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, shared his defeat in the battle of Buxar (1764). In the following year he granted to the East India Company the Diwani or financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in return for an annual subsidy of 2,600,000 rupees, and under the protection of the British kept his court in Allahabad until 1771, when he was persuaded to return to Delhi; he was blinded by one of his officers in 1788, and became a puppet in the hands of the Marathas, until General Lake's victory over them in 1803 set him free, and left him with a nominal sovereignty over the city of Delhi and the surrounding district, and a monthly pension of 90,000 rupees.

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In the south Haidar Ali had made himself master of Mysore in 1761, and was succeeded by his son, Tipu Sultan (1782–99), whose death at the storming of Seringapatam marked the disappearance of Mohammedan domination from southern India. The kingdom of Oudh lasted longer; the Nawab Wazir, Ghazi-uddin Haidar, assumed the title of king in 1819; the gross mismanagement of the country led the East India Company to annex it in 1856.

In Delhi, Shah Alam's son, Mohammed Akbar (1806–37), and his grandson, Bahadur Shah (1837–57), retained the empty titles of their ancestors, as pensioners of the East India Company; but Bahadur Shah's complicity in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 caused him to be banished to Rangoon, where he died in 1862.

None of the self-governing Native states under Mohammedan rulers joined in the attempt to drive the English out of India, and the more important of these states, e. g. Haidarabad, Bhopal, and Rampur, rendered substantial assistance, without which the condition of the English would have been still more precarious than it was. After the government was assumed by the Crown, in 1858, these states either had their territories enlarged by grants of land, or received other rewards for their loyalty.

II. Mohammedan India under the British Crown

(*a*) *Native States.*—Nearly two-fifths of the total area of British India is administered by native chiefs. Of these Native states (693 in number) the following are governed by Mohammedans, under the suzerainty and protection of the British Crown. The largest is Haidarabad, with an area of 82,698 square miles, and a population of 13,374,676, of whom about one-tenth is Mussulman; this is the only Mohammedan state in direct political relations with the Government of India; the others communicate either with an Agent to the Governor-General or with one of the Provincial Governments.

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Agency or Province.	*State.*	*Area in sq. m.*	*Population.*	*No. of Musalmans.*
Baluchistan	Kalat	73,278	359,086	345,906
	Las-Bela	7,132	61,205	59,386
Bombay Presidency	Khairpur	6,050	223,788	182,827
	Junagarh	3,284	434,222	88,130
	Palanpur	1,766	226,250	25,158
	Cambay	350	72,656	9,715
	Janjira	324	88,747	14,769
	Radhanpur	1,150	65,567	8,320
	Balasinor	189	40,563	4,578
	Sachin	42	18,903	2,278
	Savanur	70	17,909	5,448
Paying tribute to the Gaikwar of Baroda	Dabha	12	—	—
	Punadra	11	—	—
	Ramas	6	—	—
Central India Agency	Bhopal	6,902	730,383	81,996
	Jaora	568	75,951	13,686
	Basni	122	20,121	2,349
	Korwai	111	18,456	2,309
	Basoda	40	4,630	737
	Muhammadgarh	29	2,863	422
	Pathari	22	3,866	390
Madras Presidency	Banganapalle	255	39,355	8,054
Panjab	Bahawalpur	15,918	780,641	654,247
	Malerkotla	167	71,144	25,942
	Loharu	222	18,597	2,401
	Patawdi	52	19,543	3,338
Rajputana Agency	Tonk	2,600	303,181	40,432
United Provinces	Rampur	892	531,217	244,604

(*b*) *British India.*—After the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny (1858), the Moslems (especially in northern India) found themselves exposed to grave suspicions on the part of the British Government. Though large numbers of Hindus had taken part in this insurrection, its ostensible aim had been the restoration of the Moghul Empire, and it had consequently enlisted the sympathies of many Mohammedans. The estates of those who were convicted of complicity with the mutineers were confiscated, and thus a number of families of the old Mohammedan aristocracy were ruined. The members of these aristocratic families for the most part held aloof from the service of the British Government and sullenly watched the Hindus crowd into those numerous administrative and judicial posts which the Mohammedan aristocracy were by tradition and training peculiarly fitted to fill. A few of these

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families migrated into Mohammedan countries; for the common soldiery there was the fanatic settlement at Sattana, over the north-west frontier.

Rebel Camp at Sattana.—This originated in the Jihad stirred up among the Pathan tribes, especially the Yusufzais and the Barakzais, by the Wahhabi preacher, Sayyid Ahmad, of Bareli, who, after a successful missionary progress through Bengal, crossed the north-west frontier and in 1826 commenced a Jihad against the Sikhs, who were the rulers of the Panjab. Constant accessions to the Mujahidin of Sattana were received from India, and especially from Bengal, where they had an active organization. After the annexation of the Panjab in 1849, the British had to bear the brunt of their fanatical incursions, and sent against them as many as twenty separate expeditions between 1850 and 1863 (cf. below, p. 129).

Mohammedan Attitude towards British Rule.—Besides the mutineers who swelled the numbers of the Sattana camp, there were those Mohammedans whose consciences would not permit them to remain in a country the government of which was not Mohammedan. For Moslem opinion at this period was much exercised to decide whether India under British rule was to be regarded as *Dar ul-harb* ('the land of war') or *Dar ul-Islam* ('the land of Islam'), and whether a Jihad against the Christian rulers was obligatory on the Mussulmans. Except among the more fanatical, the opinion began to prevail that, inasmuch as the British Government left the Mohammedans free to practise the observances of their faith and made no attempt to restrict their religious freedom, they might live under its rule as loyal subjects. But their power and wealth had been steadily declining during the British period, largely through their failure to adjust themselves to the changed conditions of administration, and to avail themselves of the opportunites of acquiring education on Western lines. Up to the early part of the nineteenth century the Mohammedans had enjoyed the greater part of State patronage, as collec-

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tors of revenue, military and police officers, and judges, but as the old order changed these posts came to be filled by English and Hindu officials; when in 1837 Persian ceased to be the official language, and English or the provincial vernaculars took its place, a considerable number of subordinate offices passed out of the hands of the Mohammedans, and the abolition (by Act xi of 1864) of the posts of qadis (kadis, or Moslem law officers) closed to a large number of learned men what had previously been an honourable means of livelihood. (Act xii of 1880 gave power to the provincial governments to appoint a qadi in any particular locality if the Mohammedans of the place so desired.) Though the more far-sighted members of the community recognized that the altered conditions of the country called for a change in the methods of Mohammedan education, and urged their co-religionists to study Western sciences and learn English, their efforts for some time bore little fruit and met with much opposition.

The Mohammedans and the National Congress. —In 1877 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali founded in Calcutta the National Mohammedan Association, which was afterwards, when branches had been established in other cities of India, styled the Central National Mohammedan Association; in 1882 this association endeavoured to organize a national conference of Mohammedans, but the project fell through on account of the strong opposition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In 1885 the first meeting of the Indian National Congress was held in Bombay; while the third meeting was being held in Madras, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan delivered in Lucknow on December 28, 1887, the first of a series of political lectures with the object of inducing the Mohammedans to hold aloof from the National Congress and similar political movements. He also endeavoured to organize the Mohammedan opposition by the formation of a society entitled 'The United Indian Patriotic Association', to which more than fifty Anjumans in various parts of the country became affiliated; but its

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activity was short-lived, mainly through lack of funds to continue its propaganda. But, though his efforts were successful in persuading the main body of his co-religionists to refuse their support to the National Congress, each yearly gathering continued to be attended by a small number of Mohammedans, especially from the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, and Lucknow; and on two occasions the president of the Congress was a Mohammedan, at the third (Madras, 1887) the Hon. Mr. Badruddin Tyabji (afterwards Judge of the High Court, Bombay), and at the twelfth (Calcutta, 1896) Rahmat Ullah Mohammed Sayani. The latter in his presidential address enumerated and discussed the objections of the Mohammedans to joining the Indian National Congress. They were mainly that the success of the aims of the Congress would imply that a preponderating share in the administration of the country would pass into the hands of Hindus, and that the Mohammedans would be reduced to an inferior position; that the movement was disloyal to the British Government; that Western methods of government, and especially that of selecting officers for administrative appointments on the basis of educational qualifications, &c., were not suited to India, and would be detrimental to the Mohammedans, as owing to their backwardness in education they could not readily adapt themselves to such methods. The main body of the Mohammedans continued to hold aloof from the Indian National Congress, and from 1886 held on the same dates a separate gathering of their own, entitled the Mohammedan Educational Conference, the main object of which was to impress upon the Mohammedans the importance of modern methods of education.

All-India Moslem League.—But after the powerful personality of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was withdrawn, some of the younger generation came to the conclusion that Mohammedan interests suffered in consequence of their abstention from political life, and they founded an organization entitled the All-India Moslem

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League, the first meeting of which was held at Dacca in December 1906. In October of the same year a deputation of influential Mohammedans, headed by His Highness the Agha Khan, had presented a memorial to the then Viceroy, Lord Minto, and had urged that special consideration should be given to the Mohammedans in the proposed enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and in the bestowal of posts in the higher branches of the public services. This deputation gave the impulse to the formation of the All-India Moslem League, which rapidly extended its organization by the establishment of provincial leagues affiliated to the central body, together with a branch in London, and held a general meeting every year in some city with a large Mohammedan population.

Mohammedans in Official Positions.—In 1907 Nawab Imad ul-Mulk Syed Husain Bilgrami was made a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and was the first Indian to become a member of that body. In 1909 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali (formerly a judge of the High Court, Calcutta) was appointed a Privy Councillor, and, as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sits in the final court of appeal for Indian cases. In 1910 [Sir] Syed Ali Imam was made Legal Member of the Council of the Governor-General of India; he was the second Indian to hold that office. These appointments were made in pursuance of a policy of associating Indians more closely with the direction of affairs of State, a policy which led to the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. This Act and the regulations and rules under it increased the size of the Legislative Councils, and arranged for the inclusion of elected members (previously all the members had been nominated), and gave to these Councils greater liberty of discussion and interrogation than they had before enjoyed. The Mohammedans claimed to be represented as a separate community; and special regulations were framed for securing the election of Mohammedan members, in accordance with the relative importance and numerical strength of the

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Mohammedans in different provinces. There was, however, a feeling among the Mohammedans that due consideration had not been paid to their claims.

Partition of Bengal.—There were other circumstances which contributed to this feeling of dissatisfaction. In 1905 the Partition of Bengal into two separate provinces had caused the Mohammedans to become a majority in Eastern Bengal; and they were beginning to take a more prominent part in the affairs of that province, when in December 1911 this partition was reversed. Through the readjustment of the boundaries of Bengal the large Mohammedan population of Eastern Bengal again became a minority in respect to the Hindus, and lost that opportunity of self-development which had been opened to them in 1905.

Influence of decline of Mohammedan Powers.—Further, the declining fortunes of such independent Mohammedan states as Morocco, Persia, and Turkey excited much sympathy in India; and this state of feeling was intensified by the successive disasters of the Turks in their wars with Italy (1911–12) and the Balkan States (1912–13). Sums of money, considerable in relation to the general poverty of the community, were collected on behalf of the Turks; and a medical mission was fitted out and sent to Turkey under the charge of Indian doctors. The growing sympathy with Mohammedans in the Turkish Empire prompted the foundation, in May 1913, of the Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'ba, the objects of which were stated to be the maintenance of the respect due to the Ka'ba and the defence of it against non-Moslem aggressors; the designation of this society was undoubtedly suggested by the title of the Sultan of Turkey, as protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina—Khādim ul-Haramain—and indicated the pro-Turkish sympathies of the founders.

Moslem League and National Congress.—In January 1913 the council of the All-India Moslem League altered its constitution, and included among its objects the attainment of a system of self-government in India.

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From this date, the Moslem League began to draw nearer to the Indian National Congress; and the younger generation of Mohammedan politicians definitely abandoned the separatist policy of the older school and advocated co-operation with the Hindus in political activities. In December 1913 a Mohammedan, Nawab Syed Mohammed, was elected president of the National Congress.

Feeling during the War.—The declaration of war in 1914 between Great Britain and Turkey evoked many expressions of loyalty towards the British Government on the part of the Mohammedan native princes, the Anjumans, and other organized bodies; but the pro-Turkish journalists still came under suspicion, and towards the end of the year four prominent Mohammedan newspapers were suppressed.

In 1916 the Sherif of Mecca revolted against Turkey, and Mohammedan feeling, among those who had pro-Turkish sympathies, was much disturbed by what was correctly recognized to be a serious blow to Turkish authority in Arabia; the action of the Sherif was strongly condemned by several prominent members of the Moslem League. Meanwhile, the younger leaders of the Moslem League tended towards co-operation with the extreme Hindu politicians; and in November 1916 representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League met and decided to accept the Home Rule programme. But the whole of educated Mohammedan opinion did not follow the Moslem League in its agreement with the National Congress, e. g. the Mohammedans of the Panjab broke away from the main organization, and there was also considerable expression of disapproval in the United Provinces.

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III. Ethnology of the Indian Mohammedans

General Backward Condition.—The general mass of the Mohammedan population of India has been but little touched by the political movements of the latter part of the nineteenth and of the present century. Of the various religious communities in India, the Mohammedan on the whole exhibits the greatest degree of illiteracy, with the exception of the animistic tribes; only 69 men and 4 women per thousand are able to read and write. This backward condition of the Mohammedans generally is largely due to the low level of education in the parts of the country (e. g. the north-west of India and Eastern Bengal) where they are chiefly to be found. Accordingly, in reference to the main body of the Mohammedan population, racial and tribal characteristics tend to assume greater importance.

Main Ethnological Types.—Within this Mohammedan population of over 66,000,000 there is a great ethnological diversity. One broad distinction may be drawn between the descendants of foreign Moslem immigrants on the one hand and of the indigenous converts on the other. Among the latter, the physical types that are most numerously represented are (1) the Indo-Aryan type, occupying the Panjab, Rajputana, and Kashmir, to which belong the Rajput and Jat Mussulmans; (2) the Aryo-Dravidian type, found in the United Provinces and Bihar; and (3) the Mongolo-Dravidian type, represented by the majority of the Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal. Though by far the larger proportion of the indigenous Mohammedan population owes its origin to the lower Hindu castes or to *pariahs*, still there are few of the higher castes that have not at one time or another contributed converts to Islam. Brahmans were forcibly converted during the Mohammedan conquest, or in periods of intolerance under some settled Mohammedan government; other Brahmans embraced Islam through the persuasion of Moslem missionaries, or to gain some social or financial advantage. From

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the warrior castes Islam has received large accessions from the earliest days of its entrance into India; Rajput Mussulmans are found in large numbers in the Panjab, and to a less extent in the United Provinces and Rajputana. From the lower castes among the Hindus there has been a constant stream of accessions during the whole Mohammedan period, as well as from the aborigines of the country who stood outside the pale of Hinduism. In the case of the various Mongoloid or Mongolo-Dravidian tribes of Eastern Bengal, there was probably a mass movement towards Islam; adherence to the new faith raised them out of the despised condition to which the higher Hindu castes consigned them.

Mussulmans of Foreign Origin.—The Mussulmans of foreign origin are numerically fewer than the descendants of native converts, but their influence in the history of Mohammedan civilization in India has been vastly more important; the various conquerors, Arabs, Turks, Pathans, and Moghuls, brought into the country large bodies of foreign troops, whose services they rewarded by grants of land; when their power was established, their courts attracted into India military adventurers, poets, scholars, and theologians, most of whom remained and settled in the country; this movement of immigration went on during the whole period of Mohammedan ascendancy, and has not ceased even under British rule.

Arabs.—Of these foreign immigrants, the first to enter India were the Arabs, who invaded Sind in 712; the trade in spices, gems, &c., early attracted Arab merchants to the west coast of southern India, and the Mapillas are descended from the Hindu women they married. Thus from the earliest period of the Mohammedan occupation to modern times there has been an immigration of Arabs into India; their numbers have been small, but their influence has been profound and widespread. There was a Sayyid dynasty in Delhi from 1413 to 1451, and one in Bengal from 1493 to 1537; a dynasty of Arab origin ruled

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over the kingdom of Khandesh from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century; in the second decade of the eighteenth century two Sayyids of Barha for seven years enjoyed the position of king-makers, and set whomsoever they chose on the throne of Delhi. As administrators, generals, men of letters, teachers, and saints, the Sayyids in India have played an important part in the history of Mohammedan culture.

Numerically, however, the Arabs form the smallest group of Indian Mohammedans of foreign origin.

Turks.—Another important group, likewise not numerous, is made up of the descendants of the Turki invaders, to whom the establishment of Mohammedan rule in India is really due; Mahmud of Ghazni was a Turk, as also were the generals of Mohammed Ghori, who founded dynasties in Delhi and elsewhere, and Babur, the founder of the so-called Moghul empire; the founders of the Adil Shahi, Kutb Shahi, and Barid Shahi dynasties were all Turkish officers, who had succeeded in raising themselves above the mass of soldiers of fortune and mercenaries whose history is more obscure. Timur settled a number of families of Karlugh Turks in what is now the Hazara district of the North-west Frontier Province, on his return from his invasion of India in 1399, and their descendants are found there to the present day. A group of Kizilbash migrated from Kabul to the Panjab as recently as 1842, and their descendants have received grants of land and are permanently settled in the country.

Persians.—Among the smaller groups of immigrants, the Persians have exercised considerable influence on Mohammedan culture in India. Saints, religious teachers, poets, and men of letters, as well as soldiers and statesmen, have brought into India the refinement and subtlety of the Persian genius. Traders from the Persian Gulf settled in the cities of Gujarat as early as the ninth century. Political troubles have driven Persians at various periods to take refuge in India, e. g. during the devastations of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, in the eighteenth century when the

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Afghans brought the Safavid dynasty to an end in 1722, and again when Nadir Shah seized the throne in 1736. Naturally, many Persians were attracted to the Shiah kingdoms in India, and Persian mercenaries still come as recruits to the Persian regiment of the Nawab of Cambay.

Abyssinians, &c.—A small number of Abyssinians or Somalis, known as Habashi or Sidi, settled in western India; mention of them as soldiers and sailors is found as early as the thirteenth century. The Sidis were admirals of the Moghul fleet, and a dynasty of Habashi kings ruled over Bengal from 1486 to 1490; the present chiefs of Janjira and Sachin are also of Habashi origin.

Afghans or Pathans.—The largest group of foreign stock is that of the Afghans or Pathans, who are found in greatest number in the north-west, but also as far east as Bengal and as far south as the Deccan. The terms Afghan and Pathan are used indifferently by the natives of India to designate this large section of the Mohammedan population, but it is a matter of dispute whether the original Afghan and Pathan stocks were the same, or whether a purely Indian origin must not be assigned to the Pathans. There has been a constant stream of immigration from Afghanistan into India, from the end of the twelfth century up to modern times. Most of the Mohammedan conquerors of India have entered the country through Afghanistan, and have brought in their armies large numbers of Afghan soldiers, who received grants of land as military fiefs and settled in the country. Of the Afghan tribes found in India the most widely distributed are the Yusufzai, of whom a body of 1,200 accompanied Babur in his final invasion of India, and settled in the plains of Hindustan and the Panjab. Migrations on a large scale into the fertile plains of India have also taken place at various times, e. g. during the period of the Lodi (1451–1526) and Sur (1540–55) sultans of Delhi. The Prangi and Sur tribes from which these dynasties sprang, and their neighbours, the Niyazi,

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appear to have migrated almost bodily from Afghanistan into India. The great bulk of the Baluchis has similarly migrated across the border into India ; there are about ten times as many of them in India as in the whole of Baluchistan.

IV. Religious Sects

Sunnis and Shiahs.—The majority of the Indian Moslems are Sunnis, and owing to the high level of theological learning maintained by the 'ulamā for centuries, and the close relations kept up with centres of religious life and thought in other parts of the Moslem world, there has always been a large body of orthodox opinion and practice among the Indian Sunnis, and these have not differed materially from similar manifestations in other Moslem lands. The Shiahs have always been in a numerical minority in India ; under the rule of the Shiah sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda, and later under that of the kings of Oudh, the Nawabs of Murshidabad, and such of the Nawabs of Rampur as became Shiah, they enjoyed the favour of the ruling power ; but under Sunni rule they were often exposed to persecution. The Shiahs in India form less than 10 per cent. of the total Moslem population, and are mainly of Persian or Turki descent, with the exception of the converts of Hindu origin, belonging especially to the Ismaili sections of the Bohoras and Khojahs.

Wahhabis.—Among the modern sectarian developments, the most important are the Wahhabi, the Ahmadi, and the Ahl-i-Koran. The Wahhabi movement was introduced into India about 1820 by Sayyid Ahmad and Shariat Ullah, who initiated entirely independent movements ; the latter worked in Bengal and confined himself to peaceful propagandist methods, but Sayyid Ahmad made his way to the Panjab (which was then under Sikh rule) and stirred up a Mohammedan insurrection against the Sikhs on the Peshawar frontier. After his death in 1831, his followers established themselves at Sattana on the north-west frontier,

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and there formed a centre (cf. p. 118) which later was swelled by the mutineers who after 1857 were unwilling to live under the restored British Government. Their numbers were constantly increased from various parts of Bengal and northern India, until this rebel camp was broken up by the campaign of 1863; but the organization has continued to exist up to the present day, and has shown signs of reviving activity during the recent war.

Ahmadis.—Unlike the Wahhabi movement, which is distinguished by its hostility to Christian influences and its zeal for Jihad, or war against unbelievers, the Ahmadi sect strongly condemns Jihad and all deeds of violence committed in the name of religion. It was founded about 1880 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (of Qadian, in the Panjab), who claimed to be the promised Mahdi and Messiah, and to inaugurate a period of peace and righteousness. Since the death of the founder in 1908, the sect, which at that time did not exceed 19,000, has split into two rival parties, and appears to be declining in numbers.

Ahl-i-Koran.—The sect of the Ahl-i-Koran, though insignificant in numbers, is remarkable for the boldness with which it rejects all traditional theology and accepts the Koran alone as authoritative in matters of faith and practice; a new form of prayer has been devised and other innovations have been introduced.

Moslems and Hindus.—Owing to the fact that the Moslems in India have lived for centuries in close contact with Hindus, and are themselves to a large extent descended from Hindu converts, many Hindu characteristics are to be found in the religious life, especially of the uneducated classes. The process of conversion was often incomplete, and the converts, ill-instructed in their new faith, carried with them many of their old beliefs and practices. Such survivals from Hinduism are more marked in villages and country districts, remote from the influence of the 'ulamā; here the Mussulmans still continue to worship the tutelary gods of the village, join in Hindu festivals,

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and employ Brahmans in their marriage ceremonies. This close association with Hindus has also led to the formation of some mixed sects, which attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Hindus and Mohammedans, e. g. the Pirzadas, the Husaini Brahmans, the Lalbegis, &c. A like syncretism shows itself in the teaching of Kabir, the founder of the Kabir-panthis, and of Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion. In some instances the incompleteness of the process of conversion has rendered possible the return to Hinduism of the descendants of the converts. The Arya Samaj has recently been very active in the work of reconversion; and one of the societies affiliated to it, called the Rajput Suddhi Sabha, has for its special object the reconversion of Mohammedan Rajputs to Hinduism. The process is facilitated by the fact that intermarriage between such Mohammedan Rajputs and Hindus has been common, and the tribal bond with Hindu sections of the tribe has always been stronger than any difference of religion.

V. Education

Mohammedan Learning.—During the Mohammedan period, the condition of learning was apt to vary with the goodwill of the sovereign, but from the earliest period of Mohammedan rule scholars received generous patronage from the State, and several emperors and sultans founded and endowed *madrasas*, or theological colleges. The largest of these *madrasas* were naturally to be found in the chief centres of government, and the students trained in them became teachers in the maktabs and mosque-schools that existed in most Mohammedan villages up to modern times. The decay of the Mohammedan rule and the consequent loss of patronage led to a decline in Moslem learning. Warren Hastings attempted to arrest this decline by establishing a *madrasa* in Calcutta in 1781; but, with the disappearance of Persian as the official language and the substitution of English in the higher courts, and the vernacular language of the various provinces in

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the lower courts, the older type of education no longer fitted persons for employment in Government service.

English Education.—In 1835 Lord William Bentinck, then Governor-General of India, established the policy of promoting education in the English language. While this policy was warmly supported by the Hindus, the Mohammedans held almost entirely aloof from the English schools and colleges, preferring a system of learning in harmony with their own faith, and thinking that English education induced a spirit of disbelief in religion. From time to time the Government of India proposed measures for dealing with the backward condition of education among the Mohammedans, and laid down the lines of policy to be pursued in Resolutions of 1871, 1885, 1888, 1894, and 1913. Liberal grants-in-aid have been given to colleges, such as Aligarh, and other educational establishments, and scholarships granted to Mohammedan students. The total number of Mohammedan pupils under instruction in all classes of educational institutions in 1912 was 1,562,000. Though the general level of literacy among the Indian Mohammedans is very low, there has been in recent years a remarkable increase in the number of those who have entered schools and colleges for an English education.

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Chronological Summary

Tenth century. Mohammedan Arabs build a mosque at Soba, the Christian capital of Nubia.
1009. King of Songhay converted to Islam.
1042. Abdallah ibn Yāsīn leads the militant Almoravid movement.
1076. Ghāna becomes Mohammedan.
1090–1147. Almoravids masters of Spain.
1200. Foundation of Mohammedan kingdom of Melle.
c. 1200. Islam spreads over the kingdom of Kanem.
Thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Infiltration of Mohammedans into Abyssinia.
1311–31. Mansa Musa, King of Melle, conquers the Songhay kingdom, and captures Timbuctoo. Timbuctoo a centre of Moslem influence.
1352. The King of Dongola becomes a Mohammedan.
Fifteenth century. Kadiriyyah Order introduced into West Africa.
1492. Death of Ssonni Ali, the greatest King of Songhay, after it had broken away from Melle.
1499–1530. Christian kingdom of Nubia, already weakened by internal dissensions and Arab and Negro attacks, falls before the Fung Empire.
Sixteenth century. Portuguese conquests in East Africa. Check to Arab and Mohammedan expansion.
1528–43. Mohammed Grāñ, a Somali chief, ravages Abyssinia.
c. 1550. Bakkayiyyah Order founded in Timbuctoo.
1568–1608. First Mohammedan King of Baghirmi.
c. 1600. Islam becomes the State religion of Darfur.
1612. Abd al-Kasim, the first Mohammedan King of Wadai, heads a national rising against the Tunjar Arabs.
1632. Expulsion of the Portuguese from Abyssinia, followed by confusion and anarchy.
Seventeenth, eighteenth, and first half of nineteenth centuries. Gradual increase of Moslem influence in Abyssinia.
c. 1700. Final collapse of the kingdom of Songhay before the Moors.
1750–1800. Conversion of the greater part of the Baghirmi population to Islam.

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1781. Tijaniyyah Order founded in Algeria. Spreads rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and thence to the hinterland of Sierra Leone.
c. 1800. Rahmaniyyah Order founded by a Moroccan.
1800–50. Spread of Islam in Uganda by Arab traders.
1802. Revolt of Danfodio.
1802–16. Danfodio conquers the whole of Haussaland and founds a fanatically Mohammedan Fulbe kingdom.
1827–33. Haj Omar in Mecca.
1835. Sanusiyyah and Amirghaniyyah Orders founded.
1841. Haj Omar heads another anti-pagan Fulbe expedition against the Upper Niger and the Senegal.
1855–68. Christian reaction in Abyssinia under Theodore II.
1857. Haj Omar's westward progress into Senegambia checked by the French.
1865. Death of Haj Omar. He is succeeded by his son, Ahmadu.
1876. Introduction of Christian missions into Uganda checks the spread of Islam.
1880. Edict of King John of Abyssinia compelling Mohammedans to become Christians or leave the country. Schemes for religious uniformity ineffective owing to war.
1881. Samory (a Mandingo) establishes himself on the Upper Niger.
1881–85. The Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmad, attempts to found an Empire, with Omdurman as its capital.
1889–1913. Reign of Menelik II in Abyssinia.
1891. Subjugation of Ahmadu's kingdom by the French.
1898. Defeat of Khalifa Abdullah, successor to Mohammed Ahmad, at Omdurman by the British. Defeat of Samory by the French.
1901–4. British Somaliland expeditions against Mohammed ibn Abdallah, the 'Mad Mullah'.

Introductory

No attempt is made here to include the history of Egypt and those parts of North Africa which were once provinces of the Roman Empire; but a brief sketch is given of the progress of Islam southward through the Sahara into the Sudan and the tribes of the West Coast, and then on the East Coast and into those parts of the Eastern Sudan where Mohammedan influences coming southward from Egypt met those coming eastward through the Sudan.

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I. Kingdoms of Ghāna and Songhay. The Almoravid Movement

The early history of the spread of Islam among the negroes of the Sudan is obscure; but there seems to be little doubt that it was the Berbers who first introduced this faith into the lands watered by the Senegal and the Niger. Here they met with two negro kingdoms of some importance, Ghāna and Songhay, said to have been founded, respectively, about A. D. 300 and about A. D. 600. Sporadic conversions appear to have occurred so early as the tenth century; but the Berbers of the Sahara did not show themselves very zealous Mohammedans until the rise in their midst of the Almoravid movement, which originated in the first half of the eleventh century among the Lamtūna clan, a branch of one of the Berber tribes of the Sahara. The Lamtūna had led a nomadic life between southern Morocco and the banks of the Senegal and the Niger, until the Marabout Abdallah ibn Yāsīn settled among them as a religious reformer, stirring up religious zeal and rebuking them for their lax observance of the ordinances of their faith. By 1042 he found himself strong enough to place himself at the head of his followers (the so-called Almoravids), and to attack the neighbouring tribes and force upon them the acceptance of Islam. The success that attended his expeditions served as a powerful appeal to the tribes of the Sahara, and his death in 1059 did not check the movement he had initiated. Many heathen tribes of Berbers came to swell the numbers of their Moslem fellow-countrymen, and adopted their religion. The Almoravids poured out of the Sudan over North Africa, and later made themselves masters of Spain (1090–1147). This Almoravid movement reacted on the pagan tribes of the Western Sudan. In 1076 the Berbers, who had been spreading Islam in the kingdom of Ghāna for some time, drove out the reigning dynasty (which was probably Fulbe), and this ancient kingdom became entirely Mohammedan; at the beginning of the thirteenth

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century, it lost its independence and was conquered by the Mandingo. On the ruins of Ghāna rose the kingdom of Melle, whose Mandingo chiefs became Mohammedans about 1200. The most important King of Melle was Mansa Musa (1311–31), who conquered the Songhay kingdom and took the prosperous town of Timbuctoo (which had been founded on the bank of the Niger towards the end of the eleventh century). This town was not only a great trading centre, but exercised a wide influence as a seat of Moslem learning and piety; and students and divines flocked there in large numbers. The Mandingo who ruled there until 1433 were described by Leo Africanus as being the most civilized, intellectual, and respected of all the negroes; and modern travellers have praised them for their industry, cleverness, and trustworthiness. These Mandingo have been among the most active missionaries of Islam, and many tribes in the Western Sudan owe their conversion to them.

Another town on the bank of the Niger, south-west of Timbuctoo, and like it an important trading centre, was Jenne (founded about the middle of the eleventh century); it was the centre of a flourishing cotton industry and a powerful rival of Melle. The first King of Jenne to become a Mohammedan was Kunburu in the thirteenth century; he is said to have collected together all the 'ulamā in his kingdom to the number of 4,200, and to have publicly declared himself in their presence a Moslem, his example being followed by the inhabitants of the city; he had his palace pulled down, and in its place built a great mosque, which stood up to 1830.

Of the introduction of Islam into the kingdom of Songhay we have only the record that the fifteenth king of the Zā dynasty was converted about the year 1009. The centre of this kingdom lay within the great curve of the Niger, south of Timbuctoo; but after it broke away from the authority of the King of Melle, it grew in power—especially under the energetic rule of Ssonni Ali (who died in 1492)—until its territory included all the country on the Upper Niger and the

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Senegal and extended as far as the sea-coast on the west and far into the desert. The kingdom of Songhay came into conflict with Morocco, and finally succumbed to the invasion of the Moors at the end of the sixteenth century.

II. The Haussa Kingdoms. Further Northern Influences

With the destruction of the kingdom of Songhay the Haussa states rose into increasing political importance; and the central point of the civilization of the Western Sudan shifted from the Upper Niger, where influences from the north were most rapidly felt, eastward to the country contained in the angle of the Central Niger and its tributary, the Benue, i. e. the modern Northern Nigeria. The Haussa states and their dependencies were situated in a country settled by agricultural negroes, with a remarkable aptitude for commerce; the main sources of their wealth were their manufactures, especially the making and dyeing of textile fabrics, which they distributed far and wide. The Haussas are an energetic and intelligent people; and their numerous trading caravans have gained for them an immense influence among the various peoples with whom they have come into contact; their language has become the language of commerce for the Western Sudan; and wherever the Haussa traders go—and they are found from the coast of Guinea to Cairo—they carry the faith of Islam with them, and by their devout behaviour and superior culture impress the heathen inhabitants. But of their own adoption of the faith, and of the rise of the various Haussa states (such as Kano, Katsena, &c.), historical evidence is almost entirely wanting, because the Fulbe,[1] who conquered them at the beginning of the nineteenth century, destroyed most of their historical records.

[1] Fulbe is the name by which these people call themselves; upwards of a hundred variants are applied to them by their neighbours, the commonest of which are Fulah and Fulani.

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Certain other streams of influence came into the Central Sudan from the north and the north-east. It was from Egypt that Islam spread into Kanem—a kingdom which, shortly after its adoption of Islam, rose to be a state of considerable importance, and extended its sway over the tribes of the Eastern Sudan to the borders of Egypt and Nubia; the first Mohammedan King of Kanem is said to have reigned towards the close of the eleventh century; his successors entered into friendly relations with the rulers of the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis, and thus facilitated the infiltration of Moslem influence from that state. At the close of the fourteenth century, the capital was moved to the territory of Bornu west of Lake Chad, and the kingdom of Kanem was henceforth known as Bornu. In the sixteenth century, this kingdom was the predominant power in the Central Sudan. In the fourteenth century the Tunjar Arabs, migrating either south from Tunis or west from Nubia, made their way through Bornu and Wadai to Darfur; but it was some time before Islam became the State religion in Darfur, under King Suleiman, who began to reign in 1596; and it was not until the sixteenth century that Islam gained a footing in the other kingdoms lying between Kordofan and Lake Chad, such as Wadai and Baghirmi. The first Mohammedan King of Wadai was Abd al-Kasim, who, in 1612, headed a native rising against the supremacy of the Tunjar Arabs; under his rule the power of Wadai gradually increased. The nucleus of this kingdom is formed by the mountainous country on the east, inhabited by a tribe of great tenacity and military prowess, whose origin was probably Ethiopian, though it has experienced considerable infusion of negro blood. This mountain people still form the ruling class, and derive their wealth from agriculture and a flourishing system of cattle-breeding. In the south of the kingdom are districts still inhabited by heathen tribes of pure negro blood. The people of Baghirmi were fetish-worshippers when Islam was brought into their country by the Fulbe in the sixteenth century they came under the authority of

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immigrants from the east, who gradually adopted the religion of the Baghirmians; the first Mohammedan king reigned from 1568 to 1608; but it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the mass of the people of Baghirmi were converted to Islam; and many of the negro tribes are still fetish-worshippers.

The Mohammedan history of the Western and Central Sudan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shows that the progress of Islam was slow; and the survival of considerable groups of fetish-worshippers in the midst of territories which for centuries had been under Mohammedan rule seems to indicate that the influence of Islam was for long confined to the towns, and only by degrees made its way among the pagan population. In spite of the propagandist activities of races such as the Mandingo, Haussa, and Fulbe, the progress of Mohammedanism was checked by the savage internecine wars which caused one Mohammedan state to work the destruction of another. As these Mohammedan kingdoms declined with the wholesale massacres characteristic of warfare in the Sudan, fetishism regained much of the ground it had lost; the heathen districts which suffered from the merciless slave-raids that were a considerable source of wealth to the Mohammedans could hardly be expected to welcome the extension of Mohammedan rule. In cases where the heathen tribes possessed some political organization of their own, they sometimes, indeed, gained strength and a more coherent political consciousness as the result of the united efforts they made to resist the militant propaganda of their Mohammedan neighbours.

III. Nineteenth-century Revival in the Sudan

(*a*) *Militant Activities*

The nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable expansion of Islam in the Sudan. The first impulse in this direction came from the Wahhabi reformation, which profoundly stirred the whole Mohammedan world.

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Towards the end of the eighteenth century Othman Danfodio, a Fulbe sheikh, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, whence he returned full of zeal for the reformation and propagation of Islam. Influenced by the doctrines of the Wahhabis, he denounced the practice of prayers for the dead and the honour paid to departed saints, and deprecated the excessive veneration of the Prophet himself; at the same time he attacked the two prevailing sins of the Sudan, drunkenness and immorality. Up to his time the Fulbe had consisted of a number of small scattered clans leading a pastoral life; they had early embraced Islam, and had hitherto been content to form colonies of shepherds and planters in different parts of the Sudan, and were generally a peaceful and industrious people. Danfodio united into one powerful organization these separate communities, scattered throughout the various Haussa states. An attempt in 1802 by the King of Gober—a kingdom which was still pagan and which had gained ascendancy over the northernmost of the Haussa states—to check the growing power of the Fulbe in his dominions caused Danfodio to raise the standard of revolt. He soon found himself at the head of a powerful army, which attacked not only the pagan tribes, forcing upon them the faith of the Prophet, but also the Moslem Haussa states. These fell one after another; and the whole of Haussaland came under the rule of Danfodio before his death in 1816. His grave in Sokoto is still an object of reverence to a large number of pilgrims. He divided his newly-conquered empire between his brother, Abd Allahi, to whom he gave the western provinces on the Central Niger, and his son, Mohammed Bello, who succeeded to the sovereignty of the eastern provinces, with Sokoto as their capital. In this town the chief Fulbe power was centred. Adamawa, founded in 1837 on the ruins of several pagan kingdoms, marked the limit of Fulbe conquests to the south-east; and the town of Ilorin, in the Yoruba country, founded in the lifetime of Danfodio, was the bulwark of their empire in the south-west.

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Mohammed Bello met with a formidable rival in Mohammed al-Kanemi, who stirred up the people of Bornu to shake off the yoke of the Fulbe, so that they succeeded in regaining their independence. But, with varying fortunes, the dominant power remained in the hands of the Fulbe, who showed themselves cruel and fanatical propagandists of Islam, until British administration was established in Nigeria in 1900.

An independent Fulbe movement was originated in the country about the Senegal and the Upper Niger by Haj Omar, whose family came from the earliest settlements of the Fulbe people on the Senegal. Haj Omar was born in 1797 near Podor on the Lower Senegal, and appears to have been a man of considerable endowments and personal influence, and of a commanding presence. He was the son of a Marabout, and had received a careful religious education; he was already famed for his piety and learning when, in 1827, he set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and was there initiated into the Tijaniyyah Order. He did not return to his own country until 1833, when he commenced an active propaganda of the teaching of that order, fiercely attacking his co-religionists for their ignorance and lukewarmness. He traversed the Central Sudan, winning many adherents and receiving honour as a new prophet, until, about 1841, he reached Futah-Jallon, where he armed his followers and commenced a series of expeditions against those tribes that still remained pagan about the Upper Niger and the Senegal. After devastating these districts, he found himself in contact with the French, who under General Faidherbe defeated him in 1857 and checked his progress westward into Senegambia; he also suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Tuaregs, who had driven out his garrison from Timbuctoo and resisted his attempt to retake this town in 1863. Nevertheless, he succeeded in uniting the territory on the Upper Senegal and the Niger into a great kingdom. On his death in 1865 he left this kingdom to his son Ahmadu, who chose Segu-Sikoro as his capital, and thus lived among the Bambara

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negroes, the chief among the tribes subject to him. But Ahmadu succeeded in holding together the various provinces of his father's kingdom for a few years only. Internal conflicts and the advance of the French, under whose protection he had to place the valley of the Upper Niger as far as Timbuctoo in 1881, led to the break-up of his power; Segu was conquered by the French in 1890, and a year later Ahmadu's kingdom was completely subjugated.

But, before the French could establish their supremacy in the Western Sudan, they had to crush the rising power of another military adventurer, Samory. a Mandingo, who was born about 1846. Samory established himself south of Senegambia, in the upper basin of the Niger. His conquests were marked by wholesale massacres and devastation, and he reached the height of his power about 1881, shortly after which he came into conflict with the French, who took him prisoner in 1898 after a series of harassing campaigns. He died in captivity in 1900.

Mention should also here be made of the attempt of Rabeh Zubair, a former slave of Zubair Pasha, to create a Central African Empire about Lake Chad, about the years 1896 to 1902. He was finally crushed, and killed, by the French in 1902.

(*b*) *Missionary Activities*

Side by side with these militant Mohammedan movements and the creation of these short-lived kingdoms in the Sudan, the revival of Islam in the nineteenth century found further expression in a missionary activity, marked by considerable zeal and success, on the part of the religious orders. As many as eighty-eight religious orders are in existence in the Mohammedan world; and those which are represented in North Africa exercise an enormous influence, from Egypt to Morocco; in Algeria more than half the Moslem inhabitants are connected with one or other of them. In the Sudan, the most powerful of the

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Orders are the Tijaniyyah, the Kadiriyyah, and the Sanusiyyah or Senussi. The Tijaniyyah Order originated in Algeria in 1781 and spread rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and later as far south as the hinterland of Sierra Leone. The members of this Order have been largely militant in their methods, and Haj Omar was a member of it. Since French authority has been established in the Western Sudan, the Order has had to confine its activity to peaceful methods, but still exercises a widespread influence through its mosques and schools.

The Kadiriyyah Order, in accordance with the spirit of its founder, Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani (who died in 1166 A.D.)—one of the most popular saints of Islam—has always adopted peaceful and tolerant methods. Established in the twelfth century, it was introduced into western Africa in the fifteenth century by emigrants from Tuat, one of the oases in the west of the Sahara. These emigrants made Walata the first centre of their organization; but later on their descendants were driven away from this town and took refuge in Timbuctoo, farther to the east. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the spiritual revival that was so profoundly influencing the Mohammedan world stirred up the Kadiriyyah of the Sahara and the Western Sudan to renewed life and energy; and, before long, small colonies of persons affiliated to the Order were to be found scattered throughout the Western Sudan from the Senegal to the mouth of the Niger. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century most of the schools in the Sudan were founded and conducted by teachers trained under the auspices of the Kadiriyyah; and their organization provided for a regular and continuous system of propaganda among the heathen tribes.

Enormous influence has also been exercised by the Senussi Order.[1]

Besides these three great Orders, others may be mentioned. The Rahmaniyyah Order, founded by

[1] For the Senussi, see *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

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a Moroccan towards the end of the eighteenth century, which has great influence in the Western Sudan; the Bakkayiyyah Order, founded in the middle of the sixteenth century, having its centre in Timbuctoo; the Amirghaniyyah, which takes its name from a certain Mohammed Othman al-Amir Ghani, who in 1835 was sent from Mecca on a proselytizing mission to the Nile valley and Kordofan; and several others.

The initiates of these religious Orders exercise considerable political influence, and have sometimes (notably in the case of the Tijaniyyah) succeeded in establishing independent Mohammedan states; they are often welcomed in the midst of a pagan population as public scribes, legists, writers of amulets, and schoolmasters. They thus acquire in quite a peaceful manner influence over the fetish-worshippers among whom they settle, and form centres of Islamic influence from which the knowledge of their faith expands in a continually widening circle. These religious Orders constitute the best-organized religious bodies in the Moslem community, and have attracted to themselves those Mohammedans who view with dismay the growing extension of European influence and domination in countries that had hitherto formed part of the Moslem world. Through them can operate most successfully those Pan-Islamic movements which are hostile to European civilization and represent a conservative reaction; hence the great increase in the number of the adherents of these Orders in recent years, and the necessity of their being closely watched by European Governments ruling over Mohammedan populations.

IV. Eastern Africa, Nubia, and Abyssinia

In this part of the continent, the expansion of Islam has in the main had a history unconnected with that of the territories already mentioned. Before the arrival of Islam there were in existence here two ancient Christian kingdoms: Nubia, which was converted to

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Christianity about the middle of the sixth century, and Abyssinia, which had accepted Christianity two centuries earlier. The Nubians resisted the progress of Arab rule up the Nile, and succeeded in maintaining their independence for several centuries, in spite of the frequent expeditions sent against them from Egypt. But Mohammedan Arabs gradually formed settlements in Nubian territory, and by the tenth century had so increased in number and wealth that they were able to ask permission to build a mosque in Soba, the capital of the Christian kingdom, a few miles above the modern Khartum. In the thirteenth, and especially from the the beginning of the fourteenth century, there began a general process of interpenetration through the migration into Nubia of Arabs, especially of the Juhaina tribe, who intermarried with the women of the land and gradually succeeded in breaking up the power of the Nubian princes. In 1352 the mass of the Nubians were still Christian, but the King of Dongola, their chief city, was a Mohammedan, and it is probable that Islam had made considerable progress there; even so late as the early part of the fifteenth century, however, the repeated expeditions of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt had not succeeded in pushing their conquests south of the first cataract, near which was their last fortified station. The Christian Nubian kingdom appears to have come to an end partly through internal dissensions and partly through the attacks of Arab and negro tribes on its borders, and finally by the establishment of the powerful Fung Empire between 1499 and 1530.

Abyssinia has more successfully resisted the inroads of Islam. The foundation of an Arab dynasty at the end of the twelfth century alienated some of the coast lands of the Red Sea from Abyssinia, and in the course of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries a considerable number of Mohammedans penetrated into the Christian kingdom, some of them entering into the State service in various capacities. By the beginning of the sixteenth century there were Mohammedan

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tributary states in the low-lying country that had formed the northern boundary of Abyssinia, from the Red Sea westward to Sennar, and on the south and the south-east of the kingdom. Between 1528 and 1543 Abyssinia suffered from the invasions of the Galla chief, Mohammed Grāñ, who ravaged the country again and again, and penetrated up to its northern frontiers. Grāñ was defeated and killed in 1543, and with the help of the Portuguese the Abyssinians preserved their country from coming under Mohammedan rule. Islam had, however, gained a footing which the troublous condition of affairs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enabled it to retain. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, about 1632, the condition of Abyssinia became one of terrible confusion and anarchy, taking advantage of which some tribes of the Galla race thrust their way right into the very centre of the country, where their settlements remain to the present day. Before the end of the seventeenth century, one-third of the population of Abyssinia was said to be Moslem, and their faith made continuous though slow progress during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries, by which time the Moslems had in their hands all the commerce as well as all the petty trade of the country, enjoyed vast possessions, were masters of large towns and central markets, and had a firm hold upon the mass of the people. But under King Theodore II (1855–68) a reaction set in; this was strengthened during the national struggle against the aggressions of Egypt, especially between 1864 and 1882. In 1880 King John promulgated an edict compelling the Mohammedans either to embrace Christianity or to leave the country; he is said to have compelled about 50,000 Mohammedans to be baptized; but their conversion was often nominal only; and King John was soon too much occupied in fighting at once with the Italians and the followers of the Mahdi to make his schemes for religious uniformity effective. Under his successor, Menelik, Christianity again became

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powerful as the State religion; but there is still a considerable Moslem population in Abyssinia, and Islam is still a force to be reckoned with in the country. The Galla state of Jimma has remained one of the strongholds of Islam, as its ruler, Aba Ja'far, by his timely submission to Menelik, managed to keep his kingdom, the inhabitants of which are nearly all Mohammedans. The capital of Jimma is one of the most important markets in Abyssinia. The majority of the Galla tribes throughout Abyssinia are also Mohammedan—especially the powerful Wollo Gallas, north-east of Lake Tsana.

V. East African Coast and Uganda

Along the coast of East Africa, owing to its proximity to Arabia, there have been settlements of Arabs from an early period; but the facts recorded as to their establishment are very meagre. In the Mohammedan period, the Arabs, about 908, founded Magadaxo (Mogadishu), which afterwards rose to such power as to assume lordship over all the Arabs of the east coast; and a Persian expedition, about 975, founded the town of Kilwa, farther south. The coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century dealt a severe blow to Arab domination in this part of Africa; but, even after the decline of Portuguese influence and the restoration of Arab rule under the Sayyids of Oman (from whom the independent sultanate of Zanzibar became separated in 1856), the influence of Islam does not appear to have extended far inland, or to have affected the tribes of the interior, with the exception of the Galla and the Somali, until the beginning of the present century.

Harrar has been a centre of Mohammedan influence and propaganda in Somaliland for several centuries, but since 1887 it has been under Abyssinian rule. The opposition to the extension of Christian authority was carried on by Mohammed ibn Abdallah, a mullah of the neighbouring district of Ogaden, commonly known as the Mad Mullah. He declared himself to be the Mahdi in 1900, and in his raids came into conflict not only with the Abyssinians but also with

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the authorities of British Somaliland. A number of expeditions were sent against him by the British from 1901 to 1904, when it was decided to abandon further operations. An arrangement was made according to which Mohammed ibn Abdallah established himself under Italian surveillance.

The Arabs along the coast of East Africa have been given up wholly to the pursuits of commerce or to slave-hunting, and made little effort to spread their faith. A notable exception, however, is the propagandist activity of the Arab traders who were admitted into Uganda in the first half of the nineteenth century; they probably recognized that the sturdy independence of the Baganda made slave-raiding among them impossible, so they sought to gain their confidence by winning them over to their own faith. They met with some success, and many of the Baganda became Mohammedans; but the introduction of Christian missions in 1876, the rapid increase in the numbers of the Christian converts, and the subsequent establishment of a British protectorate in 1894, led to a decline of Mohammedan influence. A number of Mohammedans, however, still hold important positions in Uganda; and it is even stated that there is a possibility of the eastern province becoming Moslem.

To complete the survey of Islam in East Africa reference should be made to the attempt of the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmad, between 1881 and 1885, to overthrow Egyptian domination in the Sudan and establish an empire with its capital at Omdurman; this came to an end after the battle of Omdurman in 1898 and the death of the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa Abdullah, in the following year.

VI. Effects of European Occupation on the Spread of Islam

In its movement to the south during the nineteenth century, Islam was met by two formidable obstacles. The first of these was the activity of the wealthy and

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active Christian missionary societies, which, starting from the coast, both on the east and the west, gradually made their way inland, and increased the number of their stations as European authority became more widely and firmly established. The second was the opposition offered by the pagan tribes. The cruel and devastating campaigns of Mohammedan leaders, such as Haj Omar and Samory, caused the faith of Islam to be bitterly hated by the heathen tribes whose country they overran, and stiffened the resistance offered by such pagan negroes as the Bambāra, who have maintained their independence, though (dwelling between the Upper Senegal and the Upper Niger) they have been hemmed in by a Mohammedan population for centuries. The heathen state of Galim (to the south of Adamawa) has similarly been strengthened by the addition of numerous pagan refugees. The terror of Mohammedan aggression and slave-raiding was removed from these heathen tribes when, by a series of agreements between England, France, Germany, and Italy, from 1886 onwards, the bulk of that part of Africa which has any Mohammedan population came under European rule.

But the changed conditions of life and political administration operated in an unexpected manner to the advantage of the faith of Islam. The suppression of the slave-trade has removed one of the great obstacles to the spread of Islam in pagan Africa, because it was to the interest of the Arab and other Mohammedan slave-dealers not to narrow the field of their operations by admitting their possible victims into the brotherhood of Islam. The advent of peace to countries formerly harassed by wars of extermination or the raids of slave-hunters, and the establishment of ordered methods of government and administration, have enabled Mohammedan merchants, the members of religious Orders, and other propagandists to move freely about the country and to penetrate among pagan tribes which had hitherto kept all Mohammedan influences rigidly at bay. During the period of disorder before European occupation, the Moslems were for the most part congregated

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in large walled towns; but under the new conditions of security they are able to reside permanently in scattered villages and near the scene of their agricultural labours, and Mohammedan influences have thus become more widely extended over the country. That most active propagandist of Islam, the trader—whether Arab, Fulbe, Haussa, or Mandingo—whose very profession brings him into close and immediate contact with those he would convert, avails himself of the increased facilities of communication offered by roads and railways.

The new administrations required literate and intelligent natives as officials, and these could as a rule be found only among the Mohammedan section of the population; thousands of such posts were created and given to Mohammedan officials, who have used their influence to bring over whole villages to Islam. An instance may be taken from German East Africa. Here the district of West Usambara was said in 1891 to be still closed to Islam; and the feeling of both chiefs and people was hostile to the Mohammedans, who were hated and feared as slave-dealers. But, when an ordered administration was established, the first native officials appointed were almost entirely Mohammedan; they impressed upon the chiefs and other notables who came in touch with them that it was the correct thing for those who moved in official circles to be Mohammedans, and thereby achieved the conversion of some of the greater chiefs, who afterwards exercised a similar influence on chiefs of an inferior degree. Similarly, the teachers in Government schools are largely Mohammedan, and are able to influence their heathen pupils to the advantage of their own faith. The preference often given to Mohammedan soldiers among the troops enlisted by European officers reacts upon the non-Moslem soldiers; and the pagan recruits often adopt Islam in order to escape ridicule and gain in self-respect, being made to feel that the acceptance of Islam is a sign of an elevation to a higher civilization.

The pagans are not slow to recognize that the be-

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lievers in Islam are everywhere respected by European governors, officials, and merchants. Brought suddenly into contact with European culture, they have received an impulse to advance in the path of civilization; but being unable to bridge over the gulf that separates them from their foreign rulers, they find in Islam a culture corresponding to their needs and capable of understanding their aspirations. The Mohammedans are not so far removed from them in race, appearance, dress, or manners as to make admission into the brotherhood of Islam impossible for them; and so soon as the pagan negro, however obscure or degraded, shows himself willing to accept the teachings of the Prophet, he is at once admitted as an equal; conversion implies no violent break with his family or his social institutions; for the habits and manner of life in the new community are similar in many respects to those he has been accustomed to; but a new meaning and dignity are added to life, and the convert finds himself at once a member of an influential, if not of a dominant, caste.

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MAPS

A small map, on the scale of 1:30,000,000, showing the extension of Mohammedanism in India, is to be obtained from Bartholomew (Edinburgh).

A sketch map of 'Islam in Africa', on the scale of 1:28,500,000, is given in the International Review of Missions for October, 1912, and has been reproduced (with consent) by the War Office (G.S.G.S., No. 2908) in connexion with this series.

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The special map mentioned in the foregoing note having been withdrawn from circulation, the enquirer should observe that the area which is the subject of this book is covered by the map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, published by the Royal Geographical Society, from whom it can be obtained, price 8*s.* 6*d.* (mounted), or 11*s.* 6*d.* (bound in case with explanatory text).

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GENERAL SKETCH

Chronological Summary

1072-92 Zenith of power of Seljukian Empire.
1230-88 Ertoghrul leader of immigrant Turks.
c. 1245 Mongol invasion of Asia Minor.
1288-1326 Osman I.
1300 Assumption of title Sultan by Osman.
1386 Conquest of Karamania.
1514 Annexation of Diarbekr and Kurdistan.
1516 Occupation of Syria.
1517 Subjugation of Egypt and Hejaz.
1535 Capture of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and Baghdad.
1570 Conquest of the Yemen.
c. 1600-33 Independence of Druses in the Lebanon.
1630 Expulsion of Turks from the Yemen.
1638 Recapture of Baghdad by Murad IV.
1723-47 Independent rule of Ahmed Pasha at Baghdad.
c. 1746 Rise of the Wahhabis.
c. 1768 Ali Bey independent ruler of Egypt. Sheikh Taha established at Damascus over Syria.
1773 Defeat of Ali Bey by the Turks.
1792 Wahhabi aggressions in Arabia.
c. 1798-1840 Independent rule of Beshir in the Lebanon.
c. 1800-04 Ahmed Jezzar supreme in Acre.
1802 Wahhabis capture Mecca and Medina.
1808-39 Reign of Mahmud II.
1811 Destruction of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali.
1818 Defeat of the Wahhabis by Mehemet Ali.
1826 Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II.
1831 Revolt of Mehemet Ali. Invasion of Syria.
1840 Expulsion of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria.
1841 Rebellion of the Druses. Direct Ottoman Government installed in the Lebanon.
Firman of the Sultan granting Pashalik of Egypt to Mehemet Ali and his descendants.
1845 and 1860 Massacres in the Lebanon.
1861 First Charter of the Lebanon.
1864 New Statute of the Lebanon.
1869 Opening of Suez Canal.
1871 Expedition of Midhat Pasha to the Persian Gulf.
1872 Turkish occupation of part of highland Yemen.
1876-1909 Reign of Abdul Hamid.

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1881 Establishment of Turkish post between Baghdad and Damascus.
1888 Profession by Ibn Rashid of allegiance to the Porte.
1891 Rebellion against the Turks in the Yemen.
1894-95 Armenian massacres.
1902 Recovery of Riyadh by the Saud dynasty.
1903 Appointment of British Political Agent at Koweit.
1904 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1908 Advent of Young Turks to power.
Hejaz railway completed to Medina.
1909 Armenian massacres.
1910 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1913 Expulsion of Turks from Hasa and Eastern Arabia by Ibn Saud.

Definition

Turkey in Asia means the Asiatic dominions of the Ottoman or Osmanli Turks, who are a minority only of the Turks in Asia, are not of pure extraction, and are associated with a popular majority not Turkish at all. The north-western third of their dominions is the only part which is generally Turkish in feeling. The southern half, almost entirely Arab, identifies itself very imperfectly with Osmanli tradition and hope.

Origin and Development of Ottoman Empire

The original Turks, the embryo of the future Osmanli nation, were a very small body of migrant tribesmen, settled by the Seljukian Turks of Konia, in the thirteenth century, around Yeni-Shehr, in the north-western corner of Asia Minor. There the ground had been prepared for them by two empires, the Byzantine and the Seljukian, both, as it chanced, already moribund. The first of these empires, having spread Levantine civilisation over the ancient Bithynia and settled there many Turkish elements which had served in its wars, left this remnant of its Asian subjects to lapse into a feudal society. The second empire, itself Turkish, having given Turki colour and Moslem sympathy to almost all the rest of Asia Minor, failed to establish permanent central control. The vigorous Turki nucleus, settled under Ertoghrul after

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the middle of the thirteenth century at Yeni-Shehr, showed remarkable capacity for political expansion; and, by a process at once agglutinative and assimilative, it rapidly caused a new national unity to coalesce about itself. This it led, on the one hand, into South-Eastern Europe, where the elements composing that unity found themselves at home; on the other, into Continental Asia Minor, where, with little difficulty, it could absorb disintegrated societies abandoned to local Emirs by the dying Seljuks. In less than two centuries, despite certain set-backs, the new Turkish nation, now called Osmanli or Ottoman, after Osman or Othman, its first Sultan (for Ertoghrul, out of respect for his Seljuk overlord, never assumed the title), had taken up both the vacant Imperial heritages, north and south, and had reconstituted the Roman Empire of the East.

The proper limits of this Empire were attained by the close of the fifteenth century. But in the process of its growth the new Imperial people had developed militarism to a point at which it took control of the State, and compelled the conquest of alien territories. In Asia two hundred years of warfare resulted in failure in both Caucasia and Persia; but, in the demoralised and incoherent Arab lands, easy conquests more than doubled the area of the Ottoman Empire in less than a century. Assimilation of the Arabs, however, proved as difficult as their conquest had been easy. The Osmanli Turks had to deal with an incompatible alien population just as they were beginning to feel certain evil consequences of their own military success; for this had excited in them religious fanaticism, fear of which was beginning to link the Christian world against them, and had carried them into a wider area than their centralised system had the capacity to administer. Decay at the heart of the Empire soon began to affect the limbs, and the most lately acquired provinces were the first to suffer. Conquered in the sixteenth century, the Arab lands had lapsed again to virtual independence of an anarchic sort before the seventeenth was over; and, indeed, over most of the

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Asiatic part of his Empire the Ottoman Sultan had come by then to exercise little better than an otiose suzerainty.

Relation of the Provinces to the Porte

(1) *Independent States*

A little more than half-way through the eighteenth century the situation was this. Irak was being ruled by Ahmed Pasha, independent prince of Baghdad. Egypt and all southern and central Syria obeyed (if anyone) Ali Bey, independent Prince of Cairo, and his agent, Sheikh Taha, at Damascus. North Syria was disputed by Turcoman and Kurdish Beys. In Hejaz the Emirs of Mecca were no longer dependent. Yemen had been lost for more than a century to the Imams of the Qasim House, reigning at Sana. By the end of the century things had become even worse from the Ottoman point of view. A number of new chiefs had seized power in Syria, notably Ahmed Jezzar of Acre and Beshir, the Shehab Emir, in the Lebanon. In Aleppo the local Janissaries disputed control with the Turcomans; and throughout the northern borderland Zeitunli Armenians and Kurds did as they pleased. The nineteenth century opened with Wahhabis raiding up to Damascus on the one side and Kerbela on the other. There had come to be no reality of Ottoman Empire in any Arab-speaking land, and it was not so much from the Turks as from the local chieftains that the armies of Mehemet Ali had to capture Syria and Cilicia thirty years later. When the son of the Viceroy of Egypt crossed the Sinai Desert in 1831 he could have pleaded with much truth that he was going forth to reconquer for the Osmanli Sultan provinces which had virtually been lost to him for nearly two centuries.

(2) *Power of Dere Beys*

A change, however, had begun to operate in the north about ten years before that date, a change destined to

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make the Ottoman Empire in Asia an evil reality, but a reality for the first time. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the power of local families, generically called Dere Beys, "valley lords," grew till almost the whole peninsula of Asia Minor was parcelled out among them. Some of these Beys were descended from former Emirs of the post-Seljuk age; some were tribal chiefs of Turcoman, Kurdish, and other immigrant elements; most were sprung from tax-farmers originally licensed by the Porte. Good examples of these three classes, in their order, were the Menteshe family in Caria; the Chobanoghlus of Yuzgad in Cappadocia, whose Turcoman power extended right across the peninsula from sea to sea, and was acknowledged by nomad groups even in the Aleppo district; and the Karamanoghlus of Manisa, Aidin, and Bergama, who had begun as Imperial commissaries for the collection of revenue and the administration of crown lands in Sarukhan. Whatever their origin, the Dere Beys had attained practical independence of Constantinople. Their broad domains spared nothing to the Imperial treasury, except on rare occasions when some energetic Beylerbey of Anadol appeared with an army on their confines. Their vassals and serfs rendered military service only to their chiefs, who ignored Imperial requisitions (as, for example, did the Karamanoghlus, when bidden in 1807 to send their contingent to an army intended to deliver Egypt from the British). In some of the larger cities, such as Sivas, Smyrna and Aleppo, the control of the local Dere Bey clashed with that of the resident Janissaries; but the Imperial Government was no better off for their disputes.

Centralisation of Government

(1) *Anatolia*

At last, in 1808, a Sultan was put by the Janissaries on the throne of Turkey who not only resolved to become master in his own house—some of his immediate

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predecessors had sworn to be that—but had the courage and capacity to set about it by eliminating both Janissaries and Dere Beys. He had to wait, however, some ten years, a first attempt to suppress the king-makers in Stambul failing ignominiously soon after the receipt of his crown. His second effort was made in the provinces—at Sivas in 1818—and it attained enough success to foreshadow what was to happen eight years later in the capital itself when Mahmud massacred the Janissaries. From that date to the end of his days Mahmud II never remitted his drastic purpose to destroy in Asia the decentralising work of the two centuries before him. Using his new army for the purpose he had most at heart, while he commissioned mere vassals like Milosh and Ali Pasha to win or lose with local levies in Europe, he broke eventually the power of both Janissaries and Dere Beys from the Bosphorus to the Taurus. One never hears again, after 1840, of any member of the once great feudal families of Asia Minor lording it over Imperial representatives. By that date honourable detention, exile, prison, poison, or the bowstring, had completed their work and left an anarchy which was almost peace. The constructive sequel, the substitution of direct administration, direct collection of revenue, direct contribution of men to military service, imperial application of common Imperial law, had to be achieved by Mahmud's successor. Achieved it was, for better or worse, under Abdul Mejid; and, before the Crimean War broke out, Asia Minor had become what it was in 1914—a group of provinces depending directly on the capital, looking to it for all the government they got, and wholly identified with its policy and fortunes.

(2) *Syria and Arabia—Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim*

The history of the Arab-speaking provinces did not follow the same course. Mahmud II was never free to deal with them as he dealt with Asia Minor. By the

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time he had got to work in the eastern part of the latter region, Ibrahim Pasha, acting for his father, Mehemet Ali, had occupied Syria. The Egyptian forces remained there for ten years, and in that period did some of the work that Mahmud's army had done in Asia Minor, but without the same fixed policy, without system, and therefore but partially. If a district submitted to Ibrahim and kept quiet it was left alone; if it revolted, as did Kerak, or Safed, or Nablus, it was dealt with most drastically. In the event, the result of the Egyptian occupation of Syria was that the main towns and their immediate districts were cleared of the contumacious elements which had so long defied the Porte. There was to be no more question of semi-independent pashas in Acre or Damascus or Aleppo. Furthermore, in some turbulent districts, such as the Lebanon, the leading chiefs were so far broken that the Turks, when they returned after 1841, had no great difficulty in establishing a measure of control. The Lebanese Emirs, for instance, never really found their feet again; and Beshir had no single successor wielding anything like his power in the "Mountain." But outside these restricted areas the country was left to itself. No attempt was made by Ibrahim to unify it; and in consequence one may still find at this day, up and down the length of Syria, many more survivals of native feudal chieftainships and local autonomies than in Asia Minor. It was not only in the mountain fastnesses of Jebel Ansarie, or northern Lebanon, nor only on the edges of the eastern desert, but in the Orontes valley, Commagene, and even Palestine, that powerful beys survived, with feudal power over considerable areas.

Mahmud II dying in 1839, and Ibrahim Pasha not withdrawing from Syria till 1841, the task of making Ottoman Imperial rule a reality in the Arab-speaking countries devolved altogether on Abdul Mejid. He was not the man to carry through such a business in an area much less easy to reconcile than Asia Minor; still less so was Abdul Aziz, his successor, who started

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with an added handicap through the action of the Powers in the matter of the Lebanon. Restive during all Abdul Mejid's reign, by reason partly of certain legacies of Emir Beshir, partly of attempts by the Turks to establish direct government, but mostly of their insidious policy of dividing Maronite against Druse in the interest of their rule, the "Mountain" blazed up towards the close of Abdul Mejid's days, and gave his successor the fruits of the Damascus massacre to digest. The final constitution, giving autonomy to the Lebanon in 1864, made uniform incorporation of Syria in the Ottoman Empire thenceforth impossible, and constituted a permanent encouragement to other local autonomies to maintain their particularism.

Certain steps, however, were taken, in fact, by the Porte during these two reigns, which enabled Syria to pass to Abdul Hamid as a pacified, though far from Ottomanised land. Military operations about 1845 broke up the contumacy of the Giaur Dagh Kurds, and were completed by an application of the ancient Oriental measure of transplantation. Considerable bodies of Kurds were forced to come down from their hills and take up lands in the Marash and Aintab districts and on both sides of the Euphrates above Birejik. A year later 12,000 men were sent into the Lebanon, and forty chiefs were arrested and removed. In 1864 the whole of Syria was redistributed into vilayets and their sub-divisions; the Governors-General in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut were made to depend as directly on Stambul as did the *valis* of Asia Minor, and were given Imperial forces wherewith to preserve order and maintain themselves. Some efforts were also made to obtain control of the eastern desert through the relations of the Bedouin sheikhs and their followers with the towns, and by the establishment of armed posts along the borders of the cultivated country and at certain points on through desert routes, *e.g.*, at the oasis of Tadmor. But, nevertheless, no small part of Syria remained much as it had been before the

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Egyptians invaded it—Jebel Ansarie, for example, on the west, and Jebel Druz on the east, the region of Kurd Dagh in the north, the Orontes valley between Hamah and Antioch in the centre, and all below Hebron and east of the Dead Sea in the south. Thus no part of Syria was unified and Ottomanised as was Asia Minor.

Asiatic Policy of Abdul Hamid

Abdul Hamid was to do something more. Whatever the faults and failures of his imperial policy, he had a policy, and it was what Mahmud's had been. He proposed to exercise real empire over all territories coloured on his map as Ottoman, and first and foremost in Asia, for which, as the better soil for Ottoman seed, he, like Mahmud, cared more than for Europe. Asia Minor had long been sufficiently consolidated, and had only to be made to look for its salvation to him and his household officers rather than to the bureaucrats of his predecessor. By the abasement of the latter in Stambul this change came about as a matter of course. Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Syria offered more scope. Too late to touch the Lebanon, Abdul Hamid devoted his attention to Jebel Ansarie and the Bedouin fringes. In the mountain regions administrative centres were established, whether the mountaineers liked it or no. On the desert edge a similar policy was supplemented by extensive colonisation. *Muhajirs* (refugees) of sturdy and truculent character, principally Circassian and Turcoman, were planted down all the length of the Trans-Jordan lands, except in Jebel Druz, where the ancient enmity of Druse and Arab was expected to be sufficient guarantee of Ottoman supremacy. Encouragement and compulsion were offered to the Bedouins round the head of the Syrian Desert and in the Trans-Jordan lands to induce them to renounce nomad life for agricultural settlement. In the south of Palestine an urban administrative centre was formed at the miserable hamlet of Bir-es-Seba (Beersheba); and a Court was constituted there to settle

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tribal disputes. Everywhere new public offices and new mosques rose as symbols of the Imperial authority and the pious fatherhood of the Sultan. In the latter part of the reign the construction of railways and roads was encouraged; and, in particular, the Hejaz railway was pushed southward east of the Jordan not only to consolidate Ottoman power in Syria as far as Maan, but also to knit Western Arabia to the Empire and to provide communication with the capital not dependent on someone else's control of the sea.

(1) *Arabia after* 1841

When, after 1841, the Nile Valley had passed *de jure* out of the Sultan's direct control (as, *de facto*, it had long passed), the Ottoman Caliph saw the necessity of strengthening his hold on Western Arabia and its Holy Cities, which tend always to become dependent economically and socially on Egypt. In Hejaz, in the 'forties, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, who left the local prestige of the Meccan Emirate at a very low ebb, the Porte hastened to assume direct control and impose its garrisons on the Holy Cities; and no sooner was the Suez Canal open to traffic than it took occasion, not only to strengthen those forces, but also to send an army down to Yemen sufficient to terminate the unsatisfactory *provisorium* which had obtained there since 1849. On the invitation of the Sana citizens themselves, Mukhtar Pasha marched up to the capital; and by 1872 all Yemen, except the highland regions of Amran, Khamir, and Saadah, was brought under Ottoman control. Even the Jauf and Mareb back-country, and the slopes towards Aden, were visited by Turkish columns. The forces in Yemen could communicate with those in Asir through the Tihamah, where the power of the Sherifs of Abu Arish had been broken, and that of Idrisi had yet to be; and with the Asir force communicating directly with that in Taif, the South Arabian army formed a guard on the flank of Mecca.

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Ottoman hold on Hejaz was strengthened further in the 'eighties by the ascendency which Othman Pasha secured over Emir Aun er-Rafik. The Porte nominated and removed Emirs of Mecca at will; and, till about 1911, when the present ruler of Hejaz had been three years in his position, it continued to dominate the Holy Cities, with some assistance from the Hejaz railway, completed to Medina in 1908. Though highland Yemen and, indeed, some part of the lowlands (*e.g.*, the Zebid district), proved so recalcitrant that the Porte had to maintain a strong force by dint of annual drafts, which tried severely both its resources and the patience of the population from which the recruits were drawn, its grip held good even through serious rebellions like those of 1891, 1904, and 1910. Its prestige was acknowledged in the Hadramaut, and was imposed even on Central Arabia, about 1890, by the conclusion of an informal alliance with the Rashid dynasty of Hail, to whose help in Qasim Ottoman columns were to be despatched more than once, both from north and west, in the latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign. A beginning of penetration along the Gulf shore and inwards had been made under Abdul Aziz, when Midhat marched in 1871 from Basra through Koweit into Hasa, and occupied both that province and the capital of Katr for the Porte, thus obtaining command of the inlets of supply to Central Arabia. Having Hail under their influence, the Turks seemed in a fair way to dominate Nejd, since in the 'nineties the Rashids had control also of Riyadh. But the restoration of the Saud dynasty there in 1902, and the consequent strengthening of British influence in Nejd, set them back again. Their hopes declined still lower when the Indian Government came to an understanding with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit; and they received a mortal blow in 1913, when Ibn Saud, descending on Hasa, chased the Turkish garrisons out of that province, and ultimately out of Katr too, freeing the north-western Gulf ports. A last effort by the Turks to retain a vestige of influence

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by inducing Ibn Saud to acknowledge their nominal suzerainty over the territories he had already won led to negotiations lasting from 1906 to 1914, and collapsed with the outbreak of war.

(2) *Irak*

In Irak and its borderlands Imperial Ottoman control never attained, even under Abdul Hamid, so satisfactory a position as in Syria. The urban centres from Baghdad to Basra were administered as directly from the capital and held as adequately as any Syrian cities; and the ways of communication not only between them, but also with the north and west of the Empire, were improved and policed sufficiently to make central control effective. For example, just before the close of the reign, a regular posting service was established from Aleppo down the Euphrates Valley to Baghdad, the tribesmen on both sides of the route having been cajoled or coerced into abstention from interference with the highway. But up to the last the Porte laboured under certain irremovable disadvantages, which limited its absolute discretion. Chief of these were (1) the proximity of British warships on the south, insistently solicitous about the waterway up the Shatt and the protection of the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammerah; (2) the proximity of the Persian border with its semi-independent, warlike mountaineers on the east, of the North Arabian and Syrian deserts on the west, and of the Mesopotamian steppes on the north; (3) the natural difficulties of the interfluvial marshes; (4) the Shiah majority among the Moslem population. Thanks to these various circumstances, the Porte had control neither of the outfall of its own chief waterway nor of one of the banks for a long way above the mouth. Tribal elements on the eastern fringe could not be controlled effectually; and the Tigris bank below Kut was never safe from attack. Though the Muntefik Arabs were induced to

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settle and take to agriculture in greater proportion than previously, the Saadun family continued to exercise an almost independent power in the western back-country of the Shatt, while the character of the country on both sides of the Lower Euphrates exposed its towns, from Hilla to Kerbela, to ever-present danger of raids from one flank or the other. The last-named city, with its companion Shiah sanctuaries of Nejef and Kufa, were consistent irritants to a Sunni government. The Shatt el-Hai Arabs and those of the Lower Mesopotamian steppes alike were consistently contumacious; and the high road from Fellujah to Baghdad was not secure. The upshot of the matter is that, outside the larger towns, there was little or no Ottoman feeling in Irak; the Sultan's writ ran only at the bayonet's point; Turks were regarded as hardly less alien than Europeans, and by a majority of the population detested on religious grounds more than the local Christians.

(3) *Bedouin and Kurdish Problems*

On the Mesopotamian steppes there is a Bedouin problem in the south and a Kurdish problem in the north. It cannot be said that, before Abdul Hamid's time, either was faced by the Ottoman Government, or that Abdul Hamid himself solved one or the other. But his administration made efforts which so far succeeded that the *de facto* rulers of the steppe country, Faris and Ferhan, the two rival chiefs of the Jebel Shammar, recognised the Sultan's nominal authority, and each accepted at his hands the title of Pasha. Though the Turks never took here the extreme course whereby, after Abdul Hamid's fall, they removed Saadun from the Muntefik country to die at Aleppo, they employed freely such means of coercion as were ready to their hand in their command of Bedouin markets and of the possessions of chiefs in the towns and settled lands. These measures, however, were less effective on the richer northern downs, where Ibrahim of the Milli

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had formed a league of independence, to which not only Kurds from Birejik to Jezireh-ibn-Omar, but also Arabs adhered. Down to the end of his reign Abdul Hamid did no better than save his face by a pretence that the Milli chief held sway under a grant from himself, and that the former's armed riders were troopers of the Hamidie Horse.

Nevertheless, it was among the Kurds as a whole that Abdul Hamid scored his most conspicuous success in comparison with his predecessors. By enticing or compelling Kurdish chiefs to visit Constantinople, by dealing drastically with the persons, families, and property of open rebels like Bedr Khan, by subsidies and honours to those who had not rebelled, by enrolling tribal warriors in the Hamidie Horse and giving them the uniform and training of Ottoman cavalry, by planting Ottoman administrators under the protection of detachments of regular troops wherever possible at a tribal centre or market, and finally by granting them the fields of Christians to ravage and the persons of Christian women to violate—by such means the Sultan tried to make the Kurds, from Erzerum to Khanikin, identify themselves with the Ottoman tradition and hope. Every European traveller who penetrated the wilder districts of Kurdistan, such as Bashkale or Rowanduz, found one or another of the Kurdish Beys he had been warned to reckon with, superseded by a Turkish Kaimakam who was often installed in the ancestral house of the vanished Bey himself. The policy of Ottomanisation was carried on patiently and remorselessly. The Armenian massacres of 1894–95 were part of it—a supreme concession to conciliate the Kurds and at the same time to commit them. There were no Kurds not affected, not even the Zaza Kurds of Dersim, the hardest of all to Ottomanise by Abdul Hamid's methods; for, being Shiah, they had no respect for the Caliph, and being at one with the Armenians in their midst they were not to be bribed with Christian flesh and blood. Armed posts on their

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borders and a guarded road through the heart of their mountains were the only weapons that could be used. After Abdul Hamid's fall the Young Turks ventured to take a step further, not without success, by sending a punitive expedition to Dersim districts which had not yet seen Ottoman arms; even as, on the other flank of the Kurdish area, they succeeded at last in dealing, once and for all, with Ibrahim of the Milli.

Fruits of this Kurd policy were evident both in the Balkan War and during the conflict of Turkey with the *Entente* Powers. Several Kurdish units, among them one in which sons of Ibrahim served, distinguished themselves in Rumelia. After a little unsteadiness in the first year of the recent war, the Northern Kurds ranged themselves definitely against the Russian Caucasus force, partly because it contained Armenians; and, after the Russian Revolution had weakened the Russian power of offensive, they were regarded by the Turks as a sufficient containing force. In the Rowanduz and Kermanshah districts also Kurds sturdily opposed and harassed Russian columns, although they took little hostile action against our own Mesopotamian forces.

Nationalist Movement among the Arabs

With the Arab-speaking peoples, on the other hand, such progress towards Ottomanisation as was made under Abdul Hamid was not maintained after his fall, but has been counterbalanced by a serious movement towards anti-Ottoman nationalism. Seeds of this were sown long ago, but they would not have sprouted generally had it not been for the Young Turks and the Pan-Ottoman policy of 1909. In Syria, where lives an educated native class relatively as numerous and absolutely as far advanced as that in the Turk-speaking area, nationalism rapidly grew and flourished. Beirut was the earliest centre of it, but it soon gained the other towns. The country districts, never assimilated by their Turkish masters, remained

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less affected. The Turks, aware of the existence and activity of " Young Arab " committees, began vigorous measures for their suppression in 1914. These redoubled in violence after the outbreak of the war. Leading Syrians were haled before courts-martial, and exiled or hanged, but this did not arrest the nationalist propaganda either in the Arab countries themselves or on foreign soils. The effect of Ahmed Jemal Pasha's " reign of terror " was to deprive Syria of almost all possible leaders of revolt, but to increase in the people the spirit of revolt. It crowned seven years of Ottomanising efforts by making Ottomanism impossible among Arabs.

Lower Irak received some seed of Arab nationalism, before the rest of the Eastern Arabs, from the hand of Seyyid Talib of Basra; but his movement had not time to spread far before the war brought a British invading force into the country. Nor, indeed, was there much favourable soil to which the plant could be transferred. Baghdad, where Arabs are well educated and progressive but a minority, formed nationalist committees; but in the rest of Irak, where the population is either predominantly Shiah or predominantly nomad, or both, particularism is even more the rule than in Syria. The Bedouin element does not desire any government; the Shiahs do not desire a Sunni government; no one, except, perhaps, some Kurds, wants to be ruled by Turks; but all desire to be ruled by Moslems.

Different Groups in Asia Minor

The Christian elements in Asia Minor have now imbibed ideas of nationalism which are inconsistent with the Ottoman ideal. The Greeks, not only of the islands, but of the western and southern littorals and the colonies of the Mæander basin, regard themselves as citizens " unredeemed " of the Hellenic Kingdom; and the Greeks of the Black Sea coast, and certain inland districts of Pontus, Cappadocia, and Phrygia,

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are learning to look on themselves in a similar light. As for the Armenians, everywhere present in smaller or larger groups, but nowhere a majority except in the Commagenian Taurus, all look now for their own kingdom, having found to their cost how vain was the hope of decentralised autonomy with which they greeted the advent of the Young Turks to power. It remains to be seen whether the establishment of a Zionist home in Palestine will detach the Jews also from the allegiance which, more whole-heartedly than any other non-Moslem race, they have given to the Turks. Other comparatively small separatist groups—Circassian, Laz, Kizilbash—may detach themselves eventually, but about these it is too soon to guess.

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I. GEOGRAPHY, PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The name Anatolia (Turkish "Anadolu") is derived from the Greek word Ἀνατολή ("Sunrise," "East") which was used in the later Byzantine period to describe the Greek territories in Asia. In this ancient sense, the southern boundary of Anatolia was the Taurus Range, whose eastern portion was for long the frontier between the Byzantine and the Arab territories. By the Turks of to-day the name "Anadolu" is used in two different senses. Occasionally it covers the whole of the Ottoman possessions in Asia, and sometimes even Persia in addition, but commonly it means the peninsula of Asia Minor, up to an indeterminate line between the Gulf of Alexandretta and the Black Sea. It is in the latter sense that "Anatolia" is now generally understood by Europeans. In this volume Anatolia is treated as consisting of the sanjaks of Ismid and Bigha, and the vilayets of Brusa, Aidin (or Smyrna), Kastamuni, Angora, Konia, and Adana, as they were constituted before the war.[1] The area is about 158,500 square miles.

(2) Surface, Coasts, River System, and Lakes

Surface and Coasts

Anatolia consists of a lofty oblong central plateau, bordered on the north, the west, and the south by a

[1] From the standpoint of the ethnologist, the eastern half of the vilayet of Adana might on good grounds be included in Armenia, but for the sake of clearness it has been thought advisable to deal with the whole province in a single book. For the same reason the vilayets of Trebizond and Sivas are treated as wholly belonging to Armenia (No. 62 of this series), though parts of them might justifiably be regarded as falling under Anatolia.

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rim of mountains, on the outer slopes of which is a fringe of coastland. The plateau is about 3,000 to 4,000 feet above sea level, and its surface is mainly composed of limestone, folded into ridges or penetrated by volcanic cones. The mountain rim is mostly of considerable breadth. On the north and south it is formed of chains parallel to the coast, the outermost of which generally fall abruptly to the sea.

On the west, however, the mountains slope gradually down to the coast for a hundred miles, and are separated from each other by river valleys, which provide avenues of communication between the coast and the interior.

It follows from the configuration of the land that the main routes across Anatolia have always been aligned roughly from west to east. The region, in fact, forms a natural bridge between the Balkan Peninsula and the interior of Asia, and has been used as such by merchants and soldiers from time immemorial. But there has never been much traffic between the Anatolian plateau and the north and south coasts.

The coastal region and the region of the interior present a sharp contrast. The first has more in common with southern Europe than with Asia. The second, in its surface, vegetation, and climate, betrays the fact that it is a western continuation of the mountains and steppes of Central Asia. The highlands of Asia Minor and those of Central Asia are practically identical in character; they consist alike of arid plains, studded with oases and salt lakes into which sluggish rivers flow, and fringed by mountains with parallel folds. The Anatolian Peninsula has been aptly described as "a bit of Asia set in a European littoral."

The central plateau may be divided, for the purpose of description, into three parts: (1) the Phrygian mountain region; (2) the Lycaonian steppe; and (3) the Galatian uplands.

1. The Phrygian mountain region extends from about the longitude of Ushak to about thirty miles east of Afium Karahissar, and is, indeed, continued to the

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neighbourhood of Konia by the ridges which succeed the Sultan Dagh on the south-east. Though the mountains seldom rise to a great height above the general level of the plateau, they constitute a serious obstacle to traffic between the west coast and the regions next to be described, and the routes through them are few and devious.

2. The Lycaonian steppe stretches from the Phrygian Mountains on the west to the neighbourhood of Kaisari on the east, and from the Taurus Range on the south to the Tuz Geul on the north. This plain, which contains large tracts of salt desert, is for the most part extraordinarily flat, but is varied by a number of isolated mountains, almost all of which are volcanic cones. Along the southern fringe of the steppe, wherever there is water for irrigation, there is a considerable amount of cultivation; elsewhere the plain gives a bare subsistence to cattle and sheep.

3. The Galatian uplands border the Lycaonian steppe on the north, continuing upwards to the mountain rim, and stretching from Eskishehir on the west to Sivas on the east, beyond the limits of Anatolia as defined in this book. This region, although generally classed with the steppe, is quite distinct from it in character, and consists of a series of bare rounded downs, intersected by cultivated valleys.

The coastal region falls into three zones: (1) the Black Sea or Pontic zone; (2) the Ægean zone; (3) the zone of Karamania or the South Coast.

1. The Black Sea or Pontic zone comprises the mountain country, 60-90 miles in width, lying between the Black Sea, with the eastern part of the Sea of Marmara, and the central Anatolian plateau. The mountains are broken through by transverse valleys only at a few points. On the north, they generally fall sheer down to the sea; but small alluvial plains border the coast here and there, and the Peninsula of Bithynia is a plateau of no great height. Of the valleys, only those running parallel to the coast afford room for cultivation and facilities for communication.

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The whole of the Pontic area is well wooded, and rich in minerals. The coast, however, is singularly lacking in natural harbours.

2. The western coastal zone is, in extent and importance, much the most considerable of the three. Its northern portion extends from the Dardanelles to the Phrygian mountain region, and from the western half of the Sea of Marmara to the northern rim of the Hermus basin, comprising the ancient Troas and Mysia. It is characterised by rugged mountains in the east, and by lower ranges, separated by fertile plains and valleys, in the centre and west.

The region south of Mysia takes its character from the great river valleys of the Hermus (Gediz Chai) and Maeander (Mendere), along which lie the historic routes from the west coast to the central plateau, *via* Afium Karahissar and Dineir. Between the parallel valleys of the Hermus and Maeander lies the smaller valley of the Cayster (Kuchuk Mendere). All these river valleys are fertile, and the whole district is economically one of the most valuable in the Near East.

The west coast of Anatolia is deeply indented, and has many sheltered gulfs and bays which are suitable for harbours.

3. The south coast zone consists mainly of the Taurus Range, which is for the most part a plateau lying at a height of 6,000 to 9,000 feet above sea-level. On its southern side it has a steep scarp, which generally falls sharply to the shore, but leaves room for a few alluvial deltas and the fertile plains of Pamphylia and Cilicia. The coast has several good natural harbours.

River System

Apart from the torrents which drain the outward slopes of the coastal mountains, the rivers of Anatolia either break through the mountain rim to the sea, or flow inwards to form marshes or lakes on the central plateau. The most considerable of the latter are the Akar Chai, east of Afium Karahissar, and the Charshembe Su, south of Konia.

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The most important rivers of the north are the Kizil Irmak and the Sakaria, both of which have winding courses and drain large areas. On the west, the valleys of the Hermus and the Maeander are rich and populous regions. The chief southern rivers are the Sihun and the Jihun, which flow from the northern slope of the Taurus into the Gulf of Alexandretta. The lower courses of these two rivers open out into a delta region which is one of the most fertile districts in Anatolia, and contains the important town of Adana.

With these exceptions, the southern rivers are mostly mountain torrents, only useful for such purposes as floating timber and supplying power for mills.

Lakes

Anatolia contains many extensive lakes, the largest being the great salt lake Tuz Geul, in the desert tract to the north-east of Konia. Other considerable stretches of water are Beyshehir Geul and Egerdir Geul, to the west of the chain of the Sultan Dagh, and Akshehir Geul, to the east of that range.

Another lake district exists to the north-west of Anatolia, in the region of Brusa. The chief lakes here are Isnik Geul and Abulliond (Apollonia) Geul.

(3) Climate

In Asia Minor, three climatic regions, which differ widely from one another, are to be distinguished: (1) the north coast or Pontic province, with a moisture-laden atmosphere all the year round; (2) the central plateau, characterised by aridity throughout the year; (3) the west and south coasts, with a climate of the Mediterranean type.

1. In the Pontic climatic province, which includes the edge of the Black Sea and of the Sea of Marmara, moist northerly winds are constant, blowing in summer towards Mesopotamia, and in winter towards the Ægean and the Levant. In summer the temperature

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in this area is not very high, but the weather is damp and sultry. The winter is damp and cold, and very snowy. The rainfall decreases considerably from east to west.

2. The climate of the central plateau runs to extremes.. The winters are cold, with snow and severe frost; the summers dry, with clear skies, intensely hot days and cool nights. For the latitude, the mean annual temperature is low. The winter temperature varies much with the locality; in valleys and depressions it is much lower than on hillsides or plains at the same level above the sea. The prevailing north winds discharge their moisture on the Pontic area, and the rainfall on the plateau is small, except in districts lying near the mountain rim. The Phrygian mountain district, for instance, has a good deal of rain, which reaches it from the south and west. The wettest season on the plateau as a whole is spring, though in early summer violent thunderstorms and hail attack districts near the mountain rim. Towards the south and south-east, as the depression of Mesopotamia is approached, the spring and autumn rains are replaced by winter rains, and the heat in summer increases. The greater part of the central plateau has an annual rainfall of 8-14 inches (20-35 cm.).

3. Mediterranean climatic conditions prevail in the coastal areas of the west and south. In winter there are damp south and west winds, accompanied by a mild temperature and a copious rainfall, which enables the vegetation to survive the intense summer heat. In summer north winds prevail, which are very hot and dry when they reach the south coast.

The weather of Anatolia has an important effect on the soil. The fact that the seasons of heat and of moisture do not coincide retards the disintegration of the rock, and soil is formed slowly. On the other hand, in consequence of the violence of rainstorms, there is much erosion. Thus deforestation, or the neglect of cultivation, often leads to an extensive wastage of the available soil.

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(4) Sanitary Conditions

The principal disease to which Europeans in Anatolia are liable is malaria. It is common in the low-lying portions of the west and south coasts, but comparatively rare on the central plateau, except in the neighbourhood of swamps. Europeans, especially those new to the country, suffer also from diarrhœa and occasionally from dysentery.

Outside malarious districts, conditions are generally healthy for Europeans. Precautions must, however, be taken against the sharp and sudden changes of temperature which occur everywhere in spring and autumn, and on the central plateau also in summer, and against such risks as are inevitably encountered in a country where scientific sanitation is unknown. Whether immigrants from northern Europe could be permanently acclimatised, and retain their vigour, is doubtful.

As regards the natives, malaria, tuberculosis, and syphilis are the chief diseases. Typhoid, smallpox, and rheumatism are also common, and epidemics of cholera and bubonic plague occur from time to time. The personal cleanliness enjoined by Islam, the healing power of the dry atmosphere, and the custom, almost universal in hot districts, of moving into *yailas* (tents or high-lying villages) in summer, do much to counteract the effects of the general filth.

(5) Race and Language

Religion and language rather than race, form the political and social dividing lines in Anatolia. The vast majority of the population is Moslem in religion, and the common language, for Moslem and Christian, is Turkish. Most of the Greeks, the Armenians, and the Kurds speak their own language as well, and the Turcoman and Yuruk nomads retain their ancient dialects, which are thought to resemble very closely the speech of the original Turkish conquerors of the country. But the character of these and other elements in the heterogeneous population of Anatolia cannot be

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explained without constant reference to their history and religious institutions, and all these topics are accordingly discussed together in Parts II and III of this Handbook.

(6) Population

The distribution of settlements in Anatolia is conditioned by the character of the country, with its large uncultivable tracts surrounding and isolating patches of fertile soil. Villages crowd on each other in the most favourable places, widely separated from other groups by mountain or desert. Except on the coast, most of the towns and villages consist of one-storey or two-storey houses, sometimes crowded so closely together that the roof of one house is the area of the next, but sometimes surrounded by extensive gardens. There are no trustworthy statistics regarding the population of Anatolia, but the following figures may be taken as approximate for 1914:—

Vilayet.	Population.	Vilayet.	Population.
Constantinople (Asiatic side)	240,000	Angora	932,800
Ismid	222,700	Kastamuni	961,200
Brusa	1,626,800	Sivas	1,057,100
Bigha	129,500	Adana	422,400
Smyrna	2,500,000	Trebizond	1,265,000
Konia	1,069,000	Total	10,426,900

Since 1914 the whole population has suffered serious losses through war, and the Greeks and Armenians have undergone repeated persecution; while, to complicate matters further, there has been a considerable influx of Moslem refugees from Europe.

The Christian inhabitants of Anatolia, especially the Armenians, are very prolific, and, if left in peace, would probably soon outnumber the Moslem population, which, notwithstanding immigration from Europe, has of late tended to decline.

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II. POLITICAL HISTORY[1]

Chronological Summary

1000-600 B.C. Greek colonies in Asia Minor.
546 B.C. Asia Minor conquered by Persians.
334 B.C. Asia Minor conquered by Alexander.
133 B.C. Roman Province of Asia.
A.D. 324-1453 Byzantine Empire.
Eleventh and twelfth centuries. Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor.
1245 (*circa*) Mongol invasion of Asia Minor.
1270 (*circa*) Ertoghrul at Yenishehir.
1288-1326 Osman I.
1326 Brusa captured by Ottomans.
1386 Conquest of Karamania by Ottomans.
1425 (*circa*) Nearly all Asia Minor under Ottomans.
1461 Trebizond captured by Turks.
1498 Cape route to East discovered.
Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Power of Dere Beys.
1808-1839 Mahmud II; centralising policy in Asia Minor.
1869 Suez Canal opened.
1876-1909 Abdul Hamid II.
1894-96 Armenian massacres.
1902 Baghdad Railway agreement.
1908 Young Turk Revolution.
1909 Armenian massacres.

(1) Introductory

Ethnical Boundaries.—Anatolia is washed on three sides by the sea, but on the north-west and west the sea is too narrow, or the water-ways too easy, to establish a definite dividing-line between Anatolians and Greeks or Slavs. On the east the boundary between Anatolians and Armenians, Kurds, or Syrians is still more indefinite. Only on the north and south are clear lines of demarcation imposed by nature.

[1] This section owes much to the works of Banse, Ramsay, and Vambéry.

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Origin and Composition of Population.—So far as our knowledge reaches, Anatolia has never, with the possible exception of the Hittite period, formed a single and complete political state, governed from a capital inside it. It has always appeared as a land of passage, a land-bridge, whose possession has been contested by States lying outside it. From this situation it follows that the population has absorbed in the course of history, and still goes on absorbing, many external elements. But it belongs to the genius of the land that all immigrant elements gradually die out, or lose their individuality and become merged in the Anatolian type.

Since the opening of the historical period, the ground stock of the Anatolian population, taken as a whole, has been the race called "Hittite," or "Armenoid," which has been ruled by many foreign masters, has learnt several languages in succession, has absorbed numerous foreign racial elements, such as Greek, Phrygian, Galatian, and more recently Turkish, but has always maintained its essential character and remained fairly uniform over the whole peninsula. Greek civilisation and the Greek language obtained a considerable hold on this population under the successors of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire: and this hold was strengthened and extended by the Christian Church, which by the end of the sixth century of our era succeeded in producing a level uniformity of language and religious profession over the entire country. But beneath the veneer of Hellenism, whether Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine, or Ecclesiastical, the bulk of the native population has always appeared as Anatolian or Asiatic in type and mentality, in contrast with the European Greeks and other South European peoples. The pure Greek element, away from the vicinity of the west coast, has never been large. It is usual to speak of the Byzantine Anatolians and their modern Christian descendants as "Greeks"; but the term must be understood as connoting religion, language, political aspirations, and to

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a certain extent civilisation, certainly not race. The majority of the present-day Greeks in Anatolia are of the same stock as the Moslems; the two are distinguished mainly by their religious profession, and by the mental and moral qualities engendered by Christianity and Islam respectively. The Greeks are Anatolians who have retained their Christianity. The Moslems comprise Anatolians whose ancestors embraced Islam, blended with a Turkish element, the strength of which varies in different regions—it is especially strong in the centre and south-east—and a sprinkling of races of pure blood, Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, &c. These facts form the groundwork of any study, ethnological, social, or political, of the modern population of Anatolia. It should be noted, however, that the people themselves are quite unconscious of a racial identity. Their entire history, and the relief of the country, which breaks the population up into isolated groups, have tended to accentuate differences rather than to promote unity.

"*Osmanli*" *and* "*Turk*."—"Osmanli" (Europeanised through the Greek as Ottoman) is a title claimed by the Turks of Anatolia and Thrace. It has no racial significance. It did not come into existence until two centuries after the conquest of Anatolia had been achieved by the Seljuk Turks. The original Osmanli were the "people of Osman," a Turkish chieftain who settled in the mountain district south and south-east of the Sea of Marmara. The successors of Osman rapidly extended their power, overrunning the north-west part of Asia Minor and the south-east part of Europe, and ultimately making themselves heirs to the Seljuk Sultans of Konia and leaders of the Turkish race and Empire.

The name "Osmanli," in these circumstances, became a sort of imperial designation. All Moslem subjects who felt loyalty to the Osmanli Sultans called themselves Osmanli. The title implies adherence to the governing religion and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. It thus acquires true political application

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and force. It expresses and sums up all that exists in the way of political and social unity and of loyalty to the dynasty among the separate Moslem races in Turkey. In theory, all Turkish subjects are Osmanlis. Thus a Kurd or a Circassian subject of the Empire may call himself "Osmanli," but not "Turk." In the first enthusiasm of the Revolution of 1908 the title was assumed by the Anatolian Christians, but the enthusiasm was short-lived.

In the name "Turk" several shades of meaning are to be distinguished. The name is often applied in Europe to the totality of the Moslem subjects of the Turkish Empire. This use is misleading.

(1) As affecting Anatolia, the name "Turk" first occurs in Byzantine and Arab historians, who use it indifferently of the Seljuk Turks and of the later bands of invaders (including those afterwards called Osmanli) who entered the country from the eleventh century onwards. As regards race and language, all these invaders were Turks, and the name was used as a racial designation covering all. Sometimes the Turcomans are distinguished from the Turks in the Byzantine histories; the distinction possibly corresponds to a sub-division[1]; it was certainly not racial. From the ethnical point of view this is the only correct use of the name "Turk" in reference to Anatolia.

(2) As the invaders settled down, and as sections of them became merged in the older population, the name "Turk" gradually became confined to the mixed Moslem population who lived in towns and villages. This is the connotation of the name "Turk" as used in the country at the present day. It is rather sharply defined as meaning the settled Moslem population of mixed Turkish and Anatolian blood, or of pure autochthonous descent, as opposed on the one hand to the nomadic or semi-nomadic Yuruks, Turcomans, and Kurds, and on the other hand to the settled Moslem immigrants who have entered the country recently

[1] See below, p. 19.

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(Circassians, Rumeliotes, Cretans, &c.). In the south-east Turks and Arabs are sharply distinguished. As Turcomans or Yuruks settle down, they come in the course of a generation or two to be called "Turks."

We have therefore to note the paradox that the name "Turk" is now given in the country to a section of the population which has comparatively little Turkish blood in its veins, and withheld from or rejected by other sections, such as the Yuruks and Turcomans, who are apparently of pure Turkish blood.

The restriction of the name "Turk" to the settled population probably explains the "contemptuous" use of the name, common in the country. "Turk" has long been used as a term of abuse, *e.g.*, "Turk Kafa" means "blockhead." This is probably an echo of the nomad's contempt for his settled neighbour, which is characteristic of Turkestan or Arabia.

(3) In the last few years there has been a tendency, springing from political motives, to give dignity to the name "Turk," and to regard the empire as cemented and represented by the governing Turkish race, rather than by the Moslem religion—in other words, to establish a political and racial ideal in opposition to the Pan-Islamic ideal of Abdul Hamid. This is the sense in which the Young Turks (many of whom, be it observed, are not Turks at all) apply the name to themselves; and this is the sense in which the name "Turk" forms the basis of Pan-Turanian claims in so far as these are urged from the Ottoman side (*cf.* No. 57 of this series). The odd feature in these claims is that they are put forward, in the first instance, by the class described in the next section.

(4) As applied to the thin upper stratum in the Ottoman State, the *effendis* of the large towns and the Turkish official class generally, the term "Turk" has a somewhat different connotation. Racially and physically, this caste is quite unclassable. They represent a mixture of elements derived from Turkish landowners, Albanian officers, Circassian women, kidnapped Christian children from Europe or Armenia,

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Arabs, Greeks, Negroes, and renegade Poles. Their common bond is their religious profession, their politico-national pride, and, as the only remaining inheritance from their Turkish predecessors, a militaristic aggressiveness which makes them the scourge of their subjects and a danger to their neighbours. They are the only element in Islamic society which has adopted European ways of life, especially in dress. In character and outlook they stand in marked contrast to the ordinary Anatolian Turks. Among Englishmen who have lived long enough in Turkey to survive the glamour of first impressions, Turkophiles will generally be found to be thinking of class 2, Turkophobes of class 4.

(2) The Turkish Conquest

There are two aspects of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia which claim the consideration of students of modern conditions in Anatolia—the causes which led to its rapid and complete success and its effects on social and economic conditions in the country.

At the time of the Turkish invasions Anatolia was governed from the Byzantine capital of Constantinople. Coming from the east, the Turks had no difficulty in overrunning defences which had been shattered by centuries of war against Sassanians and Arabs, and making themselves masters of an empire weakened by internal corruption and dissension. Anatolia fell piece by piece into the hands of the Turks between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. The racial affinities and original home of the various bands of invaders who successively overran Anatolia and each other during those centuries need not be discussed here. It is enough to say that the Turkish invaders came from Central Asia, and were the kinsmen of some of the Turkish-speaking tribes who still extend from the Caucasus to the Pamir Plateau.

The invaders were mere hordes of nomad warriors, adventurers who fought Byzantines or Crusaders, or who quarrelled among themselves, transporting the

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custom of the steppe to the highly-cultivated soil of Anatolia. After centuries of strife a definite hegemony over large parts of the peninsula was established by the Osmanli. The capture of Constantinople, which commands the principal route from the west into the interior, confirmed them in the possession of Anatolia.

The Turks adopted Islam, and they appear to have combined a ruthless repression of opposition with a ready welcome to all who cared to embrace Islam. The Anatolian population went over to Islam in masses.

The change from Christianity to Islam was not indeed sudden or catastrophic. We have seen that the bulk of the Anatolian population, under a veneer of Hellenism, remained Asiatic in habit and outlook; and this population, while it has repeatedly proved amenable to just and competent administration by external Western authority (Macedonian, Roman, Early Byzantine), has never had any difficulty in submitting to Oriental rule or Ecclesiastical authority (Persian, Arab, Turkish). It has been pointed out by Sir William Ramsay that the Byzantine Government itself had been growing more Oriental century by century.

> "One dynasty overturned another, and each was less 'Western' than the preceding one. Phrygians, Isaurians, Cappadocians, and Armenians ruled under the style of Roman Emperors, till at length a purely Oriental dynasty of Osmanlis eliminated even the superficial forms of the West. The change (from Byzantine to Turkish rule) was not in all respects so great as we are apt to suppose. The language and the religion and the government of Anatolia reached at last the Oriental goal to which the genius of the land tended."

In such a propitious soil the process of Turkification cannot have been difficult. The manner and duration of the process are obscure, and historians throw little light on it. It was Armenians and "Greeks" who were most exposed to Turkish influence, while the Kurds in the east and the Caucasians in the north were less and more gradually affected. Even as between the two Christian peoples, it should be noted that

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Great and Lesser Armenia, partly owing to the mountainous nature of the country, partly to the fact that they were more rapidly overrun, and that their population escaped decimation in protracted wars, were less exposed to Turkification than the "Greek" populations of the central plateau and coast-lands of Anatolia proper. Those districts became so Turkified in the earliest period of Turkish rule that in 1334 it was said that the only Greek city remaining in Asia Minor was Philadelphia. Among the causes of this extraordinary change must be reckoned the loss of political and religious control, which resulted from the rule of a succession of effete monarchs in Byzantium. The continued success of the Osmanli hordes had its effect in the complete demoralisation of the Anatolian population; and the cooling of Christian fervour after the Crusades opened the way to Moslem proselytism. Further, the declining Christian civilisation of Anatolia suffered from comparison with the brilliant culture of Seljuk Persia, which found an Anatolian home at the court of the Sultans of Konia. If the light of the Persian culture dazzled the eyes of the pious Crusaders from Europe, it is small wonder that the half-græcised Anatolian, deprived of both moral and material support from Byzantium, turned his eyes to the same light, and as time went on ceased to look on Osmanli domination with that horror which the advent of the Turk later aroused in Europe. In South-Eastern Europe, at the centre of Greek culture, the Turk represented the hated Asiatic spirit. In the outlying provinces of Anatolia he had less difficulty in imposing himself on a population already more than half-Asiatic.

Among the newly-arrived Turks, the notables settled in the towns, bringing masses of officials and craftsmen in their train, while the agricultural work on the estates granted to individual nobles was done by imported slaves and conquered Christians. At first "absenteeism," which more recently has been one of the drawbacks of Turkish agriculture, was no doubt the

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exception; and until a century ago many landowners governed their estates in patriarchal fashion. In such a situation the effect of the privileges assured by the adoption of Islam soon made itself felt on the masses, and many went over to the Turkish faith. The weakness and helplessness of average Christian feeling can be judged from the fact that we find high officers in the Byzantine army, who fought as bitter enemies against the Turks, appearing presently as their co-religionists and fervent partisans. No doubt the Greeks who went over to Islam maintained their own language for a time; and there are said by Vambéry to be Moslems who still use that language in their prayers; but as a rule it was only those Greeks who remained Christian, and not even all of them, who retained its use. Where the Turkish element predominated, any opposition to it was of course out of the question; and, as time went on, forcible conversion on a large scale succeeded to the easy tolerance of individual Turkish leaders in the earlier period. It was the later Osmanli, rather than the earlier Seljuk princes, who carried on the work of Turkification with most energy and success. The Seljuks, in their political and cultural relations, looked to the east; the Osmanlis conceived the idea of a Turkish State astride the Straits. Those among the older population who resisted the new order perished or fled oversea; and the strong military and hierarchic constitution of the Turkish State reduced the remainder to a uniform level in a surprisingly short time.

Had the Christian population of Asia Minor not been divided by the sea from its co-religionists in the West, had it been able (like the Greeks of Europe) to lean for support on a continuous chain of similar religious systems, the Osmanlis might have found the task of Turkification much more difficult. So much might be argued from the analogy of the Slavs in Europe, who, though they flocked in crowds to Islam, yet continued to maintain intact their ethnical individuality and their language. In any case the Turkish

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influence could not be so intense on the north-western frontier of the gigantic empire as in the centre and east, and could not produce the same denationalising effect. In Anatolia, on the other hand, the ground was already prepared for the coming transformation; and it has been assumed with much probability that before the end of the fourteenth century Anatolia had been Turkified to as great an extent as it is to-day.

In its effect, the Turkification of Anatolia is a historical curiosity. It is the process whereby a minority of invaders of a lower civilisation than the older population has been absorbed physically by the older population, but has in turn imposed its language, religion, habits, and aspirations on its subjects. Anatolia is now, and has been for centuries, the core of the Turkish Empire. All the Turkish possessions lying outside Anatolia and the adjacent strip of Thrace have for long been kept in subjection to the Turks with the blood of Anatolian soldiers.

(3) Effects of the Turkish Conquest

Racial.—From what has been said above it follows that little of the physical type of the true Turk can be looked for in Anatolia. From the beginning of the process of amalgamation the Anatolian peasant and townsman represented at the most a mixture in which the Turk was never an important ingredient; and, as time went on, the population continued to absorb an uninterrupted influx of Aryan and Semitic elements—Kurds, Persians, Lazes, Circassians, Georgians, Macedonians, Bosniaks, Rumeliotes, Tatars, Jews, and other smaller bodies. But these elements have done little to modify the characteristic Anatolian type. As a rule the new-comers do not intermarry with the older population; many of them fail to become acclimatised in Anatolia, and die out.

To sum up, the Anatolian Turk is of mixed race, springing from a union between a section of the Turkish invaders and the older population, and he is

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more Anatolian than Turkish. This stock falls into two originally different, but now indistinguishable, classes:—

(1) The offspring of Turkish conquerors marrying women of the old population.

(2) A large proportion of the old population who adopted Mohammedanism.

Side by side with the Turks, as thus defined, two important groups are to be noted:—

(1) The descendants of those portions of the old population who resisted amalgamation with the conquerors and their Mohammedanised neighbours, and have conserved their orthodox faith to the present day. These are the Greeks, who are discussed below.

(2) The nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes of pure Turkish blood who are found in relatively small numbers in parts of Anatolia. These tribes extend over the southern mountains from Aidin to Diarbekr, and over large portions of the central plains. The population of the towns and settled villages consists of Turks, or, as they call themselves, Osmanli; the nomads and semi-nomads of Turkish blood are the Turcomans and Yuruks. The distinction between Turks and Turcomans is clear to the foreign observer, and is emphasised by the people themselves. The Turcomans and Yuruks are closer in character to the original Turkish invaders, for they are more distinctly central-Asiatic in physical type and in occupation. The Turks of the towns and settled villages approximate more in social type, and in their peaceful and law-abiding character, to a European population.

Generally speaking, the Yuruks are more truly nomadic than the Turcomans, whose winter and summer settlements are usually close together, while the Yuruks travel over a wider area. The real difference is that the Turcomans practise agriculture, which binds them to a particular locality, to a greater extent than the Yuruks. Whatever original tribal difference may

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have existed between Turcoman and Yuruk, they represent to-day respectively the semi-nomad and the nomad, and their habits illustrate the manner in which the Turks as a whole—originally nomads—have gradually settled down and become merged in the old sedentary population.

The common hypothesis that the sedentary Turks of to-day are the descendants of the original Seljuk and Osmanli invaders, while the Turcomans and Yuruk nomads are the offspring of tribes who entered Anatolia at a later date, is disproved by all the evidence. The distinction between Turks and Turcomans goes back to the Byzantine historians of the Turkish conquest. There may have been an original tribal difference between the two; but any such distinction has been entirely supplanted by the much broader and deeper line of cleavage which has been described above. The question why some of the invaders mixed with the old population and settled down almost at once, while others remained of pure stock, and retain their nomadic habits till the present day, is a psychological as well as a historical puzzle. It is no doubt true that the nomads have been reinforced from time to time by fresh immigration of kindred tribes from the East.

Certain it is that the nomads retain the physical characters of the true Turk in a purer form than their sedentary neighbours. In appearance they are said to resemble the Turks of Azerbaijan, especially the Terekme and Karapapak tribes. Their dialect is likewise said to bear a striking resemblance to the language of Azerbaijan, both in peculiarities of pronunciation and in the retention of a stock of old Turkish words, which in Ottoman Turkish have been modernised or replaced by borrowed words from Persian or Arabic.

The fluctuation in the ethnical composition of Anatolia is continuous, because Anatolia is a bridge over which peoples must move. But in spite even of such recent immigration as that of Caucasian, Bosniak, and Rumeliote colonists—who, it is true, were Moslem-

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ised before they entered the country—there has existed for centuries a stereotyped character which cannot be ignored. There is an unmistakable type, or series of similar types, which to some extent level down the racial and local divergence. In any case these divergences are slight. Vambéry has distinguished a northern, western, and southern type, mainly on the rather slippery ground of dialect; and it has been suggested that the old Anatolian ethnical core is stronger in the north and west than even in the settled population in the south. It is true that the "Greek" element in the physical type grows more pronounced as the west coast is approached; but the difference in physical character between the inhabitants of north and south, east and west, is negligible.

Social.—Together with this uniformity of physical characteristics, there is an even greater uniformity of intellectual and moral qualities and of social habits over the whole country. In a country marked off both by geographical conditions and by a pre-existing Greek culture from both Arabia and Central Asia, the effect of centuries of a Byzantinised Moslem civilisation has been to produce among the Anatolian Turks an individual type of social life and custom. In spite of the deep chasm dividing Moslems from Christians, the former came strongly under the influence of Byzantine and Græco-Anatolian culture. In the process of settling down among a people used to centuries of civilised life, the children of the steppe had to learn more than they taught. The influence of Persian and Arab culture on the Osmanlis is matter of common knowledge. So long as the Osmanli were a society of nomad warriors, the influence of the Seljuk culture of Persia held sway over them. The strong Persian element in their language and literature is derived from this phase of their development. Their conversion to Islam brought them likewise under the influence of Arab culture, which gave the Turkish State its strong hierarchic character, and stamped literature and the language of daily life with a deep Arabic impress.

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Both these influences, and especially the second, are still operative. But there must also be included the Græco-Anatolian influence, which came more fully into play when the Ottoman State was finally established on the Bosporus, and masses of Christian Greeks were incorporated into the body politic and even into the race. The change in geographical conditions from Central Asia to the Anatolian peninsula imposed a similar change in dress and habits; Byzantine art combined with Persian models to produce the characteristic monuments of the early Turkish period, and Byzantine culture effected a subtle transformation in Turkish and Moslem ideas and customs. Among customs due to Byzantine influence we may quote the Ottoman's predilection for the "salta," or short jacket, which offends against the orthodox Moslem's insistence on a cloak which shall cover the outline of the body, and the fashion of shaving the beard, introduced by Sultan Selim I, and strongly disapproved of by other Mohammedans, in particular by the Turks of Central Asia.

Economic.—It is a common charge against the Turk that his genius is to destroy, not to build. A study of the economic effects of the Turkish occupation of Anatolia will enable us to test this statement, and clear the ground for a consideration of measures to improve the economic position of the country.

Asia Minor was regarded by the Romans as one of the richest portions of their empire. Its wealth was derived from the development of its natural resources, vegetable and mineral, which are immense, and also from its position astride the main highway between the Mediterranean world and Asia, which made it a great avenue of trade. In discussing the effects of the Turkish regime on the prosperity of the country, it is necessary to distinguish between these two sources of wealth. The Turks may or may not be held responsible for interference with the first. Causes over which the Turks had no control interfered with the second.

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Deterioration had of course set in before the coming of the Turks. Over-taxation, misgovernment, and civil dissension during the Byzantine period must have exacted a heavy toll from the internal well-being of Anatolia, and the long series of wars with Saracens and Arabs must have disturbed the course of trade over the country. But the important point to note is that the Turks found Anatolia a settled agricultural and industrial country. They were responsible for its becoming to a great extent a country of nomads.

Many of the bands of Turks who entered Asia during and after the conquest were nomads. From the first a line of cleavage seems to have developed among the conquerors themselves, some of them settling with the older population in towns and villages, and practising crafts and agriculture, while others retained, and retain to this day, their nomadic habits. Agriculture implies settlement, and cannot flourish in a country overrun by nomadic shepherds and goat-herds. The result was that large stretches of fertile country went out of cultivation, and the century-long accumulation of agricultural skill was irretrievably lost. The forest wealth of the country suffered from the same cause. The goat keeps down forests by destroying the young trees, and the nomad does not scruple to set fire to large tracts of forest land to clear ground for pasture. Vast stretches of timber-bearing land have been, and continue to be, laid waste by these causes. Other economic effects have followed from the introduction of Central Asiatic modes of life. For example, the cultivation of the olive, a prime source of wealth in Mediterranean countries, is now confined to the few districts where Greeks predominate. The nomadic Turks prefer butter to olive oil.

While the Turks may be fairly charged with the impoverishment due to these causes, it should be noted, on the other hand, that the Turkish Government has done all in its power to suppress nomadism and to force or cajole the nomads to settle down. Where nomadism has been encouraged, as in Armenia, it was

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done with a special purpose. The nomad is the particular enemy of the tithe-collector, and the Government has a special interest in suppressing him. Nomadism has long been disappearing, and will in the end disappear completely, apart from the central steppes, where it is the only possible mode of existence, and where the nomads are easily isolated.

The discovery of the Cape route, opening up sea communication with the Far East, heavily discounted the second source of the wealth of Anatolia, and the opening of the Suez Canal practically destroyed it. The Baghdad Railway, when completed, will restore the position of the country on an active trade route, and will continue and extend the work which has already been done by the existing railways in developing the country. The diversion of Far Eastern trade from the overland route to the sea routes has had as much to do with the impoverishment of Anatolia as the sins of the Turkish Government and the ineptitude of the Turkish people. It must not be forgotten, however, that one of the motives for the discovery of new routes to the East was the closing of the old land-routes owing to the Turkish conquests.

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III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Religious Organization

Mohammedanism is the established state religion; and the profession of Islam is the touchstone of loyalty as well as the guarantee of privilege. The Sultan, as Caliph, is supreme head, even if he holds the position illegally according to the letter of the Koran. The chief ecclesiastical dignitary is the Sheikh ul-Islam, who is a member of the Cabinet. It is characteristic of the political character of the Mohammedan Church that the main functions of the Sheikh ul-Islam are judicial rather than spiritual.

Mohammedans form the vast majority of the population of Asia Minor, and the term is used to include the members of many small sects like the Takhtaji and Ansarie, who are Mohammedans only in name.

A priesthood in the strict sense of the term cannot be said to exist in Mohammedan Turkey. The Ulema, however, or persons connected in one way or another with the official ministrations of Islam, form a separate class. The principal offices in connection with mosques, theological schools, &c., are to a large extent hereditary.

The temporalities of the State Church are controlled by the Ministry of Pious Foundations, or Vakuf, which has a separate budget of its own. The revenue of the Vakuf is principally derived from charges on, and reversionary interests in, real property which has at one time or another been consecrated to religious or benevolent purposes, and which is known as Vakuf. A large part of the urban property of the Empire is Vakuf.

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The Orthodox Church in modern times has accepted the practice that, wherever there is an independent State, the Church within that State should have its own government. Owing, however, to historical reasons, there are three patriarchates within the Ottoman Empire—those of Constantinople, Antioch, and Jerusalem. It is sometimes held that the first of these has authority over the others, but the extent to which this is so in practice is very limited. The Anatolian Greeks are under the jurisdiction of the patriarch of Constantinople. There is a minority of Greek Uniats in communion with Rome.

With the Anatolian Christians, as we have seen, religion and nationality are identical. This conjunction has had important effects on the history of the Greek Church. Since 1453 the Greeks have always spoken with one voice; their mouthpiece has been their Church. They have been singularly tenacious of their rights, which have all clustered round their Church. In return the Church saved the race. They had privileges granted to them by Mahomet II immediately after the conquest of Constantinople. Throughout the centuries which have passed since his time, these privileges have often been confirmed, the latest formal confirmation being in the Hatti Sherif of Gulhane, of 1839, the Hatti Humayun, of 1856, and the Constitution of 1876. Among their most valuable privileges has been the right of the Patriarch to make representations on behalf of his flock to the Sultan and the Turkish authorities respecting the violation of any of the privileges, and to exercise legal jurisdiction over the members of his community in all matters in dispute among them. The concession was in accordance with mediæval practice not only in Moslem but in Christian States. It was not long, however, before the jurisdiction was limited to what now exists, *viz.*, to the right of jurisdiction in reference to marriage, succession, and questions of personal status. To maintain these privileges the Church has constantly been in conflict with the State. So long as by the Constitution the estab-

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lished religion of the country is Mohammedanism, it is a necessity for the Christian communities that they should maintain their own courts. Monogamous family life is the basis of such communities; and, if the State does not recognise this, the Christians must be permitted to exercise jurisdiction in regard to such matters as bigamy and right of succession.

The Greek Church in Anatolia is miserably poor; the clergy are ill-paid, and the standard of education among them is very low.

The Armenian Church.[1]—The National Church of Armenia is called the Gregorian, because the conversion of the nation was largely due to Gregory, the Parthian, known as the "Illuminator," whose great work was accomplished about 300 A.D., when Christianity was adopted as the established religion. The Kingdom of Armenia was thus the first State to erect Christianity into the national faith. The Church has adopted only the decisions of the three great Councils —Nicæa, Constantinople, and Ephesus—as against the seven recognised by the Orthodox Church. The history of the Armenian Church is a long martyrology, and it has always maintained a powerful hold over the race. Armenians felt the influence of Hellenism very slightly. They were always iconoclasts, with a strong tendency to reject Trinitarian doctrines—traits which suggest a certain spiritual kinship with the Moslems.

The Armenian Patriarch has no territorial title—he is called "Patriarch of all the Armenians." He resides in Constantinople. While the government of the Church is in his hands, aided by his council, the spiritual head is the Catholicos, who resides at Echmiadzin in Russia. Although the majority of Armenians are found in Armenia, there is no province or important city in the Empire which is without them.

A large number of Armenians have gone over to the Catholic communion, and form a Uniat Community known as the Armenian Catholic Church. This com-

[1] See *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

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munity has on several occasions enjoyed the protection of the French and Austrian Governments.

Protestant communities, mainly found as the result of the teaching of American missionaries, exist in many places.

(2) Political

Form, Character, and Methods of Government

Anatolia, like the rest of the Turkish Empire, is divided into vilayets, these into sanjaks, these into kazas, and these into nahies. A Vali or Governor-General, representing the Sultan, and assisted by a Provincial Council, is placed at the head of each vilayet. The minor divisions are subjected to inferior authorities (respectively Mutesarrifs, Kaimakams, and Mudirs), who are responsible to the Vali of the vilayet in which their division is included.

An exception to the general method of sub-division is formed by the so-called "independent" sanjaks, which are governed by Mutesarrifs reporting directly to the Minister of the Interior. The tendency of recent years (accentuated since the war began) has been to increase the number of these "independent" sanjaks by detaching ordinary sanjaks from the vilayets to which they were assigned. The feudal government of large tracts of Anatolia by independent chieftains or Dere Beys, in vogue in the early part of last century, has everywhere ceased, often to the detriment of the peasants, who have now no one to protect them from the Government officials.

In theory the official career is open to all subjects of the Sultan. In practice the administrative services are manned from a restricted, largely hereditary, caste, mainly Moslem (including, in Anatolia, some Circassians and Kurds), with a large number of Armenians filling the lower offices. The officials receive no adequate training, and are poorly paid, if paid at all. The result is that they are tempted, or inclined, to amass wealth from the proceeds of bribery and exac-

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tion. Their exactions fall with impartiality on Moslem and Christian alike; and even the Moslem cannot secure justice except at a price in bribes which usually deters him from seeking it. Naturally, therefore, the Turk reduces his dealings with the Government to a minimum, and distrusts and shuns the officials.

Under Abdul Hamid government was centralised in the capital, and rested on a system of espionage and police coercion, which penetrated into every house in the country. Since the Revolution the local authorities have had a freer hand; but all power rested with the Committee of Union and Progress, which controlled Parliament and dictated all appointments.

The Young Turks made some effort to improve and cleanse the administration, not without success. After the Revolution the police in particular were for a time regularly paid, and their former methods of treating the peasants discouraged. But the deadweight of traditional usage, and the total absence of a class from which honest and efficient officials can be drawn, brought these efforts to nought.

That mutual confidence on which democratic government ultimately rests is absent in Anatolia, not only as between the different races and creeds, but as between the members of each race and creed. Although government now rests nominally on a democratic franchise, it appears inevitable that power will continue to be centralised in the hands of a despot or of an irresponsible oligarchy such as the Committee of Union and Progress. Capacity apart, the Anatolian population has no real belief in self-government. They long, without exception, for an honest and efficient administration. Whether they would prefer the moderate amount of honesty and efficiency which is all they can expect under the most enlightened native government, or the higher standard of administration and justice which they know to obtain in Egypt or Tunis, is a question which different Anatolians would answer differently. It is certain that in the years of

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disillusionment which followed the Revolution the great majority of the natives would have welcomed any government but the Turkish. The success of British administration in Egypt, and the example set by foreign schools and hospitals, especially the American, have provided the natives with a standard by which to judge the similar efforts of their own Government.

(3) Public Education

Elementary education is nominally obligatory for all children of both sexes. Under the Provisional Law of October 6, 1913, all children from 7 to 16 are to receive primary instruction, which may be given in State schools, schools maintained by communities, or private schools, or, subject to certain tests, at home. The State schools are under the direct control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, which also provides for the inspection of schools maintained by the non-Moslem communities, &c. Besides these there survive a large number of Medressehs or theological seminaries, connected with religious foundations. The general level of efficiency in the State schools is low. There are a large number of foreign schools, mostly conducted by French, English, and American missionaries; but they draw the majority of their pupils from the Christian population.

The Mohammedan *bourgeoisie* can read, write, and count; few of them know any European language, except officials and residents in the coast towns, some of whom speak French. The Mohammedan peasants are totally illiterate. The best native schools are those maintained by the Greeks, who show by far the smallest percentage of illiterates. Most Greeks, even in country villages, are masters of the "three R's"; like the Armenians, they generally write Turkish in the characters of their own language. The Greeks and the Armenians are both interested in education; but the Greek rises above the Armenian in his appreciation of education as an end in itself. The Armenians and Greeks flock in large

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numbers to the American schools and colleges, with the result that in most towns and villages in the eastern part of Asia Minor English-speaking Christians are found.

The American colleges have played a very important part in the development of an interest in education in Anatolia; and the influx of able students from the Balkans and from Southern Russia has given these colleges a position of considerable influence throughout the Near East.

Educated Turks are attracted by the literature and civilisation of the French, to the exclusion of other European nations. England and Germany make poor seconds.

(4) Social

(i) *Moslems and Christians.*—Social distinctions of the type familiar in Europe are absent; social life is thoroughly democratic. The sharpest line of cleavage in Anatolian society is that formed by religion. The chasm dividing Moslems and Christians is abysmal; even if a common environment produces an appearance of uniformity in regard to externals, yet, in respect of mental and moral qualities, and of attitude to the problems that affect Turkey or the outside world, the Moslem and the Christian represent two entirely different points of view.

In keeping with its diversified cultural origin, the social custom of the Anatolian population is a patchwork of Byzantine-Christian, Arabian-Islamic, and Central Asiatic elements on a solid autochthonous background. Age-long custom, determined by soil and climate, government by a caste which still retains traces of all the stages in its progress from the steppes of Central Asia to the rich inheritance of the Emperors of Byzantium, and the spiritual and social predominance of Islam fix the large traits of social life for old population and immigrant alike. It is often difficult to assign its origin to a particular custom or to prophesy regarding its retention or disappearance. Thus

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the habit of moving into *yailas* in summer, which characterises a large part of the population, sometimes corresponds to the "semi-nomadic" stage in the settling down of true nomads, sometimes is simply the age-long habit of moving from winter village to summer village and back again which is imposed by the variety of climatic conditions in a limited area. Under one aspect, the custom is transient, and may disappear; under the other, it is a permanent way of life.

Islam, with its contemplative outlook, its dignified and courtly forms, its quiet submission to established authority, influences Moslem and non-Moslem alike; and even the Christian communities wear a strong Moslem aspect to the European eye. As an example, the seclusion of women, and their employment in all the drudgery of everyday life, while more pronounced among the Moslems, is also a Christian characteristic. Difference in religion brings out sharp contrasts in isolated particulars, but a common racial origin and a common physical environment produce a level uniformity of custom in regard to dwellings, dress, food, etiquette, industry, amusements, and superstitions, which overrules all divergences.

An external form of "Europeanisation" has made considerable progress in the social custom of Anatolia, affecting both Moslems and Christians; but, as between the two creeds, there exists an instructive difference of attitude to the culture of Europe. Moslems and Christians are united by the similarity of their Oriental culture; both alike are conscious of the deep chasm which divides their civilisation from that of Europe. But Christianity and political aspirations bring the Christian peoples into a certain sympathy with European ways. This sympathy expresses itself in varying ways with different individuals and classes. The educated Greek or Armenian adopts European manners as the outward symbol of his acceptance of the modern educated man's view of life. But if a Turkish official follows European customs in dress or other external matters, it is in order that he may challenge com-

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parison, in the eyes of his fellow-Moslem, with the progressive Franks, and prove his capacity for leadership among the nations in the circumstances of modern times. To this end he is prepared to bow the knee to modernism in almost any form, even if he is not prepared to abandon his distinctive culture in the process.

Moslems.—Those classed as Moslems comprise a variety of races of varying degrees of orthodoxy, from the free-thinking Young Turk official, whose conformity to Islam is merely adopted for political reasons, at one end of the scale to the wild and retiring Takhtaji of the Taurus Mountains, who is outwardly a Moslem, but practises rites derived from pre-Christian paganism at the other. The vast majority are orthodox and pious Sunni Moslems, as a rule strikingly free from fanaticism (though many districts form exceptions), with a sprinkling of Shiahs represented by some of the immigrant Kurds and Kizilbash Turcomans. All the Moslems speak Turkish; generally speaking, among the peasantry only the Kurds and a few of the Circassians are bilingual.

Christians.—Leaving the Levantines (generally Roman Catholics) out of account, the principal Christian communities are the Greeks and the Armenians. They form the chief of a number of non-Mohammedan native communities, or *millets*, recognised by the Turkish Government, and granted complete religious, and a large measure of civil, autonomy.

After the capture of Constantinople in 1453, Mohammed II organised his non-Moslem subjects in communities under ecclesiastical chiefs, to whom he gave absolute authority in civil and religious matters, and in dealing with criminal offences (such as bigamy) which did not come under the religious law of Islam. This arrangement, designed to simplify the task of government, has had far-reaching effects on the political life of Anatolia. It established an *imperium in imperio*, which secured to the Christians a distinct position before the law, the free enjoyment of their religion, control over the education of their children,

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and considerable autonomy in the management of their communal affairs. The *millet* organisation encouraged the growth of a separate communal life, which in its turn engendered a longing for separate national life. In Anatolia the Greeks and the Armenians are the main representatives of this tendency.

Greeks.—Physically, two types can be recognised among the Anatolian Greeks, corresponding to a diversity of origin. One is the old Anatolian type, descended from the Hellenised Christian population, which the Turks found in Anatolia on their entry into the country. The other corresponds to the type of Greek in Europe and the Ægean Islands, from which there has been continuous immigration throughout history.

Before the war the extension and importance of the Greek element in Asia Minor had been increasing year by year. They occupy the fertile coast-lands of the west and south, and to some extent of the north, in solid masses, and move slowly but continuously into the interior. Their native language, long neglected, is now carefully fostered, and nearly all Greeks speak it as well as Turkish. They spare no expense to secure teachers and give their children a good education. The Greeks of the west coast are skilled seamen and fishermen. In the interior the majority are engaged in agriculture, industry, and trade. The intelligent Greek has found a lucrative industry in the cultivation of fruit and vines, and the rearing of silk-cocoons and the spinning of silk is largely in their hands. Crafts requiring special skill in the towns are almost exclusively manned by Greeks. Like the Armenians, they engage not only in retail trade in the interior, but in commerce on a large scale in the coast towns. This gives them great influence in the economic sphere, and has enabled them to amass much wealth. A strong sense of community holds the Greeks together and increases their power. A leading trait is their quarrelsomeness, which brings them into continuous conflict with the Turkish authorities.

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At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Greek population of Anatolia was reckoned at 1,300,000,[1] and given favourable conditions, would have increased rapidly. But the action of the Turkish Government during and after the Balkan War drove many of the Greeks oversea; and even sterner measures appear to have been adopted during the present war.

The great majority of the Greeks of Anatolia belong to the Orthodox Church, and are under the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople in religious matters. The Greek Uniats, who recognise the Roman Pontiff as their head, are few in numbers.

Armenians.[2]—These exist (or existed before the war) as a settled population only in Armenia and in some parts of the adjoining vilayets. Only here do they live *en masse*. In Anatolia generally they belong to the Diaspora, and usually live in separate quarters of the towns. They practise all arts and crafts requiring skill and intelligence. They are distinctly more oriental than the Greeks; and the ordinary Turk is better disposed to the Armenians than to any other non-Moslem people. The majority belong to the Armenian or Gregorian Church. There are minorities of Catholics, under the authority of the Pope, and of Protestants, organised in a *millet* by themselves.

Relations of Moslems and Christians.—Loyalty to the Sultan and Caliph, a strong sense of political dominance, a firm conviction that, man to man, they are superior to the Christians—such are the leading political motives of the Anatolian Moslems. Their feelings towards their Christian fellow-subjects vary between non-committal friendliness and jealous hostility, and their general attitude is one of contemptuous toleration. As against their sense of superiority must be set the fact, of which the Moslems themselves are conscious, that they stand on a lower intellectual plane

[1] Another estimate gives 1,715,000; R. Puaux and P. L. Alaux, *Le Déclin de l'Hellénisme;* Paris, 1916. Sir E. Pears, *Turkey and its People*, 1911, gives 1,600,000.

[2] See *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

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than the Christians, and cannot compete with them in trade and industry. Under normal circumstances the two creeds live together on terms of neighbourliness.

This does not mean that the Greeks and Armenians are satisfied with their lot. Whatever their racial origin, the important fact is that the Greeks regard themselves as the kinsmen of the European Greeks; and Pan-Hellenic irredentism has awakened hopes of union with Greece, especially on the west coast. The Armenians of Anatolia—or, at any rate, such as are capable of clear thinking—are under no similar illusion; but they share and support the political aspirations of their race, and have borne their share in its persecution.

This brings us to the subject of massacre, which is, unfortunately, the feature most familiar to Europeans in the relations of Moslem and Christian in Anatolia. Various explanations of the motives of the massacres of Armenians are fashionable in Europe, and vary from time to time as one European nation or another is friendly or hostile to the Porte. German publicists lay stress on the intrigues of Russia and England, who encourage Armenian revolutionaries, with the object of weakening Turkey, or giving an excuse for intervention. But the real motives, both under Abdul Hamid and under the Committee of Union and Progress, have been, on the part of the Government, the determination at all costs to maintain the dominance of the Moslem over the more intelligent and progressive Christian nationalities, and, on the part of an assenting public opinion, jealousy of the economic strength of the Christian element. It should also be remembered that, from the Pan-Turkish point of view, the Armenians and Kurds are a non-Turkish *bloc* separating the Osmanli Turks from the Turks of Central Asia.[1]

(ii) *Turks and non-Turkish Moslems.*—While the Anatolian Moslems form a solid block in opposition to the Christians, they are by no means a compact body

[1] See, in this connexion, *The Pan-Turanian Movement*, No. 57 of this series.

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in respect of sentiment any more than of race. The main motives of feud or dissension are as follows:—

The Turks are the old settled Moslems, in contrast, on the one hand, with the nomads or semi-nomads, and, on the other, with the settled communities of recent immigrants. Between a settled agricultural population and roving groups of nomads there must always be some friction; and this is intensified in Anatolia by diversity of race and differing grades of religious orthodoxy, and often outlasts the settling-down of the nomads. The chief races who are still or have recently been nomadic are the Turcomans, Kurds, Yuruks, and Avshars. All these groups, and the Turks, live apart from each other, hold little communication, seldom intermarry, regard each other with dislike or contempt, and curse the religions of their respective fathers. The degree of attachment to the doctrine of Islam varies considerably in the different groups, although all are officially classed as Moslems, and none are officially treated as rayahs, like the Christians. The parts of the peninsula most affected by nomadism are the central steppes and the mountains of the south and south-east.

Similar causes of feud exist between the older settled population, including in this case the nomads who are in process of settling down, and the large numbers of *Muhajirs*, or immigrants of Moslem religion from neighbouring Christian States, who have been given land throughout Anatolia in recent years. The older inhabitants resent the intrusion of these immigrants, who occupy much land formerly available for pasture. Between the quarrelsome and predatory Circassian immigrants and their Turkish neighbours there is a standing feud everywhere. The Rumeliote *Muhajirs* are more popular. On their side the *Muhajirs*, who have one and all been induced to migrate to Anatolia with promises which are never more than half fulfilled, are unhappy and discontented; they pine for the homes they have left.

The situation in 1897 is well summed up in the

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following passage from Sir W. Ramsay's *Impressions of Turkey* (p. 94 *sqq.*) :—

"One of the facts that are most striking to the traveller in Asia Minor is the interlacing and alternation of separate and unblending races. In half-a-dozen villages which you visit in the course of a day you may find four or five separate peoples, differing in manners, dress, language, and even religion, each living in its own village and never intermarrying with, rarely even entering, the alien village a mile or two distant. The broad distinction of Christian and Moslem is wholly insufficient, and even misleading. The Turkish peasants entertain a stronger hatred towards the Circassian, rigid and pious Moslem as he is, than towards the Greek or Armenian Christian; while they regard the Kyzyl-Bash or heterodox Turkmans with a mingled loathing and contempt, surpassing their worst scorn for the Christian. You often meet a Greek in a Turkish village, sitting in the Oda, apparently in quite friendly conversation with the people; but you will hardly ever see a Turk in a Circassian village, and rarely a Circassian in a Turkish village, or, if you do, he glares about, feeling himself an enemy among enemies."

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IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads*

Like every part of the Turkish Empire, Anatolia suffers from a lack of roads. There are two trunk routes leading to the Bosporus, one from Armenia through Angora, the other from Syria through the Cilician Gates and Konia, and in certain districts—notably the littoral of the Sea of Marmara and the neighbourhood of Smyrna—properly made roads are fairly numerous. But Anatolia cannot be said to have a road-system, means of communication between one province and another being extremely scanty. Moreover, even when two places are supposed to be connected by a metalled road, it often happens that only small stretches have been completed, the work having been divided among the villages on the line of route, some of which perform their task while others neglect it. It is also to be noted that a road once made is seldom or never repaired, so that a metalled highway may in a few years become a rough track, quite unfit for wheeled traffic.

In the following notes the roads of each vilayet or " independent " sanjak are treated separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—The roads in the western part of the sanjak are dealt with in *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series). Three important roads converge in the eastern half of the province. South of Adjije the very important trunk route from Angora and Armenia meets the main road from Brusa and the Marmara coast, while, to the east of Ismid, the continuation of these roads is joined by one from Adabazar, Bolu, and

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Gerede. Apart, however, from these highways, communications in the district are poor.

Vilayet of Brusa.—For a Turkish province, the vilayet of Brusa is excellently furnished with means of communication, possessing upwards of 1,400 miles of metalled roads. These are for the most part in the north, the chief centres being Panderma, Brusa, and Yenishehir. In the mountainous middle portion of the province there are only rough tracks, but the east is traversed by the highway from the Marmara basin to Konia and Syria. A branch road leaves this at a point a little south of Kutahia, and runs to Ushak and Alashehir on the Smyrna—Kassaba railway.

Sanjak of Bigha.—This small region, which includes the southern shores of the Dardanelles, has a comparatively good system of roads, mostly constructed for strategical reasons.

Vilayet of Aidin.—The roads here are above the average for Turkey, alike in number and quality. The chief centre of communications is Smyrna, from which metalled roads run in all directions except towards the south, where the Smyrna—Aidin railway renders them less necessary. In other parts of the province there are roads running from points on the railways to places of economic or commercial importance. The longest lead from Ahmedli, on the Smyrna—Kassaba railway, to Demirji, and from Aidin to Giova.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—Considering its size, there are few good roads in this province. The main road from the Bosporus to Angora crosses its south-west corner, and there is a metalled road from Gerede to Adabazar and Ismid. Nearly all the other first-class roads run inland from the coast. Kastamuni, the most important centre of communications, is connected by metalled roads with the coast towns of Amasra and Ineboli, and by fairly good ones with Tashkeupri, to the east, and Kiangri, in the extreme south of the vilayet. From Sinope a first-class road runs southward to Boyabad. From Duraghan, in the south-

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east of the province, there is a metalled road to Kavza, in the vilayet of Sivas, which is connected by first-class roads with Chorum (Angora), Amasia (Sivas), and Samsun (Trebizond).

Vilayet of Angora.—Though not in general well supplied with means of communication, the vilayet of Angora is traversed from end to end by the road from the Bosporus to Armenia, which is metalled almost the whole of the way. From a point near Mutesellin, from Kirshehir and from Kaisari, branch roads run to Yuzgat, an important centre of communications in the north-east of the province. Several roads radiate from Kaisari, and from a point on the Bosporus—Armenia highway, a few kilometres west of the town, a most important cross-road runs southward, joining the other great trunk route, from the Marmara to Syria, a little north of the Cilician Gates.

Vilayet of Konia.—This vilayet is crossed by the main road from the Marmara to Syria, but otherwise is badly provided with roads. From Adalia there is a road, metalled for most of its course, which leads to Buldur, and another running parallel with the coast to Teurush. From Konia a second-class road runs north-east to Avanos, passing through Nevshehir, whence there is a passable road to Kirshehir in the vilayet of Angora; but, at any rate till quite recently, this was the only road fit for wheeled traffic in the centre of the province, while the north has nothing but rough tracks. The road from Kaisari to Cilicia, mentioned above, runs for some distance near the eastern boundary of the province.

Vilayet of Adana.—The principal roads of this province are the two branches of the one from the Marmara region. This road forks at Karaman, in the vilayet of Konia, whence one branch leads to Adana, *via* the Tauric Eregli and the Cilician Gates, while the other runs to Selefke, near the coast, which is on the one hand connected with Akliman by a metalled road, and on the other with Adana by a road which runs near the coast through Mersina, and thence

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proceeds to Adana through Tarsus. The former route from Karaman to Adana is the shorter, but the latter has the better surface. From Adana a metalled road runs southward to Karatash, and the trunk road is continued through Missis, Burnaz Khan, and Payas, to Alexandretta, which lies just beyond the frontier of the province. The roads leading north-eastward into Armenia are indifferent.

In 1910 a French group formed a company, called the Société Générale d'Entreprise des Routes de l'Empire Ottoman, for the construction of roads in various parts of the Turkish Empire. It was calculated that their projects would involve the construction of about 5,500 kilometres of roads, over 2,000 of which were to be in Anatolia, and that the cost would be about £2,000,000, which, it was hoped, would be covered by a Turkish Government loan. It was soon found, however, that both the extent and the cost of the work had been greatly underestimated, and although some 300 kilometres of the roads were made, no final agreement with the Government regarding the terms of the concession had been reached when the European war began. The project was part of a large scheme which included the construction of railways in the Marmara region and in Armenia (see below, pp. 55-56).

(b) *Rivers*

There are numerous rivers and streams in Anatolia, but few are used for transport, and none could be made navigable for craft of any size except at heavy expense. Most of them have a rapid current, and dwindle to small streams in summer, while in winter they are dangerous torrents. Both for the country and for the investor it will be far more advantageous to employ capital on railway construction than on the development of water communications.

Of the rivers flowing into the Black Sea, the most important are the Kizil Irmak and the Sakaria. The former, though its upper reaches are in the vilayet of

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Trebizond, flows for the greater part of its course within the boundaries of Anatolia, as defined in this book. It is of great volume, but very swift, and most costly works would be necessary in order to make it navigable. The Sakaria, which flows into the sea in the sanjak of Ismid, is used by small craft for 110 kilometres from its mouth. Schemes for canalizing the river have been the subject of negotiations between the Turkish Government and foreign companies, but no concessions have been granted. Numerous rivers in the vilayet of Kastamuni are used for floating timber, but none are suitable for larger vessels than the small native boats which carry local traffic.

In the Marmara basin the river of most economic value and promise is the Susigirli Chai, which enters the sea about 50 kilometres east of Panderma. For some distance it is navigable for steam launches, and for a time there was a regular service between the mines at Mikhalij (Mukalich) and the mouth. This, however, was discontinued before 1890.

Many of the rivers and streams flowing into the Mediterranean are used for floating timber, but the only ones which could be profitably developed as waterways are the Sihun and Jihun in the vilayet of Adana. Of these the Sihun has long been used for the transport of goods between Adana and Mersina, but the small craft engaged in this traffic have greatly diminished in number since the construction of the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana railway. No use is at present made of the Jihun. There seems, however, no reason why both rivers should not be controlled or canalized, and rendered navigable, at least in their lower reaches, for small steamers.

(c) *Railways*

(i) *Existing Railways.*

The systems of the following railways lie wholly or partially in Anatolia: the Anatolian Railway (Société du Chemin de fer Ottoman d'Anatolie), the Baghdad Railway (Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de

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fer de Bagdad), the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, the Smyrna—Aidin (Ottoman) Railway, the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway (Chemin de fer Smyrne—Cassaba et Prolongement), and the Mudania—Brusa Railway. Each of these concerns is now a Turkish Société Anonyme, but in reality they are all under foreign control, the first three being virtually German undertakings, while British interests predominate in the Smyrna—Aidin railway and French in the remaining two. The terms of the concessions under which the lines are owned and worked vary considerably; but in March 1914, at the instance of the Turkish War Office, the Turkish Government decided to place all the railways on the same footing as regards their use for military purposes. Meetings of representatives of the companies were held, at which a German staff officer was present, and after discussion a scheme, based partly on the French and partly on the German system of mobilisation, was adopted. Questions of compensation and remuneration, however, were left over for negotiation between the several companies and the Ministry of Public Works. The main object of the scheme adopted was the concentration of troops and material on Constantinople, Panderma, and the Dardanelles.

The Anatolian Railway.—This company has its terminus at Haidar Pasha, near the entrance of the Bosporus, from which a line to Angora was completed in 1892. The original intention was to extend the line from Angora eastward, and eventually to Baghdad. This plan was, however, abandoned, and the company built a line from Eskishehir to Konia, which is now the starting-point of the Baghdad Railway. There is a branch from Hamidie (on the Haidar Pasha—Eskishehir section) to Adabazar, and in 1912 the company began an extension of this to Bolu. Since the beginning of the war a line from Angora to Yuzgat has been partly (perhaps completely) constructed. It is said to be of narrow gauge

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and to be for Government account. Its principal object was, no doubt, to facilitate the military operations in Armenia. The relations of the Anatolian company to this line have not yet been ascertained. For further particulars of the Anatolian Railway, see *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), where its finance, relations to the Turkish Government, and economic value are treated at length.

The Baghdad Railway.—The Baghdad railway starts at Konia, and runs through Eregli, the Taurus Mountains, and Adana, whence, crossing the Cilician plain, it goes eastward as far as the Amanus range (Giaur Dagh). According to the latest information (1918) the section through these mountains is not yet completed, only a narrow-gauge track having been laid. On the farther side of the range, however, the normal gauge is resumed, and the line runs southwards to the neighbourhood of Rajun, where it enters the vilayet of Aleppo. There is a branch from Kale Keui, near Osmanie, to Alexandretta.

The concession for the construction of the line was granted to the Anatolian Railway Company in 1889,[1] but the rights were transferred to a company styled the Société Impériale Ottomane du Chemin de fer de Bagdad, which, though nominally distinct from the Anatolian company, was under the same control, namely, that of the Deutsche Bank and its group. The term of the concession was 99 years. The share capital of the company was 15,000,000 francs (£600,000), of which the Anatolian Railway Company was bound to subscribe and hold 10 per cent., while the Turkish Government had the right to subscribe a like amount. The whole of the capital has been issued, and half is paid up. The railway was to be constructed in sections of approximately 200 kilometres in length, and it was intended that the whole line with its branches should be completed within eight years from the date of the convention. The track was to be single, but land

[1] See *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, pp. 66, &c.

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sufficient for a double line was to be acquired in the first instance, and the company is under an obligation to build a second line at its own expense as soon as the gross receipts reach 30,000 francs (£1,200) per kilometre per annum. An important clause in the concession gives the company the right of working all mines which it may discover within 20 miles of the axis of its line.

The Turkish Government guaranteed to the company an annual sum of 11,000 francs (£440) per kilometre constructed and opened for traffic, and a further annual sum for working expenses of 4,500 francs (£180) per kilometre. It was arranged that this kilometric guarantee of 11,000 francs should be capitalized, and that the Turkish Government should give the company State bonds bearing interest at 4 per cent., redeemable during the period of the concession. As the Government also undertook to provide a sinking fund at the rate of 0·0875 per cent., it was therefore bound to hand to the company bonds of a nominal value of 269,110 francs (£10,764) for each kilometre constructed and opened for traffic. The minimum issue price of the bonds, it was agreed, should be 81½ per cent. The convention contains a very indefinite provision to the effect that, as soon as the financial situation permits, the company shall issue bonds of its own to replace the bonds that have been issued to them by the Imperial Government.

The receipts of the line are apportioned between the Turkish Government and the company as follows:—

(1) The first 4,500 francs per kilometre goes to the company in relief of the Government's obligation to cover the working expenses up to this amount.

(2) The surplus above 4,500 francs per kilometre, up to 10,000 francs per kilometre, goes to the Turkish Government.

(3) Of any excess over 10,000 francs per kilometre the Government gets 60 per cent. and the company 40 per cent.

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From the point of view of the concessionaires the bargain was a good one, provided that the bonds of the Turkish Government could be realised at a fair price. The bonds necessary to secure the kilometric guarantee on a section have hitherto been issued before work has been begun, so that the company has not been under the necessity of finding any money itself so long as it could succeed in placing the Turkish bonds upon the European market, and the liberal terms of the convention have given it an ample margin for doing this.

How far the arrangement was sound finance from the Turkish point of view is a matter of opinion. The amount of the bonds issued by the Turkish Government to cover the kilometric guarantee on the first section, from Konia to Bulgurlu, was 54,000,000 francs (£2,160,000) and for the next four sections the amount was 227,000,000 francs (£9,080,000), the interest on the whole being over 11,000,000 francs (£440,000) a year.

It is argued that the kilometric guarantee granted to the Anatolian railway was higher, and nevertheless that line has proved a source of profit to the Turkish Government. If agriculture develops quickly in the districts to be tapped by the Baghdad railway, the burden which the Turkish Government has undertaken may not prove insupportable, but the large amount of bonds issuable in respect of the guarantee must of necessity prove a hindrance to financial operations for other purposes.

The company paid dividends up to 5 per cent. regularly down to 1912, and at the end of that year's working had a reserve of over 6,000,000 francs (£240,000). The war has naturally affected its position disastrously, and at the meeting of the company held in February 1918 the Chairman stated that the receipts for 1916 had been nearly 15,000,000 francs (£600,000) less than those for 1915, and was silent as to the result of the year 1917. He stated, however, that the contract with the construction company had been denounced, and that

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the railway company was in urgent need of financial help.

In estimating the prospects of the Baghdad railway within the limits of Anatolia, a distinction must be made between the sections west of the Taurus Mountains and those beyond. From Konia to the mountains the line runs for the most part over an unproductive tableland. Here and there, it is true, it touches fertile tracts, but in general the country is naturally unsuited to agriculture. In the neighbourhood of Konia itself the Germans have sought to supply the deficiencies of nature by the construction of large irrigation works, but hitherto the surplus produce of the district has been sent to Constantinople by the Anatolian railway, and the Baghdad line seems to have benefited little by the improvements. It is true that before the war the traffic receipts of the section from Konia to Bulgurlu, though not large, were steadily increasing; but it seems probable that for many years this section will be mainly important as a link between the Anatolian railway and the regions beyond the Taurus.

East of the mountains very different conditions prevail, for the line runs through the Cilician plain, which already yields rich crops of cereals and cottons, and, with the spread of modern methods of tillage and irrigation, should in the near future become one of the most flourishing districts on the Mediterranean seaboard. The prosperity of this section of the railway seems assured, especially as it is already connected with the two most convenient ports, Mersina and Alexandretta.

The Smyrna—Aidin (Ottoman) Railway.—This is the oldest railway in Turkey, the original concession having been granted in 1856. In 1914 the length of the company's lines was 607 kilometres, and a branch from the main line to Buldur, some 13 kilometres long, was under construction.

The main line starts from Smyrna, where the company have extensive warehouses and sheds, and a very

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fine pier for large steamers. The general direction of the line is at first southerly, but near Azizie it turns eastward, and passing through Aidin follows the valley of the Maeander (Mendere) to Serai Keui. The line next runs along the valley of the Lycus (Churuk Su) and through the important pass of Chardak to the Lake of Aji Tuz. It then turns to the north-east until it again reaches the Maeander, the valley of which it follows past Dineir, whence it runs through Kechiborlu to Egerdir, on the lake of the same name. There are branch lines from Smyrna to Buja, a suburb; from Kasimir to Sedi Keui; from Torbali to Baindir and Ödemish, a line which has a branch of its own from Chatal to Tire; from Balachik to Sokia; from Gonjeli to Denizli; from Sutlej to Chivril. The branch to Buldur, which was being built in 1914, starts from a point about midway between Dineir and Egerdir. The gauge of all these lines is normal, the track single.

The original concession was granted to a British group for the construction of a line from Smyrna to Aidin. From time to time various extensions have been authorised, and in July 1914, after protracted negotiations with the Government and in the teeth of strong opposition on the part of the Germans and the Italians, the company was granted a new concession whereby it was empowered to construct 320 kilometres of new lines, and the navigation rights on lakes Egerdir and Beyshehir were conferred on it, in the case of Lake Beyshehir to be held jointly with the Baghdad Railway. The extensions contemplated were branches from Aidin to Mughla (95 kilometres) and from a point near Dineir to Sandukli (55 kilometres), the continuation of the Buldur branch to Kizil Kaya (some 90 kilometres), and a line from lake Egerdir to Lake Beyshehir (some 66 kilometres).

Under the concession of 1856 the Ottoman Government undertook to pay interest at 6 per cent. on the original capital. It failed, however, to fulfil this obligation, and in 1888 it was agreed that in

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future the company should have no financial guarantee whatever from the Government. At the same time the term of its concession was extended, and conditions were laid down on which, when the concession expired, the Government might buy out the company. This agreement, and subsequent modifications of it, were, however, cancelled by the new convention made in 1914. The various concessions of the company were consolidated and their term was fixed at the year 1999. The right of purchase by the Government was waived, and the company became a Turkish Société Anonyme. Before this time the company was Anglo-Turkish. The share capital has always been firmly controlled by British owners. In 1914 the capital was £1,294,340 in £20 shares, fully paid up, and £3,369,478 in debentures of 4 to 5 per cent. The company has in reserve £505,600 of share capital, authorised but not issued, and unissued debenture stocks to the value of £201,056.

The railway has been of enormous benefit to Smyrna and the district through which it runs. Smyrna is one of the few ports in Turkey where the value of the exports exceeds that of the imports, a condition of affairs largely due to the Smyrna—Aidin railway. The most important goods brought by the railway for export are dried fruits (especially figs), cereals, valonia, olives, minerals, and a certain amount of cotton from the Aidin—Nazli district. Besides increasing the export trade of Smyrna, the railway has given an immense stimulus to the domestic commerce of the interior. Ten years ago it was officially stated that the tithes (taxes on produce) from the districts near its lines had on an average doubled thirteen times over since the creation of the company. A number of factories have been erected and new industries created along its route, and there has been a notable increase of the Christian population owing to the peace and security prevailing in adjacent districts. The railway has made the most of its opportunities, and of late years

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was regarded by the Ministry of Public Works as the best managed line in the Turkish Empire.

Apart from the extensions which, as mentioned above, were sanctioned just before the war, the company is not likely to have much opportunity for enlarging its sphere. The Smyrna—Kassaba railway shuts it off from any considerable expansion to the north; to the east it is already trenching on the zone of the Baghdad Railway; and the Italian concessions on the Mediterranean coast preclude much development in that direction. The new lines authorised should, however, be of great value to the company and to the districts they will serve, especially the lines to the south, which will run through rich but undeveloped country, where the inhabitants were eagerly awaiting the advent of the railway.

The Smyrna—Kassaba Railway (Chemin de fer Smyrne—Cassaba et Prolongement).—The main line runs from Smyrna to Afium Karahissar, on the Anatolian railway, a distance of 421 kilometres, passing through Magnesia (Manisa), Kassaba, Alashehir, and Ushak. The branch lines are from Smyrna to Burnabat (5 kilometres), and from Magnesia to Panderma (282 kilometres).

The original concession was granted to a British company in 1863 for a line from Smyrna to Kassaba. In 1872 a further concession authorised the extension of the line to Alashehir, and in 1888 a third sanctioned the construction of a branch from Magnesia to Soma. In 1893 the Government, exercising the right of purchase which it had retained, bought out the British company for a sum of 35,850,000 francs (£1,434,000), and granted a concession for its lines to a Franco-Belgian syndicate which was at the same time authorised to extend the main line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar. The extension of the Soma branch to Panderma was sanctioned by a concession of June 1910, which also authorised the construction at Panderma of modern harbour works; the line was opened for traffic in 1912.

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The existing company has three separate financial arrangements with the Turkish Government. As regards the lines built when the railway changed hands, it has a right to half the gross receipts, the other half being set aside to meet the requirements of an issue of debentures, made in 1894, to cover the price paid by the Government to the old company. The annual sum required for this purpose is 2,310,000 francs (£92,400), the Government undertaking to make up this amount if half the company's profits fall short of it. The lines in question have been prosperous, and after 1909 it was not necessary for the Government to contribute anything.

On the extension from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar, the Government granted a guarantee of 18,881 francs (£755) per kilometre. This is the highest kilometric guarantee possessed by any railway in Turkey, and it has proved a heavy charge on the Government, an average of 3,300,000 francs (£132,000) a year having been paid to the company from 1908 to 1913. It has been suggested that the object of this extension was principally strategic; but however that may be, the line has not been profitable, and it is generally thought that the company, securely covered by its guarantee, has taken little trouble to increase the traffic of the line or to develop the resources of the region it serves.

In payment of the construction of the Soma—Panderma extension, the Government handed over to the company 4 per cent. Ottoman Government bonds to a total value of 38,916,000 francs (£1,556,640), or 204,821 (£8,193) per kilometre. The Government is responsible for the interest and sinking fund, and the issue is redeemable in 82 years.

The company's share capital is 16,000,000 francs (£640,000) divided into 32,000 shares of £20 each. There have been two issues of debentures. The first, which was to cover the price paid to the old company, was of the nominal value of 56,560,000 francs (£2,262,400), bearing interest at 4 per cent. and redeemable in 99 years. The second, of 70,000,000

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francs (£2,800,000), at 4 per cent., redeemable in 95 years, was made in 1895 to cover the cost of the line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar. The interest and sinking fund are secured by the kilometric guarantee.

The lines constructed by the original company have been of the greatest service to the regions of Magnesia, Kassaba, Alashehir, and Soma, and share with the Smyrna—Aidin railway the credit for the remarkable expansion of the export trade of Smyrna. They have greatly stimulated the production of fruits, especially raisins and olives, and in the last years before the war the population near the lines, which was largely Greek, enjoyed unprecedented prosperity.

The new line from Soma to the Sea of Marmara has opened up regions rich in agricultural and other resources. Parts of the country towards Panderma are inhabited by Bosnians and other Mussulman refugees from the western provinces of European Turkey, and these are industrious and skilful agriculturists. The returns of the first year's working of the line far exceeded all expectations. The line is of much strategic importance, and proved of great value to the Turks during the defence of the Dardanelles.

Although up to the present the line from Alashehir to Afium Karahissar has not been commercially successful, it should become one of the most profitable in Asia Minor, for it skirts a rich region south of the Olympus range which is wholly lacking in railways and good roads. It is in this quarter alone that any considerable expansion of the company's activities is possible. Various branches giving access to this region could be constructed, not only from the Alashehir—Afium Karahissar section, but also from the main line further west and from the Panderma branch. Lines from Ushak to Gediz and from Salikli to Geurdiz, Demirji and Simav, would open up a district which is both fertile and famous for its carpet manufacture. Balikhissar, on the Panderma line, would be a good starting-point not only for a branch running east into undeveloped country, but also for one going west to the

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mining district of Balia. From Susigirli a little further north, a line might be built to Kirmasli and up the valley of the Adranos Chai.

The Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway.—The concession for this railway was granted in 1883, and in 1886 it began working. Its total length is only 67 kilometres. It was originally in the hands of a Turkish company, constituted in 1885, and under British and French control. The company intended to build extensions in the Cilician Plain and towards the Black Sea, but its attempts to obtain further concessions were strongly opposed by the Germans and proved abortive.

The railway had no guarantee of any kind from the Government, and though it helped to develop the country through which it ran, and increased the trade of the port of Mersina, it was not commercially successful. The original capital consisted of £165,000 in shares of £20 each, fully paid up, and £185,000 in 6 per cent. debentures. In 1892 a further issue of debentures, amounting to £44,850, was made in order to pay the interest on the old debentures. In 1899, as the condition of the company was still bad, an extensive financial readjustment took place, the interest on the debentures being reduced from 6 to 4 per cent. and preference shares being created to compensate the holders. When the changes were completed there remained £209,500 in debentures, but those actually issued amounted to only £193,540. The preference shares, of £2 each, represented a capital of £23,154.

Subsequently the railway slowly made profits, but in 1906 it came under the control of the Deutsche Bank, which, after buying through third parties as many shares as were on the market, bought out the interests of the French element in the company, and obtained a voting majority. A number of the shares and debentures in English hands were afterwards secured by the bank, which ultimately obtained about five-sixths of the share capital. The object of the Bank was to secure an outlet to the sea for the Baghdad railway, as the construction of the branch to Alexandretta was not yet

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contemplated. In fact, by an arrangement between the two companies (which, of course, represent virtually the same interests) the Baghdad railway runs over the track of the Mersina, Tarsus and Adana company from Yenije to Adana, a distance of 14 kilometres.

The prosperity of the Mersina, Tarsus and Adana Railway depends on the amount of traffic which passes through the port of Mersina. Its prospects are therefore not very bright, for it is probable that Mersina will suffer increasingly from the competition of Ayas and Alexandretta.

The Mudania—Brusa Railway.—This line is of narrow gauge and only 41 kilometres long. Mudania is a small open port on the Sea of Marmara, near the entrance to the Gulf of Geumlek. Brusa, the administrative capital of the vilayet of that name, has a population of about 120,000 inhabitants, mostly Turkish. The railway is controlled by a Franco-Belgian group, to whom a concession for 99 years was granted in 1891. The company has no Government guarantee, as the line had been partly built by the Government before 1890, though never worked. The share capital, originally 500,000 francs (£20,000), has been raised to 3,825,000 francs (£153,000) by the conversion into shares of debentures which the company had issued. The railway has paid its way, but is of no great importance, though it would be easy to make extensions and branches which would vastly increase its value Very fertile and productive regions would be opened up by continuing the line to Ainegeul, with a branch to Yenishehir, or by building a line from Brusa westward to Lake Apollonia and Mikhalij. Hitherto, all proposals for expansion have been foiled by German opposition.

(ii) *Projected Railways.*

Chanak to Smyrna.—A narrow-gauge line from Chanak (Kale Sultanie) on the Dardanelles to Smyrna was to have been begun in 1914 by a French group

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called the Omnium Enterprise Company of Paris. It was to run through Eren Keui, the plain of Troy, Ezine, Aivajik, Edremid, and Pergamum (Bergama), whence there was to be a branch to Dikeli. From Ezine a line was to be built, *via* Bairamich, Khan Bazar Kari, and Bigha, to Karabigha on the Sea of Marmara, and from Bigha a branch was to run to Panderma and Brusa. The company was granted certain rights of forestry on Mount Ida (Kaz Dagh), and a general concession of all mines within twenty kilometres of the axis of its line.

The railway was to be built for the account of the Government. Its purpose, in fact, was mainly strategic, its immediate construction being strongly urged by the German Staff at Constantinople, in view of the loss of Turkish islands off the west coast of Asia Minor. The projected lines, however, would also have opened up a very rich tract of country, which possesses mines, forests, and fertile agricultural lands capable of producing a great variety of crops and fruit.

Italian Railways.—Negotiations in 1913-14 between the Turkish and Italian Governments resulted in the grant of important railway concessions on and near the Mediterranean coast. The claims of the Italians came into sharp conflict with those of the Smyrna—Aidin railway, which was then seeking authority to build extensions towards the south, and it is generally considered that the compromise reached will prove very detrimental to the British company.

The railways for which the Italians received concessions fall into two groups—one based on Makri, the other on Adalia. From Makri a line was to run in a north-westerly direction to Mughla, where it would meet a projected branch of the Smyrna—Aidin railway. A second line was to run from Makri eastward until it reached the valley of the Xanthus river (Eshen Chai), where it was to fork, one branch running up the valley for some 20 kilometres, and the other down it for 35 or 40.

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Adalia was to be the terminus of two lines. The first was to run to Kizil Kaya, which was also to be the terminus of a projected branch of the Smyrna—Aidin Railway. From Kizil Kaya there was to be a short branch to Fughla, 25 kilometres to the north-west, and a more important one following a south-westerly direction to Kaz Chiftlik, a distance of some 85 kilometres. The second line, starting from Adalia, was to run near the coast to Alaya, and from a point about 130 kilometres from Adalia a branch to Ak Seki, 50 kilometres to the north-east, was to be built. The total length of these Italian lines would be about 690 kilometres.

The commercial prospects of the lines from Makri seem doubtful. The country through which they would run is undeveloped, and it is improbable that the line to Mughla would divert much traffic from Smyrna to Makri. The harbour of Makri, however, which is one of the finest in the eastern Mediterranean (*cf.* below, p. 67), may have a commercial future before it. Lignite, chrome, and manganese, which have been worked to some extent, are found in the neighbourhood of Makri, and the finest forests in the province of Aidin are not far distant. Moreover, figs and vines of excellent quality grow well in these parts; while from the Xanthus district an increasing amount of traffic in agricultural and mineral products might be expected. Some time, however, would probably elapse before the projected lines yielded satisfactory returns.

On the other hand, the lines from Adalia would be of immediate economic value, the regions they would serve being extremely fertile. In the neighbourhood of Ak Seki and Alaya there are extensive forests, containing excellent timber; and there are known to be mineral deposits in these regions, certain coal-beds near Ak Seki being especially promising.

Zunguldak to Bolu.—The Deutsche Bank and its syndicate, which were recently in possession of the principal mines in the Heraclea coal region, were (1918) building a railway from Zunguldak to Bolu,

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where it would connect with the Anatolian Railway. This line would afford a means of rapid communication between the Heraclea district and Constantinople, but in view of the proximity of the mines to the sea it seems doubtful whether it would carry much of their output.

(iii) *General Remarks.*

When the projects mentioned above have been realised, Anatolia will be provided with the main lines of an adequate railway system. Capital will still be needed, however, for the construction of branches to districts of particular economic importance.

Railway enterprise in Anatolia is so intimately connected with the system of kilometric guarantees that it may be convenient to consider the effects of that system as a whole. In general, it may be said that the guarantees have been a success. Except on the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway's extension, the sums which the Government has been called upon to pay have almost consistently decreased. The following table shows the amounts paid by the Government under these guarantees from 1908 to 1913:—

Year.	Anatolian Railway.		Baghdad Railway.	Smyrna–Kassaba Railway.
	Haidar Pasha–Angora.	Eskishehir–Konia.	Konia–Bulgurlu.	Alashehir-Afium Karahissar.
	£	£	£	£
1908	116,800	119,700	23,170	146,200
1909	102,000	119,700	20,300	153,000
1910	22,300	96,400	15,250	130,000
1911	Nil	41,900	9,500	115,000
1912	„	Nil	Nil	123,000
1913	„	11,500	16,600	127,000

It must be remembered that the Government, when not called upon for any part of the guarantee, shares

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in excess profits. It is to be noted, however, that in 1912 the receipts of the Baghdad and Anatolian railways were swollen by military traffic occasioned by the Balkan wars, though in the following year they probably suffered through the consequent dislocation of trade. Since the European War began, the Government has derived very large sums from the excess profits of the Anatolian Railway; but as the traffic on this line has been mainly military, no great significance can be attached to this.

(2) External

(a) *Ports and Shipping*

Considering the length of its coast-line, Anatolia is very badly provided with ports. For this the supineness of the Turkish Government is, of course, partly to blame, but there is a singular lack of good natural harbours, especially in the Black Sea.

(i) *Black Sea Ports.*—The principal Black Sea ports which come within the scope of this volume are Sinope, Ineboli, and the ports of the Heraclea coal district.

Sinope has a population of 8,000, mostly Greeks. The roadstead, which offers good anchorage, even in winter, is the safest between the Bosporus and Batum. Vessels anchor in from 5 to 10 fathoms, and are quite sheltered from westerly and north-easterly gales.

The principal exports are wheat, seeds, tobacco, timber, and skins; the imports are colonial produce, coal, and hardware.

The port used to be visited at frequent intervals by ships of the Messageries Maritimes, the Austrian Lloyd Company, the Deutsche Levante Linie, and several Greek lines. Vessels of the Ellerman and Moss Lines also called occasionally.

Ineboli has a population of about 9,000, mostly Turks. The roadstead is open, but has some protection from a reef, and there is good anchorage in 3 to 4 fathoms.

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Wool, mohair, skins, hemp, and cereals are exported; the imports are chiefly manufactured goods.

The ports of the Heraclea coal basin are *Zunguldak*, *Koslu Bay*, and *Heraclea*.

The port of *Zunguldak* belongs, under a concession, to the Heraclea Coal Company, though it is also used by other mining enterprises. In the northern part of Zunguldak Bay there is an artificial harbour, protected by a breakwater, alongside of which there are berths for two steamers in 25 ft. to 27 ft. of water. There are two coal cranes and a transporter which can load a vessel at the rate of 200 tons an hour. Vessels can also be loaded on the opposite side of the harbour, where there is a pier with a steam crane, the depth alongside being 25 ft. Near the harbour the Heraclea Coal Co. has its warehouses, screening plant, and the terminus of its light railway. Vessels requiring moderate quantities of bunker coal can load from lighters in the bay outside the breakwater.

At *Koslu Bay*, two miles south-west of Zunguldak, coal is shipped from a small pier into lighters, which are then towed to Zunguldak.

Heraclea or *Eregli*, twenty miles south-west of Zunguldak, has only an open anchorage, loading or bunkering being carried out through lighters.

(ii) *Marmara Ports.*—Excluding Haidar Pasha, which falls outside the scope of this volume, these are Ismid, Geumlek, Mudania, Panderma, and Chanak, the last being on the Dardanelles.

Ismid, the ancient Nicomedia, has about 13,000 inhabitants. Situated at the head of a long gulf, it is protected in all weathers. There are certain works of the Turkish Admiralty at the port, and in 1913, after negotiations between the Government and the Armstrong and Vickers group, a company was formed with the object, among others, of constructing at Ismid a large floating dock and building and repairing yards. [For particulars of this project see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.]

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The port has little trade, the exports of the adjacent country being mostly shipped from Haidar Pasha.

Geumlek, a town of 5,000 inhabitants, though also in a sheltered position on the shores of a gulf, is of small account, and its naval yard is no longer used. If, however, communication with the lake of Isnik were improved and the region drained, the port would recover much of its former prosperity.

Mudania, with a population of 5,000, is an entirely open port, but as the terminus of the railway to Brusa it has latterly increased in importance. The railway company has a pier with 22 ft. of water alongside; but loading has generally to be done from lighters, though this method is impossible in bad weather. The exports, which nearly all go to Constantinople, are various, silk being the most valuable. For shipping the port is mainly dependent on the local services to and from Constantinople.

Panderma is now a large town, having developed very rapidly since 1912, when the railway from Soma was opened. The Smyrna—Kassaba Railway Company, which was granted a concession for the construction of a port, has built quays close to its terminus, and has improved the old breakwater, which gives protection from the north-west wind, the only one that is troublesome. Ships of moderate size can come alongside the railway quays; there is also good anchorage off the town in about 11 fathoms. The railway company is known to have contemplated the construction of repairing shops and a small gridiron or slipway for steamers up to 600 tons, but these works were not completed when Turkey entered the war.

The exports consist mostly of agricultural products of various kinds, but of late years increasing quantities of boracite have been shipped at the port. The imports are cotton and woollen goods, coffee, sugar, and hardware.

During 1913, apart from the local services between Panderma and Constantinople, 32 steamers called at the port. Of these, 18 were British and 4 German.

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There is little doubt that Panderma has a prosperous future before it, especially if the projected railway connecting it with Bigha and Brusa is built (see p. 56). Hitherto the surplus products of the southern littoral of the Sea of Marmara have almost always been sent to Constantinople and forwarded to foreign parts from there, but the development of the port of Panderma will enable them to be exported direct.

Chanak (*Kale Sultanie*), a town of 22,000 inhabitants, is situated on the Narrows of the Dardanelles. It is the *pratique* station for all vessels passing through the straits; few, however, receive or discharge cargo at the port, which offers no adequate accommodation or facilities. In the last years before the war its export trade somewhat increased, the principal goods handled being grain, valonia, wine, skins, and pottery. The construction of the projected railway to Ezine and Smyrna (see p. 55) would doubtless bring more trade to the town, but its importance will probably always be strategic rather than commercial.

(iii) *Mediterranean Ports.*—The chief of these are Aivali, Dikeli, Smyrna, Marmarice, Makri, Adalia, Alaya, and Mersina. Ayas may rank with them in the future if its harbour is improved.

Aivali, which has a population of 60,000, is situated on the eastern shore of Aivali Bay, at the southern entrance of the gulf of Edremid. It provides few facilities for shipping, and vessels have to lie off the town, where, however, there is good and well-sheltered anchorage.

The exports consisted principally of oil, soap, hides, and flour. The districts of Aivali and Edremid yield the best edible oil produced in Asia Minor, and large quantities used to be bought by French and Italian merchants. The town of Aivali has several olive-oil mills and a few soap factories and tan-yards.

The oil industry has suffered of late years through the maltreatment of the Christian population, many of whom have been deported or enrolled in labour bat-

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talions, while others have fled to the Greek islands. Recent information shows that, alarmed at the decline in the production of oil, the Turkish authorities have brought back some 4,500 Greek families to Aivali to carry on the industry, which at the time was apparently under German control. These repatriated Greeks, while receiving wages, are not allowed to live in their own homes, but are kept under official surveillance.

During 1911, 802 steamers, with a total tonnage of 133,356 tons, entered and cleared at Aivali. They were mostly small coasting vessels belonging to Smyrna.

Dikeli, which lies in a bay opposite the island of Mitylene, is a small port, from which the products of the rich districts behind the town and around Pergamum (Bergama) are shipped, mainly to the Greek islands or Smyrna.

Smyrna is situated at the head of the gulf of the same name. Before the European war it had a population of about 300,000, of whom some 140,000 were Christians, mostly Greek subjects of Turkey. The influence of the Greek element is very great; the Turkish inhabitants can generally speak Greek, while many of the Greeks do not know Turkish—a state of affairs unparalleled anywhere else in the Turkish Empire, except on one or two islands. After Constantinople, Smyrna is the most important city and port in the Ottoman dominions.

The water front is protected by a quay several miles in length. At the south end of the bay, parallel to the quay, is a concrete embankment, a mile and a quarter long and 60 ft. wide. The area between this and the quay is called the Inner Harbour. It is 40 acres in extent, and can be entered at both ends of the embankment. Its average depth is 34 ft., and there are 15 ft. to 18 ft. of water alongside the shore quay. Vessels making only a short call generally anchor outside the embankment or opposite the town, and load or unload by means of lighters.

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Warehouse accommodation is not equal to the demands made upon it. The Quay Company, a French concern, had certain warehouses under control of the Customs, but their efforts to increase the number of these encountered the disapproval of the Ottoman Government—a particularly foolish attitude, since the Government was entitled to 50 per cent. of the company's net profits. The deficiencies on the quay were partly made up by the Smyrna—Aidin railway, which erected big warehouses and a pier close to its terminus at the north end of the town, and as a branch custom-house was established on the pier, goods brought down by rail could be shipped without passing over the quay at all. This aroused opposition on the part of the Quay Company and the local authorities, and as the Central Government naturally listened sympathetically to their protests, the railway company was much hampered in its attempts to make further improvements. Up to the entry of Turkey into the war no satisfactory settlement had been arranged.

The facilities for repairing ships or machinery are fairly good. There is a slip provided with power capable of lifting 500 tons, but no dock of any kind.

In time of peace there is always great activity in the port. The following table shows the numbers of the vessels entering and clearing from Smyrna in the years 1908-1912 :—

Year.	Steamers.	Sailing Vessels.	Total Tonnage.
1908	2,933	4,347	2,819,960
1909	3,018	3,202	2,890,317
1910	2,661	4,004	2,477,733
1911	2,441	2,899	2,405,216
1912	2,448	2,587	2,254,037

It must be remembered that in September 1911 war broke out between Turkey and Italy, and that conse-

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quently no Italian ships entered the port for the remainder of that year, or during 1912. Turkish shipping, too, was interfered with by the blockade of the Dardanelles and other enterprises of the Italian fleet. Moreover, in October 1912 Greece went to war with Turkey, and trade at Smyrna was further restricted.

In 1912 the number of British steamers entering the port was 363, representing a tonnage of 653,000. Of these, however, 168, with a tonnage of 333,000, were bound to or from Egypt, nearly all being vessels of the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co.

The export trade of Smyrna was larger than that of any other Turkish port, the value of the exports exceeding that of the imports. The figures for the years 1910-12 were as follow :—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.
	£	£
1910	4,444,000	4,061,000
1911	4,400,000	4,137,000
1912	4,000,000	3,788,000

The principal exports were dried fruits, grain, valonia, opium, olive oil, tobacco, liquorice root, wool, raw cotton, skins, and emery. The imports included a great variety of manufactured goods, coal, petroleum, leather, sugar, coffee, and rice. Fuller particulars and statistics of the foreign trade of Smyrna are given below (see pp. 107-108).

Smyrna is the terminus of the Smyrna—Aidin and Smyrna—Kassaba Railways, and the trade of the districts served by their lines passes almost entirely through it. In the past, moreover, many of the goods sent down by the railways had to be prepared and packed for export at Smyrna; this was notably the case with figs, which were handled in very large quantities. Of late, however, owing to the inadequacy of the accommodation and labour at Smyrna, it became

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more usual for producers and merchants in the interior to despatch their goods ready for shipment, and the efforts of the Smyrna authorities, merchants, and Quay Company failed to check this practice, whereby the town suffered a serious loss. Besides serving as a port for the hinterland, Smyrna is a receiving and distributing centre for many of the islands off the coast, and for widely separated districts of the Mediterranean littoral of Anatolia. Goods from places as far away as Aivali and Adalia, whatever their ultimate destination, were generally shipped first to Smyrna.

The prosperity of the port rests on stable foundations, and is likely to increase as the rich country behind it is further exploited and provided with additional railways. The development of Marmarice and Makri and the construction by the Italians of railways in their neighbourhood might perhaps divert a little trade from Smyrna, but no serious harm is to be apprehended from that quarter. What Smyrna principally needs is the provision of adequate warehouse accommodation.

Smyrna used to be well served by steamship lines. Among British undertakings, the Wilson, Ellerman, and Cunard Lines, and the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co., touched regularly at the port, as did all the important continental lines plying in the eastern Mediterranean, such as the Deutsche Levante Linie, the Austrian Lloyd, the Messageries Maritimes, the Società Marittima Italiana, and the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company. Smyrna was, of course, also visited by the vessels of numerous local companies, both Greek and Turkish, which operate among the islands and along the coast.

Up to the outbreak of the war Smyrna possessed no wireless apparatus, but its telegraphic communications were otherwise excellent.

Marmarice, lying in a well-sheltered bay at the south-west corner of Asia Minor, has an excellent natural harbour, which, however, is little used, the town being extremely unhealthy. Extensive drainage works will

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have to be undertaken before the place can become commercially important.

Makri is in similar case. The port is situated at the south-east extremity of the Gulf of Makri, with complete shelter, and has the finest natural harbour in Asia Minor. The country round is rich and fertile. A certain amount of chromium, wood, and charcoal used to be exported, but the town, which is bounded on the landward side by a marsh, is so unhealthy that it is inhabited only in winter. If the Italians push forward their railway projects in this region (see above, p. 57), and take measures to improve the sanitary conditions, Makri will no doubt soon attain the importance to which its harbour entitles it.

Adalia, in the gulf of the same name, has a population of 30,000. The harbour is too small for any but small craft, and the anchorage off the town, in 15 to 20 fathoms, though good in summer, is unsafe in winter.

The exports of Adalia were wheat and flour, sesame and other seeds, live-stock, timber, and charcoal. The timber and charcoal were mostly sent to Egypt, the trade being mainly in Italian hands. Other goods went principally to Smyrna and the Greek islands, the latter taking large quantities of flour. Adalia had seven hydraulic flour mills, and most of the wheat brought down to the port was milled before shipment. The imports consisted chiefly of manufactured goods, mostly from the United Kingdom and the United States. The future of Adalia depends mainly on the success of the Italian schemes for exploiting the neighbouring districts (see above, p. 57).

Mersina has an open roadstead. Vessels anchor about a mile off shore in six fathoms with a stiff mud bottom. The anchorage, though exposed to winds between the quarters of south-west and east-south-east, is safe for ships in any weather, but lighters are apt to break adrift in winter gales. There are five piers. The most easterly, belonging to the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, is 460 ft. long and 20 ft. to 35 ft. broad; the water is 10 ft. in depth at the end, shoaling

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towards the shore; there are two lines of rail and two travelling steam cranes. The Customs pier is the principal landing-place; it is 240 ft. long and 20 ft. to 40 ft. wide; the depth of water at the end is 8 ft. On the pier is a light tram-line, and there are two small cranes. The other piers are small and unprovided with facilities for unloading or shipping goods.

In 1909, 645 steamers, of 797,433 tons in all, entered the port. Before the war the principal exports were cotton, cotton-seed and cake, cereals, sesame, and live-stock. The cotton went mainly to Italy, Spain, and Germany; the grain to other parts of Turkey; the animals to Egypt. The imports were miscellaneous, coal being one of the most important.

Several shipping lines touched regularly at Mersina, the chief being the Messageries Maritimes, the Austrian Lloyd, the Società Marittima Italiana, the Società Italiana di Servizi Marittimi, the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Co., and the Khedivial Mail Steamship Co. Vessels of the Prince Line, the Asia Minor Steamship Co., and the Deutsche Levante Linie also called frequently at the port. Mersina had no wireless installation or submarine cable before the war.

Mersina has direct railway communication with the rich Cilician Plain, but its situation does not lend itself to the construction of an adequate harbour, and its importance is not likely to increase much in future. When Cilicia is properly developed most of its trade will probably pass through Ayas or Alexandretta.

The town of *Ayas*, in the vilayet of Adana, is situated at the north-east corner of Ayas Bay, a large inlet on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta. Off the north coast of the bay, to the south-west of the town, there is safe anchorage in 4 to 10 fathoms, with good holding in stiff mud and complete shelter except from east and south-east winds, which seldom blow for any length of time. East of the town is a small harbour, protected by two ancient and massive moles. It is fast filling with sand, but still affords sufficient accommoda-

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tion for small coasting vessels. The town itself is poverty-stricken and most unhealthy.

For some time the Baghdad Railway Company contemplated the construction of a modern port at Ayas, which was to be connected by rail with Adana; but when the Company acquired control over the Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana Railway, the project was shelved. Subsequently it was decided to build a branch to Alexandretta, and the Haidar Pasha Port Company, which is dominated by the same interests as the Baghdad Railway Company, obtained a concession for constructing a large new port at that town. In consequence the scheme for developing Ayas was definitely abandoned. Ayas Bay, however, offers so many attractions to shipping that it would probably compete successfully with Alexandretta if facilities for handling cargo were provided. Indeed, if current expectations regarding the economic future of the adjacent regions should be realised, both ports would soon become very prosperous.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply*

The supply of labour in Anatolia is scanty. This is partly due to the sparseness of the population, on which the military system and the frequent wars, especially those of the Hejaz and the Yemen, have been a severe drain. Another cause is the fact that the land is mostly in the hands of peasant-farmers, who live on their own produce, and have neither the time to work for others nor the means to hire others to work for them. Consequently, hired labour is little used in agriculture. At harvest-time, however, nomad gypsies and Kurds from the mountains offer their services as reapers, often contracting to cut all the crops of a village. In south and west Anatolia, moreover, where a great variety of agricultural products

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is raised, the Christian peasants, who are industrious and intelligent, are willing to work as hired labourers on tasks requiring special experience and skill, such as the tending of the tobacco plant and the poppy, or of olive yards, vineyards, and fig gardens. They receive high pay, and as soon as the season for their particular work is over, they return home to cultivate their own lands. This system prevails especially in the vilayet of Aidin, where in 1912 men skilled in the care of the tobacco plant were paid as much as 6*s*. a day—an enormous wage for Turkey, and only obtainable, it must be added, under exceptional conditions.

It has always been a difficult matter in Anatolia to secure labour for the construction and working of railways. As a rule, the companies are bound by the terms of their concessions to employ native labour, if possible from the districts through which their lines run, for any work not requiring technical knowledge. Even for the roughest tasks, however, it has generally been found necessary to obtain labour from a distance; and most of the navvies employed on the railways come from the coastal regions of the Black Sea, many of them being Kurds. These men are hired in gangs, each under a headman, who is responsible for the maintenance of his gang at full strength—a necessary precaution, as the Turk is apt, after earning a few pounds, to throw up his job and go home, regardless of threats or remonstrances. Any work calling for the slightest degree of skill, such as masonry, is almost always performed by foreigners or native Christians, and on most railways all engine-drivers, stokers, mechanics, and clerks belong to one or other of these classes. Nevertheless, the prevalent opinion that the Turk is by nature incapable of becoming a skilled workman is not justified, for the Smyrna–Aidin Railway employed in their large workshops 400 Turks, whom they had engaged as boys and carefully trained, and who were not only intelligent, but also industrious and conscientious, whereas Christian workmen, though clever, are commonly unreliable and dishonest. It is

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also to be noted that, after the Revolution, a Railway Engineers' Battalion was added to the army, and the recruits were sent to work on the railways, where they showed excellent promise.

The shortage of labour has affected the mining industry even more than the railways. Mining work is, in general, too severe and strenuous for the Turk, who, furthermore, has a rooted objection to leaving his native place and settling down elsewhere. Mine-owners have in consequence to rely almost entirely on Christian labour, especially for work underground.

In the towns the skilled artisans are mostly independent craftsmen, working for their own account. Any workmen they may employ are, with rare exceptions, Christians, and Christians generally do all the better-paid work in the few factories that exist. The labouring class is almost wholly unskilled, consisting largely of Turks who have come from the country to earn a little money for some special purpose—such as the purchase of exemption from military service—and who hire themselves out for the roughest kind of manual work, or as porters, doorkeepers, boatmen, and such like.

It is very unusual for women to work in factories, though at Brusa some are employed in the silk-spinning mills.[1] The domestic textile industries, however, some of which are important, are carried on mainly by women and girls, who work either for their own account or for merchants who provide them with materials. Women also commonly assist the men of their family in agricultural work of all kinds.

The Turkish Government has made little effort to regulate the supply or the conditions of labour. Apart from certain ineffectual stipulations in concessions to foreigners regarding the employment of native labour, its only important measure has been the passing in 1910 of a law forbidding strikes in establishments or institutions of public utility, and providing, in the case of

[1] See below, p. 75.

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disputes, for mediation by the Ministry of Public Works, and, if this fails, for the holding of a conference, under the presidency of a delegate of the Ministry, between representatives of the contending parties.

(b) *Emigration and Immigration*

During the reign of Abdul Hamid, emigration from Turkey was most severely restricted; and the majority of those who left Turkish territory did so contrary to law. There was virtually no emigration on the part of Mussulmans, but a good many Christians managed to leave the country. Many thousand Armenians fled from Turkey to the Christian States in the Balkans, Russia, or the United States. These refugees were generally men, their families being left behind. After the Revolution some of them returned to Turkey; others sent for their families to join them in their new homes. Besides the Armenians, many Greeks, though from different motives, succeeded in emigrating. They were mostly young men from the seaboard, who found it fairly easy to get across to the islands or Greece, whence they generally went to the United States. A large number, however, after making some money, came home, and it is probable that the majority intended to do so. In 1906 and the following years there was a considerable emigration of Jews from or through Smyrna, mostly to South America.

The Revolution led to the return of a few Armenians; but, on the whole, it stimulated emigration among the Christians, especially the Greeks of western Anatolia. The main cause of this was the new law establishing what was called equality, whereby the Christians were for the first time made liable for military service. In 1910, 8,000 young men, the pick of the peasant class, left the district of Smyrna for America.

Since the Balkan Wars there has been a considerable decline in the Christian population along the

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western seaboard of Anatolia. Thousands fled to escape the maltreatment to which they were subjected by the Turks at the instigation of the German Military Mission at Constantinople, who wished to make the region a military zone, and regarded the Christians as friends of the enemy. Forcible deportations were also carried out, this policy being in full vigour at the outbreak of the European War. The regions opposite Chio and Mitylene were treated with special severity.

While emigrants from Anatolia are almost all Christians, immigrants are almost all Mussulmans. These come from the European provinces which have been lost to Turkey since the war with Russia in 1877. This movement has gone on steadily, stimulated by religious propaganda and by official promises of grants of land and immunity from taxes and military service. All the lost provinces and islands have contributed a quota. Entire villages have often emigrated, taking with them their cattle and agricultural implements. The newcomers have settled most thickly along the Marmara littoral and near the line of the Anatolian Railway; while many of those who arrived after the Balkan Wars were planted by the Government in the country behind Smyrna. Though the authorities have often failed to keep their promises, many of the immigrants have been able to buy land, and have proved themselves a valuable element in the country, as they are industrious and their methods of cultivation are much more advanced than those usually followed in Anatolia.

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

In treating of the agricultural products of Anatolia, it is well to deal with the provinces separately, as the nature and quality of the crops and live-stock depend on the past history of each region, the character of the population, and the adequacy of communications, not

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to mention climate and soil—factors which vary greatly in such a large and mountainous tract of country with so long a coast-line. It may broadly be said that agriculture flourishes most in regions near the railways and where the Christian element in the population is numerous. The railways enable the cultivator to find a market for surplus produce, and have largely removed the danger of famine, which formerly might arise after any year of bad weather. The Christians are, as a rule, far more industrious and intelligent than the Mussulman Turks, and alone possess the skill requisite for the successful cultivation of tobacco, poppies, and olives. Where they are numerous, a greater variety of produce is raised, and such districts are thus less dependent for their prosperity on particular meteorological conditions.

To avoid unnecessary repetition, it may be stated here that in the more fertile parts of Anatolia the raising of live-stock is of small economic importance. The peasants breed domestic animals—horses, asses, oxen, buffaloes—for their own use; but it is only in the high country of central Anatolia that stock-breeding attains the dignity of an industry. The Angora goat and the camel are the most valuable animals produced.

Sanjak of Ismid.—With a healthy climate, good railway communication with the capital, and a population consisting largely of Christians and Mussulman refugees from Europe, the province has of late increased rapidly in prosperity. About one-third of its area is under cultivation, the remainder being mostly covered with forests. Cereals, especially maize, and seeds are grown in large quantities. The province is particularly suited to fruit, which finds a ready market at Constantinople. Sericulture has been successfully introduced of recent years, being practised principally by Greeks and Armenians. Among other products of importance are tobacco, opium, honey, and wax; and poultry and eggs are sent in great numbers from Adabazar to Constantinople.

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Vilayet of Brusa and Sanjak of Bigha.—The sanjak of Bigha may be treated along with the vilayet of Brusa, as the conditions of the two provinces are similar.

Although the communications stand in need of development, this region is one of the most prosperous in Anatolia. The parts near the sea are particularly fertile. The eastern and south-eastern parts lie on the central plateau of Asia Minor, Eskishehir being 2,600 ft., and Afium Karahissar 3,000 ft. above sea-level; but even here the soil is excellent for cereals. In the north and west the population is largely Christian, while in the highlands there are many Turkish immigrants from Europe. The most fertile tracts are along the Marmara coast; but much of this country is almost uninhabitable, as it is marshy and fever-stricken, especially between Brusa and Panderma.

In the north and west, wheat, barley, maize, beans, and seeds of all kinds are produced in increasing quantities. Opium, tobacco, and cotton are successfully grown, and a considerable amount of valonia is produced. Rice is also cultivated, especially round the lake of Isnik, but the peasants regard it with disfavour, as it requires marshy and therefore malarious ground. Olives and all manner of fruit grow well, their cultivation extending far into the interior; the district of Balikhissar produces some of the finest fruit grown in Turkey. The most valuable product, however, is silk. Schools of sericulture have been established at various centres by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt; and whereas, some 30 years ago, Pasteurised silkworm-seed had to be obtained from France, the peasants now export seed thither and elsewhere. The centre of the silk industry is the city of Brusa, where a certain amount of silk thread is spun.

The high tableland in the east produces good grain-crops, and is specially celebrated for its barley, which is exported on a large scale, principally to England for the malting industry.

Vilayet of Aidin.—This is unquestionably the richest

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province of Anatolia. Its communications, internal and external, are good; its inhabitants, among whom the number of Christians is exceptionally large, are hard-working and intelligent; its soil is fertile, and the railway companies have done their best to develop its resources and to introduce new methods of cultivation.

The vilayet raises a remarkable variety of agricultural products. Cereals of all kinds flourish; cotton is grown in various districts, especially at Aidin and Nazli; opium is produced in large quantities; the valonia oak is carefully tended; and, notwithstanding the irksome regulations of the Tobacco Monopoly, the cultivation of tobacco has of late years greatly increased. The province is justly renowned for its fruit, many kinds of which are plentiful. Fig gardens and vineyards abound, and are cultivated with great skill and success by the peasants. The quantity of figs carried by the Smyrna—Aidin Railway increased fivefold in the twenty years before the war. The vines cultivated are mainly those which produce raisins, several kinds of which are exported in great quantities. Another important product is liquorice, which grows wild and is particularly abundant along the Maeander River and its tributaries. The root, either dried or in the form of a paste, was largely exported to the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1913 it was stated by the British Consular authorities that the revenue of the province had risen from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 in the space of 10 years; and though the increase was partly due to better methods of collecting the taxes, it was principally the result of the growing prosperity of agriculture.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—This vilayet, mountainous in most parts, with poor communications, and a population almost entirely Mussulman, is the most backward in Anatolia. Much of the soil is fertile, but the peasants are generally content with raising the bare necessaries of life. There is a little export of agricultural produce from the coastal regions; but the products of the interior are nearly all consumed locally.

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Wheat, barley, maize, chickpeas, gallnuts, and valonia are produced; and also, though only on a small scale, cotton and opium. Fruit grows well, but little commercial profit is derived from it. In the south and east the silkworm is bred, but this industry is not important. Among the animal products are wool, mohair, and skins.

Vilayet of Angora.—This province consists for the most part of a tableland more than 3,000 ft. above the sea. The great majority of the inhabitants are Mussulman Turks; the Christians are mostly Armenians. The soil is generally fertile, but the comparative coldness of the climate precludes the raising of many products that do well in the western provinces. The rainfall, which varies much from year to year, is of particular importance in this vilayet, which in general suffers from a lack of rivers and streams. The most prosperous regions are those traversed by the railway from Eskishehir to Angora and Kaisari.

Wheat is the principal crop. Barley comes next, the quality grown in the districts near the railway being particularly good. Oats, rye, millet, and various kinds of seeds are also cultivated. In the less elevated parts, rice, cotton, tobacco, and poppies are occasionally grown. The province produces good fruit, especially apples and pears.

The wide extent of uncultivated country lends itself to the rearing of cattle, sheep, and goats, especially the so-called Angora goat, which produces mohair. The mohair and wool of the vilayet are almost entirely sent to Constantinople, whence they are exported to foreign markets. Since the railway to Angora was built, the domestic manufacture of mohair and woollen stuffs has greatly declined. There is a large trade in dried or jerked meat. Camels, donkeys, and mules are bred in considerable numbers.

Vilayet of Konia.—This province, like Angora, lies on the central tableland of Asia Minor, except in the south, where the land slopes sharply down to the Mediterranean. Less than 10 per cent. of the popula-

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tion are Christians; most of these live in the department of Adalia on the seaboard. Though the total length of the railways in the vilayet is considerable, means of communication are, on the whole, bad. In the west, north, and east, the soil and climate are much as in Angora; the south is more fertile and much warmer; in the centre there are a number of salt lakes, and the country round these is dry and barren. Agriculture generally is very backward, and, the population being sparse, much cultivable land is untilled. The greatest prosperity is seen in the south and near the line of the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, where a large extent of new land has recently been brought under cultivation.

In the greater part of the province little is grown save cereals and seeds; but in the regions of Isparta, Buldur, and Adalia, cotton, opium, tobacco, valonia, olives, raisins, and other fruits are produced. In the north and east the peasants breed cattle, mohair goats, and sheep.

Vilayet of Adana.—This province falls into two well-defined areas. The western part is mountainous, rising abruptly from the sea to the Taurus mountains; the eastern part lies largely in the Cilician Plain, which is very fertile, though most unhealthy. Christians, principally Armenians, formed the most numerous element of the population before the war, but in all probability few are now left. Communications are more satisfactory than in most parts of Anatolia.

In the western half of the province, agriculture is not very remunerative, and the forests are the most valuable asset of this region. The Cilician Plain, on the other hand, yields a great variety of agricultural products, including wheat, barley, oats, rice, seeds, opium, sugar-cane, and cotton. The cultivation of cotton, for which the climate and soil are most suitable, increased rapidly in the decade before the war, and in 1912 the vilayet produced 110,000 bales of cotton and 35,000 tons of cotton-seed.

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(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

In general, the methods of cultivation followed in Anatolia are most antiquated. The time-honoured wooden plough, little altered since the days of the Hittites, is commonly used; threshing is usually done by dragging over the corn a heavy sledge studded with flints; manure, though used in gardens and vineyards, and for certain plants, such as the poppy, which require special care, is rarely employed in the cultivation of grain crops. The peasant, in fact, seldom produces more than will satisfy the needs of himself and his family. Certain distinctions must, however, be drawn between various classes of the population and various districts. As a general rule, the Christian peasants are more skilful and intelligent, and readier to welcome modern improvements, than the native Turks; and in the western vilayets, they possess valuable traditional lore and show wonderful ability in gardening and the raising of particular products, such as grapes, olives, opium, and tobacco. The *Muhajirs*, or Mussulman immigrants from European Turkey, are likewise comparatively advanced in agricultural knowledge and methods, and their villages and fields can be distinguished at a glance from those of the native Turk by their orderly and prosperous appearance. Nevertheless, it is only in a few districts particularly exposed to foreign influences that really modern methods and implements have been adopted. Scientific cultivation, as might be expected, flourishes most in the regions traversed by railways, where the possibility of disposing of his surplus produce stimulates the peasant to increase his output. In such districts a light modern plough has found favour, and threshing, winnowing, and screening machines are beginning to be used.

The vilayet of Aidin, in agricultural methods as in other respects, is the most advanced. The railways have done their best to encourage the sale of agricultural machinery; and the Smyrna—Aidin

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Company allows its stationmasters to keep a supply of fittings and duplicate parts for certain standard machines, which, in the total absence of skilled mechanics, would otherwise never be repaired when out of order. The same company has also made experiments in the growing of new crops, and has given instruction and distributed seed to peasants who wish to cultivate them.

The Anatolian Railway has done good work of the same kind. In the sanjak of Ismid it has experimented in new crops, and established three tree-nurseries. In the vilayet of Konia it has successfully introduced modern agricultural machinery, which is being increasingly used.

For some years prior to 1914, the neighbourhood of Adalia was importing a good deal of agricultural machinery from the United States. Modern methods and apparatus were also rapidly winning favour in the vilayet of Adana, where British steam-ploughs and threshing machines and American reapers were widely used, and certain farmers had begun to sow cotton by machinery.

Anatolia abounds in the remains of extensive irrigation works, dating from Roman or Byzantine times. With the advent of the Turks these fell into disuse, the result being the creation of large fever-breeding marshes. A few years ago there was virtually no irrigation in Anatolia, except for gardens near the towns, where rights to water are commonly sold along with land. When, however, the economic penetration of Anatolia by foreigners began, the need for scientific irrigation was soon realised. Several important projects have been considered, but only one, the Konia Irrigation Scheme, has so far taken practical effect. This was initiated by the Anatolian Railway Company, though the territory chiefly affected falls within the sphere of the Baghdad Railway. The capital was found by the Deutsche Bank. The undertaking was nominally carried out for the Turkish Government, but hitherto it has

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remained in the hands of the Germans. The object of the scheme is to irrigate the unproductive plain south-east of Konia. The water for this purpose is derived from Lake Beyshehir and Lake Soghla or Kara Viran, and is brought down by canals and the River Charshembe, the flow of which has been artificially regulated. The distribution of the water in the Konia plain is controlled by an elaborate network of canals and dykes. Although the system is not yet complete, the main works were opened in 1914. They are stated to have been most successful; in 1915, 150,000 acres were brought under cultivation, and a report of the Turkish Ministry of Works, dated April 1917, states that in the region affected by the scheme the peasants' crops of wheat and oats have increased fivefold, even though antiquated methods of tillage are employed, while crops cultivated according to scientific methods under Government supervision have yielded fifteen times more than those previously raised on the same land.

Another project which has been much discussed, and which is said to have been revived lately at the instance of the Turkish Government, is the draining and irrigation of the marshes and lands round the Lake of Abullion (Apollonia). The district is naturally very fertile, but is now swampy and malarious. A similar scheme under consideration affects the region of the Lake of Isnik (Nicea), and the opening up of communications between the lake and Geumlek. All this region is also fertile and most unhealthy. It might be possible to make some use of the remains of the irrigation works and canals which existed here in the days of the Byzantine Empire.

In 1911-12 the firm of Sir John Jackson, Ltd., acting for the National Bank of Turkey, completed surveys with a view to controlling the Maeander and irrigating its valley. No works, however, were begun, though the scheme is of great importance. The valley is very fertile, but the devious course of the river is constantly changing, with disastrous results to

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agriculture. It was computed that the accomplishment of the project would have brought a million acres of land under cultivation.

During the war the Germans initiated an ambitious scheme for draining and irrigating a large tract of the vilayet of Adana. It appears that the main purpose of the project was to drain the marshy country between the lower reaches of the Sihun and the Jihun, and then to water the area systematically from these rivers. Work was to be started in the autumn of 1917, but it is not known whether any substantial progress has been made.

(c) *Forestry*

It is only within the last half-century that the Turkish Government has made any effort to preserve from indiscriminate devastation the valuable forests which cover the mountain slopes in all parts of the Empire. The present administration of the forests is based on a law promulgated in 1870, though subsequently modified at various times. This measure places all forests, whether on State, communal, or private property, under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, Mines, and Forestry; provides for the appointment of a staff of inspectors and keepers to supervise the felling of trees; specifies the conditions on which timber may be taken by Government Departments; fixes the taxes payable by private individuals who are granted permits to cut wood; and ordains severe penalties for unauthorised depredations. It is an admirable law, but, like most Turkish laws, has made very little difference. This is partly due to the slackness, ignorance, and venality of Turkish officials, and partly to the lack of communications, which renders impossible the effective supervision of many of the forests. There is still much unauthorised and wasteful felling of timber and stripping of bark; great damage is frequently caused by fires, which are not seldom started by incendiaries; tracts of woodland fall

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into decay from sheer neglect; and there is scarcely a district where any serious attempt has been made to replace losses by planting young trees.

Notwithstanding the havoc that has been wrought, the forests of Anatolia are still of vast extent and great potential value. Every Anatolian province has large stretches of woodland, and in reviewing the country's forest resources it is convenient to take each separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—The forests of this region have suffered very serious devastation, but considerable areas remain under timber in the districts of Kandra, Adabazar, and Geive. From the last-named district much walnut wood is exported to Constantinople. There are also forests near Ismid; the wood here is used chiefly for making charcoal.

Vilayet of Brusa.—This province has numerous beautiful forests, their total area being estimated at 23,000 square kilometres. Many of them, however, are neglected and almost unknown. The district of Ainegeul is the richest in timber, while near Gediz there is a large forest consisting exclusively of oak. The principal trees found are pine, fir, oak, elm, chestnut, beech, and hornbeam.

Sanjak of Bigha.—There are about 2,000 square kilometres of forest in the province. The forest of Eshelek, which covers 510 square kilometres, has been systematically exploited under the direction of the School of Forestry near Constantinople. Its principal product is oak, which has been exported in considerable quantities. Elsewhere coniferous trees are the most abundant, and there used to be some export of timber from the celebrated pine-woods of the Kaz Dagh region. Beeches, limes, elms, and plane-trees are numerous, and there are extensive and valuable plantations of valonia oaks. In normal times, large quantities of gall-nuts are exported. Better use has been made of the forests in this province than in most parts of Anatolia, but except around Eshelek there has been no serious attempt to apply modern methods.

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Vilayet of Aidin.—There are about 6,000 square kilometres of forest in this province. The most thickly wooded areas are in the west and south-west, the neighbourhood of Makri being specially rich in excellent timber. The oak and the pine are the principal trees; near Makri cedars also flourish. In this district private undertakings have of late begun to exploit the forests, but the work is generally directed by natives who know nothing of scientific forestry. A few hydraulic sawmills, with vertical saws, have been erected, and in the town of Makri there is a small steam sawmill; but many of the trees felled are still sawed on the spot by hand. In the district of Davas there is also some exploitation of the forests, the timber being floated down the Ak Chai to the railway. Elsewhere in the province, however, the forests are subjected to the usual haphazard treatment.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—About a third of the province consists of forest. The district of Bolu is especially rich in timber, all the mountains being well covered, particularly the Ala Dagh on the southern boundary of the province. The forests in this district, and also around Kastamuni and Sinope, have been to some extent exploited by the State. The principal trees are oak, beech, chestnut, elm, lime, and black pine. Considerable numbers of whorls, made of walnut wood, are exported.

Vilayet of Angora.—In this vilayet there are only four forests of note: those of Yaban-Abad in the district of Angora, Akdagh Maden and Sungurlu in the district of Yuzgat, and Chichek Dagh in the district of Kirshehir. They furnish the local peasants with firewood and charcoal. The most plentiful tree is the oak.

Vilayet of Konia.—This province has many rich forests; but they have been little exploited except in the region of Adalia. Here there are about 900,000 acres of forest, mostly covered with pine and larch.

Vilayet of Adana.—The mountainous regions in the west of this province contain fine forests of oak and

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pine. They have been very wastefully used, but remain of great extent and value.

(d) *Land Tenure*

The conditions under which land is held in Anatolia differ in no material respect from those prevailing in other parts of Turkey. The subject is treated at length in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

(3) Fisheries

It is illegal to catch or sell fish, or even to possess fishing apparatus, without a licence; and, in addition to the cost of the various licences, a tax has to be paid on the price of all fish sold. It is perhaps largely due to these restrictions that little systematic fishing is carried on; and although the Marmara, the Dardanelles, and the Mediterranean abound in excellent fish of many kinds, there are, except near Constantinople, no fisheries of more than local importance. Most of the rivers and lakes of the interior also contain good fish; but only in the vilayet of Brusa and the sanjak of Adalia are they caught in any number. There is everywhere a good deal of poaching by the peasants for their own needs.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Natural Resources*

The chief provisions of the Turkish mining law are given in *Turkey in Europe*.

Though the mineral resources of Anatolia have been very imperfectly investigated, enough information exists to show that they are both varied and valuable. Few mineral deposits, however, are worked, and the number of concessions granted for exploiting minerals gives an exaggerated impression of the extent of the mining industry, as many persons and companies have obtained concessions with the object of selling them to

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others and therefore limit themselves to the minimum of work required by the law. Several causes have contributed to discourage mining—the badness of communications, the lack of coal in proximity to the chief mineral deposits, the heavy dues exacted by the Government, and the difficulty of securing labour.

The principal minerals known to exist in Anatolia are coal and lignite, lead, chromium, boracite (pandermite), emery, and meerschaum.

Coal.—By far the most important coalfield is that of Heraclea. The coal in this region was first mined successfully by a French company, the Société française d'Héraclée, which in 1896 obtained a concession for the construction and administration of a port at Zunguldak, the working of a number of mines, and the building of a light railway. The concession was to expire in 1846. For some time the company made no profit, but in the last few years before the war it did better. In 1912 it sold 513,900 tons of coal, at an average price of 16*s.*, f.o.b. at Zunguldak. Of this, 217,000 tons were supplied to ships' bunkers at the port, and 186,000 tons were shipped to Constantinople. Before the war there were several other companies working in the same area, but their total output was considerably less than that of the Société d'Héraclée.

Shortly before the war several of the mines of this region were bought by a Belgian syndicate, and others by a German company under the control of the Deutsche Bank and Hugo Stinnes, the coal magnate. In 1916 this company took over the mines of the Belgian group. It has since undertaken the construction of a railway from the coalfield to Bolu.

When war broke out between France and Turkey, the Turkish Government assumed control of the mines and other works of the Société d'Héraclée; and it afterwards bought up the harbour of Zunguldak. It also endeavoured to bring all the mines of the region under a single new company, which was being formed in 1917 by a group of German financiers, headed as usual by the Deutsche Bank.

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There are small deposits of coal in other parts of Anatolia. Near Manjilik, in the north-west of the vilayet of Brusa, there are small workings, and prospecting in this area is being continued. Coal has also been found near Lapsaki on the Dardanelles, but these deposits have not yet been exploited. In the vilayet of Aidin coal is mined near Soma for the use of factories in that neighbourhood and at Pergamum. At Sokia and Nazli, in the Maeander Valley, there are workings which supply local needs; and at Makri a mine produces coal of good quality. It is reported that coal has been discovered near Konia, and is being worked by the local authorities.

Lignite.—Deposits of lignite are found in several parts. The so-called Panderma Lignite Mines, which lie between Kirmasli and Mikhalij in the vilayet of Brusa, formerly produced little, but during the latter part of the war sent more than 300 tons monthly to Constantinople. The lignite, however, is of poor quality, and has to be mixed with better lignite or coal before being used. The most important lignite mines in Anatolia are at Manjilik, in the same province, and belong to the celebrated Balia-Karaïdin Company, further particulars of which will be found below. From 1908 to 1912 the mines produced on an average 29,000 tons a year. In the vilayet of Aidin several deposits are worked. Near Soma mines have been opened during the war, and according to report produce very large quantities of very bad lignite, some of which, however, mixed with German coal, is burned by the locomotives on the Soma-Panderma Railway, while some is sent to Smyrna. At Sokia workings which were fairly successful before the war have, it seems, greatly increased their output. Here, too, the lignite is poor, but it is bought in Smyrna by the railways, the gasworks, and factories. Another deposit, near Nazli, has also been worked very vigorously since 1914, mainly by an American company. The produce, though said to be deplorably bad, commands a market in Smyrna. In contrast to the mines just mentioned, a

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deposit of lignite recently found near Angora is said to be of good quality.

Lead.—Lead ore, usually containing silver and sometimes gold, occurs in many places, frequently in association with zinc. By far the most important mines are those of Karaïdin and Koja Gümüsh, near Balia-Maden, in the north-west of the vilayet of Brusa, which belong to the Société Anonyme Ottomane de Balia-Karaïdin, already mentioned as working lignite in the same neighbourhood. This company, which was established with French capital, took over the mines from the Société de Laurium, of Athens, in 1892, and has become the most prosperous mining enterprise in Anatolia. In the years 1910-1913, the dividend paid on its share capital averaged 23 per cent. per annum. During the same period the mines produced yearly on an average 12,900 tons of argentiferous "rough" lead, smelted on the spot, and 5,800 tons of blende, containing 41 per cent. of zinc. The mines are worked on the most scientific principles and with modern plant, and the company has built a Décauville railway from the lignite mines at Manjilik to Balia and Palamutlik, whence there is a good road to the small port of Akchai, which is used for the shipment of such of the company's products as are destined for overseas. It is stated that after the outbreak of the European War the mines were for a time shut down, but later, it appears, the company was given large contracts for lead by the Otttoman Government.

There are also very valuable deposits of auriferous and argentiferous lead in the Bulgar Dagh mountains, in the extreme south-east of the vilayet of Konia. The most famous mine in this district is that of Bulgar Maden, which has been exploited since 1825. It belongs to the State, and, perhaps on that account, has not been very vigorously worked, although the ore can be easily and cheaply reached by means of horizontal galleries. The ore contains 44.2 per cent. of lead, and 1,665 grammes of silver and 7 of gold to the ton; but owing to the primitive methods of smelting employed

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a large proportion of the lead and silver is lost. The gold is separated from the silver at Constantinople, and of late years has surpassed in value the other products of the mine. There can be no doubt, however, that, with energetic and enlightened methods of working, the mine's yield of lead and silver would be very large. A German report on mining in Anatolia indicates that at Berektli Maden, some 60 kilometres north-east of Bulgar Maden, argentiferous lead has been worked with great success during the war. No particulars, however, are given.

Of the numerous other lead mines a few may be mentioned. At Karasu, in the sanjak of Ismid, the Société Minière Anonyme Ottomane de Karassou has since 1898 worked argentiferous lead and zinc. For some years prospects were satisfactory, especially as regards zinc, but the last few years before the war saw a great decline in the company's output.

Near the coast of the Dardanelles, some 16 kilometres south-west of Lapsaki, an English company was in 1914 conducting preparations for the opening of a lead mine. In the vilayet of Kastamuni there are abandoned workings of argentiferous lead at Kurei Nahas, south of Ineboli, which might be exploited successfully if improved means of transport were available; and in the vilayet of Angora there are at Akdagh Maden and Denek Maden, and in the Elma Dagh range, mines which are reputed to be rich in lead, but little work has been done in any of them for many years. During the war a very large number of concessions for the mining of argentiferous lead have been granted.

Chromium.—Chromite, the principal ore of chromium, is abundant in Anatolia, especially in the vilayets of Brusa and Aidin. In the former, the richest district is in the wild and remote country to the south of Mount Olympus. Though means of communication and transport are most primitive, several mines have been successfully worked in this region. The most celebrated are near Chardi, among them being the mine of Dagh Ardi, which until recent times produced

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more chromium than any other in Anatolia. In 1908 prices in Europe fell, and since then there has been a marked decline in the production of the mines in the vilayet; in fact, one or two of the most famous seem to have been closed. The second great centre for the mining of chromite is the south-west corner of the vilayet of Aidin. A great many concessions have been granted here, but in most cases very little work has been done. The fall of prices in 1908, however, seems to have affected the mines in this region less than those in the vilayet of Brusa. In the last few years before the war one or two near Makri did particularly well.

It appears from a German report that since the beginning of the recent war chromite has been profitably worked at Denizli, which is on a branch of the Smyrna—Aidin Railway. It is also known to occur at several places in the vilayet of Adana—for example, near the coast south-west of Mersina, near Tarsus and the town of Adana, and close to the Baghdad Railway in the extreme south-east of the province. Some of the deposits have been worked, but, to judge from official statistics, with small success.

Chromium-mining in Anatolia has hitherto been handicapped by the fact that the mineral occurs most abundantly in districts that are particularly lacking in means of communication. If the Smyrna—Kassaba Railway Company builds branches northward of its main line, and if the schemes, mentioned above, for connecting Aidin and Makri by rail can be carried out, the expansion of the industry will be greatly facilitated, and it should become extremely prosperous. It is, in fact, possible that its position has improved during the war, for it is known that large quantities of chromite have been exported from Turkey to the Central Powers. The competition of New Caledonia, which has already done harm to Anatolia, will doubtless be felt severely, but the world's demand for chromium will probably soon become large enough to absorb the supply of both sources.

Emery.—The vilayet of Aidin is by far the most

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important source of the world's supply of emery. The most productive area lies some 40 miles south-east of Smyrna, between Tire and Sokia, where a number of rich deposits are worked with great profit, especially those at Alajali, a few miles west of Tire, and Gümüsh Dagh, to the north of Sokia. There are also rich workings near Nazli, and further south, in the sanjak of Mughla.

Of the holders of concessions for emery by far the most influential is Ernest Abbott, an Englishman, who before the war was working several of the most lucrative deposits, including those of Alajali and Gümüsh Dagh. It is said that the industry has been injured by the invention of artificial abrasives, but this view is not borne out by the most recent statistics. The artificial products, in fact, are higher in price, and are used to supplement the natural supply. During the war a number of concessions for exploiting deposits of emery were granted.

Meerschaum.—Anatolia has almost a monopoly of the world's supply of meerschaum. Of late years the only deposits which have been worked are those near Eskishehir, which, however, yield very large quantities. They belong to the State.

Boracite (*pandermite*).—The mineral produced in Anatolia under the name of boracite is a hydrous borate of calcium, also and more correctly known as pandermite, a name suggested by the proximity of Panderma to the principal sources of the mineral. Pandermite is much used in the making of lenses and the manufacture of enamel. It is found almost exclusively near Susigirli, about 30 miles south of Panderma, on the Soma—Panderma Railway. The principal workings belong to an Anglo-American company, Borax Consolidated, Ltd. In the years 1908-12 the average annual production of raw pandermite was 11,500 tons. During the war, one or two concessions for mining pandermite in this region were granted.

Other minerals.—Many minerals besides those already mentioned are known to occur in Anatolia.

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Few, however, have been systematically worked in recent times, and there is much difference of opinion, even among experts, as to the importance of many of the deposits that have been traced. In these circumstances, it seems advisable to limit comment to a few brief notes indicating where the more promising deposits have been found.

Antimony ore is mined at several places in the vilayet of Aidin, but only at Mesjidli was there any considerable production before the war. Several concessions have been granted for antimony mines in the districts of Ivrindi and Balikhissar, in the vilayet of Brusa, but up to the outbreak of the war the work done here was insignificant. Since 1914 the mineral has been vigorously worked at Chinlikaya, in the hilly country north of Nazli, in the vilayet of Aidin.

Mercury is one of the most promising of the less abundant minerals of Anatolia. It has for many years been profitably mined at Saib and Tepejik, in the sanjak of Smyrna and vilayet of Aidin; and, in the last few years before the war, a recently opened mine at Sisma, in the vilayet and sanjak of Konia, was doing fairly well. It is reported that during the war the Deutsch-Türkische Montangesellschaft bought or took on lease all Anatolian mercury mines that could be worked, and that it has opened a new one near Ödemish in the vilayet of Aidin. It is also stated that a particularly rich mine has been discovered near Ushak (Brusa vilayet).

Since 1914 nickel mines at Ak-Kaya, near the town of Kastamuni, have been worked by the State.

Iron and copper ores are found here and there, and a few concessions for working them have been granted, but before the war the output was negligible. It is stated that there is iron ore of good quality and easily accessible in the Beshparmak Mountains, near the mouth of the Maeander (Aidin vilayet).

Iron pyrites has been successfully worked at Malaj, in the vilayet of Adana, but is not of frequent occurrence.

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Zinc has been treated above, under the heading of lead, with which it is commonly found.

Many concessions have been granted for working deposits of manganese, mostly in the western provinces, and it is thought that the output of this mineral may become very great. Hitherto, however, very little has been mined.

Near the railway from Smyrna to Kassaba there are deposits of sulphur, which, it is thought, could be worked very profitably. Sulphur has also been mined at Kechiborlu (Konia vilayet), on the Smyrna—Aidin Railway.

Salt, which is under the control of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, is produced and exported in large, though fluctuating, quantities. Rock-salt is mined at several places in the vilayets of Angora and Konia, but most of the Anatolian output of salt is derived from springs, lakes, marshes, or brine deposits, whence it is extracted by somewhat primitive methods. In the years immediately before the war the Anatolian vilayet with the largest production was Aidin, Konia coming second, and Angora third.

Various kinds of building and lithographic stone occur in Anatolia. Marble, of which many beautiful varieties are found, especially in the vilayet of Brusa, should become a source of much wealth to certain regions.

An Anatolian product of some note is fuller's earth, which is obtained in great quantities from the State-owned deposits at Michalijik, in the vilayet of Angora. It is also found in the vilayet of Brusa.

(b) *Output*

The following statistics of the output in 1910-11 of the principal minerals worked in Anatolia are based on Turkish official statistics, revised and amplified by a German expert. They are, nevertheless, only approximately correct, falling short in both complete-

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ness and accuracy, but they are useful for comparison with corresponding figures for other parts of Turkey:—

Mineral.	Output in metric tons.	Value in £ sterling.
Coal	766,392	354,001
Lignite	41,226	14,385
Chromium	16,604	33,995
Emery	27,656	90,516
Meerschaum	115	61,306
Pandermite	11,352	75,636

(5) Manufactures

Apart from carpet-making, there is no manufacturing industry on a large scale in Anatolia. Factories of any kind are few, the system being in several ways repugnant to the principles and prejudices of the population: the employment of women, for instance, is restricted by the Mohammedan rule that they must be veiled in the presence of men; and though at Brusa a certain number of Mussulman women and girls work in the silk-spinning mills, they have to be carefully segregated and kept under strict supervision. In 1911, with the object of encouraging the establishment of factories, a law was passed exempting them from taxes and customs duties on machinery and raw materials. Manufacturing enterprises with a capital of £2,000 and 25 workmen were to be regarded as factories for the purposes of the Act. Nevertheless, factory industry remains less important than domestic handicraft, despite the regrettable decline of the latter in the districts traversed by railways, where the peasants find that it pays best to export their raw materials and to buy the cheap foreign goods that are now brought within their reach.

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Manufacturing industry flourishes most in the sanjak of Ismid and the vilayets of Brusa, Aidin, and Adana. In the following paragraphs the provinces of Anatolia are treated separately.

Sanjak of Ismid.—This region possesses several small but growing industries. The chief of these is the spinning and weaving of linen. There are a few factories where linen for native garments is made, but most of the thread and cloth produced is spun and woven by hand in the homes of the peasants. The linen cloth is coarse, but is in considerable demand in Turkey.

Near the town of Ismid there are two large Government factories which work exclusively for the Army and the Navy. One manufactures fezzes, the other a coarse cloth for uniforms.

Carpet-making and embroidery are carried on, especially by Christian women. At Hereke, on the Gulf of Ismid, there is a well-conducted State school of carpet-making. It is attended by many women and children, both Mussulman and Christian. Very beautiful carpets are made in its factory, but, its immediate objects being educational and not commercial, the output is not large.

Vilayet of Brusa.—The town of Brusa is the centre of the silk-producing industry. Most of the silk, however, is exported, whether in the form of cocoons or as thread, which is spun in primitive mills. There used to be much silk-weaving in the district, but, owing to disease among the silk-worms some forty years ago, this branch of the industry almost disappeared, and only recovered very imperfectly when the disease was eradicated and the production of silk again increased. At present, the manufacture of silk fabrics is mainly a domestic occupation. In connection with the silk manufacture, a cotton industry of some importance grew up. This passed uninjured through the crisis which affected the production of silk, and to-day there is in the district a considerable manufacture of towels, kimonos, and other goods, in most of which silk is

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mixed with the cotton. The work is generally done on hand looms, and is often embellished with embroidery, in which the native women are most expert. In some villages a kind of velvet, known in Europe as "Utrecht velvet," is made. The upland regions of the vilayet manufacture a thick woollen cloth, or felt, which is used for saddlery, horse-blankets, overcoats, and door-hangings. Good tanned leather is also produced in various parts. In the south of the province carpet-making flourishes. This industry is centred at Smyrna, and is treated below under the vilayet of Aidin.

Kutahia, in the east of the province, produces a small quantity of glazed tiles and pottery. The industry has long been established in the district, and was formerly famous, but the secret of the old colouring and glaze has been lost, and the present products are generally of poor quality. The best are the tiles, which have bold classical patterns, and are used with good effect in the decoration of public buildings. There is also in the province a small manufacture of meerschaum goods, mostly cigarette-holders.

Soap of good quality, made from inferior olive oil and the refuse of olives, is produced at Aivali and Edremid. The town of Brusa has several steam flour-mills.

Sanjak of Bigha.—Notwithstanding its favourable situation, there is little manufacturing industry in this province. Soap is manufactured in the south; there are a number of tanneries, for which the materials are plentiful; and Chanak still produces and exports a little pottery, though this industry has utterly fallen from its former prosperity and repute.

Vilayet of Aidin.—By far the most important manufacture in this province is that of carpets. The industry flourishes also in the south of the vilayet of Brusa and the west of the vilayet of Konia, but may properly be treated as a single whole with its centre at Smyrna.

The industry is an old one, the districts of Geurdiz, Kula, Ushak, and Isparta having long been renowned

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for the fine rugs called Asia Minor carpets. Of late, however, it has developed rapidly under the stimulus afforded by the railways and other types of foreign enterprise. Much of its present prosperity is due to Englishmen. The carpets are nearly all hand-woven by women and girls who work in their homes, and who often possess much traditional lore in the art. It would be almost impossible to produce similar carpets elsewhere, except in parts of Persia, as the labour employed is not only highly skilled but very cheap, and the wool used is grown locally, and not being subjected to chemical treatment such as it would receive in European factories, retains certain natural oils which are essential to the peculiar excellence of the finished fabric.

In recent years the merchants of Smyrna have undertaken the supply of good thread to the peasants, and a number of modern spinning-mills have been established. At Smyrna, moreover, there are two factories for dyeing yarns; both are British enterprises, though the technical staff and the machinery are German. The merchants, too, have employed artists to design good patterns. The native workers have shown themselves very ready to make use of the advantages offered them and to adapt themselves to the requirements of the exporters. Over 60,000 work for the merchants of Smyrna alone. The remarkable expansion of the industry is illustrated by the statistics of the export of modern carpets from Smyrna: in 1901 the value was estimated at £284,000, in 1910 at £735,000.

Carpet-making has given rise to another industry, the spinning of Turkish-grown cotton, which is used as the backing or canvas of the carpets. Recently, however, this industry has developed independently, and much of the cotton is woven into towels and clothing, mostly, it is true, of a somewhat coarse texture. The chief centres of this manufacture are Magnesia, Aidin, and Nazli. A French company has a cotton-spinning mill at Smyrna; its output is partly consumed locally, partly exported to Bulgaria.

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Though Smyrna is not an industrial centre according to European standards, its manufactures are more considerable than those of any other Turkish town. Apart from the enterprises mentioned above, it has an important manufacture of a very serviceable plain soap, made from the refuse of olives which have been pressed for oil, and from the inferior kinds of the oil itself. This industry flourishes to a smaller extent at Aidin.

At Smyrna, moreover, there is a cloth mill, under British control, which used to manufacture for the army; an ironworks, where tools, boilers, and machinery of various kinds are made; and a factory, owned by a British firm, for the extraction of tannin from the valonia acorn, 5,000 tons of its output being exported annually. An industry of some note is the manufacture of wooden boxes for figs and raisins; the cheap wood used comes principally from Austria and Rumania.

Vilayet of Kastamuni.—Little manufacture is carried on in this backward region. In the capital of the province and other towns a coarse cloth is made from wool and goats' hair; it is valued by the natives, who put it to various rough uses. In the west, coarse rugs are made, but are not in much demand. Sinope produces a little cotton cloth, and is celebrated for beautiful embroidery. At Sinope and Ineboli, and, in fact, all along the coast, there is a good deal of boat-building, sailing-vessels of several hundred tons burden being sometimes made. These are generally of primitive design but sound workmanship. They are mostly sold at Constantinople.

Vilayet of Angora.—Here also there is little manufacturing industry. The local weaving industry, once very extensive, has rapidly dwindled since the advent of railways made it profitable to the peasants to export their wool and mohair. At Sivrihissar a certain amount of knitted clothing is produced. Carpets are made in some parts, but the industry is not important.

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Vilayet of Konia.—It is only in the west and south of this vilayet that any manufactures exist. The carpet-making industry of Isparta and its vicinity has already been mentioned. In the same region, especially at Buldur, there is an old-established manufacture of linen and cotton cloth, used by the natives for underclothing; this industry has of late increased. In the south of the province there is a considerable production of woven mats, some of which used to be exported to Syria or Egypt. In the same part wooden agricultural implements, used by the peasants, are made, and at Adalia there is some manufacture of bricks and tiles and of copper vessels.

Vilayet of Adana.—Of late years important industries have been introduced into this province. In the town of Adana there are two factories for spinning and weaving cotton, with 10,000 and 5,000 spindles respectively, and 180 and 50 looms. At Adana there is also a pressing and baling mill for cotton, which belongs to the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft. Tarsus has two cotton-spinning mills, employing respectively 20,000 and 6,000 spindles; one of them is worked by electric power. Small ginning mills are fairly numerous, Adana alone having 21. There are in the province a number of factories producing sesame oil or cotton-seed oil; one of the chief sources of the latter, at Mersina, is owned by a British firm. At Mersina, bricks and tiles are also made.

The development of all industries in the vilayet has been seriously hindered by the repeated massacres of the Christian population.

(6) Power

Before the war, electricity was used at Tarsus for street lighting and for working a cotton mill, but elsewhere in Anatolia it was practically unknown. As a general rule, the rivers and streams would be of little use in generating power, as they are swift torrents in winter and not much more than brooks in summer.

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Some of the rivers in the north, however, have a more consistent flow, and might, perhaps, be utilised, though the initial expense would probably be great. At the town of Brusa there is sufficient water power to provide electricity for both lighting and the driving of machinery, and shortly before the war a German group was negotiating for a concession for the supply of electric light and power to the town. At Smyrna, the electrification of certain existing tramways and the construction of new ones were in contemplation.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Character of Trade*

In many parts of Anatolia there is virtually no commerce at all, the peasant producing all the food and clothing he needs, and often making his own crude implements. Even where opportunities of disposing of surplus products give a stimulus to his industry and ambitions, the consequent commerce is very simple. Whenever possible the peasant sells his goods in person at the market town of his district, so that with the money he gets he may at once buy what articles he wants. When, as is often the case, the nearest market town is a long way off, the peasants of a village generally organise an expedition after the harvest has been got in, and, often accompanied by their women, set out with a long train of carts and pack animals laden with grain, seeds, poultry, honey, skins, and the products of domestic manufacture. They bivouac at night, and on arrival at their destination camp in the market square. The more perishable goods are commonly sold by the women in the open market; their cloth and embroidery are sometimes disposed of in the same way, but more usually taken to the bazaar and bartered for yarns, Manchester goods, needles, and such-like. The grain and seeds are

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sold by the men to local merchants, generally Greeks or Armenians, many of whom, especially in towns on or near a railway, are agents for houses at Smyrna or Constantinople. There are also Jewish merchants who buy skins, eggs, and poultry, which they re-sell locally, often hawking them round on days when there is no market; but this class is not numerous.

Autumn is the time when trade is most active, but country towns usually have two market days every week, when the peasants of the immediate neighbourhood come in to sell the produce appropriate to the season. The diversity of religions which prevails in most parts of Anatolia is a serious handicap on commerce—Friday being a holy day for Mohammedans, Saturday for Jews, and Sunday for Christians.

While Turkish merchants are few, there are many wealthy Turkish landowners in the interior who sell their crops regularly to the same buyers in Smyrna or Constantinople, for whom they often act as agents. They are usually very honest and straightforward in business. They frequently buy up the surplus produce of whole villages, which in this case is delivered at their farms and forwarded by them to the big firms at the great seaports.

Certain products of special value, such as opium, olive oil, cotton, and various kinds of seeds, are sometimes bought direct from the peasants by traders who travel from village to village, acting for their own account or for exporting firms. They often make advances to the peasants on their prospective crops, and a good deal of undesirable usury is practised under this guise. The Mussulmans, who are generally stupid and honest, expose themselves readily to sharp practice; the Christians are not only shrewder and more suspicious, but as a rule will deal only with co-religionists.

The goods purchased by the peasants are manufactured articles of various kinds, principally cotton fabrics and hardware, but of course the nature and extent of the demand varies much from district to district. The shopkeepers and small merchants of the in-

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terior obtain their supplies from importers at Smyrna or Constantinople, buying in winter or early spring, either on sample or from stock, the quantity purchased depending on the prospects of the harvest. It is essential to the up-country retailer that his order shall be executed before the harvest is over, or he loses the custom of the big parties of peasants who come from a distance in the autumn. A careful study of his customers' tastes and prejudices is also more necessary than might be supposed in a country where wants are so simple. Among the peasant women, for instance, there are continually changing fashions in the colours and patterns of cotton goods, and the men have obstinate preferences for certain makes of agricultural implements. It is consequently important that the foreign manufacturer should supply exactly what is wanted.

(b) *Towns, Markets, Fairs*

Brusa is the only town of importance. It contains 85-90,000 inhabitants, of whom two-thirds are Turks, the rest Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Its sulphur baths are much frequented, and it has considerable trade in silk, fruit, and wine.

The ports have been treated above, and the few other towns of note call for no special reference. They are mostly very small and ill-provided with modern amenities; such industries as they possess have been mentioned above; the general character of their trade has been sufficiently indicated in the last section, and any peculiar importance they may have in relation to foreign commerce will be pointed out below. Nothing need be added to what has been said about markets, and fairs properly so called are not known in Anatolia.

(c) *Organizations to promote Trade and Commerce*

There was a British Chamber of Commerce at Smyrna, but this appears to have been the only institution of the kind in Anatolia. Public exchanges are un-

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known. Before the war, in short, systematic encouragement of industry and commerce was left almost entirely to the railway companies and other foreign undertakings.

For efforts to stimulate production and trade during the war, see p. 133 below.

(d) *Foreign Firms and Companies*

Foreign commercial houses are found only at Smyrna and a few other ports, and even in such places they are not numerous. Most of the foreign trade of Smyrna is carried on through native firms, which play a much more important and successful part here than in Constantinople. The native merchants and agents are generally Christians; they are clever and enterprising, but of late years many have been ruined through reckless speculation in prospective harvests and fruit crops. Of the European business houses the great majority are British, some of them having been in existence since the days of the old Levant Company. The most conspicuous firm is C. Whittall and Co., who do a large export business, and are renowned throughout Asia Minor. MacAndrews and Forbes, who control the liquorice trade, are also very influential. Of late years a number of business houses have been incorporated as British limited liability companies; these are not, however, always composed entirely of British elements. Among these concerns may be mentioned the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Ltd. (capital £1,000,000), the Smyrna Fig Packers Ltd. (£250,000), the Ottoman Cloth Company (£80,000), the Ottoman Oil Company (£60,000), the Anglo-Anatolian Trading Company (£30,000), and the Anglo-Oriental Trading Company (£20,000).

For the foreign firms at Constantinople, through whom much of the trade of northern and central Anatolia is carried on, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series.

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(e) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

The efforts of European capitalists to secure concessions for railways, public works, and mines have been sufficiently illustrated above. As for commercial penetration in the strict sense, the methods of Germany, which have been peculiarly successful, are described in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. What is there said, though German policy is the same throughout Turkey, applies in particular to Constantinople and its neighbourhood. Before the war Anatolia, for the most part an undeveloped country, had been influenced comparatively little by Germany's commercial aggression, and in the province of Aidin, which was economically the most advanced, British interests were paramount. Nevertheless, German trade was making headway in the districts served by the German railways, and even at Smyrna the competition of several continental countries was being felt by the old-established British houses. According to the British Consular Report for Smyrna for 1912, a local paper gave the following as the principal reasons for the growing success of Great Britain's rivals:—(1) Personal visits to Turkish markets and a thorough study of them on the spot by manufacturers; (2) the frequent supply of samples and regular despatch of travellers; (3) acceptance of the smallest orders; (4) the ungrudging replacement of unsatisfactory goods; (5) the grant of great facilities for payment; (6) co-operation between banks and shippers; (7) the quotation of inclusive (*c.i.f.*) prices; (8) combination of land and sea freights.

In 1911 it was reported by H.M. Consulate that the Hungarian Société de Commerce et de Banque had set up a showroom at Smyrna for samples of the products of firms for which it acts as agent, and in the same year a similar exhibition was established by the Rumanian Government. An attempt of the British Chamber of Commerce at Smyrna to organise a showroom for British goods met with insufficient support. In 1912 commercial missions from Spain and Russia

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visited Smyrna to study the best openings for the trade of their respective countries. There appears to have been some danger that British traders would be content to rest on their reputation and would neglect to take measures to counter the progressive methods of their rivals.

(2) Foreign

It is impossible to give precise statistics of the foreign trade of Anatolia. Before the war it was nearly all conducted through three ports, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Mersina. Constantinople was the chief emporium for the north and centre, Smyrna for the west, and Mersina for certain parts of the south. It is safe to say that the goods exported and imported at Smyrna and Mersina were almost entirely of Anatolian origin or destination; but this was not the case at Constantinople, through which passed the exports and imports of many regions, both in the Turkish Empire and elsewhere. The real position of Anatolian trade was rendered yet more obscure by the method of grouping followed by the Customs authorities; thus, the returns for Mersina were not published separately, but formed part of a total to which Adalia and Alexandretta also contributed. Further, from 1911 to 1913 Turkey was at war, and the conditions of her trade were abnormal. It is consequently advisable to base all conclusions on the statistics for 1910-11, when the official Turkish returns were fortunately compiled according to the improved methods introduced after the reform of the Customs Administration in 1909. On the other hand, between then and 1914 Turkey lost much territory, including several islands which were treated as "dependencies of Smyrna," and for which separate figures were not quoted. In short, all that can be attempted is a rough estimate of the foreign trade of Anatolia eight years ago; while the value of the exports and imports of

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particular regions can seldom be calculated at all, even those of coastal districts with ports of their own passing for the most part through Constantinople or Smyrna and figuring in the returns for these places.

(a) *Exports*

(i) *Quantities and Values.*—In considering statistics of Turkish exports, it must be remembered that tobacco, which is controlled by the Régie Ottomane des Tabacs, and certain other commodities controlled by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt, are not included in the Custom House returns. In 1910-11 the value of the tobacco exported from Turkey was £2,842,000, and that of the articles controlled by the Council of the Public Debt £172,000. The sum of £3,014,000 should therefore be added to the total value of the exports as given in the Customs returns. For 1910-11 this was £20,072,000, distributed among the various districts as follows:—

	£	£
Constantinople—		
Stambul and Galata	1,993,000	
Haidar Pasha, Marmara and Dardanelles ports, and Zunguldak ...	2,316,000	
		4,309,000
Smyrna	4,444,000	
Dependencies of Smyrna (Aivali, Mitylene, etc.)	1,876,000	
		6,320,000
Alexandretta, Mersina, and Adalia ...	...	1,471,000
Trebizond and Dependencies (including Sinope and Ineboli)	...	1,654,000
Other districts (including the European provinces since lost)	...	6,318,000

It is possible to some extent to analyze the figures of certain customs districts with the help of statistics in British Consular Reports, which, for the year 1910, give separate returns for Adalia and Mersina. Their statistics for these places, which are derived from various sources, generally unofficial, are admittedly

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only approximate; and in the case of Adalia they do not attempt a precise discrimination between exports destined for other parts of Turkey and those destined for foreign countries. On a rough estimate, however, the value of the goods shipped direct from Adalia to foreign countries may be put at £70,000. The exports from Mersina, nearly all of which came from the vilayet of Adana, were valued by H.M. Vice-Consul at £619,640.

A considerable proportion of the goods shipped from Constantinople proper, and most of those shipped from Haidar Pasha, must have come from Anatolia. It may therefore be estimated that the value of the export trade of Anatolia in 1910 was about £8,000,000, representing approximately 35 per cent. of the total export trade of the Turkish Empire, tobacco included.

The Custom House returns show that in 1910-11 the exports of Smyrna alone exceeded in value those of Constantinople and its dependencies. As they must have consisted almost exclusively of Anatolian products, and came moreover from widely separated localities, the following list of the most important gives a good impression of the character of the export trade of Anatolia as a whole, except that cereals would be more and fruit less prominent among the exports of the northern and central regions, which are mostly shipped from Constantinople:—

	£
Barley	243,000
Oats	23,684
Flour	79,574
Beans	80,000
Cotton	243,578
Cotton seed	53,816
Sesame seed	33,908
Tobacco	210,000
Opium	415,208
Poppy seed	52,871
Liquorice root and paste ...	150,626
Figs	591,263

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	£
Raisins—	
Dried	982,765
Fresh, and fruit	62,300
Olive oil	74,166
Valonia	476,314
Valonia extract	23,706
Hides and skins	61,347
Eggs	33,502
Carpets	735,000
Emery	88,106[1]

(ii) *Countries of Destination.*—The following table indicates the shares of the principal European countries in the export trade of Turkey during 1910-11. The figures are those of the Turkish Custom House returns:—

	£
United Kingdom	4,882,000
France	4,003,000
Austria-Hungary	1,994,000
Italy	1,344,000
Germany	1,190,000
Russia	828,000
Other countries	5,831,000
	20,072,000

Corresponding statistics for other years are given in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, where they are compared with figures taken from the trade returns of the countries concerned. The exports to Germany were really larger than is indicated, a number of goods

[1] These figures are taken from a British Consular Report on the trade of Smyrna, where it is said that they are based on the returns of the Central Customs Administration of Turkey. The sums quoted, however, amount to considerably more than £4,444,000, which the Turkish Customs returns give as the value of the whole of Smyrna's exports for the year in question. The discrepancy is partly due to the fact that tobacco is included in the list; but even when allowance has been made for this, the total reaches £4,530,000, although many minor articles of export are ignored.

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returned as going to Austria being destined ultimately for Germany.

Since 1909 the Turkish Customs authorities have not published particulars as to the destination or origin of the foreign trade of individual ports or even of the several customs districts. It is, therefore, impossible to say how much of each country's purchases from Turkey consisted of Anatolian products. An examination of various Consular Reports, however, shows that the goods shipped direct to the United Kingdom from ports which do not serve Anatolia accounted for only a small proportion of the British imports from Turkey. It is beyond question also that Smyrna had for many years been the chief centre of British commercial influence in the Ottoman Empire, and that in this region British trade had held its own well. It is certain, therefore, that Anatolia produced a very large proportion—probably more than half—of the Turkish goods taken by the United Kingdom.

Of the products despatched from the districts served by the Anatolian and Baghdad Railways, a considerable part was undoubtedly destined for Germany and Austria-Hungary. It should also be noted that Turkey's exports to the United States were large, the American official returns putting their value in 1910 at £2,817,000. The figure given by the Turkish Customs authorities is only £916,000, the causes of the discrepancy being that Turkey's exports to America consisted largely of tobacco, that many goods destined for the United States were shipped first to ports of other countries, and that carpets, which were sent to America in great quantities, were commonly valued when passing through the Turkish Customs at a much lower price than they commanded at their destination.

(b) *Imports*

(i) *Quantities and Values.*—The imports into Turkey in 1910-11 were of the value of £38,687,000, and

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were distributed among the various Customs districts as follows :—

	£	£
Constantinople—		
Stambul and Galata	12,181,000	
Haidar Pasha, Marmara and Dardanelles ports, and Zunguldak ...	1,280,000	
		13,461,000
Smyrna	4,218,000	
Dependences of Smyrna (Aivali, Mitylene, etc.)	781,000	
		4,999,000
Alexandretta, Mersina, and Adalia ...	...	1,483,000
Trebizond and Dependencies (including Sinope and Ineboli)	...	2,382,000
Other districts (including the European provinces since lost)	...	16,362,000

Constantinople serves as a distributing centre for an enormous area, and it is impossible to estimate what proportion of its imports was destined for Anatolia, though it is certain that the figure would be considerable. Details of the import trade of Constantinople are given in *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series. British Consular Reports furnish separate figures for Adalia and Mersina. The value of Adalia's imports from abroad in 1910 may be estimated at about £136,000, while the Consular Report gives £611,890 as the value of the imports at Mersina. As in the case of exports, the statistics of Smyrna are the most illuminating. The following were the values of the principal imports in 1910-11:—

	£
Rice	94,300
Sugar	333,200
Coffee	138,000
Cotton :—	
Manufactures	857,000
Threads and yarns	226,000
Worsted yarns	12,600
Abbas and cloth	206,000
Other woollens	26,000

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	£
Hides, undressed	141,276
Leather and dressed hides ...	58,100
Timber	101,790
Coal	53,100
Petroleum	109,860
Machinery and tools	100,000
Other iron goods	135,881
Copper	20,800
Glassware	40,625
China and earthenware ...	20,285
Dyes and colours	25,681

(ii) *Countries of Origin.*—The following list shows the principal sources of Turkey's imports and the value of their respective contributions in 1910-11, as estimated by the Turkish Custom House authorities:—

	£
United Kingdom	7,709,000
Austria-Hungary	6,957,000
France	3,572,000
Germany	3,542,000
Italy	3,316,000
Russia	2,543,000
Bulgaria	1,820,000
British India	1,760,000
Belgium	1,518,000
Egypt	1,058,000
United States	589,000

These statistics should be compared with Table X in *Turkey in Europe*, p. 126, which gives figures of Turkish imports in 1910 based on the trade returns of the countries of origin. Some of the more glaring discrepancies are explained by the fact that many goods are clandestinely admitted into Turkey without paying duty. The value of the imports from Germany and the United States was really much higher than that given above. Many goods shipped from Trieste and classed as Austrian were, as a matter of fact, German, and Turkey's imports of railway and

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war material from Germany do not appear in the Custom House statistics. American goods destined for Turkey were generally sent through some port of western or central Europe, and it is therefore impossible to make a precise calculation of the value of Turkey's imports from the United States, though it is known to have been considerable.

There is no means of estimating accurately what part of each country's imports into Turkey was destined for Anatolia. British Consular Reports, however, often furnish statistics of British imports into individual ports, and the Constantinople report for 1910-11 fortunately gives a list, with both quantities and values, of British goods discharged at Constantinople during the year, the figures being supplied by the Customs. It is much to be regretted that no similar information is furnished in the Smyrna reports for the last few years before the war, especially in view of the importance of Smyrna to British commerce.

British goods imported at Constantinople in the year in question were of the value of £2,354,000, a figure which does not cover certain articles imported in trivial quantities. The principal items were as follows:—

	£
Cotton yarns	84,000
Cotton piece-goods	852,000
Cotton mulls, tulles, &c. ...	82,000
Army cloth and serges	264,000
Broadcloth *choka*	77,000
Other woollen textiles	17,000
Textiles of wool mixed with other materials	69,000
Hosiery, shirts, &c.	66,000
Coal and anthracite	143,000

As for Smyrna, a careful examination of the statistics of British imports into other parts of Turkey leads to the conclusion that the approximate value of the goods it received from the United Kingdom in 1910-11 was £1,300,000, or about 30 per cent. of

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the total value of its import trade. That this figure is not far from the truth is borne out by statistics for the years 1906-8, which show that in these years British imports at Smyrna stood in almost exactly this proportion to its import trade as a whole. The principal goods imported from the United Kingdom were textiles and coal. In cotton goods, especially those of the better class, England held a commanding lead, though there was increasing competition from Italy, which was the chief supplier of flannelette, very little of this being obtained from Great Britain. The coarser kinds of woollen cloth—army cloth, or *abbas*, in particular—came principally from the United Kingdom, which also supplied most of the woollen underwear imported; but the finer dress cloths were supplied chiefly by France or Germany. The coal imported was mainly British, though for some years before the dislocation of Turkish commerce in 1911 continually increasing quantities were supplied by the Heraclea coalfield. The petroleum trade was in the hands of American and German-Rumanian companies. Belgium was the chief country supplying iron, Great Britain and Germany coming next.

Notwithstanding growing competition, the United Kingdom had held its ground well in the import trade of Smyrna. In northern and central Anatolia, on the other hand, the influence of the railways under German control was telling heavily in favour of the efforts of Germans and Austrians to get a secure hold on the trade of the country. It is significant that whereas at Smyrna Great Britain's share in the imports was about 30 per cent., at Constantinople it was only about 18 per cent.

(c) *Comparison of Exports and Imports*

Before the war, an established feature of Turkey's foreign trade was the striking excess of imports over exports. The causes of this, which have never been adequately explained, are discussed in Handbook

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No. 16, p. 119. As regards this "adverse balance," Anatolia, so far as can be gathered, held a more favourable position than any other part of the Turkish Empire. At Smyrna, in particular, the exports regularly exceeded the imports in value. The latest figures available for comparison are the following :—

Year.	Exports.	Imports.
	£	£
1910	4,444,000	4,218,000
1911	4,400,000	4,137,000
1912	4,000,000	3,788,380

The balance in favour of the exports was even greater than these figures indicate. The value of the tobacco exported, which in 1910 was £210,000, should be added, and it is recognised that many exports were valued at much less than their market price. The British Consular Report for 1913 states that in each of the three preceding years the exports really exceeded the imports in value by at least £1,500,000.

The relation between Anatolian exports and imports passing through Constantinople cannot be calculated. It is significant, however, that in 1910-11 the exports of Haidar Pasha and the districts grouped with it were very much greater than the imports, and most of this trade was certainly Anatolian. Little can be gathered from the statistics for Adalia, as the foreign trade of that port passed largely through Smyrna; but it appears that at Mersina exports and imports nearly balanced. It looks, in fact, as if the exports of Anatolia as a whole were at least equal to the imports and perhaps in excess of them.

(d) *Customs and Tariffs*

Anatolian trade is, of course, subject to the same regulations as that of the Turkish Empire at large. See *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 128.

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(D) FINANCE

(1) The Ottoman Public Debt

(a) *History up to* 1914

In September 1875, when the amount of the Public Debt placed outside the Turkish Empire amounted to about £T 190,750,000 (£173,500,000),[1] Turkey committed what in a private individual would have been an act of bankruptcy. She ordered the suspension from the following month of the payment of one-half of the interest and sinking fund on all her loans, excepting the Egyptian Tribute Loans, and the Loan of 1855, which was guaranteed by the British and French Governments.

The Six Contributions, 1879.—Various expedients were used to obtain money until after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78), when the leading financial establishments in Turkey refused further advances unless those which they had previously made were secured. They suggested that six revenues (called the "Six Contributions"), paid to the Government, should be made over to a committee of local bankers, to be collected and administered by them. This condition was accepted in principle in November 1879. The Six Contributions were the revenues derived from tobacco, salt, wines and spirituous liquors, stamps, fisheries, and silk, subject to a reduction of one million sterling, but supplemented by the contributions payable to Turkey from Eastern Rumelia and Cyprus, and the tribute of Bulgaria.

The Porte and Abdul Hamid thereafter found that the borrowing of money from abroad without the consent of the local bankers was impossible, and further, it was desirable that old and new loans should be secured by a sound administration. Consequently, the original scheme required enlargement and amendment; it could not be left in the hands of local bankers. Accordingly, in October 1880, the Porte addressed the embassies of the various Powers concerned, suggesting

[1] £T1 = 100 piastres; £1 sterling = 110 piastres.

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that the foreign bondholders should send delegates to Constantinople to discuss new arrangements. This invitation was accepted; the delegates came to an agreement with the Porte, and on December 20, 1881, the law known as the Decree of Muharrem was promulgated.

The Decree of Muharrem, 1881.—The issue of this decree was an event of high importance for Turkish finance. Under its terms there was called into existence, as from January 1, 1882, a Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. This Council, commonly known as the Public Debt, consists of seven persons. Six represent the British, Dutch, French, German, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, and Ottoman bondholders.[1] The seventh member, who is nominated by the Imperial Ottoman Bank to represent the privileged bondholders (the Galata bankers) is only entitled to sit until the extinction of the particular debt in which they are interested. The largest amount of foreign bonds being in British and French hands, it was decided that the office of president of the United Council of Foreign Bondholders (an office which is tenable for five years) should be held alternately by French and English subjects.

The principal liabilities as consolidated by the Decree of Muharrem stood at £T 125,250,958, consisting of:—

	£T
Priority Bonds (Galata bankers)	8,170,000
Loans, Series A, B, C, D[2] ...	101,448,410
Lots Turcs[3]	15,632,548
Total ...	£T 125,250,958

[1] The same delegate represented the British and Dutch bondholders.

[2] These loans covered the period 1858-1873, and were to be amortized in a stated order.

[3] These were of the nature of premium bonds, receiving no yearly interest, the drawings of which, however, were to be continued on a basis which gave to the holder 58 per cent. of the bonus and the interest due on each bond when it was drawn.

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To provide the fixed annuity for the Priority Bonds and interest on the Series A, B, C, D, together with the corresponding sinking fund (viz., ¼ of the interest charge), it was necessary to find annually the following sums:—

	£T
Priority Bonds annuity	590,000
Series A, B, C, D—	
Interest	1,170,810
Sinking fund	292,702
Total ...	£T 2,053,512

There were, however, further liabilities, belonging to a different category, taken over by the new authority. These amounted to £T 71,778,260, and were as follows:—

	£T
The Loans guaranteed by the Egyptian Tribute	17,200,260
The Russian War Indemnity ...	35,310,000
Indemnities to private persons ...	268,000
The Floating Debt	19,000,000

The revenues originally conceded to the Ottoman Debt for collection and administration under the Decree of Muharrem were the following:—

(1) The monopolies of salt and tobacco.
(2) The revenues derived from stamp duties, spirits, fisheries, and the silk tax.
(3) The tribute of Eastern Rumelia.
(4) The tribute of the principality of Bulgaria, to be replaced by an annual payment of £T 100,000 from the tobacco tax (*dime*) until the amount of the tribute should be fixed by the Powers.
(5) The produce of the tax on pipe tobacco (*tumbeki*) up to the sum of £T 50,000.
(6) Any surplus of the Cyprus revenues.

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(7) Any increase in the Customs duties resulting from the modification of the commercial treaties.

(8) Any increase of the revenues resulting from new regulations affecting patents and licences *(temettu)*.[1]

(9) Any sums which might be fixed as contributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for the service of the Debt.

On certain revenues ceded to the Debt, the proceeds rose steadily from £T 983,000 in 1883 to £T 2,500,000 in 1913-14. The monopoly of tobacco was farmed out in 1883 to a society created for that purpose, the ***Régie Co-intéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire***, from which a fixed yearly payment of £T 750,000 was obtained, as well as a fixed proportion of its profits. In 1907 the rate of the Customs duties was increased, with the consent of the Powers, from 8 to 11 per cent.; of the proceeds of these increases 25 per cent. was consigned to the service of the Debt. No funds were, in fact, obtained from the modification of the licence tax (*temettu*), but the amount payable in respect of pipe tobacco (*tumbeki*) has always been paid.

On the other hand, no contributions from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro were ever assessed by the Powers. The claim on Bulgaria for tribute yielded nothing, and the tobacco dimes which were assigned in compensation did not regularly yield as much as £T 100,000 a year until 1908. The tribute from Eastern Rumelia, after various reductions (falling from £T 265,000 to £T 92,000) and temporary suspensions (1885-87 and 1896), was suspended altogether in 1908. Finally, the surplus of the Cyprus revenues, which was assessed at £T 114,680 per annum, was retained by the British Government for the service of the British share of the loan of 1855, which had been guaranteed by Great Britain and France.

[1] The *temettu* is a licence for carrying on an occupation or profession.

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In compensation for the last-mentioned item, the Turkish Government has always provided £T 130,000 per annum by bills on the Customs, and to balance the other losses the debt eventually (in 1910) obtained from the Government all surplus revenues on the ceded dimes, over and above the amounts which it already had to collect and administer, up to £T 114,000.

The Decree Annex, 1903.—The second important date in the history of the Public Debt is that of the promulgation (1903) of the Decree Annex of Unification and Conversion, which was brought about in response to the insistent demand of the Debt Council for a reconstitution and simplification of the Debt. The main effects of the Decree were:—

(1) First, to get rid of the prior lien, dating from 1881, of the Priority Loan (into which the original Priority Bonds and Series A had been converted in 1890); this was effected by the repayment of the holders either in cash at par or in new Unified Bonds (see below) at par with a cash bonus of 6 per cent.

(2) The Decree aimed secondly at the creation of a new capital debt of £T 32,738,772, bearing interest at 4 per cent., and subject to amortisation at the rate of 0·45 per cent. per annum, in the place of the Series B, C, D, the bonds of which were to be exchanged for a new series of Unified Bonds at the respective rates of £70, £42, and £27 10*s*. per cent.

(3) Thirdly, the Government was given the benefit of 75 per cent. of any surplus remaining after payment of an annuity of £T 2,157,375, which was assigned for the service of the Debt and allocated as follows:—

	£T
Interest at 4 per cent. on the original capital of the Unified Converted Debt (including Converted Priorities) ...	1,691,000

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	£T
Ordinary Sinking Fund on the Unified Converted Debt ...	196,000
Fixed annuity for Lots Turcs ...	270,375
Total ...	£T 2,157,375

Later Liabilities, 1908-1914.—In 1908, after the revolution, the Ottoman Government fell under the influence of the Young Turks. Unfortunately for Turkey, this era was heralded by the proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria (October 1908), the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, and the proclamation of the union of Crete to Greece. The new rulers of Turkey, encouraged by the Germans, began in self-defence to reform their army and fleet. This forced them to incur heavy expenses in armaments.

Up to the time of the revolution there existed no real budget, and the first constitutional budget appeared in 1909-10.[1] This budget, and all further budgets until the entry of Turkey into the European War, showed a considerable deficit. The receipts of the Ministry of Finance for the four years 1909-10 to 1912-13 were, in round figures, as follows:—

	£T
1909-10	26,990,000
1910-11	28,340,000
1911-12	30,374,000
1912-13	29,500,000

The deficits were as follows:—

	£T
1909-10	5,447,221
1910-11	9,678,683
1911-12	8,463,205
1912-13	8,608,569

To meet these deficits the Turkish Government could only resort to further loans. On July 4, 1914, according to a statement made in the Turkish Chamber, these amounted to £T 51,963,432, which, together with

[1] The Turkish financial year begins on March 1st.

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the floating debt of £T 18,303,615, gave a total of £T 70,267,047 of increased liabilities.

Of these loans the most important was that of £T 11,000,000 at 4 per cent. advanced in 1911 by a syndicate of 32 Austro-German establishments.[1] Part of this loan, £T 7,040,000, was issued at 86¾ on the Berlin and Vienna markets, but the expenses of flotation reduced the nett yield to 81 per cent. of the nominal capital. The second part, amounting to £T 3,960,000, was in suspense at the time of Turkey's entry into the European War.

The total funded debt of Turkey in March 1914, exclusive of the floating debt, the residue of the Russian War Indemnity, the charge in respect of kilometric railway guarantees (see below), and the Docks, Arsenals and Naval Constructions Company's guarantees loan,[2] amounted to £T 151,656,007. This total includes debts of two classes:—

	£T
(1) Loans under the Decree of Muharrem	47,936,721
(2) Loans not under the Decree	
(i) Various Loans 1890 to 1914	85,738,180
(ii) Egyptian Tribute Loans	17,981,106

[1] It may be convenient to enumerate here the loans since 1881 in which the Deutsche Bank and its group are interested. These are as follows:—

		Capital outstanding March, 1914. £T
(1)	1888, Fisheries Converted, 1903 ...	2,459,842
(2)	1894, Oriental Railways	1,573,990
(3)	1903, Bagdad Series I.	2,346,454
(4)	1905, Tedjhizat-Askerie	2,469,566
(5)	1908, Bagdad Series II.	4,718,120
(6)	,, ,, III.	5,226,650
(7)	1911, Loan	6,756,002
		25,550,624

(1), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are secured on revenues administered by the Council of the Debt.

[2] For particulars of this company see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 78.

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The amount of the floating debt was in 1914 £T 37,800,000, composed as follows:—

	£T
(1) Old Floating Debt	19,500,000
(2) New Floating Debt	18,300,000

Results of the Decrees.—Apart from the constitutional reforms effected by the Decrees, new sources of revenue (as distinct from the Customs surtax and the surplus on the dimes already mentioned) have been assigned to the Debt at various dates since the Decree of Muharrem. It is not surprising therefore that the yield of the revenues collected steadily increased from 1882 to 1903; still less so that the increase became much more rapid after 1903, when the Government, as has been seen, obtained a direct interest in the efficient service of the Debt. The average of the gross yearly receipts of the ceded revenues for the first three decades of the Council's administration amounted to £T 2,280,000, £T 2,600,000, and £T 3,800,000 respectively, while the cost of administration, in spite of manifold difficulties, did not exceed 8 per cent. of the gross receipts on the average of those periods. The gross receipts for the year 1903–4 were £T 2,971,984. In 1911–12 they amounted to £T 3,910,150, or, with the Customs surtax, £T 5,061,335. Whereas at the close of the reign of Abdul Aziz (1876) the service of the loans had absorbed £T 13,000,000 out of a total revenue of £T 25,000,000, in the last years of the reign of Abdul Hamid the service of the loans was absorbing just over £T 6,000,000,—or, with the amount of sums payable for the kilometric guarantees (see below), the Russian Indemnity, and interest on short loans, about £T 8,500,000—on a budget of £T 25,000,000.

Up to the year 1903, £T 222,398 represented the total value of debts redeemed. In 1912–13 the sum of £T 621,610 was devoted to redemption. During the period 1904–1913 no less a sum than £T 4,329,028 was applied for that purpose. Further amounts, moreover, were devoted to the liquidation of the Lots Turcs.

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with the result that, whereas up to 1904–5 the nominal value of drawn bonds was only £T 41,663, this steadily increased until in 1913–14 £T 79,755 were drawn.

The Decree of Muharrem was originally concerned solely with the Ottoman Debt as it stood in 1881, and the functions of the Debt Council are confined, as far as the Decree goes, to the administration of the revenues assigned for the service of that debt. But the Council of the Debt figured as a contracting party in nearly every loan contract made between 1881 and 1914, by virtue of the stipulation recurring in such agreements that the revenues hypothecated by the Turkish Government for the service of the new loans should be collected and administered on behalf of the creditors by the Debt Council. By 1891 the Turkish revenues administered by the Council on behalf of the new creditors were equal to those required for the service of the Muharrem Debt, and the new obligations of the Porte were increasing even faster than the Muharrem Debt decreased by amortisation. In fact, the only loans with which the Council is not concerned are the few secured by charges on Customs duties or similar revenues collected by the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

As long ago as 1889, the Turkish Government, recognising the utility of the Public Debt Department for its own purposes, joined with certain railway companies, to which the Government had granted kilometric guarantees, in requesting the Debt to take over the administration of the revenues which had been allocated for their payment[1]. In subsequent years the collection of other revenues was entrusted to the Debt; and probably if events had pursued a normal course, the Debt Department would have been made collectors of the whole of the revenues of the Ottoman Empire.

[1] For details of the kilometric guarantees, see above, pp. 46, 47, 52, 53, 58; see also *Turkey in Europe*, p. 67.

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The work of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt is declared by French, British, and other writers to have been a success in every way. Every year has seen its efficiency increased, the bondholders satisfied and better order introduced into the administration, collection and application of the public funds.

(b) *Development of Ottoman Public Debt during the War*

During the War the Public Debt of Turkey has on the lowest estimate been almost trebled. Germany has necessarily had to shoulder the main burden of financing her ally.

Loan Operations with Germany.—The first German advance took the form of specie actually despatched to Constantinople. The second, in which Austria-Hungary shared, was also in specie, but it was stipulated that the gold should be deposited in the lending country for account of the Ottoman Public Debt, and the loan was only made liquid by the issue of £T currency notes payable in specie six months after the signing of peace. Thereafter until August 1917, apart from mark and kronen credits, the advances were made almost entirely in paper currency, *viz.*, German Treasury notes (*Reichskassenscheine*) which were held by the Debt as cover for further issues of £T currency notes. Germany was pledged to provide means to pay all these issues in specie over a period of 11 years from the signing of peace. This guarantee, however, was quite ineffective to maintain the value of the notes, which depreciated in Turkey with great rapidity until a £T note was worth less than ¼ of a gold £T. A new device had to be found and the greater part of the August 1917 loan from Germany (£T 50,000,000 out of £T 56,500,000) was made in German Exchequer bills payable to bearer in £T at 3, 6 and 12 months. These were to serve as cover for another issue of notes redeemable by the eleventh year after the signing of peace, and might by agreement with the payee be themselves used to make

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payments in Turkey, but they were also offered to the Turkish investors at 4 per cent., 4½ per cent., and 5 per cent. discount respectively, with the option of renewal on the same terms and the guarantee that they would be discounted by the Debt at any time. The amount sold was £T 17,000,000.

Finally in the spring of 1918 Germany refused to increase further the total sum of her liabilities in specie. The £T 36,500,000 required for the period March–August 1918 was therefore provided in the shape of £T 4,000,000 of marks for purchases in Germany and Austria-Hungary, £T 11,000,000 raised by Germany by the sale of marks for £T in Berlin, and an undertaking similarly to supply any part of the balance which the Turkish Government should fail to secure by an internal loan. The special feature of this internal loan was the obligation of payment of the interest in specie and the first half-year's interest in advance, the specie to be provided by Germany in return for a corresponding nominal amount of £T currency notes of any issue. Germany thus began at once to redeem her promise to provide for payment of the note-issues, and to some extent anticipated her promise by disregarding the different dates for payment of the different series. The internal loan was issued at par bearing 5 per cent. interest, but, purchased in the depreciated £T paper and paying interest in gold, it actually yielded a return equal to 20 per cent. in the first year and liable to fall only if and when the depreciation of the £T paper was corrected. The loan was also secured upon particular Turkish revenues. The total subscription from all sources was £T 17,977,000 leaving £T 3,523,000 to be lent by Germany.

Analysis of the War Debt.—Neither the items nor the total increase of the Public Debt during the war can be stated with certainty. The following account of the position in February 1918 is a combination of the figures given by Djavid Bey in the budget speeches of March 1917 and February 1918, as inter-

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preted by the comments of the Constantinople correspondent of the *Oesterreichischer Volkswirt*:—

	£T
Pre-war funded debt	155,000,000
Advances by Central Powers:—	
Gold (Germany)	12,612,000
Gold (Austria)	2,167,000
Silver	2,600,000
German Treasury Notes ...	78,800,000
German Exchequer Bills ...	50,000,000
German advances in marks and £T	24,500,000
Austrian advances in kronen	12,500,000
Other debts (probably German)	30,576,000
Turkish military requisitions	19,245,000
Total ...	£T 388,000,000

On this table the following remarks must be made:—

The figure given by Djavid Bey for pre-war debt exceeds the official figures already quoted (p. 121) for the debt down to March 1914 (without the floating debt) by about £T 3,350,000, but it is not clear how the difference arises. The figures for loans in specie and Exchequer Bills are exact; the remaining figures of the table are approximations only; the total is the round total given by Djavid Bey. £T 5,000,000 of the total borrowed from Germany was re-lent to Germany as a currency loan.

It remains to consider the effect of the loan operations of the spring of 1918. It is not clear whether Djavid Bey included in his total of £T 388,000,000 the advances made by Germany in this connection. Assuming, as is probable, that he did not, the total debt in August 1918 would be approximately:—

	£T	£T
Total to end of February, 1918 ...		388,000,000
German loan in marks	4,000,000	
German loan in £T ...	11,000,000	
Internal loan	17,980,000	

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	£T	£T
Balance due from Germany	3,520,000	
		36,500,000
Total, August 1918		... £T 424,500,000

To this total will have ultimately to be added a large sum in respect of arrears of interest due to Germany. The various loan agreements postpone actual payment of interest for eleven years after the signing of peace, but interest runs on each loan as and when the actual cash is provided, and is added to the capital debt. Thus, on the specie, mark, and £T loans it accrues from the date of the loans, and on the Treasury note and bill loans it accrues from the date on which the cash equivalent is supplied by Germany. In the eleventh year from the signing of peace, according to Djavid Bey, the annual interest on both categories of loans will be £T 11,000,000, and the arrears to be added to the capital debt, £T 51,000,000.

The figures given here also ignore the pre-war floating debt of £T 37,800,000 (p. 122), and it is not certain whether they include all the liabilities incurred by Turkey for munitions supplied by the Central Powers, and some minor loans for constructional purposes. Further, in 1949, Russia will become entitled by way of war indemnity to an annuity of £T 350,000 for 34 years.

The total amount of £T notes issued by the Turkish Government down to February 1918 appears to be about £T 135,000,000. Germany is under obligation to provide specie for their payment over the following periods from the conclusion of peace, *viz.*, after 6 months, £T 6,500,000; after one year a further £T 19,000,000; by the end of 7 years, half the total issue; and by the end of 11 years, the whole issue. The notes of each series are forfeit to the Turkish Treasury if not presented within a fixed period from the first date for payment of the series.

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(2) Turkish War Budgets and Deficits

In presenting the estimates for the year 1918-19, Djavid Bey stated that the expenditure of Turkey since the commencement of war had been as follows :—

	£T
1914-15	59,000,000
1915-16	53,000,000
1916-17	83,000,000
1917-18	112,000,000
Total ...	£T 307,000,000

In these figures is included military expenditure to the following amounts:—

	£T
1914-15	19,000,000
1915-16	17,000,000
1916-17	32,000,000
1917-18	56,000,000
Total ...	£T 124,000,000

The Budget estimates for the year 1916-17 were for a revenue of £T 23,000,000 and an expenditure of £T 39,700,000, leaving an estimated deficit of £T 16,700,000. The actual expenditure was £T 83,000,000, producing an actual deficit of £T 60,000,000. The Budget estimates for the year 1917-18 were for a revenue of £T 23,584,165, and an expenditure of £T 43,304,511, leaving an estimated deficit of about £T 20,000,000. The actual expenditure was £T 128,058,659, producing an actual deficit of more than £T 104,000,000. The Budget estimates for the year 1918-19 were as follows:—

(1) Estimated revenue: £T 33,965,698 (Budget figures),[1] £T 37,016,694 (Commission figures).

(2) Estimated Expenditure: £T 51,762,761 (Budget figures), £T 51,402,327 (Commission figures).

The estimated deficit is thus between £T 14,000,000

[1] The Budget figures are more likely to prove correct.

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and £T 17,000,000, which, with estimated extraordinary expenses of £T 60,000,000, makes a total estimated deficit of at least £T 74,000,000.

The 1918-19 Budget is claimed by Djavid Bey to constitute a reform in three respects: first, in the collection of the taxes; secondly, by the increase of certain existing taxes; and thirdly, by the creation of new taxes.

(3) Taxation

It is estimated that, when the Turkish public revenue stands at £T 25,000,000, at least 40 per cent. of this total arises from charges on agriculture, or, more strictly speaking, on the agricultural classes. It must further be remembered that the yield of the principal source of revenue, namely, the agricultural dime, represents for the most part an amount received by the Government from tax-farmers to whom the right of collection is sold. Nominally, the tax is 12½ per cent. on the gross produce of the peasants' crops; but the peasants have never escaped with a payment of less than 20 per cent. Again and again this system has been condemned as too heavy a charge on the peasant, and as leading to grave evils. Even where before the war the dime was collected by the State, the employees of the Government were guilty of very gross extortion and favouritism.

Out of a revenue of £T 25,000,000 the following contributions are burdens on the agricultural population:—

	£T
Dime (agricultural)	5,383,000
Taxes on cattle	1,655,000
Impôt foncier	2,435,000
Produce of Civil List lands ...	620,000
Contribution of the Banque Agricole	770,000
Total ...	£T 10,863,000

Djavid Bey, in his speech on the 1918-19 Budget, announced that the Government had decided to collect

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the dimes directly.[1] He stated that this method had already been applied in certain districts, and had given good results in increase of revenue, and that it was hoped to establish a basis which might lead to an eventual transformation of the dime into a direct land tax. Before the war the tax generally brought in between £T 5,000,000 and £T 6,000,000. It figures in the new budget, under the new system, as estimated to bring in for the present year £T 8,500,000. In 1917-18 the dime had figured in the budget as expected to produce £T 4,100,000, and Djavid Bey stated that in consequence of the partial application of the new scheme, and owing to the enhanced value of the crops collected, the sum actually realised had been over £T 14,000,000. He further added that although in the present budget the dime figured at £T 8,500,000, it was expected to realise more than £T 12,000,000, even after the deduction of expenses of collection (which he estimated at 10 per cent.).

The taxes on cattle (*aghnan*) have been doubled, and their estimated yield is £2,500,000; in 1917-18 the estimate was £T 1,160,000. Before the war £T 1,660,000 was the estimated and £T 1,200,000 the actual yield.

The Impôt foncier has been increased by 50 per cent., and reorganised; it is now estimated to yield £T 2,100,000; in 1917-18 the estimate was £T 1,700,000. This revenue is mostly derived from a direct tax on real property in the cities, which up to the time of the war was very irregularly paid, and led to great abuses. The tax is supposed to be based on a State valuation, which in theory is revised every seven years. Before the war it amounted to about 8 per cent. on the assessed yearly rental. It has been increased twice since 1914.

[1] It is not known whether the dimes hitherto collected by the Council of the Debt are also to come under the new system of direct collection by the Government. It appears unlikely that the Debt would be subjected to such treatment, for a considerable portion of the dimes collected by the Debt is required for the kilometric guarantee of various German-controlled railways.

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The dimes, the cattle tax, and the Impôt foncier together represent about 40 per cent. of the total estimated revenue. The following further taxes in the new budget call for special notice:—

(1) The Temettu tax (*droit de patente*), estimated in the budget of 1917-18 at £T 370,000, is now estimated at £T 750,000. This is owing to an increase of rate and the inclusion in taxation of all foreigners and all Sociétés Anonymes.

(2) The so-called tax of exoneration is new; it is a payment for military exemption, levied from those who are not called upon to serve under arms for various reasons. It is proposed later to apply the tax to all foreigners, and even on a higher scale.

(3) The exemption tax is an amount paid by persons called up for military service, who wish to avoid serving. The law as to this tax has been considerably modified since the beginning of the war. In pre-war time it was generally estimated to bring in £T 6,000,000.

(4) The tax on salt is tripled. The revenue under this head is thus raised from £T 500,000 to £T 1,500,000.

(5) The new Customs tax on exports is estimated to produce £T 2,400,000. Djavid Bey stated in his speech that in the previous year Germany had taken £T 12,000,000 of exports, and Austria £T 2,000,000. The estimate of £T 2,400,000 appears very high, as the export duties vary from 3 per cent. to 10 per cent., only one article, tobacco, being charged at 10 per cent. It is unlikely that Germany, under present circumstances, will increase her imports from Turkey, or that the excessive prices charged by the Turks for foodstuffs can be maintained.

Among other objects of new taxation are tobacco, cigarette paper, playing cards, and matches.

It is proposed to tax war profits, and also to take toll of coffee, tea and sugar by a consumption tax.

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Taxation of alcohol is also under consideration. Finally, it would appear that the Government will refuse its consent to the renewal of the monopoly of tobacco in favour of the Régie.

(4) Banking

Up to quite recent times, branches of large Turkish or foreign banks did not exist in Anatolia outside the chief seaports. In the interior there were only small local bankers, mostly Armenians, with a few Greeks. When, however, the Anatolian railway was built, and central Anatolia began to be actively exploited by foreigners, the Imperial Ottoman Bank appointed agents and correspondents at many inland towns. It met with little competition until 1906, when German banks were first established at Constantinople. The Deutsche Orient Bank at once extended its activities to Anatolia, opening branches and establishing agencies at a number of places, mostly on the Anatolian and Baghdad railways, an example followed with energy by the Wiener Bank-Verein. The Deutsche Bank, on the other hand, though transacting a certain amount of business through the German-controlled railway companies, did not appoint agents of its own outside Constantinople.

Besides the banks mentioned, the Banque d'Athènes had much influence in Anatolia, especially at the ports, where shipping and trade were largely in the hands of Greeks, who here as elsewhere showed a strong preference for dealing with Greek undertakings. In the inland towns, the bank, though it had numerous correspondents, was less important. The Banque de Salonique, in which Austrian interests were strong, had a branch at Smyrna.

The competition between the Imperial Ottoman Bank and its foreign rivals proved of great benefit to the Anatolian merchant. As long as its supremacy was unchallenged, the Imperial Ottoman Bank conducted its business on narrow and old-fashioned lines,

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but when the German banks appeared, offering very attractive terms and ready to transact many kinds of business on behalf of their clients, it had to meet them on their own ground.

For further particulars regarding the banks mentioned, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, pp. 134-136.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Recent Development of Industry and Commerce and Future Possibilities

Just before Turkey's entry into the European War the economic prospects of Anatolia seemed bright. Its losses in men during the Italian and Balkan Wars had been more than made up by the influx of refugees from Europe. The inhabitants generally had been aroused to the advantages to be gained from industry and enterprise. Many of the vexatious restrictions of the old regime on personal liberty had been removed. The means of communication were continually being improved and extended; modern methods of cultivation were finding ever-increasing favour; and numerous concessions had recently been granted for the exploitation of mines and the construction of works of public utility. The least promising feature was the character of the Government, with its violent nationalist ambitions, exemplified by the persecution of the Greeks along the western seaboard. It is, however, likely that but for the war this fanatical policy would soon have been abandoned, as its disastrous economic consequences must speedily have become apparent; indeed, as was mentioned above, they are now realised, and even in the stress and excitement of the war efforts have been made to retrieve the blunder.

What has been said in the preceding sections refers almost entirely to the situation of Anatolia before the war. In order to estimate the future possibilities of the country, however, it is necessary to take into account the course of events during the last five years.

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In this period the prospect has, of course, changed completely. Foreign interests have been confiscated and often destroyed. The resources of the country have been placed at the disposal of the military authorities, who have seized the crops and live-stock at their discretion. The population has suffered enormous losses; the Mussulmans have mostly been drafted into the army, whose casualties have been very heavy; the Armenians have nearly all been massacred; and, of the other Christians, some have been slaughtered, some deported, some enrolled in labour battalions, some put to forced labour in the unhealthy plains of Adana, where many have perished, while those who escaped these fates have fled in large numbers to the Greek islands.

Simultaneously with these blows to Anatolian prosperity came a vastly increased demand from the Central Empires for Anatolian products of all kinds. The Young Turks at once resolved to turn this opportunity to account, but instead of fostering a natural export trade they passed a "New Law of Imports and Exports," creating Export Committees, Food Committees, and other similar bodies, whose ostensible purpose was to requisition all agricultural produce, part of which was sold to the natives and part to Turkey's allies, in each case at extortionate prices, these operations being performed under colour of protecting the peasants and preventing speculators from amassing unreasonable profits. The profits, as a matter of fact, have mostly gone into the pockets of members of the committees and their friends; and, when the scandal was debated in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, it was urged that the creation of Turkish capitalists, by whatever means, was to the economic advantage of the Empire. The Government, having imposed an *ad valorem* duty on all exports, had a strong motive for upholding a system which kept prices high. It is known that huge fortunes have lately been made, especially at Constantinople, where even Greeks and Armenians have shared in the plunder. Nevertheless, the exports to Germany and Austria increased rapidly; for the six months from

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September 1, 1916, to February 28, 1917, those to Germany were valued at £2,253,000, and those to Austria at £686,000; whereas in his Budget speech on March 7, 1918, Djavid Bey, the Turkish Minister of Finance, stated that in 1917-18 the exports to Germany were worth £10,900,000, and those to Austria £1,800,000.

The Government, however, did not limit itself to the artificial raising of prices, but also took vigorous measures to stimulate production. At Smyrna, Brusa, and Eskishehir committees were formed to study the best means of improving agriculture. A German specialist was engaged to give advice as to the development of native industries, especially the production of silk, wool, and olive oil. Experts from Austria were commissioned to report on the forests, and a new forest law is said to have been under consideration. At Constantinople the Government established a new meteorological station, which was to telegraph its observations to all parts of the Empire. A hundred and fifty students were entered at the cost of the State at the agricultural college at Budapest; and sons of soldiers killed in the war were sent to Germany to learn how to make and work motor ploughs. Great efforts were made to extend the use of agricultural machinery, which is exempt from customs duty. The Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture ordered large numbers of agricultural machines in Germany and Austria, an example followed by the Banque Agricole and the Commission d'Alimentation. The sale of agricultural machinery from Germany has also been vigorously promoted by several companies, such as the Anatolian Railway Company, the Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft, which is established at Adana, and deals in machines for use in cotton growing, and the Anatolische Industrie- und Handelgesellschaft, which operates at Adana, Konia, Smyrna, and Constantinople. It was hoped that the efforts of these agencies would be followed by a great increase in the area of cultivated land. Notwithstanding the artificial character of the present development of agriculture,

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its results will probably be permanent and beneficial, for the demand for Anatolian products will remain very great after the war.

While the exports of Anatolia have increased, imports have naturally declined. From September 1, 1916, to February 28, 1917, the total imports of Turkey from Germany amounted to only £558,000 in value, and those from Austria to only £868,000; and these were, of course, practically the only foreign supplies obtainable. The shortage of manufactured goods has been particularly felt, as the native manufacturing industries have mostly fallen into decay. Feverish efforts have been made, both by the Government and by private undertakings, to establish new industries and to enlarge and revive old ones. It has already been mentioned that during the war mining concessions have been granted in great numbers. At Angora the old pottery industry has been revived, in the vilayet of Kastamuni the flax and hemp industry. There are several new companies, generally with their headquarters at Constantinople, for establishing factories for textiles. The production of sugar has been strenuously promoted, especially in the neighbourhood of Konia, which is becoming a centre of great economic activity. There, and also at Eski-shehir, concessions have been granted for the supply of electric light and power.

It is worthy of remark that, as the war went on, the views of German experts on the future of Anatolia seem generally to have become much less sanguine than they were when Turkey entered the struggle. Thus Dr. Mohr, of Berlin, fears that the export of foodstuffs from Anatolia can never be largely increased, though he is more optimistic regarding the prospects of mining, which, he says, would make immediate and marked progress but for the lack of communications and the vexatious restrictions of the mining law. Another authority, Gustav Herlt, on the other hand, holds that recent research has shown the mineral resources of Anatolia to be smaller than was supposed, and maintains that in every branch of industrial enterprise, agriculture in-

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cluded, the shortage of labour and the indolence and conservatism of the natives will for long stand in the way of any substantial advance. Such pessimism was, of course, not universal among Germans who knew Anatolia, but that expression was given to it by writers of some repute at a time when the German hold on Turkey seemed quite firm should serve as a warning against extravagant estimates of the economic and commercial importance of the country.

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HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 60

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TABLE OF ALTERNATIVE PLACE-NAMES.

Acre	Akka	Jerusalem	El-Kuds
Aleppo	Haleb	Kishon river	Nahr el-Mukatta
Alexandretta	Iskanderun	Latakia	Laskie
Amanus	Giaur Dagh	Lebanon	Libnan
Anti-Lebanon	Jebel esh-Sharki	Litani river	Nahr el-Kasimie
Antioch	Antakia	Orontes river	Nahr el-Asi
Baalbek	El Buka'a	Palmyra	Tadmur
Beersheba	Bir es-Seba	Shechem	Nablus
Damascus	Esh-Sham	Sidon	Saida
Dead Sea	Bahr el-Lut	Tiberias	Tubariya
Gaza	Ghaza, Ghazzeh	Tripoli	Tarabolus
Hebron	El-Khulil	Tyre	Es-Sur
Hermon	Jebel esh-Sheikh	Yarmuk river	Nahr el-Menadire
Jaffa, Joppa	Yafe		

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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

Syria, broadly speaking, is the country that lies between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the deserts of Arabia; but, except in the west, the boundaries are vague. In Turkish official usage Syria consists of the vilayet of Damascus, extending from the Arabian borders on the extreme south to 35° 25′ north latitude.

Syria has no fixed boundary on the east; but in recent years the advance eastward of the sedentary population and the policy of the Turkish Government have considerably extended the limits of Syria in this direction. Starting south of Akaba, on the Red Sea, the boundary crosses the Hejaz railway, runs northward, and turns east so as to encircle the Jebel Druz; thence continuing by longitude 37° to the neighbourhood of Hama, and crossing diagonally to the eastward bend of the Euphrates, near Rakka. The Euphrates then forms the boundary to beyond Rum Kale (about 37° 20′ N.). The best physical boundary between northern Syria and Arabia, according to Blanckenhorn, would be the ranges of Jebel esh-Sharki (Jebel et-Tawil) and Jebel Bishri, which stretch from Damascus past Tadmur and reach the Euphrates at Halebie. The building of a railway from Homs to the Euphrates would probably tend to establish some such political frontier.

On the north the latest boundary of the vilayet of Aleppo supplies a provisional frontier. It starts from Jonah's Pillar, slightly north of Alexandretta, runs eastward to Giaur Dagh (the Amanus range), follows the crest of these hills northwards to a point nearly due west of Rum Kale, and then strikes on to the

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Euphrates somewhat north of that place. There have been various temporary extensions of this line both to the east and to the north, but there is no satisfactory physical boundary corresponding either to the present administrative line or to former political lines, although various possibilities have been suggested. The further north the line is moved the greater is the wedge of Syrian territory between Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and the larger is the Turkish-speaking territory included in Syria. It must also be remembered that Alexandretta is now the port of western Mesopotamia, and it will be to the interest of any power established there to have access to the Mediterranean secured.

In the south the boundary between Egypt and Syria, settled in 1906, follows an arbitrary line drawn from slightly west of Rafa on the Mediterranean to slightly east of Taba, south of Akaba, on the Red Sea. The boundary is completed by a line starting south of Akaba and running north-eastwards towards Ma'an and the depression of El-Jafar, separating the vilayet of Damascus from the vilayet of the Hejaz.

In modern usage the expression Palestine has no precise meaning, but it is best taken as being equivalent to southern Syria. When defined in accordance with geographical and political conditions, the drawing of the northern boundary alone presents any special difficulty. On the west side of Jordan the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie) is a definite physical limit from its western bend to its mouth, and the boundary may then be completed from the bend of the Litani eastward to the Jordan or may follow the northern limit of the kaza of the Merj Ayun.

The amount of country east of the Jordan that may be reckoned to Palestine depends chiefly on the political situation of Damascus. If Damascus itself be associated with southern Syria the difficulty disappears, as all that portion of the centre of Syria that lies to the east of Jebel esh-Sharki may easily be separated from northern Syria and associated with Pales-

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tine. If, on the other hand, only a portion of the country along the Hejaz railway line, south of Damascus, is to be united to Palestine a satisfactory solution is not easily found. If the line be drawn at the Yarmuk (Nahr el-Menadire) full justice is done to the claims of Damascus. On the other hand, the Hauran now finds its principal commercial outlet into Palestine by the railway to Haifa, and so should be associated with Palestine rather than with Damascus. In that case the most distinctive line, physically, east of Jordan, skirts the southern and south-eastern base of Mount Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh), and then follows the Wadi Zabirani and the Nahr el-Awaj to the border village of El-Uijane, with its lake into which the Nahr el-Awaj flows.

The area of Syria, as defined above, has never been exactly measured, and estimates vary, according to the territories included, from 72,000 square miles (186,000 sq. km.) to 80,000 square miles (207,000 sq. km.) and 91,700 square miles (237,600 sq. km.) as a maximum. The area of southern Syria (Palestine) can be given more exactly. Western Palestine as far as Bir es-Seba has an area of 6,040 square miles (15,655 sq. km.); the country south of Bir es-Seba, as far as Akaba, 4,500 square miles (11,660 sq. km.); total for western Palestine, 10,540 square miles (27,315 sq. km.). The corresponding country east of Jordan and as far north as Hermon may be estimated to be of similar extent. The total area of southern Syria is accordingly about 21,000 square miles. This figure suggests that the 72,000 square miles suggested as the area for the whole of Syria is an over-estimate rather than an under-estimate.

The extreme length of Syria from about 37° 20′ to 29° 50′ north latitude is about 550 miles, and its width from the sea to the desert varies from 100 to 130 miles. From Rakka, on the Euphrates, to the sea is a distance of 180 miles.

Administrative Divisions.—Syria includes the three vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, and since

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1887-8 the two sanjaks of Lebanon and Jerusalem. In 1908 the territory from Bir es-Seba to Akaba became a separate sanjak (though still associated with Jerusalem). The boundaries of the vilayet of Aleppo are noted above (p. 1). The sanjak of Jerusalem has been gradually extended since 1888, at the expense of the vilayet of Damascus, the eastern parts of which were distributed in 1894 and again in 1907. The vilayet of Beirut is split into two separate parts by the semi-autonomous district of Lebanon.

(2) Surface, Coast, River System and Lakes

Surface

Syria is bordered by a coastal plain of varying width. In northern Syria the relative area of coastal plain is small except to the north of Alexandretta and around the Bay of Antioch. Between Latakia and Tripoli extensive plains spread in two inland sweeps of great depth, continuing in varying width as far as the base of Lebanon. The region immediately south of Latakia is well watered by perennial rivers, and the soil is rich and well cultivated, although the southern part is partially flooded in winter. Towards Saida the plain widens to a considerable breadth, and is very fertile.

South of the Litani, in Palestine, coastal plains become a more marked and constant feature, and there follow in succession the plain of Es-Sur (Tyre), some 12 miles in length and 1 mile broad at its widest part, and the plain of Akka (Acre), which stretches for some 20 miles as far as Carmel, and has an average depth of 4 miles, being continued inland along the basin of the Mukatta river in the plain of Esdraelon. South of the Carmel promontory the coastal plain runs continuously, and with gradually increasing breadth, to the confines of Egypt. The Nahr el-Auja divides this strip into two parts, the plain of Sharon in the north and that of Philistia in the south. Both sections have great agricultural possibilities.

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Physically the rest of the territory of Syria lies in three parallel belts running roughly north and south: (1) the Maritime Range, with its broken coastal plain; (2) the Central Depression; (3) the Eastern Plateau, to the verge of the desert. On the north these three salient features are limited by the chain of the Anti-Taurus, and on the south they merge into the desert.

The *Maritime Range*, in north Syria, is divided into three sections, which are, from north to south: (1) the Amanus or Giaur Dagh, between the Jihan and the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi); (2) Jebel Ansarie, between the Orontes and the Nahr el-Kebir (near Tripoli); (3) the Lebanon, between the Nahr el-Kebir and the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie). The construction of the range presents certain prevailing characteristics. The main ridge lies in general towards the east, but the western slopes are of greater importance, as on these practically all the perennial water is found and to them almost all occupation is confined. The general aspect is bare and rocky, but there are many fertile localities among the hills which are well watered. The range forms a formidable barrier to communication with the interior. Its average altitude is 3,000 ft., but numerous peaks rise to nearly 6,000 ft., and Duldul Dagh, in the north, attains a height of 8,500 ft.

Jebel Ansarie in its northern part has its main ridge close to the sea, skirting the Orontes gorge. It drains southward to the Nahr el-Kebir and eastward to the Orontes, through the cultivable tableland of Jebel Kuseir. Many of the Kebir spurs are clothed with forests. The main ridge lies to the east, at an average height of 3,000 ft., with several peaks. The general aspect of Jebel Ansarie is comparatively tame, and its slopes are easier, its gorges less wild, and its country more fertile and adaptable to cultivation than the Lebanon. Between Hama and Homs the mountains spread eastward in low and easy slopes, with little or no perennial water. This region is one of the least known and least developed in Syria.

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The Lebanon is the highest and most rugged and developed region in Syria, and the main ridge for two-thirds of its length rises to sub-Alpine heights. There is a group of peaks in the north, the highest being Dahr el-Kadhib (10,018 ft.), and southwards Jebel Sunnin (8,650 ft.) marks the centre of the range. The eastern flank of the northern part is separated from the main chain by an elevated valley with an altitude of 5,000 ft. South of this the eastern slopes are unsuited to occupation; but the western slopes, although intersected by many gorges, have a perennial water supply, and are studded with villages. In general the northern part of Lebanon is less fertile than the southern.

South of the Litani the range continues southward through southern Syria to the Sinaitic plateau, its continuity only being interrupted by the plain of Esdraelon, which forms the easiest entrance to the interior of the country. The watershed in general is so situated that less than one-third of the country lies on its eastern side. The western slope is long and gradual, and merges into plains near the coast, but the eastern slope is steep and precipitous, especially towards its southern end.

South of the Esdraelon plain is the open hill system of Samaria, with the ridge of Carmel (altitude 1,810 ft.), and then the range, continuing parallel with the Jordan valley, passes imperceptibly into the compact tableland of Judaea.

In Judaea the highlands attain their greatest height (about 3,300 ft.) just north of Hebron, and then descend gradually towards the desert and the Egyptian frontier. The ridge as a whole varies in width from 14 to 17 miles, and its general character, especially in the south, is that of a stony upland with rough scrub and thorn vegetation, much broken up by deep valleys running both eastward and westward.

Central Depression.—With a few interruptions this feature is clearly defined from the base of the Anti-Taurus to the Gulf of Akaba. At the northern end it

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is a wide plain, with an altitude of about 500 ft., narrowing as it rises southward to the heights of Amir Musa Dagh (altitude 1,800 ft.). Thence it falls southward to the broad Antioch plain, El-Amk, with its lakes and marshes. The whole of this northern part of the depression is extremely fertile.

From El-Amk the depression narrows and rises towards the south, carrying the Orontes, and widens out again into the marshy and almost level valley plain of El-Ghab, which is about 6 miles by 40 miles, and extremely fertile. From Hama it bends eastwards, and emerges upon the fertile Homs plain. Between the high ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon the depression becomes the plain of Sahlet Baalbek, much of which is barren and stony, although with fertile belts. In the latitude of Baalbek is the highest point of the depression (3,600 ft.), on a low swell, where are the upper sources of the Orontes flowing north and the Litani flowing south. With a gentle fall to southwards the plain reaches Lake Hule basin, at about sea-level. This forms the head of the remarkable "rift," or deep, trough-like valley, known as the Ghor, down which the Jordan runs to the Dead Sea. The Ghor falls rapidly to a depth of about 680 ft. below sea-level at the Lake of Tiberias; the valley is here not more than 4 miles in breadth. At the Dead Sea, about 65 miles further south, the valley has reached a depth below the sea of 1,300 ft., the depression continuing downwards to twice that depth in the bed of the sea. South of the Dead Sea the depression is prolonged for another 100 miles to the Red Sea by the wide Wadi Araba.

The Eastern Plateau.—In Kurd Dagh, the northern part of this region, broken ridges rise to a height of over 4,000 ft., but at Aleppo the altitude is 1,205 ft. The plateau falls easily to the Euphrates in rolling downs intersected by valleys, which are generally fertile, though scantily watered. The Aleppo region falls southward in rolling hills to the lower plateau and to the desert, which commences at this point. Southward lies the plain of Homs, a level and fertile

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but waterless tract stretching eastward to the desert and southward to the Anti-Lebanon range.

The mountain system of Anti-Lebanon consists of four distinct chains converging southward on Hermon. It has been compared to a hand, palm upward, Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh) representing the palm and the several chains the four fingers. Hermon is the most conspicuous mountain in this part of Syria, its snow-capped crest rising to a height of 9,700 ft. Its lower slopes are fertile and fairly well watered, and the well-wooded southern slopes fall to the Ghor and the highlands of Jaulan. The higher altitudes are bare and stony.

Along the eastern base of Anti-Lebanon the desert in parts approaches close to the mountains. The country is generally poor until the Damascus plain (2,260 ft.) is reached. This level tract, "the Garden of Syria," owes its great fertility to the Barada, which is here adapted to an extensive system of irrigation. The plain is limited on the south by the Nahr el-Awaj, which descends from Hermon. The Hauran Plain, treeless and level and dotted with villages, now stretches indefinitely southwards; in parts it is diversified by volcanic hills and boulders, in parts it consists of fine, red, stoneless soil. Everywhere the soil is fertile, although it is practically devoid of perennial water except in the western part and in the district of Jaulan, which marks the limit of the plateau towards the Jordan valley. On the eastern side of the plain is El-Leja, a black, desolate, and almost inaccessible region, with an area of about 350 square miles, containing patches of arable and pasture land which support the scanty population. Immediately east of El-Leja is Jebel Druz, whose main ridge rises to an average height of 4,000 ft. Numerous other peaks occur, the highest being Tell el-Jeno (5,910 ft.), many of whose ravines and spurs are clothed with oak. The soil is rich, and bears fine crops.

South of the river Yarmuk the mountains rise into a lofty fissured tableland, the western flank of which

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extends as far as the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, while on the east it merges into the desert-steppe. This tableland is divided into three main sections: (1) From the Yarmuk to Wadi Hesbun, which empties into the Jordan near its mouth. This region comprises the hill masses of Jebel Ajlun and of the northern Belka. A considerable part of the latter is well wooded. (2) From the Hesbun to Wadi el-Hasa, the latter river falling into the Dead Sea at its southern end. This consists of the districts of southern Belka and El-Kerak, which form an open and high plateau sometimes known as the Mountains of Moab. The highest summit is Jebel Shihan (3,470 ft.). The region contains various perennial streams, and there are large tracts of the best wheat-growing land in Syria. (3) From the Hasa to the Gulf of Akaba. Here the mountains continue for the most part as a narrow and sterile plateau, terminating further south just east of the Gulf of Akaba.

Coast

The coast-line of Syria from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Egyptian frontier runs in general from north to south. In northern Syria naturally good harbours are few, except in the Gulf of Alexandretta, where secure anchorage may be found at all seasons. Latakia and Tripoli are comparatively open and exposed, and Beirut depends largely on artificial protection. With the exception of the stretches of plain (see above, p. 4), the whole extent of coastline to a short distance beyond the Litani is in the main abrupt and in parts lofty.

In southern Syria, beyond Akka (Acre) the shore is conspicuously uniform and low, mainly consisting of long shallow curves of low, sandy beach. With the exception of the headland of Carmel there are no strongly marked prominences producing sheltered bays, and Athlit, Tantura, Abu Zabura, Jaffa (Yafe), and Askalon provide the only possibilities of natural harbourage. The small estuaries of the coastal streams

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both in north and south Syria are usually closed by sand-bars.

River System and Lakes

The central depression forms the only drainage bed of great length in Syria, and in it flow the three great rivers, Orontes, Litani, and Jordan. In the north several considerable streams come down from the Kurd Dagh, flowing towards the Euphrates.

(*a*) *Northern Syria.*—The maritime slopes are mostly well watered, especially in Lebanon, which sends considerable streams to the sea, some of which, such as the Beirut, Kelb, Ibrahim, Kadisha, Barid, Akkar, Kebir (Tripoli), Alrash, and Kebir (Latakia) are perennial.

The Orontes and the Litani rise close together near Baalbek, and flow north and south respectively.

The *Orontes* (Nahr el-Asi) is the longest river in Syria. Some 20 miles from its source it receives copious affluents, and then, a large stream tapped by irrigation canals, it flows to the artificial reservoir of Lake Homs. Thence it flows to Homs, Hama, and Kalat es-Seijar, where it bends northward through the long marshy plain of El-Ghab, being then supplemented by the waters of several lakes and small perennial streams. The river is thickly fringed with papyrus and other reeds.

Beyond Jisr esh-Shoghu it flows in a deep gorge to Antioch plain, bending westwards to receive the navigable Kara Su, a larger stream than the Orontes itself, flowing from the Lake of Antioch. This lake catches the waters of the upper Kara Su and Afrin Su, which drain the country to the north and east. From Antioch the Orontes pursues its remaining course of 21 miles, and flows to the sea over a bar, being 200 yards wide and 12 ft. deep at its mouth. In winter it is navigable 3 miles from the sea for vessels of 100 tons.

The *Litani*, after receiving the Yafufe, the Barduni, and the Zair, flows close to the Lebanon base

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to below Kalat esh-Shakif. Its bed lies in parts in a deep and narrow gorge. About 1½ miles from the sea the river widens, and falls into the Mediterranean 5½ miles north of Tyre.

(*b*) *Southern Syria.*—The *Jordan* is the most important and in some respects the most peculiar river of this part of Syria. It flows southwards in the Ghor (see p. 7 above), and draws its head-waters from the slopes of Hermon. Its three main sources, the Nahr el-Leddan, the Nahr Baniyas, and the Nahr Hasbani, unite in the Plain of Hule (altitude 150 ft.), and flow to the marshy and papyrus-choked lake of Hule, a few feet above sea-level. Issuing from this lake the Jordan has a fall of 65 ft. to the mile and enters Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) at 682 ft. below sea-level. This lake measures 13 miles by 7½ miles, and has a maximum depth of 160 ft. After leaving the lake the waters of the stream become very turbid. The fall gradually decreases, and the river enters the Dead Sea 1,300 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In this section the river actually flows in a trough, in some places 150 ft. deep and from a quarter of a mile to 2 miles wide, called the *zor*, which it has hollowed out for itself in the *ghor*. The *ghor* is intersected on both banks by the deep channels of small lateral streams and winter torrents.

The Jordan receives two main perennial affluents on the left bank, the Yarmuk and the Zerka, and on the right bank the Jalud and the Fara. The direct length of the Jordan from its most remote sources to the Dead Sea is about 104 miles, and of its actual course probably twice as much.

The *Dead Sea* has an extreme length of 50 miles, and its greatest width is about 10 miles. The greatest depth of the lake, 1,310 ft., is in the northern part, at which point the bottom is at least 2,600 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In its southern part the bed is shallow and shelving. In consequence of extraordinary evaporation the water is impregnated with 26 per cent. of mineral salts, and is extremely buoyant.

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The minor water-courses all flow westwards into the Mediterranean, and of these the principal are (from north to south) the Nahr Namein, Nahr el-Mukatta (Kishon), Zerka, Iskanderun, Auja, and Rubin. They are the outlets of the wadi-basins of the western slope of the maritime range in Palestine, and, with the exception of the Mukatta, are usually perennial in their lower courses.

(3) Climate

Syria has practically only two seasons—a dry, hot summer and a rainy but comparatively warm winter. Broadly speaking, three climatic zones may be distinguished: the humid, sub-tropical coastal region; the mountains, with a more temperate and drier climate; and the tropical depression of the Ghor.

Temperature.—The temperature varies from the intense heat of the Ghor to the Alpine temperature of the higher peaks of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon. The mean annual temperature of the coastal zone averages about 70° F. (21° C.), and ranges from 57° F. (14° C.) in January to 84° F. (29° C.) in August; of the mountains 61° F. (16° C.), ranging from 43° F. (6° C.) to 73° F. (23° C.); of the Jordan depression 73° F. (23° C.) to as high as 130° F. (54° C.) in the shade. The mean annual temperature of Jerusalem (altitude 2,200 ft.) is 60° F. (15½° C.), with a yearly range of 29° F. (16° C.); Jaffa (altitude 66 ft.), 67° F. (19° C.); Beirut (altitude 115 ft.), 69° F. (20½° C.); Kereye, on the Lebanon (altitude 3,300 ft.), 56° F. (13° C.).

The climate of Syria is characterised not only by extremes of temperature but also by very great daily variations, amounting to 23° F. (13° C.) in summer and 15° F. (8° C.) in winter. On the tableland east of Jordan the daily variation is sometimes as great as 48° F. (27° C.). The heat at Damascus and other places in the depression and towards the desert is great, while on the sea coast the sun temperature often reaches 145° F. (63° C.), and in the deep Jordan

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valley and the narrow gorges debouching into it the heat is blistering.

Frost seldom occurs on the coast, and never in the Jordan valley, but in the mountains it is not infrequent from December to February. Snow falls each winter to a considerable depth, but lies for any long period only in the higher altitudes; it sometimes lies for over a month in northern Jaulan, and for much longer periods at heights of over 4,000 ft. in Jebel Druz, Hermon, Lebanon, and Anti-Lebanon.

Rainfall.—The average yearly rainfall varies from 16 in. to 45 in., according to the district, and is least in the south, increasing northwards. In the coastal belt Gaza has an average rainfall of 16 in., Jaffa 20 in., Haifa 26 in., Beirut 35 in., Alexandretta 36 in.; in the highland belt, Hebron 25 in., Jerusalem 26 in., Nazareth 27 in., the higher altitudes of Lebanon 45 in. The central depression in general gets much less rain, and the Ghor least of all: Jericho 8 in., Tiberias 17 in., and Damascus 27½ in. Kereye has an exceptional record of 63 in. The rainy season begins about the middle or end of November, but about five-ninths of the total fall occurs in January and February, and about one-third from mid-March to the end of April. The average number of rainy days is: Gaza 41, Jaffa 53, Beirut 82, Jerusalem 58, Kereye 80.

Winds.—On the yearly average the wind blows from the north and north-west for 114 days (May—October); from the west for 55 days, and from the south-west and south for 46 days (winter). The sirocco sets in in May and again in October, the thermometer then rapidly rising to 100° F. or more. A light sea-wind sets in almost every morning, and blows till sundown, when the cooler land-breeze begins.

(4) Sanitary Conditions

Syria, generally speaking, may be regarded as a healthy country, and the prevalent diseases are mainly due to neglect, under the Turkish regime, of the most elementary sanitary precautions.

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In winter the comparatively mild climate permits life in the open air, so the country is to a large extent free from the severe inflammatory affections so fatal in colder climates. The high mountains are, moreover, an excellent sanatorium for those enervated by the climatic conditions of the lower and damper parts of the country.

The most widely spread endemic diseases are malaria and trachoma. The former is naturally especially prevalent in all places where water stagnates, or where there are faulty or unclean cisterns. Trachoma is largely due to want of personal cleanliness, and is often accompanied by loss of sight. The so-called "Jericho" and "Aleppo boil" are confined mainly to the districts of Jericho, Homs, and Hama, and to the old town of Aleppo. Among epidemic diseases are meningitis, Malta fever, cholera, and at rare intervals dengue fever. Syphilis is exceedingly widespread, even in the villages.

The health conditions in the Jewish colonies generally are comparatively good.

(5) Race and Language

Race

Syria has always been a land much exposed to invasion and conquest, and it therefore contains a large number of foreign elements, derived from both ancient and modern times. The Turks and Kurds are modern examples of these foreign elements. Distinct from this is the replenishment of the population from the tribes of the Arabian Desert, which maintains the specific racial character of the Syrian people. The transition between the nomad Beduin and the Syrian fellahin, or peasants, may be seen all along the eastern border, but the extremes are distinct. The Syrian people have a civilisation and history that marks them off sharply from the Arabs. Both peoples speak Arabic, and both profess Islam; but as some of the Syrians are Shias,

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and therefore at variance with the Sunnite Arabs, they cannot be entirely identified.

Such elements of the population as the Ansarie and the Druses preserve more purely than most the blood and customs of an early period; but they are not, therefore, distinct races from the Syrians. The native Christians, also, are a part of the same Syrian people as their Moslem neighbours, and even the Arabic-speaking Jews (as distinct from recent Jewish immigrants) cannot be sharply distinguished from a racial point of view.

The most important foreign elements in the population of Syria are the Turks (and Turcomans), who are mainly officials, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians, Persians, immigrant Jews, and a certain number of Europeans. The Jews have recently increased rapidly, owing to immigration from Russia and Rumania, and are most numerous in Palestine (about 90,000).[1] The Europeans are settled chiefly in the coast towns, and in Jerusalem, Aleppo, and Damascus. There are several German "colonies" in Palestine, but the entire number of colonists does not exceed 2,500.

Language

The language of the country is Arabic (Syrian Arabic) spoken with considerable dialectal variation in different parts. Aramaic (Syriac) is now used only in a few villages to the north of Damascus and in the liturgies of some of the churches. Turkish is almost entirely the language of officials. The Jews speak a medley of languages, according to their origin, but most Jewish immigrants speak Yiddish. The missions have diffused a considerable knowledge of European languages, but English, and more especially French, are more generally understood than German. Many Russian schools have been established.

[1] Another recent estimate gives, for Palestine only, 475,000 Mohammedans, 150,000 Jews, 35,000 Greek Orthodox, 25,000 Catholics (including Uniats), and 15,000 other religions (including Protestants).

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(6) Population

Distribution

The latest official record (1914-15) makes the registered population of Syria 3,156,000. This does not include those who are not Ottoman subjects, nor the Beduin, and is believed to be otherwise under-estimated. The total population may be estimated at about 3½ millions.

The average density of the population is 43 per square mile. In the vilayet of Aleppo it is only 30 (population 857,000, including Beduin), in Lebanon 330 (population 407,700, excluding Beirut, which has 500,000), in western Palestine (as far as Bir es-Seba) 119 (population 718,000). For some years before the war the population of Lebanon was decreasing, and in 1914 it was probably less than 300,000.

The largest towns in Syria are Aleppo, Damascus (populations 200,000 or more), and Beirut (180,000). Jerusalem, Homs, Hama, and Aintab range between 60,000 and 80,000, and the following between 20,000 and 40,000: Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Haifa, and Safed, in western Palestine; Tripoli, Latakia, and Antioch on or near the northern coast. In Lebanon (Beirut is not included in the province) Zahleh is the only town of any size (14,000). Elsewhere most of the Syrian people live in hamlets or small villages.

Movement

There are no statistics by which the birth- and death-rates, with the rate of increase of the population, may be determined, but the death-rate is known to be high. Emigration has seriously drained the country for many years, although, on the contrary, some of the towns of western Palestine have lately increased rapidly (*e.g.*, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth). Since 1880 the population of the coast towns generally has consistently increased (*e.g.*, Beirut, Tripoli, and Latakia); but

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many districts are quite stationary, and others have largely decreased in population.

Recently the influence of emigration has been most marked in Lebanon, the Jebel Ansarie, and the neighbourhood of Homs and Hama.

The most numerous immigrants since 1880 have been Jews (between 60,000 and 70,000), who have settled in Palestine and are the chief cause of the modern growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa. Of these immigrants only 10,500 have settled in the Jewish agricultural colonies. Another substantial increase of population has been brought by the Circassians, who have settled at various points along the eastern borders.

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II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1535 French rights in " Holy Places " (reasserted 1740, 1878).
1649 French assertion of protection of Maronites (confirmed 1727, 1792, 1901).
1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Russian protection of Christians.
1788-1840 Beshir Ómar el-Shehab in Lebanon.
1791 Jezzar (d. 1804) expels French residents.
1799 Napoleon invades Syria; defeated at Acre by Jezzar and British.
1821 American mission at Beirut.
1831 Egyptian invasion of Syria.
1831-40 Egyptian occupation.
1841 Egyptians expelled by British forces.
1840-45 Druse and Maronite troubles.
1847-54 Greek and Latin contention as to " Holy Places."
1856 Hatti Humayun. Equality of religions.
1859 French religious missions.
1860 Damascus massacre; French intervention.
1861 Organic Statute of the Lebanon.
1864 Law of the Vilayets. Direct administration of Syria.
1869 German Crown Prince's visit to Jerusalem.
1870 First Hebrew colony in Palestine (Alliance israélite universelle).
1876 Abdul Hamid Sultan.
1878 Treaty of Berlin; equal civil and political rights for all religions.
1878 British Jews settle in Palestine.
1879 Circassian colonies in Syria.
1886 Railway construction.
1887 Jerusalem Sanjak directly dependent on Porte
1888 Further Hebrew colonies forbidden.
1895 Herzl and the Zionist movement.
1898 German Emperor's visit to Palestine.
1904 Hejaz Railway begun.
1908 Young Turk Revolution.
1908 German Jew colonies increase.

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1909 Foundation of Arab "clubs."
1909-14 Repression by Young Turks of nationalist movements.
1915 Lebanon Organic Statute denounced.
1915 "Young Arab" party's application to the King of the Hejaz.
1917, Dec. British capture of Jerusalem.

Syria after Napoleon's Expedition.—The nineteenth century opened on the morrow of Napoleon's retreat from Palestine, his renunciation of designs on Syria, and his departure from Egypt. His expedition was barren of military advantage, and left the political state of Syria to continue as in the century past. But by attracting Sir Sydney Smith, with a British fleet, to the Lebanon coast, in March 1799, Napoleon brought into being the somewhat antagonistic views regarding Syria which still exist. For that reason the birth of the century marks an epoch in Syrian history. For that reason, however, only. The broad lines of political and economic life were to remain for another generation practically unchanged. What they had been during the eighteenth century has been sketched in the general survey of Asiatic Turkey.[1] If we look at Syria a decade after Napoleon's expedition we find it still in much the same state. During the years 1810 to 1812 the Swiss traveller, J. L. Burckhardt, lived in Aleppo, and wandered in Arab guise over most of Syria as far south as Petra and Sinai. He has left, in his Travels, a special description of the political situation as he found it, and general indications.

Various Local Rulers.—He represents Syria as a decentralised country, parcelled among divers local autonomies, under the rule of native chiefs or foreign pashas. The latter had generally been introduced by the Porte, but thereafter were quit of Ottoman control for the payment of tribute. Nominally the whole area was divided into five pashaliks, which, however, had come to be under three, or even only two, rulers, the Pasha of Damascus being also ruler

[1] See *Turkey in Asia*, No. 58 of this series.

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of Tripoli, and the Pasha of Acre appropriating Gaza permanently and Damascus now and then. Really, three-quarters of Syria had very little to say to these rulers. All lying to the north, north-east, and north-west of the Aleppo oasis, including the towns of Killis, Aintab, and Marash, was in the hands of independent Aghas and Beys, mostly Kurds or Turcomans, the latter paying tribute and some sort of allegiance to the great Dere-Bey family of Chapanoghlu at Yuzgad, in Cappadocia. West to the Orontes, down the river almost to Antioch, and up it nearly to Hama, ruled three self-made princelings, seated in Edlib, Jisr Shogr, and Kala'at el-Mudik; while Antioch itself and Alexandretta were obeying only their own Aghas, and Kuchuk Ali, the Kurdish lord of Payas, held all the north-western angle. South of Antioch to within sight of Acre the whole length of the mountain country was autonomous, the Ansarie, under the Fakker house of Safita, and the Ismailiya admitting no Ottoman officer to the northern half, and the Shehab Emir of the Lebanon none, except as a guest, to the southern half. The Buka'a and most of Anti-Lebanon were at the discretion of the Emir of Baalbek, a Metawali. All the Trans-Jordan lands, except the Nukra Plain in the Hauran, kept outside Ottoman control, and so also did parts of western Palestine, for example the Nablus district, the Ghor, and the neighbourhood of Hebron. Needless to say, the Syrian deserts, east and south, remained untouched by Ottoman power. This list of exceptions leaves little to the direct rule of the pashas beyond the immediate neighbourhoods of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus; the littoral strip from Latakia to Gaza (with many interruptions); Galilee and parts of Samaria and Judaea. Nor even there was their rule always effective. Burckhardt's account of Aleppo in his time, torn between sherifs and janissaries, often without a pasha at all, besieged more than once by its pasha (when it had one) from a neighbouring hillock, and defied by Kurds and Turcomans at its very gates, illustrates better than

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anything else the condition of Ottoman government in Syria a hundred years ago.

Imperfect Imperial Control.—Over even its imperial officers the Porte exercised very imperfect control, excepting over the weakest, the Pasha of Aleppo. One not infrequently made war on another. In 1803 the Pasha of Damascus marched on the Pasha of Baghdad, and in the following year was himself attacked by the Kiaya of the Pasha of Acre. The last-named pashalik had become almost private property. Ahmed Jezzar, who had foiled Napoleon, lived on to 1804; and, dying, bequeathed south Syria to one of his Mamelukes. The Porte could do no more than "confirm" the nominee of Jezzar. Actually, in 1810, Suleiman Pasha of Acre was holding not only Gaza, but also Damascus and Tripoli; that is to say, so far as the bulk of Syria was under any one rule, it was under a Prince of Acre. And so it was to remain for twenty years more. To avoid infringing this *imperium in imperio*, and revealing the unreality of Osmanli control, the Caliph's Grand Vizier, who was commissioned in 1807 to turn the British out of Egypt, had to lead his army down the uncomfortable roads east of the Jordan; and it is not surprising that, three years later, no political effect of this manifestation of imperial power was visible in Syria.

Suzerainty of Caliph.—Nevertheless, if there was little substance of Ottoman Empire in Syria, there was everywhere something more than its shadow. Burckhardt somewhat minimises it. The pashas and almost all local princelings, Emirs, and Beys not only acknowledged the suzerainty of the Caliph by seeking (sometimes *ex post facto*) his approval of their successions or usurpations and paying a quit-rent for them, but also had a precarious and usually brief tenure, if disowned by the suzerain. Burckhardt does, in fact, admit that not to show marks of fealty was ill-esteemed by the Syrian population of whatever race and creed; and anyone who withheld them was regarded as illegitimate or a rebel. Ahmed Jezzar had an Ottoman

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commissary at his side when he was resisting Napoleon at Acre, and the Shehab Emir never failed to pay to the Imperial Treasury at Constantinople a proportion (even excessive) of the *miri* (land-tax), which he extorted in triplicate, and sometimes quadruplicate, out of his feudatories.

Feudalism was, and continued to be, the dominant social feature throughout Syria. It was a feudalism of ancient prescription, centred not, as in Asia Minor, upon families sprung from Household officers of the Ottoman Sultan or commissaries of the Porte and enriched by the exercise of Imperial functions, but on chiefs who held power in virtue of descent from families originally preferred by popular selection or their own arms. We have ample evidence of its universal prevalence, whether the feudal unit was tribe, district, town, village, or clan; but we happen to know it best in the Lebanon, as it was in the time of Emir Beshir Omar el-Shehab, whose long reign covered intermittently all the period from 1788 to 1840. The paramount power of the Shehabs was based at the first on Druse tribal feudalism, to which the family, though originally Arabs of Hira, had obtained a claim by marriage with the greater family of Ma'an. It came to be supported and confirmed by a vassalage, not of birth so much as appointment—by a whole hierarchy of *mukatajis*, who contracted for taxes and had penal powers. As a result, the old feudalism of birth was subjected in the eighteenth century to a new feudalism, identical in character with that most often found in the Anatolian Dere-Beyliks, but sanctioned by a paramount Emir, not an Ottoman Sultan. In disgust at this change, a large section of the Druses emigrated to the Hauran; but a strong remnant remained in Lebanon under the chiefs of the Jumblatt and Yezbeki families. This kept Druse feudalism alive, and prepared a day of reckoning with the Christian elements in the mountain, who not only accepted the new feudalism, but secretly incorporated the Emir in their own religious circle. About 1820 the

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Emir, who, at the time of Burckhardt's visit, had not got the measure of the Jumblatts, put the Druses firmly under his heel, and became free to lord it over Lebanon as independently and arbitrarily as his ally, Abdullah Pasha, son of a Mameluke of Jezzar, was lording it over Palestine from his palace at Acre.

Hereditary System.—In the course of a century the *mukatajis* became hereditary in most localities of the mountain by a process which operates inevitably in feudal countries, however drastically the substitution of appointment for birth may have been effected in an earlier generation. In the rest of Syria also the same process was repeated again and again, the deeply ingrained feudalism of the population disposing it, after a short lapse of time, to accord freely to birth the fealty which their fathers had been forced to give to appointment. Owing to this instinct, itself due largely to survival of nomadic tribalism among settled Arabs, more feudal features exist in Syria at this day than in any other settled region of Turkey.

When the Egyptian invasion of Syria began in 1831, the country was still under an eighteenth-century regime, still entirely feudal, and still given over to Abdullahs and Beshirs. Mahmud II had been at work on Asia Minor for over a decade, breaking up its feudalism and converting it from a dependency of the Ottoman Empire indirectly administered, into an extension of the Imperial centre itself. He had intended to make himself master in his own house of Syria also, and his writing was already on the wall. But the Russian war of 1828 delayed the execution of his will; and, with peace hardly restored, Mehemet Ali of Egypt sent an army across the Sinai Desert, which, by excluding the Sultan from Syria for the rest of his term of life, postponed Imperial centralisation there to successors less able, less single-minded, and more beset by international tutors.

International Rivalry of Foreign Powers.—Before, however, we pass to the Egyptian invasion, a word should be said about that international rivalry for

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Syrian sympathies which had been inaugurated before the century began. During thirty years it developed obscurely, and gave little warning of the importance it was destined to assume. The earliest protagonists were France and Great Britain, the two Powers which still fill the leading rôles on that time-honoured stage. It was long before other competitors would enter the lists. Russia did not challenge in earnest till the 'fifties; and Prussia waited till there was a German Empire. A still longer period elapsed before Italy began to make herself felt in the Holy Land.

It cannot be doubted that France and Great Britain had very similar motives in endeavouring to obtain, each for herself, a preponderating influence in Syrian affairs: for each was anxious to establish herself in this neighbourhood on the road to the East, in order to secure the fullest advantage for her trade with India and China. With the progress of invention, it was felt that it would not be long before the difficulties of time and space would be overcome; it was obvious that the possession, or, at all events, the domination, of the countries round the eastern end of the Mediterranean would greatly facilitate the trade of whichever Power happened to be the strongest, at the time, in those regions. Hence the attraction both of Egypt and of Syria for the two great maritime Powers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and hence the vigilance with which thereafter each, even in peaceful times, noted the doings of the other in this direction.

French and British in Syria.—France had enjoyed a long start, but during two centuries made indifferent use of her Syrian monopoly. Nominal "protector" of the Latin Church in the Ottoman Empire since the Capitulations granted in 1535 by Sultan Suleiman to Francis I, she had allowed Latin rights to the Holy Places of Palestine to be limited by rights, equal or even superior, of the Orthodox Church; and she had made little use of her opportunities for acting politically in the Lebanon. Before the

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last decades of the eighteenth century middle and southern Syria did not appear to France or any other European Power to have much political significance, the south-eastern angle of the Levant being considered a blind alley. Such politico-economic interest as the Western nations felt in Syria was directed to the north of the country, where Aleppo had been a half-way house to India and the East since the days of Queen Elizabeth. Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century the political effect of the platonic interest which Louis XIV and Louis XV had displayed in the Maronites was virtually obliterated by the anti-religious tendencies of the French Revolution. Jezzar turned the French residents out of his coast towns in 1791, and found none to object; and the French eclipse was completed by Napoleon's open avowal of anti-Christian policy in Egypt. Consequently, on invading Syria, Napoleon found, to his disappointment, Emir Beshir arrayed with Jezzar, and the Maronites helping, though somewhat half-heartedly, to beat him back from the walls of Acre; while the British admiral, Sir Sydney Smith, had no difficulty in instituting an accord with Beshir, which subsequent British hospitality and assistance, after the latter's exile from the mountain, in December 1799, went far to cement.

After 1808 Beshir's power grew in middle and south Syria, and became paramount when the Circassian Abdullah had succeeded to Acre in 1820 and put the Jumblatt chief out of the way. British influence had now every chance, France being discredited by the long absence of her flag from the Levant. But, like France before her, Great Britain found no conspicuous opportunity for using political influence. The Lebanese had yet to develop acute antagonism of creed; and, so long as but one European Power, whether France before 1800 or Great Britain afterwards, was concerning itself with them at one time, they lacked the external temptation to dissension which was to offer itself presently. British influence, therefore, was doing as yet no more harm in

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middle and south Syria than French interest had done before it; but the fact that two European Powers, with growing and antagonistic interests in the Levant,[1] had gained a footing, where one alone used to be, foreshadowed danger.

The Egyptian Invasion.—This danger the Egyptian invasion and occupation of Syria was to bring to a head. Anxious to secure his Pashalik from sudden attack, to command a supply of ship timber, and to control the land to which 6,000 Sharkiyah fellahin had escaped from military service, Mehemet Ali had been giving a favourable ear for a while past to some (chiefly ex-officers of the Grand Army) who constantly reminded him of the example of Napoleon. He had tried, by cajolery and bribery, in 1822 and 1823, to persuade the youth and inexperience of Abdullah, the heir of Jezzar, to link his fate with Egypt's; and, failing, had asked the Porte outright for the Acre Pashalik no less than thrice. Put off with Crete only, he resolved to take what would not be given. It was the hope of France that he might succeed. Predominant in his councils, she looked to be carried back into Syria by his arms; and subsequently the Porte on more than one occasion reproached the French Government with interested connivance in a rebellion which, alone among the five Great Powers, France refused eventually to extinguish. Great Britain remained indifferent, trusting to her hold on both Mehemet Ali and the Emir of the Lebanon, and unwilling to thwart the controller of the overland route to India. Both Powers, therefore, kept their fleets out of harm's way; and late in October 1831 Ibrahim Pasha crossed the desert to go a greater distance than either he or his father had planned or desired, and effect more than they would ever know. For it is this Egyptian occupation which closed in Syria the ancient order of decentralised autonomy, and introduced the modern order of centralised dependence, vexed and limited by the rival interests of foreign Powers.

[1] See especially Driault, *Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1917.

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Egyptian Occupation.—To end the nominal Empire of Turkey in Syria took less than a year of Egyptian conquest. To enable Turkey to have real Empire there was the work of nine years more of Egyptian occupation. Ibrahim did very much what Mahmud had done in Asia Minor and had intended to do in Syria, but probably would have been less able to do. He abolished once for all the decentralised pashaliks, and broke the power of local chieftains and recalcitrant or predatory townsmen and villagers, tribes and clans, to a greater or less degree, all over the area; while he enforced regular taxation and compelled the recognition of non-Moslem rights in local government. In the lower and the plain regions, *e.g.*, the Antioch and Aleppo districts, the middle and upper Orontes valley, the Damascus district, the western Trans-Jordan lands, and Palestine generally, his work was fairly complete by 1840, and Ainsworth has testified that in 1835 the Antiochene country was as safe as England. But pacification had not been effected without serious difficulties. The Moslems of Damascus and Safed, for example, had to be compelled by force of arms to admit Christians and Jews to any rights at all, and to forgo the gratification of seeing them walk the gutters or dismount at sight of the faithful. When the British Consul rode into Damascus in 1835 he had to be closely hemmed in by troops. In 1840 he could go where he pleased, unattended. The Nablus folk, who had defied Napoleon, tried the same course with Ibrahim, on being asked to accept military service, and actually besieged him in Jerusalem. Nazareth was as troublesome as Safed, and Hebron held out longer than Nablus. The Hauran Druses and the Arabs of the Ghor and Kerak needed several punitive expeditions and tedious experience of closed markets, occupied watering-places, and prohibited pastures. The Hauran and Kerak in particular gave Ibrahim some stiff fighting; and the villagers of the Judaean highlands once exacted the release of their leader, Abu Ghosh, by blocking, with 17,000 armed men, Ibrahim's passage from Jerusalem to meet his father on

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the coast. He had to thank the Emir Beshir that the Palestine revolt of 1834 came to nothing in the end.

In the mountains not so much was attempted. Lebanon kept its single prince; but he was constrained to help the unpopular disarmament of his Druses, and the Mountain had to grow accustomed to the passage of Egyptian troops. The Metawalis were coerced by a regular garrison at Baalbek. The Ansarie found their coast firmly held and their contributions rigorously exacted. The predatory Turcomans and Kurds of the north, who continued recalcitrant throughout the Egyptian occupation, had to keep to their higher mountains or the Antioch marshes; and Kuchuk Ali had no successor at Payas.

The process, like all interference with vested abuses, was cordially detested; and, when the moment came for Egyptian withdrawal—even at the prospect of it—Ibrahim found whole districts rise upon his rear and flanks. But his name has lived on in Syria, to be used still with awe and respect, although Egyptians are almost as unpopular there as, on account of another past occupation, they are in Hejaz. The Arab everywhere despises them; and, because they compensate for presumed physical and moral inferiority by superior apparatus and knowledge of its use, he hates them with a jealous hatred.

Encouragement of Europeans.—The work of the Egyptian occupation, however, had further results. In opening up Syria to Europe, even as Egypt had been opened during a quarter of a century past, it went far beyond Mahmud's work in Asia Minor. Mention has been made already of Ibrahim's consideration for the non-Moslem elements in the native population—a consideration for which he paid the price of present unpopularity, and they that of irreconcilable rancour. Attracted by such evidence of a liberal policy, Europeans came to Syria as they had never come before; and all, except those who were so ill-advised as to throw the Sultan at his head, were made welcome by Ibrahim. The earliest books on Syria that are still read—Chesney's,

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Ainsworth's, Kinglake's, Thomson's, Lamartine's, Warburton's, &c.—narrate the authors' travels under his ægis, and some of the travellers were not mere globe-trotters. In 1839 Moses Montefiore discovered for Europe the Palestinian Jews and the possibilities of Jewish restoration. In 1835 a British Commission was studying a line for an overland route to the Euphrates; and the little opposition it encountered, in its extraordinary task of hauling steamers in sections overland from the Orontes to the Euphrates, is a testimony to Ibrahim's power, all the more significant because the British held their permission, not from him, but from the Sultan with whom he was at war. During those ten years Europe progressed from mediæval ignorance of Syria to almost as much knowledge of it as she has had up to the present war. When Lady Hester Stanhope settled in the Lebanon, in 1814, it was a wild, unknown region; and the British Government could only keep precarious touch with Pitt's niece through a Levantine consular agent in Cyprus. When she died, in 1839, a visit to her at Joun had become a common incident of the grand tour; and a British Consul rode up from Saida to collect and seal her effects.

Lebanon Question; Beshir.—Finally, for good or for ill, it was the Egyptian occupation that caused Syria to become a cockpit of Great Powers. If it did not make the Lebanon question, it brought it on. The fault was only in part Ibrahim's. During nine years of Egyptian occupation there was no more Lebanon question than there had been since the establishment of the Shehab dynasty and the emigration of the Yemenite Druses. Not that the Mountain had been an abode of peace during those hundred years; but its intermittent intestine warfare had been feudal, not religious—wars of one Druse sheikh or group of sheikhs against another—Jumblatts against Yezbekis, or one Shehab against others, with some Maronites or some Orthodox Greeks or some Metawalis enlisted for one or for both. Hitherto Druses had led in council and action, thanks to their superior feudal cohesion, their

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social organization, which encouraged alert political spirit, and their small proportion of fellahin; also because, in Metn and Shuf, they held the best of the Mountain. If latterly the stars of their chiefs had paled before the single splendour of Beshir, the eclipse of the Jumblatts had gratified the Yezbekis. Beshir, who had begun life as more Moslem than Druse, was regarded as laxly complacent to all creeds rather than representative of any one (his reputed conversion to Maronite Christianity got abroad later). He held his power by grace neither of Maronite nor Druse, but of their common fealty to the Padishah of Stambul and the favour of the Pashas of Acre and Damascus. His overlordship did not impair Druse pride of place; his sympathy secured the position of the Christian clergy; and his strong hand protected the fields from all marauders but his own tax-collectors. All elements alike obeyed him, sharing his sentiment for Great Britain, if the Maronite clergy retained also some sentiment for France; but neither Maronite nor Druse yet entertained thought or hope of oppressing the other by the help of a foreign patron. Even in 1832, when certain Druses, instigated by sheikhs of the Jumblatt and Abu Nakid houses, fomented a scuffle with Christians in a Maronite centre (Der el-Kamar) and disowned Beshir's authority, further fighting was easily prevented by the prompt arrival of an Egyptian detachment from Baalbek; and no outside Power was concerned in the matter, except the Porte.

Druses and Maronites; Britain and France.—The economic state of the Mountain, however, grew worse during the Egyptian period. Ibrahim exacted regularly and inexorably the annual contribution for his father. Beshir had to provide both for this and for his personal greed and administration. His *mukataajis* also were determined to live well. The amount of *miri* (land-tax) which would be requisitioned by the Emir in any one year could not be foreseen. The Mountain became discontented, suspicious, and apprehensive. In

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1838 Ibrahim took an unfortunate step. At his wits' end to deal with the Druses of the Hauran, who had cost him 15,000 casualties, he called in the Emir Beshir, armed 7,000 Maronites, and sent these against cousins of their fellow-mountaineers. They were successful, and disarmed the Hauran. Beshir, anxious about the effect in the Lebanon, asked that not only should these Maronites retain their arms, but other Maronites be armed, up to 24,000 in all; and Ibrahim, in the first flush of his gratitude, consented.

With the Druses already hostile, after their forcible disarmament, Ibrahim tried, two years later, to take back his gift from the Maronites, and enrol them, as well as the Druses, in his *nizam*. Beshir seconded this order, by telling each element that the other alone would be disarmed in permanence. Both were soon disillusioned, and each proceeded to sink for a moment its now profound suspicion of the other in a common hatred of the Egyptian. It was known that the Powers had come on the scene in earnest and arrested Ibrahim's advance the previous year, after his crowning victory at Nizib; but it was not yet known that there was division between Great Britain and France. Some Maronites and some Druses rose together, chose a Frenchman for leader, and appealed to the British and French Consuls in Beirut. It was a very partial rising. The mass of the Druses came out, only to return immediately to their obedience; the mass of the Maronites never came out at all. A small body of insurgents kept the field for a time against weak Egyptian forces on the coast; but Ibrahim would quickly have overwhelmed it from the inner country had it not been for events which had nothing at all to do, in their inception, with the Lebanon revolt—the Treaty of London restoring Syria to the Porte, and Mehemet Ali's refusal to yield except to force.

Egyptians driven out; Measures for Settlement.—Great Britain accepted a mandate to execute the London warrant, which France had declined to endorse. The easiest way was to shut Ibrahim from his vital ports.

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These ports lie from Tripoli to Acre. Therefore, unfortunately, operations had to begin in the Lebanon. A British force landed in August 1840, called out the mountaineers, armed them without distinction of creed, and in three months swept both the Egyptians and Emir Beshir off mountain and littoral. Armed, blooded, and free, Druses and Maronites parted company to face one another, demand mutual satisfaction for accumulated griefs, and assert their respective equality or superiority in the future. Neither Great Britain nor France, it is clear, desired a civil war in Lebanon; but, while the former had armed both parties, the latter was favouring one and inspiring it to demand majority rights. British sympathy, therefore, inevitably went out to the minority, which, for its part, had been quick to recognise the discord of the two Powers and the superiority of British influence with the new Ottoman Powers that were. Tension lasted until October 1841, and then broke in rapine and massacre—Druses on the one side, Maronites, with Metawali, on the other, and the blame as much on one as the other. Not till January 1843 was there any truce. The Porte tried direct government in vain, and at the instance of the Powers consented at last to control a dual autonomy under a Maronite and a Druse.

Outbreaks of 1845.—This may have been the best that could be done while native passions were hot, and the new accord between Great Britain and France was weakened by the unpopularity of Louis Philippe's government and the avowed intention of Legitimists, Clericals, and Imperialists to force French interests in Syria to the front. But it was a bad measure. The hands to which the Powers had just entrusted Syria were fatally weakened. While the rest of the country could be brought under direct control of the Imperial centre, the Porte was compelled, in Lebanon, to accept a survival of the old order of decentralisation, so constituted as to remain an open sore. For, in reality, there was no peace yet. Too lately had the Mountain

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been drawing apart into fanatic camps. The Druses, with secular predominance to lose, continued restless, ashamed of such degradation of their chiefs as Churchill witnessed in the 'forties. The Maronites, who stood to gain, were irritatingly complacent under their Emir Haidar. The newly-established paramount authority was alien and derogatory. If both Druses and Maronites used frankly to acknowledge the suzerainty of a Sultan in distant Stambul, they murmured now at sovereignty exercised through a *mushir* in Saida. They had, both of them, learned by this time to appeal against his authority and one another to outside Powers of unknown strength but known rivalry. France and Great Britain had, indeed, returned to governmental harmony at home since 1842, but in the Lebanon their representatives were still at odds, and when trouble broke out again in 1845 were manifestly partisans. Their positions and aims differed as positive from negative. Poujade, inspired by the colonial element in the French Opposition, aspired to change the political and social state of the Lebanon, to promote a protectorate of his nation in Syria, and to invert the secular relation of Maronites to Druses. Rose, acting on his Government's fixed policy of preventing the introduction into Turkey of any foreign protectorate or sphere of exclusive influence, encouraged Lebanese society to resume, under Omar Pasha, the same mutual relations as had existed in the earlier days of Emir Beshir. France, for obvious reasons, hoped to compass her subversive aims through the Maronites; Great Britain, for reasons equally obvious, endeavoured to preserve the *status quo ante* by means of the Druses. Strong divergence of sentiment and sympathy was added to the political discord of the Consuls. The Maronites, as they then were, mariolatrous, priest-ridden, inconstant in warfare, and only in small part willing to fight at all, did not commend themselves to Rose as did the keen, warlike Druses. By the recent action of the

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latter against Ibrahim Pasha in both the Lebanon and Hauran close ties had been riveted between Briton and Druse, while the Maronites had trimmed to the Egyptian, and to a Power which lately had stood out of the European Concert. Both Great Powers, working equally in their own interests, the one for peaceful change, the other for peaceful conservation, failed equally, and both were responsible for the outbreaks of 1845. The Maronites began them in the hope of driving the Druse remnant right out of the Mountain; but the Druses rendered worse than they had received. Both Great Powers showed themselves commendably impartial in encouraging the Porte to deal out even-handed justice and in blaming it for what had been largely their own work.

Reassertion of Turkish Authority.—When this account was settled, or, rather, deferred, the Mountain relapsed for fifteen years into such quiescence as interrupts the activities of a volcano, in which subterraneous forces continue at work. The Porte, anxious to complete the task of Ibrahim, found the Lebanon an impediment. It was successful enough with the Kurds and Turcomans of the north, against whom expeditions proceeded in 1845 and 1846, suppressing chieftains and deporting villagers from Amanus and Taurus into the lowlands, and *vice versâ*; and it pacified, if it could not break, the Hauran. But when, in 1846, it sent a strong force into the Lebanon to effect wholesale arrests among feudal sheikhs of both parties, the result was not satisfactory. The Maronites rather than the Druses were weakened, the latter being always better able to replace lost leaders; and the chances of future trouble were only strengthened, the more so since the interest and sentiment of the Turks inclined them inevitably to be tender with the Druses. Were they not a minority fighting by themselves against a majority suspected of reliance on the intervention of a European Power?

Latin and Greek Rivalry about the "Holy Places."—Turkish favour towards the Druses became

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more pronounced after the Imperial Restoration in France, whose colonial designs grew more suspect. In 1847 a serious tumult between Latins and Greeks in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem had resulted in favour of the Greeks, but led to the return of the Latin Patriarch *in partibus* to Jerusalem, and of a French Consul-General to support him. Four years later, when Louis Napoleon was in power as President, a Commission was demanded to report on the whole question of encroachments by the Orthodox Church upon ancient rights of French-protected Latins in the Holy Places of Palestine. The Russian Tsar had already revived his eighteenth-century claim to protect politically all Christians of the Eastern Rite in the Ottoman Empire. Was a similar claim to the Latins, based on French Capitulations, now in the mind of Louis Napoleon? The Porte desired one Protectorate as little as the other, and the Commission of 1851 was brought to nought. But two years later, a reiteration and definition of the Russian demand, with a stipulation for substantial guarantees, promising the greater danger, threw the Sultan into the French Emperor's arms, and brought on the Crimean War.

Effects of Crimean War; Confusion in Syria.—This war, far away though it was waged, had an evil influence on Syria. With heavy recruiting of the settled peasantry, and withdrawal of the better garrison troops, the newly-established Ottoman peace began everywhere to break down. Travellers who penetrated rural Syrian districts in the middle 'fifties bear witness to a general growth of insecurity and lively fear of nomads and mountaineers. The Metawalis were in open rebellion in the Buka'a and the northern Lebanon. In 1854 Ismail Bey, of the Metawara tribe of the Ansarie, succeeded in restoring his mountains to their pre-Egyptian independence for several years. Homs and Hama remained in a state of siege for months; and the neighbourhood of Damascus was as unsafe as that of Aleppo had been before Ibrahim's

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conquest. It was not a return to the old order; for formerly feudal chiefs had had the power to stop all rapine but their own. Now there was no restraint but that of an immature Turkish administration, relying upon such tatterdemalion forces as Rey remarked sheltering in the ruins of Lebanese palaces in 1857.

Massacre of 1860.—Nor did the successful issue of the war bring any gain to Turkey. It only increased the French weight upon her back, and led to the reiteration of the *Hatti Humayun*, promising Christians and Jews the same rights as Moslems. The Druses saw the Maronites about to be exalted in their room; the fanatic faithful of Damascus believed that a worse than Egyptian regime impended over their heads. The result was the year 1860, infamous for all time in the annals of Syria. The reports of two Commissions working at cross-purposes, the rivalry of two Powers united in the primary object of securing atonement for atrocities and precluding their repetition, but divided, secretive, and suspicious in all other respects, finally, much mutual defamation ever since, have rendered hopelessly obscure the history of that and the following year. We can be sure only of the situation which was brought about.

Constitution of Autonomous Lebanon.—It would be useless, even were it in place, to ask now who was responsible, or in what measure, for those massacres of sixty years ago, or with what precise motives foreign intervention was planned, carried out, and crowned by the constitution of an autonomous Lebanon under a Christian *mushir*, who, in practice, would always be a Catholic. Certainly, if Lebanon alone had but added another to its series of internecine tumults, even at a cost of 5,000 lives, there would have been no mandate of Europe and no Organic Statute. It was not the Lebanon events, but the Damascus massacre, interpreted as a symptom of infectious fanaticism, that overcame the reluctance of Great Britain to commission Louis Napoleon. It is equally useless to enquire now whether it was wise, in the general interest of the Ottoman

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Empire, or fair to the Ottoman Sultan, to guarantee for ever such an infringement of his sovereignty as the autonomous State of the Lebanon. But we may still ask usefully whether it had any effect on the general economy of Syria so bad as to offset the benefit it conferred on a part. The honest answer is negative. On the debit side we have to set no more than some periodic unrest of Buka'a villages seeking, for the sake of political or economic advantage of the moment, to be reckoned on one side or the other of a frontier which was never delimited; the development of Beirut into a focus of European diplomatic intrigue and native separatism; and, perhaps, the annual emigration of four to five thousand Lebanese, unable to live well within the narrow bounds assigned to an autonomous State which should have included the Buka'a, and the westward slopes of Anti-Lebanon and Hermon, as well as the coast-line from Tyre to Tripoli. This last disadvantage, at any rate, has been compensated by the knowledge and capital brought home again by the emigrants after a few years in Europe or America. To credit, on the other hand, stands the capital fact that, two years after the final ratification of the Organic Statute in 1864, warfare ceased in Lebanon for fifty years. Maronites and Druses relapsed into peace, if not amity; and public security and standards of social and political life advanced to a point not nearly reached by any other province of the Ottoman Empire.

Lebanon has been a spoiled child of fortune. Thanks to its misdeeds, it has received, at the hands of aliens, liberties which it has done very little in its history to vindicate for itself. Even if Burton's gibe, that the Lebanese hide their weapons at the call of patriotism, be too bitter, it may be owned that they have turned their arms ninety-nine times in a hundred on one another, and have allowed Arabs, Turks, and Egyptians to ride roughshod over them, unopposed by any local patriotism worthy to be mentioned in the same breath with that of the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Balkan races, or even that of their own Druse

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cousins in the Hauran. The measure of their happiness is their lack of history down to the outbreak of the recent war. Indeed, their danger, as time went on, lay in the uncompromising attitude of the Powers towards the charter of the Lebanon. Suspicious of one another, and unwilling to give the Porte any opening, they tried to prevent any change, even the most plainly desirable, in the Constitution they had made; and such slight beneficial modifications as were, indeed, introduced, *e.g.*, in 1868 or 1892, were accepted only on protest as accomplished facts.

Organization of the Rest of Syria.—On the rest of Syria the settlement of the Lebanon had, on the whole, a good effect. It is no mere coincidence that the Ottoman Law of the Vilayets is dated 1864. The able Ministers of the half-crazy Abdul Aziz feared that more Lebanons would be constituted, unless their master's house were set in some sort of order. The attention of the world was being called to the south-eastern Levant by the construction of the Suez Canal. Napoleon III, who, in 1861, had commissioned Gifford Palgrave to go down from Damascus into the Arabian peninsula, was known to cherish far-reaching plans for the Arab lands. High-placed Europeans began to appear at the Holy Places. The future Kaiser, Frederick, came to Jerusalem in 1869; and the Empress Eugénie planned a pilgrimage in the same year, but did not make it. Russia, in spite of her Crimean defeat, was increasing her solicitude for the Holy City, having acquired a large tract of building land just outside it in 1856. The annual tale of Russian pilgrims, formerly a few hundreds, had become, by 1870, a matter of thousands, while since 1847 the growing influx of Russian Jews had been causing uneasiness to the Porte. For these and many other reasons the viziers saw it was high time to bring Syria under the same centralised system of direct administration, civil and military, as Asia Minor; and this they accomplished in the 'sixties. The system was substantially that still in force, only one important administrative change

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having been made since. This took place in 1887, when an access of nerves about Jewish colonisation and the imminence of railway construction (the Jaffa—Jerusalem line, first mooted as long ago as 1864, was definitely sanctioned in 1888), caused Abdul Hamid to detach the Jerusalem *sanjak* from the vilayet of Syria and make it depend directly on the Porte. Even the irreconcilable Druses of the Hauran were forced by Midhat to accept a *kaimakam* depending directly on Damascus, and to send representatives to his *mejliss*. But this dose of law and order was sweetened by the choice of the officer from the native house of Atrash, and by the renunciation of taxes and military service for the time being.

Relapse owing to Franco-German and Russo-Turkish Wars.—Further efforts to knit Syria to Constantinople and further steps in its internal development would, doubtless, have taken place but for two great wars and the intervening bankruptcy of Turkey. The catastrophe of France in 1870 relieved the Porte of its chief apprehension about the Arab-speaking part of its Empire; the financial crisis of 1874 cut short all reform; and the Russian war of 1877 produced on the outlying provinces much the same effect as had been coincident with the war in the Crimea. The Hauran Druses once more threw off the shadow of dependence. Eastern and central Syria became a happy hunting ground of nomads and other highwaymen. The Kurds again did as they liked in the north, and so did the Ansarie in their mountains. Only the Lebanon remained undisturbed. Then came the Treaty of Berlin, the consolidation of Abdul Hamid's position, after storms of constitutional revolution and war had subsided, and the inauguration of that Asiatic policy by which he looked to redress the balance of Europe.

Abdul Hamid's Policy.—In this policy Syria was the most vital province, as it has always been in the policy of Asiatic Empires which have tried to hold under one yoke Irak, Arabia, and Egypt. It is true

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that Egypt, since the digging of the Suez Canal and the development of steam communication, stood no longer in the relation to Syria that it had held a generation before. But Abdul Hamid, it must be remembered, was very slow to abandon the hope that it would come again under his control; to the persistent vitality of this hope among Turks the Tabah affair of 1906, the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, and very recent events have given conspicuous proof. He still held that a land-way to Egypt, as also to Arabia and Irak, must, at all cost, be better assured; and that by such assurance all those provinces, together with Syria, would be knit firmly into his Empire.

Circassian Colonies.—The harbingers of Abdul Hamid in Syria were Circassians. His idea of planting these truculent refugees on the desert fringes, as irregular garrisons, to hold back the nomad Arabs, was not quite new; for Richard Burton, when British Consul at Damascus in 1870, had found groups of them already established on the Alah plateau, east of Homs. But the immigration from the Caucasus, which followed the Treaty of Berlin, gave Abdul Hamid far more Cherkess material to dispose of than his predecessor had. A part of this he settled, from 1879 onwards, along the Haj Road towards the Belka. The colonists were to be pioneers in every sense; for they had to introduce not only their ploughs where nomad Arabs had been content to pasture, but also, in the 'eighties, their own government and police; for in neither the Jaulan nor the Belka would the Imperial Government organize permanently its administration or garrisons till 1895. The lands assigned were mostly Government property according to the letter of the Ottoman law, since, no doubt, they had neither paid tax nor been tilled within the prescribed term, nor, indeed, at any time. But Ottoman law did not run in Trans-Jordan, and the nomads and half-settled Arab villagers held that the lands so disposed of were, in fact, theirs. Accordingly, local enmity to the colonists was assured from the outset, and all the years since have been filled with

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strife. The Government consistently supported its colonists, rounding up more than once on their behalf an irreconcilable tribe or clan, as, for example, the Abbad Arabs near Es-Salt, or a section of the Beni Hasan, near Jerash, and sending it to cool its passions west of Jordan or in the Eastern Desert; and the Cherkess have been able to hold on. But the Arabs have not forgotten what they believe to be their territorial rights, and the racial feud smoulders unquenched.

Administration and Communications.—In pursuance of his policy Abdul Hamid took in hand, in the early 'eighties, the public insecurity of northern Syria and southern Palestine, multiplying guards and increasing garrisons, and paying particular and unwelcome attention then and later to both the Kurds of Amanus and the robber Armenians of Zeitun. Improved communications, however, he knew, or soon learned, would provide the most effective means to his end. In the year 1885, when the Jaffa—Jerusalem track was improved into a metalled chaussée, began an era of road-building throughout Syria, and in 1886 it was followed by one of railway construction. This was destined, in the course of the next thirty years, to give Syria through-connection with Constantinople, a railway from Aleppo to Bir es-Seba linked to five ports, and trunk lines to Arabia on the one hand and Mesopotamia on the other. When it is remembered, further, that such harbour structures as exist in Syria, and the equipment of principal cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem with broad ways, modern buildings, electric lighting, tramways, and other convenient apparatus, are also of Abdul Hamid's time, one is bound to admit that a good deal of beneficent construction—almost all, in fact, that makes Syria as a whole the most civilised province of Turkey at this day—stands to the credit of a Sultan whose energies are popularly supposed to have been uniformly destructive and sinister.

Railway Schemes.—Two, in particular, among the

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railway enterprises of his reign are of capital significance for the political future of Syria; but, being still incomplete, they have been able to exercise but a small part of their destined influence. These are the Hejaz railway, which promises to make Damascus again the chief gathering point of Moslem pilgrims, and the Baghdad railway, which should give back to Aleppo some of its lost importance in the commerce of East and West. Both cities, indeed, have resumed something of their cosmopolitan character; but the Hejaz railway must reach Mecca and the Baghdad railway the Gulf before either will relieve the Suez Canal of any great proportion of the men and merchandise that pass through it to-day.

Settlement of the Country.—The consolidating effect, whether designed or accidental, of these measures of Abdul Hamid's reign was supplemented by a deliberate governmental effort to diminish nomadism, to whose disturbing social influence, exercised from east and south, all Syrian history bears witness. The precedent of the Trans-Jordan agricultural colonies was followed in the north. Strong bodies of Cherkess were settled round the head of the Syrian Desert, on Imperial estates about Membij, and also at Rakka; and both in the Euphrates valley and in Trans-Jordan measures were taken to encourage or compel settlement along the arable fringes. These measures took the form of free or favourable grants of land, opening of local markets, establishment of administrative posts and police caracols, and, latterly, road construction and the institution of a posting service from Aleppo to Felluja and Baghdad. In the Trans-Jordan country, where settlement had been slowly spreading for a generation, amid a welter of tribal claims and feuds, the Government undertook at last, in the 'nineties, to assure and promote the process by establishing garrisoned posts from Kuneitra southwards, and by introducing administrative machinery of the same type as in the rest of Syria. A *mutessarif* appeared at Kerak, for example, in 1895, and *kaimakams* and *mudirs* fol-

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lowed throughout the Belka region, and southward as far as Shobak and Ma'an. In 1896 considerable irregular forces were sent against the Hauran Druses; and with the exile of over 1,000 of their notables to Crete, Rhodes, and Asia Minor some peace was secured. On the southern desert frontier Bir es-Seba was selected to be a focus of settlement and a steadying influence. Made an administrative centre in 1904, it was garrisoned and provided with solid government buildings; and an experiment was made, not unsuccessfully, with a Court of Tribal Appeal, to which representatives of the nomadic and half-settled Arabs of all the region east of the Egyptian frontier were called as assessors.

Christian Influx into Palestine.—Meanwhile, Palestine became an ever more irksome possession for Abdul Hamid. As he watched colonists, pilgrims, and tourists pour in an ever-swelling stream from Christendom and Jewry, he foresaw a second Lebanon to be constituted at the gates of Egypt and Arabia. Christian missions and educational institutions had been increasing steadily throughout Syria during all his reign, despite studied and obstinate obstruction. The American representatives, who dated back (at Beirut) to 1821, he regarded with least distrust, relying on the official aloofness of the United States from Old World politics. They had, however, extended their activities greatly since 1870, rebuilding the Beirut College in 1872, and opening schools all over Palestine; and, disinterested though they might be, the encouragement they offered to emigration from Lebanon and elsewhere, and the democratic and liberal ideas which their curriculum introduced to the minds of Armenians and Syrians, were disquieting to an Imperial Absolutist. Worse than these, however, were the French Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition, of St. Vincent de Paul, and others, who had been spreading all over Syria since 1859, and had established in Jerusalem a centre of educational and other charitable effort.

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Thence their Sisters of the Rosary were penetrating even the doubtful districts east of the Jordan. The Italians, whose Franciscans were of such old establishment at Jerusalem (fourteenth century) as to be accepted as a matter of course, were not regarded as likely to increase either the numbers or the liberalism of their institutions; but the British Church missionary schools and hospitals throughout Palestine were another matter, and the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem had recently instituted a new centre for educating natives, whether Protestant or other.

Jewish Immigrants.—More, however, than any Christians, Abdul Hamid believed he had reason to fear the Jews. They were to be a wedge driven in by the hands of France, Russia. and Great Britain, whom, in this connection, he suspected in the order named. The *Alliance israélite universelle*, of Paris, had introduced a first Hebrew colony to Palestine in 1870. British Jews followed suit in 1878. Four years later there was a veritable rush, as a result of pogroms in Russia and Rumania. With ten colonies already in existence, occupying some of the best land of the maritime lowlands, while Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias. and Safed had long sheltered Jewish communities, the Porte resolved to act. In 1888 it informed the Powers that it would not admit another Hebrew colony into Palestine, or, indeed, any Jew pilgrim, except on payment of heavy caution for his departure within a short term; and that the standing interdict against aliens holding real estate would be rigorously enforced. This effort, however, availed but little. The Powers (although Great Britain had pledged herself to cease protecting Russian Jews after 1890) refused to accept discriminatory legislation against their nationals, Hebrew or other; while a people so well supplied and so conversant with finance as the Jews found little difficulty in evading the prohibitions of a Turkish administration. The tide of Jewish colonisation slackened, but did not stop, and it flowed again with renewed volume after Herzl had enunciated his Zionist

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gospel in 1895. Some, even then, dared to speak openly of coming Hebrew domination where Jews had hitherto crept to hide.

German Emperor's Visit.—Foiled by the Powers, and betrayed by men of his own household, Abdul Hamid turned to his one Christian friend, a sovereign who never browbeat him, but watched the French and Russians, and was not credited with any predilection for the Jews. Kaiser Wilhelm II appeared in Palestine in October 1898, made a royal progress through the country, was presented with lands at Jerusalem, and there inaugurated a German epoch of the city's history. German influence, which had begun obscurely about the time of the Prussian Crown Prince's visit in 1869, and had been sustained inconspicuously by small Templar colonies at Haifa and on Mount Carmel, was to challenge henceforward all others in Palestine. But when the spectre of a second Franco-Lebanon had thus been laid, Abdul Hamid was not minded to raise that of a German Palestine; and he was careful to keep his gratitude within bounds. Herzl retired baffled from Constantinople in 1902, and obstruction continued to be offered to the Jews. Only after the revolution of 1908 could the German-Jew institutions, which had come into existence to take control of the Hebrew movement in Palestine, begin to make headway, and the German era of Jew colonisation increased materially the numbers and holdings of alien settlers.

Progress under Abdul Hamid.—Taken as a whole, the Hamidian regime in Syria marked Imperial progress, and is open to less criticism than elsewhere in Turkey. There were, of course, bad features—the same repressive atmosphere as in other provinces; the same nervousness of foreign encroachment, issuing, for example, in fantastic prohibition of access to coastal districts; the same suspicious and jealous system of administration. But there was no general sense of oppression and terror. The population steadily increased. When the Porte took over from the Egyptians in 1841, Syria and Palestine were estimated to contain

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less than a million and a quarter inhabitants. Sixty years later these had swelled to nearly four millions. In spite of the presence of a large Armenian population in the north, the Armenian troubles of the reign in the rest of the Empire awoke but a faint echo in Syria. No urban massacre took place there, even when such neighbouring centres as Urfa, Birejik, and Adana were convulsed; and a few isolated atrocities committed in convents and villages, like that at Yenije Kale in 1896, were so generally condemned by the public opinion of Aleppo, Alexandretta, Aintab, and other towns that their contagion never spread. Even Zeitun, provocative though it was, escaped any very severe treatment. Thanks to the influence of Syrians like Izzet Pasha el-Abid, in Abdul Hamid's secret councils, the province got something more than its share of Government help and opportunity of advancement, with the result that it was by no means ripe for revolt in 1908, and that Abdul Hamid's name is not held accursed there at this day. It would not have required more than some consideration, some breadth of sympathy, some relaxation of doctrinaire patriotism, to secure the co-operation of Young Arabs with Young Turks and the continued solidarity of Syria with the Ottoman Empire.

Young Turk Revolution and Arabs.—Such consideration, however, the Arab-speaking peoples were not to find at the hands of the Ottomanising doctrinaires of the Committee of Union and Progress. Like other provincials, the Arabs had been carried off their feet by the high-sounding phrases which rang out at the first from Salonika and Constantinople. Syria found these words easy to act upon, since she had no such notoriously subversive elements in her population as existed, for example, in European Turkey and in some parts of Asia Minor; and, even in Damascus, there was not much bitterness between races or creeds. But with ideas of nationality, home rule, and representative institutions in the air, no wonder the Arabs thought of managing

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their own domestic affairs in their own language, of developing their own country, and of themselves enjoying the responsibilities and emoluments of its administration. Nothing more, even on the witness of Ahmed Jemal Pasha himself, was in the programme of the three or four Arab literary and political clubs which had come into being at Constantinople by the end of 1908, or in that of the larger "Reform Club," which was formed at Beirut in the following year.

Attempts at Ottoman Nationalisation.—The Committee of Union and Progress, however, lost no time in showing that it would have none of these ideals—not any nationalism but Ottoman Turk, not any official language but Turkish, not any home rule within the Empire, not any of the higher power in other hands than those that subscribed to its programme of one race, one language, one administration. One Constantinople club, the Akha el-Arab, founded by Shefik el-Muayad and Nadra Mutran, was snuffed out; Arab deputies heard plain words in the Chamber, and plainer if they attended meetings of the Committee of Union and Progress; the Adana massacre showed Arab-speaking Christians that they had not found a new earth; and the undisguised contempt testified by the Turks towards Arab Moslems warned these to expect no superior offices or emoluments. There was no mistaking the survival of the Old Turk in the Young one. All spirit of home rule was dealt with promptly and drastically, whether it was the Kurdish spirit of Ibrahim Pasha Milli in 1908; or the Arab spirit of the Mujaliah of Kerak, which threatened the Hejaz railway in 1910; or the Druse spirit, which provoked Sami Pasha in 1911; or the Armenian spirit of Zeitun, which never rested till broken in August 1914.

Anti-Turkish Committees.—By the time the Balkan War was going ill for the Turks the temper of Syrian Arabs had changed for the worse. Clubs like the Kahtaniya, which had been formed without a thought

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of separatism, now contemplated a national *jihad* against Turkish "infidels," which Christians and Jews were called to join. Other clubs, the Jemiyat el-Islahiah, for example, were started to invite foreign intervention in Syria and even permanent foreign protection; and the attempt to suppress them in Beirut was met by a cessation of all trade and business for three days. In 1912 we find many of the Syrian Committeemen gathered into Egypt, where a "decentralisation society" ("el-La-Merkesiah") had been constituted with a non-separatist programme. It gradually became bitterly anti-Turk, and inclined to seek French or other European intervention. When the meagre concessions offered to the Arab Convention at Paris had proved a dead letter, the secret societies of Syria became definitely separatist; and the year 1914 was occupied with revolutionary intrigues in all the principal cities, the Turks knowing something of them and suspecting more, but being unable to lay their hands as yet on the leaders or on proofs of their guilt.

Incriminating correspondence was, however, found by the Turks soon after the outbreak of the recent war; and courts-martial, constituted in permanence at Aley, Damascus, and Aleppo, found excuse for instituting a reign of terror, which sent to execution or exile almost all possible leaders of Syrian revolt, and also for infringing the Constitution of the Lebanon. A Moslem Governor and Turkish garrisons were despatched to the Mountain in 1915, pending formal denunciation of the Organic Statute in the following year.

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III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

(i) *Mohammedans*

Generally speaking, the indigenous population of Syria and Palestine is Sunni Moslem; and Jerusalem is regarded by orthodox Moslems as the holiest city after Mecca and Medina. The fellahin are more religious than the Beduins, though the latter were particularly influenced by the Wahabite movement.

There are in Syria a certain number of Shia sects, and of religious communities who came into existence during the first centuries of Mohammedan activity. To this latter class belong the Metawalis, who range from Lebanon as far as Homs; the Ismailites, or Assassins, who first appeared in Mesopotamia in the tenth century and are now to be met with in the Nusairiya mountains in the north of Syria; and the Druses.

The Druses number 55,000 in Hauran, 50,000 in the Lebanon (where they are to the Maronites as 2 is to 7), and about 45,000 in Hasbeya, Raheyra, and Homs The Druses of Hauran are the most representative of their sect. They are secret Unitarians (Muwahhidin), believing in successive reincarnations of the One God; these reincarnations include Jesus, but not Mohammed. The last incarnation was Hakim, the sixth Fatimite Caliph, who founded the sect in A.D. 996. Hakim will reappear in the world to make his religion supreme. The Druses believe in metempsychosis; they consider prayer to be an impertinent interference with the Creator, but are not fatalists. Polygamy and the use of wine and tobacco are forbidden. Truth in words is enjoined as a commandment, but only between Druses.

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Outwardly, the Druses conform to Orthodox Mohammedanism; in their secret religion only 15 per cent. of the adults of both sexes are fully initiated, and wear a white turban as a distinguishing mark. It is doubtful whether there is any foundation for the tales of pagan practices connected with the secret religion.

(ii) *Christians*

Antioch and Jerusalem were the centres of Christianity in Syria and Palestine under the Roman Empire. The former was the seat of one of the three Great Patriarchs; the latter was given patriarchal dignity in the fifth century. Both sees were torn asunder by the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies in the fifth and sixth centuries, and through the epochs of the Arab invasions, the Crusade, and the Turkish rule, have never succeeded in re-establishing orthodoxy in their respective spheres. A further schism has been caused by the division between eastern and western Christendom.

The present position is that there are three Uniat Patriarchs and one Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch,[1] and a Latin and an Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Uniat Patriarchs of Antioch are: (i) the Melchite, who resides at a monastery in the Lebanon, and has jurisdiction over all Uniats of Greek nationality in the Turkish Empire; (ii) the Maronite, who also resides in the Lebanon, and has jurisdiction over about 500,000 people; (iii) the Syrian, who resides near Diarbekr, and rules over 15,000-20,000 people who have seceded from the Jacobite Church.

Of the communities represented by these three Patriarchs, the Melchite represents the old Orthodox and Imperialist Byzantine Church, which refused, in the fifth and sixth centuries, to accept the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies; the Maronite represents a very old and extensive body of Christians in the Lebanon and other mountainous districts in Syria,

[1] There is also a Jacobite Patriarch.

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whose orthodoxy during the Middle Ages is more than questionable, but who accepted a constitution from Rome in 1736. The Maronite Church has retained local usages, but Romanising influences are gaining ground, especially since the higher native clergy have begun to be educated in seminaries at Rome and Paris. There are Maronite colonies in Cyprus, Alexandria, and the United States.

The Syrian community is a reflux of the wave of Monophysite heresy that resulted in the foundation of a heretical sect by Jacob Baradaeus in the sixth century. The Jacobite sect included 150 archbishoprics during the Middle Ages, but has now only a small following. About 1860 the Uniat seceders were able to gain possession of most of the Jacobite churches.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, who now resides at Damascus, retains little of his old authority. Nearly all the 250,000 Christians under his jurisdiction are Syrian Arabs who know no Greek; but from 1724 to 1899 all the Patriarchs were Greeks, and, as a rule, unable even to speak Arabic. In 1899, when the see fell vacant, the Arabs proposed a candidate of their own, who was backed by the Russians and Rumanians; the Sultan yielded to pressure from the Russian Ambassador and appointed the Arab candidate. The Constantinopolitan Greeks, supported by the French Ambassador, refused to recognise the Arab candidate, who was, however, installed. Throughout his patriarchate (1899-1906), he was not recognised by Constantinople or Jerusalem; and the schism was continued under the next Patriarch.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem has about 15,000 Christians under his jurisdiction. The Patriarchs have, since the sixteenth century, been Greeks who, until last century, lived in Constantinople. whereas the Orthodox Christians are, again, Syrian Arabs. The history of the Patriarchate during the last fifty years has been one continual struggle against Russian interference.

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The Latin Patriarchate was founded during the Crusades; after the tragic failure of the latter the Patriarchs *in partibus* resided in Rome. In 1847 Pius IX sent the Latin Patriarch back to reside at Jerusalem.

Both Catholic and Protestant missions have been active in Palestine; and, from the early nineteenth century, much educational and medical work has been done by missionaries, mainly of English, French, American, or German nationality (*cf.* pp. 53—56)

The custody of the Christian Holy Places has naturally been a matter of supreme interest to Christians, and has caused many disputes. Not the least unedifying feature of these disputes has been the way in which the religious claims of their own Churches have been used by Governments as pretexts for political interference on a large scale.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jewish religion in Palestine and Syria is in no way distinguished from orthodox Judaism elsewhere. Their ritual is Sephardic or Ashkenazic, according as they originate from Spain and Portugal or the rest of Europe. The newcomers, especially the colonists, are inclined to be somewhat lax in their observance of rites and ceremonies. Of special interest among the Jews of Jerusalem are the colonies of Yemenite and Bokhariot Jews who immigrated because of the oppression they suffered in Arabia and Central Asia. There is no great cathedral synagogue even in Jerusalem.

The Jewish Holy Places are the Temple Area, now occupied by the Mosque of Omar, and the cave of Macpelah, covered by the Hebron Mosque. The Tomb of Rachel near Bethlehem, and the Tombs of the Rabbis at Tiberias are objects of exclusively Jewish reverence.

(2) Political

Except in the semi-autonomous Lebanon, the Government of Syria and Palestine differs from that of the

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Turkish provinces only in that the Sanjak of Jerusalem is directly under the Porte.[1]

Lebanon has been, since European intervention of 1861, which followed the massacres of 1860, a separate sanjak under a Christian *mushir*, advised by a Central Council of Twelve, of whom only two are Moslems. The ordinance of 1861 was revised by the Porte in 1864, in concert with the six great protecting Powers.

The administrative divisions of Syria and Palestine have already been enumerated.[2]

(3) Public Education

General.—In Syria and Palestine elementary education is nominally compulsory for all. It may be given in other than State schools. For example, in Aleppo, a city of 250,000 inhabitants, there are stated to be 710 Moslem, 250 Christian, and 30 Jewish schools, with 19,000, 8,000, and 2,000 pupils respectively. This represents a school attendance of about 10 per cent. of the population. But, as the average number of pupils throughout the Turkish Empire is 4 per cent., that figure would probably be a fair estimate for Syria and Palestine also. The general level of efficiency in the State schools is low. Elementary education of a conventional kind is supplied gratis in the schools attached to the mosques.

Educational Work under British Control.—Ten British missionary societies report 19 educational institutions and boarding schools with close on 1,000 pupils; and about 120 elementary and village schools with about 9,000 pupils, of whom over two-thirds are girls. In Gaza alone 400 girls are in the mission schools.

The most important institutions are:—

In Syria: the Girls' Training College of the British-Syrian Mission at Beirut (staff, 6 Europeans and 15

[1] See above, p. 39.
[2] See above, p. 3.

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native teachers; 114 boarders, of whom 42 are normal students; and 120 day pupils). There are also high-grade schools at Aleppo, Damascus, and Brumana in the Lebanon.

In Palestine: an English College (33 pupils) and the Bishop Gobat High School (84 pupils), both for men and boys, in Jerusalem; a Training School at Bethlehem (41 pupils); and an Orphanage School at Nazareth, both for girls. These four institutions belong to the Church Missionary Society. There are also high-grade schools at Jaffa, Safed, and Es-Salt, and several other places. A new college for well-to-do girls has recently been opened with great success in Jerusalem.

Educational Work under American Control.—This is all in Syria, except that the American Friends have schools at Ramallah, near Jerusalem. In Syria, 7 American Mission Boards have 19 institutions and boarding schools with about 1,400 pupils, and 118 day schools with 5,500 pupils, of whom over 3,000 are boys. The Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, governed by a Board of Trustees in New York, is a centre of light and learning in the country. It includes schools of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, commerce, and arts and sciences. It has over 20 buildings and a staff of 69 foreigners. Even up to the middle of 1918 the College had over 700 students on its roll (not included in previous total), and its influence is felt in every country in the Levant. There are other American schools of high grade at Sidon (the Gerard Institution with industrial departments), Tripoli, Zahle, and other centres.

Roman Catholic Educational Agencies.—The following statistics are given by Comte Jean de Kergolay in the *Journal des Débats*. In Damascus and its neighbourhood between 4,000 and 5,000 children were being educated before the war by French religious communities. In Hauran there were nine schools, with 540 scholars. In Beirut the French Sisters of Charity had a girls' school with

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2,000 scholars on the rolls; the Lazarists conducted a boys' school; there were also a boarding school and a day school for between 5,000 and 6,000 girls, and three other boys' schools. In Aleppo there was a Franciscan commercial college.

The Jesuit University in Beirut, founded as a school in 1875, almost immediately took the rank of a university, which has since 1891 had the power to confer degrees in philosophy and theology in accordance with the usage of the Gregorian University in Rome. The French Ministry of Public Instruction has also authorized it to grant the classical baccalaureate for Oriental lay scholars desirous of pursuing medical or legal studies in France. The Medical School, opened in 1883, was given, five years later, the power of conferring medical degrees after an examination passed before a Medical Committee sent out from France. These degrees were recognized in 1890 by Egypt, and in 1898 by Turkey; 390 doctors and 92 chemists have thus qualified. There were 275 students in 1911. There was also an Oriental Faculty, the lectures of which were open free; and smaller schools of law and engineering. A secondary and an elementary school, connected with this machinery for higher education, had, in 1913, 582 and 600 scholars respectively.

In Palestine there are 13 schools, several of them for girls, controlled by the Franciscans; these contain 1,700 children.

Jewish Educational Agencies.—European Jews have for the last half-century paid special regard to the educational needs of their co-religionists in Palestine. In Jerusalem there are the Rothschild Technical School and the Evelina Girls' School (Anglo-Jewish Association of London), and two boys' schools, one of which is administered by the Alliance Israélite of Paris (which also has founded an agricultural school at Jaffa); the other was formerly managed by the Hilfsverein of Berlin. These Jewish schools have restored Hebrew to its ancient rôle as the vernacular

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of the Jews of Palestine. The foundation-stone of a Jewish University in Jerusalem was laid in 1918.

Other Educational Agencies.—German Protestant Missions have about 14 elementary schools in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem and in Haifa and Beirut, and an orphanage with a normal department attached in Jerusalem.

The Jaffa Gymnasium is chiefly Russian. The Greeks also have made provision for the education of their co-religionists and nationals in Palestine.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Popular Opinion and National Sentiment

It is impossible to speak of any common national sentiment in Syria, since its population consists of so many diverse elements, often with conflicting interests and ideals. It may, however, be roughly divided for the present purpose into (i) Moslem, (ii) Christian (including Orthodox and Catholic), and (iii) Jewish. Each of these must be considered separately.

(i) *Moslems*

The majority of the population of Syria is Moslem; but it is by no means homogeneous in race, mentality, or organization, even in Palestine. Some West Syrians, who advocate the doctrine of "la Syrie intégrale," preach that Palestine is part of Syria, and that all the land from Alexandretta to Jaffa and from Aleppo to Ma'an is one country that can become a homogeneous state or nation. But such a policy could hardly be realised, even if there were no such things as the Arab and Zionist movements; and the existence of these movements makes it impossible. The people west of the Jordan are not Arabs, but only Arab-speaking. The bulk of the population are *fellahin*; that is to say, agricultural workers owning land as a village community or working land for the Syrian effendi. In the Gaza district they are mostly of Egyptian origin; elsewhere they are of the most mixed race. They have for

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centuries been ground down, overtaxed, and bullied by the Turk, and still more by the Arab-speaking Turkish minor official and by the Syrian and Levantine landowner. They have little, if any, national sentiment, and would probably welcome any stable form of government which would guarantee to them reasonable security and enjoyment of the fruits of their labour.

A nebulous Syrian sentimentalism originated in Beirut, among a class of lawyers and traders, with no civilisation of their own, and demoralised by 500 years of Turkish misrule. They, like the Moslem effendi class in Palestine, and particularly the educated Moslem-Levantine population of Jaffa, evince a feeling somewhat akin to hostility towards the Arab movement, very similar to the feeling prevalent in Cairo and Alexandria. This class, while regretting the opportunities for illegitimate gain offered by Turkish rule, has no real political cohesion, and, above all, no power of organization. There is, however, a very widespread fear among the Moslem landowners that the progress of Zionism is inimical to their interests; and societies have been formed to organize resistance to the sale of land to the Jews.

A satisfactory solution of the West Syrian problem, which involves the territory north of the Litani river and west of the Rayak-Homs railway, is a matter for arrangement, now that Syria is definitely cleared of the Turks. As one goes eastward from the watershed which divides the Mediterranean from the Jordan valley, there is an increasing proportion of Arabs; and Trans-Jordania is an Arab country. The Arab movement is becoming increasingly national; its goal is Arab independence, free from British or French protection. It has as its aim the rehabilitation of the Arab nation, and the restoration of Damascus as a centre of Arab learning and culture (*cf.* p. 63) and an independent Arab capital.

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(ii) *Christians*

The Christians in Palestine are for the most part settled in clearly defined local communities. There are about 12,000 in Jerusalem, 10,000 in Bethlehem, about 3,000 in Jaffa, and there are in addition a few Christian villages in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. There is also a very considerable settlement of Christians who are partly Arab in race and speech beyond the Jordan, notably at Es-Salt. The overwhelming majority of the Christians in Judaea belong to Orthodox sects; in Jerusalem there are twice as many Orthodox as Catholics. The bulk of the Christians are interested, directly or indirectly, in the Holy Places and the pilgrims' traffic. However, in the villages round Jerusalem, and notably in Bethlehem, they engage in agricultural production, and must be regarded as an important element in the Palestinian local population.

The politics of Orthodoxy are in a transitional stage. Hitherto there has been a tendency to gravitate more and more into the orbit of Russia. Before the war large sums of money were received from Russia, and an annual flow of Russian pilgrims sustained the growing connection. The war and the Russian revolution have diverted this line of development. A certain number of the leading Orthodox clerics are now turning to the Kingdom of Greece; but, among many others, and the laity in particular, there are signs of the growth of the idea of a local Orthodox Church, autonomous and centred round the autonomous Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Catholics tend to fall into two very distinct groups. These two groups centre round the Italian Franciscans and the French clerics respectively. The head of the Franciscans is the Custode della Terra Santa, who lives in the Franciscan Convent attached to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The Franciscans are in possession of the more important rights in connection with the Holy Places so

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far as the Catholics are concerned. On the whole, they have the largest numerical following among the Palestinian Catholics. The various French orders do a great deal of educational work among Moslems as well as Christians.

The Armenians (non-Catholic), of all Christian denominations, are the most friendly disposed to the Anglican communion on the one hand, and, politically speaking, to the Zionists on the other. The Anglican Cathedral, with St. George's School attached to it, has for some time played a certain part in the Christian life of Jerusalem.

There has been during the past ten or fifteen years striking growth in German religious and political penetration. The city of Jerusalem is to-day literally dominated by new German religious buildings. Within the city, near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, is the great Lutheran Church of the Redeemer. Immediately outside the walls, near the Damascus Gate, is the big German Catholic Hospice, while on the other side of the city the Catholic Church of the Dormition has recently been rebuilt in the German Romanesque style by German effort. Above all, on the Mount of Olives, is the great German Convent. Large establishments at Bethlehem and the agricultural colonies of Savona and Wilhelma, founded by the German Templars near Jaffa, are evidence of the rapid growth of German penetration.

American Protestant and other missions have also done much work in Syria; the well-known American college at Beirut is the most prominent of these.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jews in Palestine may be divided into two main classes, by no means identical in their social conditions and their aspirations. On the one hand there are the older inhabitants, some of them craftsmen or agriculturists, refugees from other lands; but the great majority of them, particularly in Jerusalem, are fanatical in religion and opposed to modern Zionism.

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On the other, there are the more recent immigrants, consisting mainly of agricultural colonists introduced into the country by Zionist influence or other philanthropic agencies. The attitude of the two classes to political questions generally and to the Zionist movement in particular, is widely divergent.[1]

In Jerusalem the Jews form the majority of the population, outnumbering all the Christians and Moslems combined. In Hebron they are a small minority. The Jerusalem Jews include a minority of Zionists, composed of the artisan and shop-keeping classes; but the bulk of Jerusalem Jewry consists of the orthodox Jews, either devoted entirely to the religious life or dependent upon the religious devotees. This class of Jews (the Halukah) produces no wealth, and depends on charity, being supported by contributions from Jews all over the world. It does not participate in the political life of the country or in the common work of organization of the colonists. The religious devotees, who are emigrants or the children of emigrants from the ghettoes of Russia, Hungary, Galicia, and Rumania, spend their whole lives in the study of religious books; and their lives are regulated by the closest observance of the Judaic ritual. Some of them are undoubtedly "religious," but many of them live on alms in a condition of dirt, poverty, and idleness, which is almost indescribable. They, however, regard themselves as a caste above the other Jews of Jerusalem. The children begin at an early age to study the Talmud in the Talmud Torah schools, after which they continue their study for the remainder of their lives in the Yeshivoth. There they read or intone aloud from Hebrew books daily from sunrise to sunset, or are cross-examined by the rabbis regarding the most abstruse points of scholastic interpretation of the Mishnah in German Yiddish. All this takes place in conditions so insanitary that periodical ravages of typhus and malaria carry off numbers of the popula-

[1] For the Zionist Movement, see *Zionism*, No. 162 of this series.

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tion, whose physical development is almost atrophied and whose intellectual development is abnormally strained. They are intensely bigoted, and are ruled by the rabbis. Nevertheless, these students represent an idea which must not be allowed to die; they have kept alive some aspects of Judaism for the Jewish people. The Hebrew university would go a long way to inspire the Halukah with the idea that they did not exist merely for themselves. It is important that the Halukah should be guided in such a way as would assure the flame of Jewish learning being kept alive in Jerusalem under more tolerable conditions.

There are in addition other communities, attracted to Jerusalem as the Holy City from all parts of the world, who, while they do not carry matters to such extremes as those described above, live a life of comparative seclusion from the ordinary affairs of the world and as more or less self-contained colonies. The most interesting of these is the Bokhara-Samarkand colony from Trans-Caspia. This colony, which is situated some two miles outside the Holy City, speaks either Hebrew or Persian Yiddish; most of the people write in Persian character. They are well-to-do, somewhat attractive in mien, and, if their statements regarding their origin are true, they are the descendants of people who have lived in Bokhara and Samarkand since the time of Tamerlane the Great, and before his time in Persia, and before that in Babylon. Another element that deserves mention is the Yemenites, who have been coming back to Palestine in fair numbers during the last twelve or fifteen years under the influence of the Zionist movement. These Yemenite Jews, who speak a pure Hebrew and very pure Arabic, have been cut off from the rest of the world since the rise of Islam in the seventh century of our era. They are the remnant of those large Jewish communities, many autonomous, which existed in all the cities of Arabia in the time of Mohammed. They have maintained themselves absolutely distinct and orthodox in religion for many

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centuries in Yemen, and have acted as metal-workers, craftsmen, and carpenters for their Arab rulers. Three or four thousand Yemenites are now living in Palestine either as agricultural labourers or still as craftsmen in Jerusalem.

The Jewish agricultural colonies, which have grown up during the past twenty-five years, show a level of agricultural and scientific development far ahead of anything else in Palestine. The Jews have in many cases flung themselves upon barren and uncultivated land and transformed it into rich intensively cultivated plantations. The colonies are inhabited by strong and healthy agriculturists living in clean, well-built houses, and possessing a high degree of commercial and political organization, as well as a distinctive social life. The schools are progressive and excellent in every way. The children think and talk in Hebrew, and all the colonists possess the newly acquired national consciousness. They have their own newspapers, their own cultural institutions, and their own national anthem. They are all pioneers, and look forward to the day when they can acquire more land and can be joined by emigrants from all parts of the world inspired by the same ideals. They have a representative system of organization on an adult suffrage basis. Each colony is self-contained and autonomous; and the common affairs of all the colonists are in the hands of a Federal Committee elected by the Vaads (Committees of the Colonists).

The most important event which has taken place, so far as the Jewish community in Palestine is concerned, since our occupation, has been the recruiting of Palestine Jews, whatever their national states, into the British army; and practically the whole available Jewish youth of the colonies and many of the townsmen of military age came forward for voluntary enlistment in the Jewish battalions, took the oath to King George V, and were clad in British uniforms. The initiative in favour of the recruiting movement

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took place as the result of the demand of the Jewish population itself, rather than from any desire or even encouragement from the British authorities. The campaign in Palestine is regarded by the Jews as a campaign for the liberation of the country from the thraldom of Turkish misrule, and the return of even Turkish suzerainty would be regarded by them as a betrayal.

The essence of the Zionist ideal is the desire to found upon the soil of Palestine a revived Hebrew nation based upon an agricultural life and the use of the Hebrew language. Just before the war, a struggle took place between the Zionists in Palestine and a body called the "Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden," over an attempt by the German Jews to introduce the German language into certain Jewish schools in Palestine. The whole secret of British popularity in Palestine depends upon our willingness to give the people freedom to develop their own national consciousness in their own way.

The desires of the Zionists, as formulated in the document quoted in *Zionism* (No. 162 of this series, p. 39), are very moderate in themselves and by no means inconsistent with the interests and ideals of either the Arab movement or of the Moslem inhabitants of Palestine. Jewish national development, cultural, agricultural, and economic, is inevitable and natural in Palestine after the war. There is so much unoccupied and uncultivated land in Palestine that there is plenty of room for Zionist development without ousting the existing Moslem population. The Jews have already shown that land, hitherto regarded as barren, can be converted in a very short space of time into rich vineyards, or into fruit and almond plantations. With the Arab movement centred at Damascus, Zionism in Palestine would be a help rather than a hindrance to it; for that movement would only suffer from the attempt to absorb a district ethnologically and otherwise so different from countries in which the Arab element stands alone or is distinctly predominant.

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Above all, from the Zionist point of view, Turkish and German influences must be kept as far as possible from the confines of Palestine; and this can only be done by the realisation of Arab hopes.

The Zionist development will be practical rather than political, and Zionists make no secret of the fact that they wish the political control of the country to remain in the hands of Great Britain. They seek to have in Palestine cultural and local autonomy together with commercial representation, such as has been granted to the Mohammedans in India. They want Hebrew recognized as an official language of the country equally with Arabic.

History, age-long associations, and present-day conditions point alike to the separability of Syria and Palestine; and such a separation violates none of the principles laid down by the Allied Powers at the commencement, or recognised by them in the course, of the recent war.

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IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads, Caravan Routes, Tracks*

Of the more important Syrian roads, two, the Beirut—Damascus and Tripoli—Homs roads, are peculiar in having been built by private companies, both of which were afterwards bought out by the railway company whose lines between the same points have more or less superseded the roads. All other roads are due to the Government, and are divided into three classes: those of the first class, connecting capitals of vilayets with Constantinople or with the nearest seaport or railway station, are seven or eight metres in width, and metalled to a depth of 25 cm.; second class roads, which connect vilayet capital towns, are six metres in width, with lighter metalling; all other roads are included in the third class. Maintenance of roads is exacted from the population, either in labour or in a money equivalent, and in 1889 10 per cent. of the revenue of the Banque agricole was also assigned to this purpose. Bridge-tolls are collected in some instances. Nevertheless, before 1914 the roads generally were very defective, except in the Lebanon, where they were well kept up. During the war, however, great improvements have been effected both by repairs and by fresh construction, additions of about 500 km. in all being reported.

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The existing system of main roads in June 1916 may be summarised as follows:—

(i) Along the coast: Gaza—Jaffa—Haifa, about 180 km., and Es-Sur—Saida—Beirut—Tripoli, about 170 km. Between Haifa and Es-Sur a stretch of some 60 km. remains ill-provided, and a much longer one between Tripoli and Alexandretta, a region which is especially badly served. At Alexandretta the coast road begins again, skirting the gulf and then striking west to Missis and Adana.

(ii) The main internal artery: El-Auja—Bir es-Seba (Beersheba) — Hebron (El-Khulil) —Jerusalem—Nablus (Shechem)—Nazareth—Tiberias (Tubariya)—Kuneitra—Damascus—Homs—Hama—Aleppo (Haleb)—Killis—Aintab, about 750 km.

(iii) Roads from the principal towns on the coast joining or crossing the route last described: Gaza—Bir es-Seba, about 45 km.; Jaffa—Jerusalem—Jericho—Es-Salt—Amman, 182 km.; Jaffa—Nablus, 60 km.; Saida—Safed—Roshpina, 76 km.; Beirut—Damascus, 126 km.; Tripoli—Homs, 94 km.; Alexandretta—Aleppo —Meskene, 245 km.

A road from Akka to Safed, which should be very useful, has been begun. The road between Alexandretta and Aleppo, the most important trade route of the country, is partially out of repair. With proper maintenance and the extension of the roads, vehicular transport, both mechanical and animal-drawn, would no doubt soon increase. Hitherto, waggons have been little used except in the Lebanon and by the agricultural colonists near Haifa and Jaffa. Motor lorries have recently been extensively employed for military transport, the wear and tear occasioned to the roads being made good by labour battalions.

The main caravan routes from Syria take five directions, (i) northwards to Marash and beyond: (ii) north-east across the upper Euphrates towards

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Urfa and Diarbekr; (iii) eastward across the Euphrates towards Mosul and, further south, Baghdad; (iv) south and south-east to Arabia; (v) south-west to Egypt.

(i) The most direct route from Alexandretta to Marash leaves the Aleppo road at the Beilan Pass, and follows the Kara Su valley along the eastern slope of the Amanus (Elma Dagh). This valley is unhealthy in summer, and there is an alternative route *via* Payas, Osmania, and the Bagche Pass. There is a considerable traffic, chiefly by means of camels, between Alexandretta and the inland towns to the north and north-east.

(ii) From Aleppo, routes leading in the direction of Urfa and Diarbekr cross the Euphrates at three points, Birijik, Jerablus, and Tel Ahmar (Kala'at en-Nejim). The northern crossing at Birijik is taken by caravans from Killis, Aintab, and Marash, the route from Marash passing slightly north of Aintab. From Aleppo there are two well-defined routes, by Akhterin to Jerablus, and by El-Bab and Membij to Tel Ahmar, the latter, which had gone out of favour owing to danger from Beduin, having since 1908 come into use again.

(iii) The two main easterly routes (for Mosul, Baghdad, &c.) are from Aleppo to Meskene (whence goods for Baghdad are commonly carried down the river on rafts to Faluja), and from Damascus to Deir ez-Zor (Ed-Deir) *via* Tadmur (Palmyra). Traffic between Damascus and Baghdad is fairly regular, caravans passing each way every 40 or 60 days; they are less frequent in the summer months. The usual route between Damascus and Tadmur is by Nebk and Karyatein. There is also a direct route between Tadmur and Homs.

(iv) The old pilgrim road from Damascus to Ma'an for Medina and Mecca is now largely super-

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seded by the railway, and a more important caravan route in this direction is that leading from the Hauran down the Wadi Sirhan to Jauf and central Arabia. At Weisat, about 175 km. from Jauf by this way, another track strikes westward to Ma'an.

(v) Traffic to and from Egypt is for the most part by sea, but the old coast road *via* Gaza and Rafa is still used, and many camels are sent that way in the summer.

Inferior roads and tracks are too numerous to describe in detail, though they have an importance in consequence of the large extent to which pack-animals are still used. It has been estimated that in Syria the tonnage transported by animals is at least equal to that sent by rail. Since 1914, however, pack-animals have been commandeered in large numbers for military purposes, and very many are reported to have died.

(b) *Rivers*

The Euphrates lying outside the scope of the present survey, Syria and Palestine may be said to have no navigable rivers. In winter, boats of 100 tons can ascend the Nahr el-Asi (Orontes) for about three miles; this river is 100 yds. wide at its mouth; its depth inside the bar is 9 ft., and on the bar 3-5 ft. There are no canals. During the war a service of motor boats and barges across the Dead Sea was established in order to transport grain from the Kerak district to the north-west shore for Jerusalem. A small steam launch owned by the Hejaz Railway plies on the Lake of Tiberias from Semakh to Tiberias in connection with trains.

(c) *Railways*

(i) *Railway System in General*

The railways fall into four groups:—

1. The Baghdad Railway, of which the Syrian portions are: Islahie — Muslimie — Aleppo,

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142 km.; Muslimie—Jerablus, 93 km.; Alexandretta—Toprak Kale branch, 60 km.; total, 295 km., completed 1914.

2. The French Group, consisting of:

(*a*) The system of the company now called the Société Ottomane du Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements. This includes three lines of a total length of 682 km.:

i. Beirut—Rayak—Damascus—Mzerib, 249 km., completed 1895;

ii. Rayak—Homs—Hama—Aleppo, 331 km., completed 1906;

iii. Tripoli—Homs, 102 km., completed 1911.

(*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem), 87 km., completed 1892.

(*c*) Tramways Libanais (administered by the management of the Beirut—Damascus line): Beirut Harbour—Mameltein, 19 km., completed 1908. In 1913 an extension was undertaken to Jebeil, 20 km. further.

3. The Hejaz Railway, of which the Syrian section of the main line, Damascus—Deraa—Ma'an, 459 km., was completed in 1904. Between 1904 and 1917 the following lines were added: Haifa—Deraa—Bosra, 200 km.; Akka—Beled esh-Sheikh (Haifa line), 17 km.; Afule (El-Fule, Haifa line)—Massudie—Ludd (Jaffa line), about 100 km.; Massudie—Nablus, 15 km.; Wadi Surar (Jaffa line)—Bir es-Seba—El-Auja, 155 km., with a branch Et-Tine—Julis—Deir Sineid—Beit Hanum, 39 km. to be carried on to Gaza, some 10 km. further, and a sub-branch of about 12 km. from Deir Sineid to Huj. These two branch lines have been dismantled since the British occupation. The total length is 997 km., exclusive of the Arabian section from Ma'an to Medina [843 km.], the present terminus to the south. This line is

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linked up with the French Beirut—Mzerib line by short branches at Damascus and Mzerib.

Some portions of these railways have been more or less dismantled during the war, *viz.*, the line between Alexandretta and Erzin on the branch of the Baghdad Railway, the Damascus—Mzerib section, the Tripoli—Homs line, the Jaffa—Jerusalem line between Jaffa and Ramle, and the Deraa—Ma'an section, and the greater portion of the Deraa—Bosra eski Sham section on the Hejaz main line. This last has been partly destroyed by the British Army, while the Alexandretta—Toprak Kale line has also been bombarded by the Allies.

4. Strategic railways built by the British Army. These consist of the following:—

(*a*) The extension of the Kantara—Rafa line along the coast *viâ* Gaza and Sukereir to Ludd on the Jaffa—Jerusalem line: approximately 102 km.

(*b*) A branch line from Rafa to Bir es-Seba: 60 km.

(*c*) Ludd—Tulkeram, 44 km. This line was built practically along the old Turkish 3 ft. 5½ in. gauge line which has been dismantled.

(*d*) Tulkeram—Haifa, 67 km. This runs along the old Turkish railway alignment as far as El-Mejdel.

(*e*) The line from Ludd to Jerusalem has been altered from the Turkish 3 ft. 5½ in. gauge to the standard gauge.

All the railways are single track, and burn coal or patent fuel.

Local electric tramways have been installed at Beirut and Damascus, but have so far been unremunerative, apparently owing largely to the excessive cost of the concessions. Similar systems have been planned at Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Jaffa. A horse-tramway owned by a native company connects the town of Tripoli with its harbour of El-Mina, 2 km. distant.

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(ii) *Particulars of Construction*

Gauges. On the Baghdad Railway, the Tripoli—Aleppo section of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama, and on the British lines, the gauge is the normal one of 1·435 m., or 4 ft. 8½ in. On all others it is the narrow gauge of 1·05 m., or 3 ft. 5·34 in. (the Jaffa line was 5 cm. narrower, but has been altered during the war).

The *mode of traction* on all lines is the usual adhesion system, except on the line of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama from Beirut to Rayak, on which, between the stations of Hadeth and Jedita-Shtora, trains are run on a rack-rail (Swiss Abt) system for a distance of 31 km.

Bridges, gradients, &c.

1. Baghdad Railway.—The line from Islahie, which enters the Aleppo vilayet near Rajun, crosses several streams, the chief bridges being at 12·8 km. and 37 km.; there is also a 130 ft. bridge at Kurd Kulak. Beyond Aleppo the line crosses the Kuweik by a 60 ft. span girder bridge, the Sajur by a two-span girder and reinforced concrete bridge, each span of 30 ft., and leaves Syrian territory at Jerablus, where the bridge over the Euphrates is of 10 spans, with overhead lattice girder, and of a total length of 2,677 ft. Between Akbar and Katma the ruling gradient is 1 in 40, elsewhere it is 1 in 80.

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. Apart from one curve of 80 metres radius between Damascus and Mzerib, the sharpest curve on the adhesion section has a radius of 100 metres, and on the rack section a radius of 120 metres. On the rack section the steepest gradient is about 1 in 12, between Muderij and Deir el-Beidar. On the ordinary line are some gradients of 1 in 33-40. There are a number of bridges, the most

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notable being two of 50 ft. over the Litani, and two of 60 ft. over the Barada; these are girder bridges. There are five tunnels, but the length of the longest is not more than 400 yds.

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The ruling gradient is 1 in 80. After the 48th kilometre from Rayak there are several bridges, including two of three 20 ft. girders, and at the 98th km. there is a 50 ft. girder bridge. Further on there are two large bridges over the Orontes: one, near Telbise, has a central span of 80 ft. between two 30 ft. arches (while beyond it is a four-span girder bridge over a tributary stream); the other, at Hama, is 165 ft. long.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. The steepest gradient is 1 in 50, and the chief bridge that over the Orontes.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). There is a sharp curve at Ludd station, and others after Deir Aban. The steepest gradient is 1 in 62. Over the Wadi Surar there is a girder bridge of 50 ft. beyond Sayad, and two others of 100 ft., beyond Deir Aban.

3. Hejaz Railway.

(i) Damascus—Ma'an. There is insufficient ballast on several sections. Gradients of 1 in 45 occur, one coinciding with a sharp curve of 100 m. radius at the tunnel (154 yds. long) south of Amman, where derailments have taken place; there is also a sharp curved gradient after Khan Sebib (295 km.). The more important viaducts and bridges are: one of three 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Awaj, one of five 20 ft. arches after Deraa, two of six 20 ft. arches over Wadi Zerka (at 207 km. and 220 km.), the Amman viaduct of ten 25 ft. arches, one of six 20 ft. arches after Jise, four of six 25 ft. arches after Khan Sebib, and another similar one at 348 km.

(ii) Haifa—Deraa. There is a masonry bridge of six 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Mukatta, one of three 25 ft. arches over the Nazareth road, and one of six 40 ft. arches over the Jordan. From this point a long

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succession of bridges and tunnels occurs. There are thirteen bridges over the Yarmuk, the last, which has a central girder span of 165 ft. with three 40 ft. masonry arches on either side, being the longest. Of the seven tunnels, the longest is 300 yds. Between Haifa and Jasr Mejamie in the Jordan valley the ruling gradient is 1 in 70; east of that point the gradient varies between 1 in 40 and 1 in 55.

(iii) Afule—Ludd. The line follows an easy route in the plain, crossing a few water-courses and the Nahr el-Auja. Accurate details are not yet available.

(iv) Wadi Surar—El-Auja. There are a number of bridges, of which the largest are: one of ten arches at Wadi el-Abiad, one of 16 arches over Wadi Rakhama (36 km.), one of 19 arches at Um Dabkal (93 km.), and one of 15 arches at Arak el-Menshiya (116 km.).

4. British Strategic Railways. Details of the construction of these lines are not yet available.

(iii) *Relations to Government: Foreign and Other Concessions*

The only State-owned railway is the Hejaz system, which owes its inception to the Sultan Abdul Hamid; it has been built with funds subscribed by Mohammedans in Turkey and elsewhere, supplemented by taxation, and much of the labour was supplied by soldiers. Other lines have been built, under concessions, by private companies:—

1. Baghdad Railway (German). The concession for the Syrian sections is for 99 years from 1908.

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. A concession for the Damascus—Mzerib section was originally given to a Belgian company, and another for a line from Beirut to Damascus to a French company; in 1892 these companies amalgamated, and the concession for the whole was fixed at 99 years from 1891.

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(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The concession is for 99 years from 1893.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. This concession (granted in 1908) runs concurrently with the last, and includes a service of lighters in the port of El-Mina. The Government has the right to half the gross receipts above 15,000 frs. per km. from the 46th to the 50th year of the concession, and subsequently to half those above 18,600 frs.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The concession is for 71 years from 1888.

2. (*c*) Tramways Libanais. The concession is for 99 years from 1891, with provision for prolongation of the line northwards to Tripoli and southwards to Saida.

(iv) *Finance*

1. Bagndad Railway.—The company has a capital of 15,000,000 frs. only, the building expenses having been met by the State, which issued 4 per cent. bonds to the company at the rate of 269,110 frs. per km.; and there is a kilometric guarantee of 4,500 frs. for working expenses. If the gross receipts exceed this latter sum, the difference up to 5,500 frs. goes to the Government, and 60 per cent. of any further excess. No separate statistics for the Syrian sections of the line have been issued. In 1915 the total gross receipts were 10,443,553 frs., and 5,900,912 frs. were paid to the Government on account of receipts above the guarantee, but no dividend was declared; from 1906-13 there was a dividend of 5 per cent. The Government has a right of purchase at any time.[1]

2. (*a*) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama. The capital of this company, behind which is the Paris Régie Générale des Chemins de fer, consists of 107,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, issued since the reconstruction of 1901, on which interest has regularly been paid; 60,000,000 frs. in 3 per cent. old debentures, taken over by the Imperial

[1] See also *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, pp. 45-48.

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Ottoman Bank, on which for the years 1907-1911 slightly under 3 per cent. *per annum* was paid; and 15,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which received in the same period only a little over 1 per cent. *per annum*. Only the Rayak-Aleppo line has a kilometric guarantee, finally fixed at 13,600 frs., which in 1911 cost the Government over 1,800,000 frs. In 1905 the company received £T150,000 in State bonds as compensation for loss entailed by the competition of the Hejaz Railway, whose line from Damascus to Deraa runs parallel with the French line to Mzerib.

The traffic returns show that while the Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line is the most lucrative, the Rayak—Aleppo line has progressed more steadily.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line.

Year.		Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907	...	4,171,991	16,891
1908	...	4,704,744	19,048
1909	...	4,619,333	18,701
1910	...	4,578,055	18,585
1911	...	4,350,436	17,458

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo line.

Year.		Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907	...	1,804,648	5,436
1908	...	2,110,000	6,355
1909	...	2,284,610	6,881
1910	...	2,627,234	7,913
1911	...	2,678,625	8,063

(iii) Tripoli—Homs line. For the seven months of 1911 during which the line was working the gross receipts were 627,757 frs.; at this rate the receipts for the whole year would be 10,550 frs. pr km.

2. (*b*) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The capital of the company consists of 286,000 frs. in old debentures redeemable without interest by 1949; 9,512,000 frs. in new 5 per cent.

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debentures, to which 95 per cent. of the net revenue is assigned; and 4,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares (all in units of 500 frs.). Since the reconstruction in 1894 the gross receipts have risen steadily, and in 1908 the full dividend of 5 per cent. tax free on the new debentures was paid, but the return to shareholders was still under 1 per cent.

Year.	Gross receipts in frs.	Receipts per km. in frs.
1907 ...	1,120,609	12,881
1908 ...	1,120,690	12,882
1909 ...	1,211,079	13,920
1910 ...	1,368,423 (approx.)	15,729
1911 ...	1,388,755	15,963

Receipts are largely derived from passenger traffic, which is at its height in March and April. Of the goods traffic over 80 per cent. is in the direction of Jerusalem, whence there is little export. The competition of camel transport is assisted by the inconvenient position of the railway stations both at Jaffa and Jerusalem.

2. (*c*) Tramways Libanais. The capital is 2,400,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, interest on which has been paid, and 3,600,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which have hitherto received no dividend. Statistics of the traffic of this line are not published.

3. Hejaz Railway.—Being Government property, this system is independent of interest-bearing capital.

Year.	Gross receipts in £T.	Receipts per km. in £T.
1911-12 ...	282,868	193
1912-13 ...	297,976	198

Working expenses for the year 1912-13 were £T 251,702. These figures include the extra-Syrian section from Ma'an to Medina. Receipts have depended on passengers rather than on goods. The most profitable portion of the line is that from Haifa to Deraa, but no separate statistics are available.

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(v) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Expansion*

Syria is now comparatively well provided with railways, though the use of two gauges is unfortunate. A line traverses the interior of the country from north to south, forking at Deraa into two branches, one running east of the Jordan, while the other, with its feeders, serves the region west of that river. The chief ports, Beirut, Alexandretta, Haifa, Jaffa, Tripoli, are linked with the internal railway, and the main inland centres of commerce and industry have been given communication by rail with the sea. Some projected extensions would further improve the system.

On the Baghdad Railway branches are designed to Aintab and Birejik; a branch *viâ* Killis to Aintab, which is a flourishing industrial town, is especially desirable.

A proposal put forward in 1909 by the Ministry of Public Works included a line from Rayak to El-Arish *via* Afule. A line has now been built from Afule southwards, but the extension north to Rayak remains to be constructed; it would traverse a fertile region, and serve the considerable town of Safed.

In 1908 the administration of the Hejaz Railway was authorised to build a line from Afule to Jerusalem. There is continuous railway communication between these places, and though the route might be greatly shortened by building a line from Nablus to Jerusalem, it is doubtful whether such an undertaking is sufficiently needed to justify the labour and expense. Connected with this plan is one for a branch from Jerusalem to Ma'an by Jericho and Es-Salt, which would give access to a somewhat isolated district, and in particular facilitate the exploitation of the large phosphate area about Es-Salt (*cf.* p. 111). It has also been proposed to extend the Deraa—Bosra branch to Salchat and then carry it northwards through the Druse country to join the main line again at El-Mismije.

The line of the Tramways Libanais (Beirut—Mameltein—Jebeil) was planned to connect Tripoli and Saida.

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In 1913 the extension to Jebeil was taken in hand; and the completion of the programme should be beneficial, and not unremunerative in this populous district.

The project of connecting the Palestinian and Egyptian railways has lately been realised by the construction of the military line from El-Kantara to Gaza. A proposed branch of the Hejaz Railway, connecting Ma'an and Akaba, might prove of some economic importance, provided that political and military considerations permitted its construction.

The question of the line advocated by Sir W. Willcocks across the Syrian desert to Mesopotamia becomes important in view of recent events. The best route seems to be Tripoli—Homs—Tadmur, whence the line might be carried along the regular caravan track to Deir ez-Zor (190 km.), or strike more directly east to Abu Kemal (245 km.), a route on which, however, water is scarcer. By the former, the total length (passing directly from Ana to Baghdad, and avoiding Hit) would be 916 km., of which 814 would be new; by the latter 830 km., 728 being new. The Tripoli—Homs line has comparatively easy gradients and good alignment, and is further commended by its standard gauge. The railways to Damascus from Beirut and Haifa are narrow-gauge; the Beirut line is, moreover, handicapped by its rack-rail section, and the port is already too small for the traffic, while against the Haifa—Damascus route there is the greater distance. A line from Alexandretta to Aleppo *via* Beilan would be very costly.

Apart from the projects described above, further development in suitable localities by minor branch lines, which would obviate expensive camel transport, is desirable (*cf.*, however, p. 85, note).

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, Telephones*

The foreign post offices, which were maintained in several centres by each of the six Powers, were formally abolished by the Government in 1914. Turkish post offices are of three kinds: (1) international, from which

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telegrams can be sent in a European language (not cypher); (2) native, at which only Turkish or Arabic telegrams are accepted; and (3) postal stations without telegraphic connection. Offices of the first two classes are fairly numerous, and postal facilities now extend to all the more important towns. The following places have international offices: Aintab, Akka, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Antakia, Baabda, Beirut, Beit ed-Din, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Hasbeya, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Kuneitra, Latakia, El-Merkez, El-Mina (Tripoli), Nazareth, Safed, Saida, Tiberias.

Syria has no public telephones; short lines have been installed in some towns for official use.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

(i) *Accommodation, &c.*

In general, westerly winds predominate on the coast. From April to October land and sea breezes prevail, but in April and May hot south-east winds are liable to occur. Gales begin in November, and are frequent in January and February, generally starting from south or south-east and veering to south-west or to north-west, when they may become very violent. The current generally sets north; its rate, even when helped by wind, is rarely over one mile an hour. There is no variation of tide at ports north of Jaffa, though here spring tides rise 1½ ft.

The only adequately constructed port is that of *Beirut*, built at a cost of 12,500,000 frs. by a French company, which has a concession for 99 years from 1887. Its management since 1903 has been in the hands of the Régie Générale des Chemins de fer (*cf.* p. 74). In 1909 the revenue was 1,038,695 frs. gross, 210,835 frs. net. The capital consists of 6,000,000 frs. in shares and 7,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures: the former received a first dividend of 1 per cent. in 1904, and this rose gradually to 3½ per cent. in 1913. The

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harbour, which is about fifty acres in extent, lies between two moles, the width at the entrance being about 160 yds. and the depth seven fathoms, decreasing to one fathom by the quays. The railway runs on to the main quay. Four electric cranes of five tons capacity have lately been set up, and Beirut alone of Syrian ports possesses proper warehouse accommodation. There are two coaling wharves, the outer one about 150 yds. in length, with a depth of 17-25 ft. of water alongside, the inner about 100 yds., with 6 ft. of water. Nearly all steam vessels enter the harbour when they can find room, but the port is too small, as well as too shallow, for modern requirements. The anchorage outside is open from west to north, and strong westerly gales are frequent from November to March; but ships are comparatively safe above the mouth of the Nahr Beirut, just east of the town, where there is a tough mud bottom.

The six other ports which are regularly visited by steamers—Alexandretta, El-Mina (Tripoli), Haifa, Jaffa, Latakia, Saida—are at present open roadsteads without artificial protection. ***Alexandretta*** (Iskanderun), at the south-east corner of the gulf which bears its name, has the safest anchorage on the whole Syrian coast. Winds, indeed, are extremely variable here, but there is shelter from all except those from the north, which in January and February sometimes delay landing for a few hours. The bottom is generally mud. There are some fairly good storehouses and several small piers for loading and discharging cargo, which has to be done by means of lighters; the Custom House pier, 120 yds. long and 9 yds. broad, with a steam crane of $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons, has only 5 ft. of water at the end. The projected harbour works were begun in 1912 by the Baghdad Railway Company, but so far have made little progress. The town is handicapped by the prevalence of malaria in summer, and seems unlikely to grow greatly in importance except as a port of transit.

El-Mina, the port of Tripoli (Tarabolus), is protected to some extent on the west by a chain of low rocks and

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little islands which runs north-west for some distance from the promontory. Between two of the islands a channel nearly half a mile broad and at least six fathoms deep gives access to the bay from the west. The roadstead, however, lies open to the north, though when gales blow from that quarter an anchorage south-west of the promontory may be utilised. Boats of 5 ft. draught can discharge at one of the moles, except in a strong north wind. There is a coal wharf 120 ft. in length, with 6 ft. of water alongside. Warehouse accommodation, as usual, is defective. Surveys for projected harbour works have been made.

Haifa lies on the south-west shore of the sandy bay at Akka, which is well protected on that side by Mount Carmel, and affords a safe anchorage in summer. The railway pier extends about 380 yds., and has a width of about 50 yds., with a depth of 12 ft. of water at the end; it is supplied with two cranes, the larger lifting two tons. There was no coal wharf in 1914, though large stocks of coal were imported for the Hejaz Railway.

At *Jaffa* the harbour lies between a sea wall on the north side of the town and a fringe of low rocks, the width ranging from 50 to 100 yds., and the depth from 3 to 7 ft. It is provided with a short wharf and jetty. The best anchorage is in seven to nine fathoms, sand, about half a mile off the rocks, but ships lying there are much incommoded by westerly winds, which are accompanied by a heavy swell and a northerly current of 1-1½ miles an hour. They have sometimes to proceed to Haifa in order to land passengers. Jaffa is subject to malaria, especially in autumn.

The ancient port of *Latakia* is choked with sand, and useless except for coasting vessels; others anchor outside in the open about a mile off shore on a sandy bottom.

At *Saida* (Sidon) the anchorage, on a sandy bottom, has some natural protection from west and south-west winds, a narrow island a quarter of a mile in length lying off the ancient port, which is sanded up and can shelter only a few small coasting vessels.

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Besides the places mentioned there are several minor stations, of which two, *Akka* (Acre) and *Gaza*, receive a few calls from steamers in the harvest season. From Akka the coast trends for three miles south-east from the peninsula on which the town stands. Large vessels anchor about a mile out in 9-10 fathoms, smaller vessels in 5-6 fathoms, sandy bottom. Gaza is separated from the coast by two miles of drifting sand. Vessels anchor about a mile out to receive cargoes, but owing to the exposed position and a persistent heavy swell from the west loading is often a tedious process. Suedia, Banias, Tartus, Jebel, Yunie, Nebi Yunus, Es-Sur (Tyre), and Kaisarie (Caesarea) are small places with a certain amount of coastal traffic, conducted for the most part by sailing vessels. Late in 1913 official sanction was obtained for opening Yunie and Nebi Yunus, on the Lebanon coast, to steamers.

(ii) *Volume and Distribution of Trade.*

Tables showing the tonnage of steamships engaging in foreign trade at various Syrian ports from 1910 to 1913 are printed in the Appendix (Table I). In estimating the total volume of foreign shipping engaged in the Syrian trade, it must, of course, be remembered that many vessels call at several Syrian ports on the same voyage, and are consequently included in the returns of each of these ports.

Beirut, which since the loss of Salonika has been the third port of the Turkish Empire, has a rich hinterland in the Lebanon, the Buka'a, and Damascus, with which it is connected by railway, and is the principal distributing centre of foreign manufactured goods, especially the large textile imports from England. It is also the chief coaling station on this coast, and plays a leading part in the silk export to France. This prominent and well-established position may be impaired when the harbour works designed for Alexandretta and Haifa, both of which have now obtained railway communications with the interior, have been provided. A certain amount of the traffic with the Aleppo district

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has already been diverted to Tripoli by the railway thence to Homs, which reduced the distance by rail to the sea by over 100 miles, besides obviating the reloading necessitated by the change of gauge at Rayak. The new branch from Alexandretta to Toprak Kale will make Alexandretta a still more attractive alternative for trade with Aleppo. The competition of Haifa with Beirut for the Damascus market is already felt.

Alexandretta is clearly marked out by nature as the harbour *par excellence* of northern Syria. It has long been the principal port of Aleppo, with which it is connected by a much-frequented road, and also of a wide district to the north and east, and an increasing trade with this region seems now assured by the branch of the Baghdad Railway connecting Alexandretta with the main line. Copper from Arghana, in Kurdistan, was already exported through Alexandretta to Belgium, and among the other exports were large numbers of sheep and cattle, principally for Egypt, from the Euphrates district and beyond, liquorice for the United States, silk from the Antioch district for France, native fabrics for Egypt and Turkey, Aintab leather for Egypt and Tunis, and pistachio nuts from Aleppo and Aintab for England, Turkey, and Egypt.

From *Tripoli* an easy route skirts the Lebanon in a north-easterly direction, and is now followed by the railway to Homs. Though, as already remarked, the advantage temporarily secured by this railway in regard to Aleppo has passed to Alexandretta, Tripoli remains the gate of the rich Homs-Hama district. Silk and eggs for France, native fabrics and soap for Egypt and Turkey, oranges for Turkey and Russia, and wool for the United States, England, and Italy are the principal exports.

Haifa, which in 1906 became the Mediterranean port of the Hejaz Railway, is likely to rise rapidly in importance when once supplied with an adequate harbour. It has a fertile hinterland in the plain of Esdraelon, the upper Jordan valley, and the Hauran, which the railway has now opened up, and considerable

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quantities of grain and sesame go this way, especially to Marseilles. Haifa has begun to attract imports for Damascus as well as for Arabia, and may well play the part in southern Syria that seems destined for Alexandretta in the north. It is now connected by rail with Jerusalem, from which, however, it is twice as far as Jaffa.

Jaffa, in spite of the disadvantages of its harbour, has a large export and import trade, being not only the centre of a fertile district, which produces especially oranges, wine, and oil, but also the port of Jerusalem and the nearest regular port to Egypt, whither goes an appreciable part of the local produce. The bulk of the orange export, with some durra, goes to England.

Latakia and *Saida* are on much the same level, and serve only local needs. The former is best known for the black tobacco which it exports to England and Egypt. Saida, besides oranges, eggs, figs, &c., exports a little bitumen from Hasbaya, on the slopes of Hermon.

Of the minor ports, *Akka* and *Gaza* are visited by steamers after the harvest for the export of grain. Akka has no natural advantages compared with the adjacent Haifa, with which it is now connected by rail, and which is likely in future to handle the Hauran cereals, of which there has been some export *via* Akka in the past. Barley from Gaza is taken by England.

(iii) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.*

The inadequacy of the Syrian ports in their present condition has long been recognised, even Beirut being inconveniently small. Works at Alexandretta are, however, included in the concession of the Baghdad Railway Company, which began some operations there in 1912, while a French concession for harbours at Haifa, Tripoli, and Jaffa was agreed on in 1913, and arrangements for their construction at Haifa and Jaffa, at an estimated cost in each case of fifteen to twenty million francs, were in progress at the outbreak of war. Jaffa stands in especial need of some artificial protection for

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shipping. With these additions, and the provision of suitable warehouses, the country would be sufficiently well supplied, though minor improvements at the smaller places of call are no doubt desirable. The people of the Lebanon in particular are anxious for the development of the harbours on their littoral, and the French concession of 1913, already mentioned, provided that any new works at Yunie or Nebi Yunus should be granted to the Beirut Harbour Company.[1]

(b) *Shipping Lines*

Before the war Syrian ports would have enjoyed good sea communications if their harbours had been more adequate and quarantine on vessels from Egypt less frequent. The following lines have regular services and carry mails:—

Messageries Maritimes: from Marseilles (1) weekly to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut (on the return journey Jaffa only is visited once a fortnight); (2) fortnightly to Constantinople, Smyrna, Rhodes, Beirut, north as far as Mersina, thence to Larnaka (Cyprus), Jaffa, and Haifa, returning to Marseilles by Beirut, Smyrna, and Constantinople. The second of these services provided the most rapid service between Constantinople and Syria. The company has a subvention from the French Government.

Austrian Lloyd: weekly from Trieste to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Saida, Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, Alexandretta, Mersina, and back the same way. Subsidised by the Austrian Government.

Khedivial Mail Steamship Company: weekly from Alexandria to Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut and back, with fortnightly extension to Mersina, Smyrna, and Constantinople.

[1] The above remarks must be taken as referring to pre-war conditions. A good deal of uncertainty prevails regarding the present state of the country, but, in view of the reported depopulation of certain districts (see p. 87), existing facilities of communication might be expected to prove more than adequate for some time to come.

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The Società Marittima Italiana and the Società Italiana di Servizi Marittimi both maintain fortnightly services from Genoa or Venice to Alexandria, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Alexandretta, Mersina, and from Venice to Beirut by Rhodes or the Piraeus.

Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company: weekly from Odessa to Constantinople, Smyrna, Mersina, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa, and Egypt. Many pilgrims from Russia come this way.

The recurrence of Alexandria in these services is noticeable. That port, moreover, receives the bulk of the British exports to Syria, which are sent from Liverpool or Manchester, and reshipped from Alexandria to their destination.

Besides these mail steamers, numerous merchant vessels call more or less frequently, those of the Rumanian Service Maritime, the Deutsche Levante Linie, and the Bulgarian Varna Company sometimes taking passengers as well as cargo. Among British lines are the Prince, Moss, Ellerman, Asia Minor Steamship Company, and Westcott and Laurance; the Orient is Belgian, with British boats. A "conference" or syndicate, including the Prince Line, Westcott and Laurance, the Deutsche Levante Linie, the German Atlas Linie, the Belgian Armement Adolf Deppe, and the Royal Netherlands Line, with sailings from London, Antwerp, and the chief German and Dutch ports, was established for the unification of freights and the exclusion of competition. A curious feature of this combine was that goods for Syria of German origin enjoyed cheaper rates than those of other countries. Ottoman shipping, apart from the small sailing vessels engaged in the coasting trade, has much decreased since 1911.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication Abroad*

There is no direct cable between Syria and Europe. Foreign telegrams may go either by Constantinople or by Egypt through the Eastern Telegraph Company. A

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submarine cable connected Latakia with Agios Theodoros, in Cyprus. All the chief ports (including Akka and Gaza) have "international" telegraph stations (*cf.* p. 79).

Except at the German sanatorium on the Mount of Olives, there were no wireless installations before the war, but other stations have since been established, at any rate at Hebron, Ramle, and Damascus, and no doubt at Aleppo.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

(a) *Supply of Labour*

Syria as a whole is thinly populated (*cf.* p. 16), and the supply of labour is not generally abundant, though certain districts are, no doubt, better off than others. The Lebanon especially, in spite of a large emigration (*cf.* p. 17), was comparatively well peopled before the war, and the bulk of the population being Christian, male labour could be supplemented by that of women, which was an important factor in the silk industry; it is, however, not usual for women to continue work of this kind after marriage. Again, in some parts of Palestine the labour supply has been appreciably increased by Jewish immigration. A United States consular report of 1909-10 goes so far as to assert that in the south the abundance and cheapness of labour formed an obstacle to the introduction of agricultural machinery. This, however, can certainly not be said of the country at large, where scarcity of labour is a common complaint, and machinery is usually regarded as the remedy. During the war the situation has undergone a change. The countryside has been drained of men of military age, some of whom will, of course, not return; and the population has been further thinned by famine and disease. The Lebanon especially has suffered severely, being reported to have lost from half

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to three-quarters of its inhabitants. On the other hand, there has been some accession in northern Syria of Armenian refugees, of whom some 40,000 are stated to have been drafted into the Aleppo vilayet. These may relieve the scarcity of labour which has hampered the textile industry of Aleppo. It is possible, too, that war conditions may to some extent break down the Mussulman prejudice against female labour. The mortality among beasts of draught and burden—a serious matter for both agriculture and trade—has been noted above, p. 68.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

According to a law of 1916, all labourers in factories having a capital of £T 100 or over, and workers enough to make 750 working days a year, must be Turkish subjects. Another recent enactment enables the State to demand labour at will. Four days' work annually (or a money payment in lieu of work) for road-making was previously incumbent on male subjects between the ages of 18 and 60.

As noted below (p. 99), peasant proprietorship has declined, and no small proportion of the fellahin are now insecure metayer tenants of large landholders. A certain number also work for a daily wage. In Palestine, for instance, on the land of the Jewish colonists, both Jews and Arabs find employment, commonly earning from one to two francs a day. This may be regarded as an average wage for agricultural labour. In the Lebanon, to take another example, during the olive-gathering season, 6 or 7 piastres are paid for men, and about half that amount for women and children; but lower rates are found elsewhere, and payment is sometimes made in kind at the rate of about 1/13 (7-8 per cent.) of the quantity gathered. In other industries also wages are low judged by European standards, grown men, unless specially skilled, seldom earning more than about two francs a

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day, and often less (*cf.* p. 113), while the scale for female and child labour is considerably lower. In the factories little attention has hitherto been paid to hygiene; in particular the unhealthy conditions prevailing in some of the Lebanese silk-spinning establishments, where young girls work for long hours in steamy and ill-ventilated rooms, have been the subject of criticism. Attempts at improvement have lately been made in some instances.

(2) Agriculture

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its wealth is derived almost wholly from the cultivation of the soil, and the bulk of the population is engaged in raising produce of various kinds or in keeping and breeding domestic animals. The extent of the cultivated area is not accurately known. Official figures for the year 1915 give to cultivation in the vilayet of Damascus, exclusive of natural pastures and forests, 15,710,481 *donum* (14,438 sq. km.),[1] and in the Lebanon 435,200 *donum* (400 sq. km.), *i.e.*, about 16 per cent. and 12 per cent. respectively of the total areas. In the vilayet of Aleppo and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem the proportion is probably somewhat smaller, in the vilayet of Beirut somewhat higher, and the total area normally under crops may be put roughly at from 20,000 to 24,000 sq. km., or from 10 per cent. to 12 per cent. of the whole. This is no doubt capable of appreciable extension, even if the ancient limits cannot be reached. The theory of a considerable alteration of climate in the historical period is, indeed, now commonly discredited, but, on the other hand, the facts are not easily explained without supposing some decrease of moisture in these regions. Drought is the chief danger to the harvest. Much depends on equable distribution

[1] Reckoning the *donum* as 919 sq. metres, or 1,088 to 1 sq. km. The exact value of the *donum* in Syria is said to be 919:3024 sq. metres, or about 227 acres.

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of rainfall during the winter season, and a failure of the late rain in March and April makes a great difference to the wheat crop. Damage from frost or hail is rare (*cf.*, however, p. 93, note), but locusts may be very injurious. The Italian locust has been persistent of late in the Aleppo vilayet, and Sudanese locusts have occasionally appeared in great numbers, causing serious loss, for instance, in 1915.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products. Owing to its geological complexity, and the great diversity of its climate, which ranges from tropical heat in the Jordan valley to a temperature on the upper slopes of the mountains compatible with perennial snow, Syria has a rich variety of vegetable products. Cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees are produced in profusion; tobacco, cotton, and hemp are successfully cultivated; and there are some wild-growing plants of value.

Cereals. Of these the chief is wheat, to which is devoted nearly half the area under grain, the total crop in the average year being estimated at upwards of a million tons. It is sown in December-January, and harvested between the end of May and the beginning of July. The principal wheat districts are the upland plains east of the Jordan, especially the Hauran, and the Buka'a (Coele-Syria), and, in the west, the plain of Esdraelon. Several varieties are grown, that of the Hauran being the most esteemed.

Barley is cultivated on about 30 per cent. of the cereal area, and the normal crop is some 500,000 tons, much of which is grown in the Homs-Hama district, and about Gaza and Bir es-Seba. Gaza barley ripens as early as the end of April, and is much appreciated by English brewers, but the crop is uncertain, and the amount available for export varies greatly. Barley is largely used locally for feeding animals.

Durra (Indian millet), which is sown in March-April, and harvested five months later, yields about

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200,000 tons. The bulk is used for bread by the poorer classes, small quantities only being exported.

Maize is grown in the plains of Damascus, the Hauran, &c., but is of minor importance, as are oats and rye, which are only raised in small quantities by the foreign colonists.

Sesame, from which oil is produced, is one of the most valuable crops, fetching as much as £16 a ton, but it needs much labour and is very uncertain; consequently it is not much in favour except as a preparatory for wheat. It is grown chiefly on the coastal plain and in the Homs-Hama district, the annual yield being about 30,000 tons, of which a third or so is exported.

Rice, which requires a swampy soil, is grown in small quantities in the north of the Aleppo vilayet and in the upper Jordan valley (Jaulan district). Its cultivation is subject to Government restriction.

Leguminous plants, including chickpeas, lentils, beans, vetches, and lupins, are largely cultivated. Chickpeas are sown in February, the others earlier, and harvest time extends from April to July. The total crop may be estimated at about 500,000 tons, and chickpeas and lupins are exported in appreciable quantities. The latter are sometimes grown merely as a manure. Lucern and clover are grown for fodder, especially in the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo.

Vegetables, which are for the most part consumed locally, include potatoes, turnips, onions, melons, marrows, aubergines (egg plants), tomatoes, carrots, garlic, cabbages, cauliflowers, artichokes, and asparagus. Potatoes, which fetch £4 5s. the ton, are not much grown except in the Damascus and Aleppo districts: an obstacle to their wider cultivation is the fact that they ripen early and do not keep through the hot weather till the next sowing time, so that seed-potatoes must be imported afresh every year. The combined yield of potatoes and turnips amounts to about 200,000 tons. Melons grow best on the coastal plain

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between Jaffa and Haifa, whence they are sent in large numbers to Constantinople and Egypt in the autumn. There is also some export of onions from Tripoli and Latakia. Experiments recently made with sugar-beet by Jewish colonists are said to have given satisfactory results.

Other crops. Tobacco. The Beirut vilayet and the Lebanon are the chief tobacco-growing districts, smaller amounts being produced also in the vilayets of Aleppo (at Aintab and Killis) and Damascus. According to official statistics the area under tobacco in the departmental districts of Latakia, Aleppo, and Beirut with Damascus, in the year 1911-12 was 20,203 *donum* (about 18·5 sq. km., 4,652 acres), and the produce 1,310,000 kg.; in the following year the production was larger, the export from Latakia alone amounting to 1,323,944 kg. The Latakia smoke-dried tobacco is practically all exported, about 90 per cent. going to England. There is also an export to Egypt both of the ordinary tobacco and of *tombac*, a variety used in the *nargileh* or hookah, and grown mainly about Latakia. The total value of the tobacco crop, which is subject to official restriction, is put at about five million francs.

Cotton was extensively cultivated during the American Civil War, but subsequently died out along the coast, and in central and southern Syria it has reappeared only in the last ten years. The neighbourhoods of Latakia, Akka, Tiberias, and Nablus, and the valleys of Esdraelon and the Buka'a now produce some 1,000 tons, and approximately twice that amount is grown in the Aleppo vilayet (chiefly about Edlib, Dana, Killis, and Aintab), where heavy dews make artificial irrigation unnecessary.

Hemp, the annual crop of which was estimated in 1911 at about 1,300 tons, is grown chiefly in the Barada valley (Damascus), and to a less extent in the Euphrates district of the Aleppo vilayet. The best fibres are exported, and the rest used in the factories of Damascus.

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Sugar-cane can be grown on the coast and in the Jordan valley, but needs profuse irrigation, and is only cultivated in small quantities for chewing.

Other minor crops are carraway seed, fennel, and aniseed, the first of which is grown about Tripoli, the other two in the neighbourhood of Damascus. Aniseed, of which about 500 tons are raised, is used locally for flavouring arrack, and there is some export, as of carraway seed and fennel, to Egypt.

Fruit trees. Four of these, the olive, vine, mulberry, and orange, are of special importance.

Olive trees may be seen all over the country, but the largest groves are in the Lebanon, and about Beirut, Tripoli, Akka, Nablus, Safed, Ludd, Antioch, Edlib, Killis,[1] Aintab. The tree, which is comparatively hardy, growing on the poorest soil and requiring little attention, comes into bearing between its eighth and twelfth years, but usually yields a good crop (10-20 *okes*[2]) only in alternate years. It attains a great age. Olives are gathered green in September for eating, but hang till about the end of October when intended for oil-making. The total number of trees in the country before the war may be estimated, from official and semi-official statistics, at upwards of 10 million, producing 125,000,000 *okes* (about 158,000 tons) to the value of about 30,000,000 frs. During the last three years, however, the number has been much reduced, many trees having been cut down for fuel for the railways, &c.; as many as a third are stated to have been sacrificed in this way.

Vines are also very widely cultivated. Official and semi-official figures of 1910 and 1913 give the grape-producing area as 887,227 *donum* (nearly 815·5 sq. km.), with an output of 250,268,150 *okes*, exclusive of the Lebanon, for which another 30,000 *donum* (over

[1] Many trees in this neighbourhood were destroyed by frost some years ago.

[2] The *oke* (*okka*) is reckoned at 1·282 kg. or 792·5 to the English ton.

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27·5 sq. km.) and 20,000,000 *okes* may be added, raising the total production to some 345,000 tons. Of this a certain proportion is dried or converted into wine or spirits, but the bulk is consumed fresh on the spot. The vintage begins in July at Gaza and Jericho, the period varying elsewhere with the climate and the kind of grapes. Phylloxera, which has made its appearance during the last twenty years, has been successfully met by the introduction of American vines.

The white mulberry is largely cultivated in northern Syria on the coastal plain between Saida and Antioch (Antakia), the lower mountain slopes, and in the Buka'a, for feeding silkworms; the black mulberry is also grown to some extent for its fruit. The tree thrives in both heavy and sandy soil (the latter being said to produce the most suitable leaves), arriving at maturity in 15-25 years, and living for 80-100. In regular plantations other crops—vegetables, grain, or tobacco—are often placed between the rows. The young silkworms are hatched in April and May, and their feeding, which is largely carried on by women and children, lasts for about five weeks. Subsequently the leaves are used for fodder. The area devoted to mulberry trees in 1914 may be put at about 310,000 *donum* (285·5 sq. km.), with a production of fresh cocoons of about 6,600,000 kg. Owing to decreasing profits due to the competition of Chinese and Japanese silk, there has been a tendency in recent years to replace mulberries by oranges or tobacco; and during the war, which has closed the French market, there has been a great decline. In the Lebanon, which is the centre of the silk industry, the production in 1915 is stated to have been not above half the normal, in 1916 not above a third; and many mulberry-trees are said to have been felled.

The cultivation of oranges and lemons, especially the former, has made great strides in the last two decades, though, owing to the need of summer irrigation, it is limited to districts where water is readily accessible, *e.g.*, the neighbourhood of rivers and the plains

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between Gaza and Haifa. The bulk of the orange plantations are in the vilayet of Beirut and the mutessarifik of Jerusalem, the Jaffa district being especially important; the chief lemon groves are about Saida. Official statistics make the area under oranges and lemons in Beirut 26,430 *donum* (about 24·3 sq. km.), and the weight of fruit 21,078,000 *okes* (about 26,680 tons). There are no corresponding figures for the Jerusalem province, but the area under cultivation must be at least as large, and the weight produced is probably considerably greater. The Aleppo vilayet is comparatively unimportant in this respect. Large quantities, to the value of about 8,000,000 frs., representing perhaps half the total crop, are exported, especially oranges from Jaffa. During the war the plantations have suffered severely, particularly in the Jaffa neighbourhood, partly from locusts, but still more from the failure of irrigation. Fortunately, orange-trees mature quickly, and the groves could be restored within a few years.

Of other cultivated fruit trees, statistics are available only for the Aleppo vilayet, where in 1914 there were reckoned to be 1,314,520 fig trees, yielding 34,038,780 *okes* (43,080 tons); 289,021 apple trees, yielding 911,250 *okes* (1,153 tons); 105,350 pistachio trees, yielding 811,125 *okes* (1,026 tons); and smaller numbers of pear, peach, apricot, pomegranate, black mulberry, almond, and walnut trees. Other trees which occur are quince, plum, cherry, hazelnut (especially about Hama and Damascus), and carob, while in the Jordan valley grow date palms, bananas, and cactus figs. The carob-fruit (known as locusts) is partly exported for spirit manufacture, partly converted into syrup for home consumption. The chief fruit crops are apricots, especially about Damascus, where quantities are dried or made into paste, figs, of which a few are dried and exported, pomegranates, pistachios, almonds, and walnuts. Pistachios, which are cultivated in the vilayet of Aleppo, were exported in 1912

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to the value of 1,500,000 frs., representing, perhaps, about half the crop; the crop of walnuts, grown chiefly in the Damascus district, averages about 4,000 tons, with a value of about 1,000,000 frs.; while the almond crop, a considerable part of which comes from the Jewish colonies, is worth approximately the same amount. Some dates are also exported. The total value of the average yield of the fruit trees must reach 10,000,000 frs.

The preservation of the fruit is for the most part done by the actual growers. Olives, green and black, are preserved in salt water, especially at Damascus, where a species, large in size but of low oil-producing capacity, is grown. From three to four million *okes* are prepared annually.

Apricot preserving is another speciality of Damascus and the neighbourhood, where this fruit is largely cultivated. It is both dried whole and made into a paste, the kernels being also an article of export. In 1909, the annual production of dried apricots was put at 500-700 tons, and of the paste at 3,000-4,000 tons, and it has tended to increase. Some of the paste is exported to Rumania, and both the paste and the dried fruit go to Egypt and all parts of Turkey. Apricots and other fruits are also preserved with sugar at Damascus, and "Turkish Delight" is made there in considerable quantities. The annual value of these various products, including apricot kernels, is estimated at four to five million francs.

Dried figs are produced at Antioch and about Saida, but the industry is not large. They are not usually prepared like Smyrna figs, but are compressed into a solid mass.

Sultanas are produced chiefly in the vilayet of Aleppo, and about Damascus, Es-Salt (from which the word sultana is sometimes derived), Zahle in the Lebanon, and Hebron. The small grapes are moistened with olive oil, and then dried over hot ashes and afterwards in the sun. In 1914, the production of the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo was about 11,000,000

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okes. Large quantities of grapes are also converted into a kind of honey. In the vilayet of Damascus over 33,000,000 *okes*, in that of Aleppo over 14,000,000 *okes* were so used in 1914.

Of the *wild produce*, much the most valuable is the liquorice root, which grows abundantly in the Aleppo vilayet, particularly in the upper Euphrates region and about Antioch. The greater part of the root collected goes to the United States; in 1908 the amount was over 20,000 tons, to the value of £158,510, these being the highest figures in recent years. In the north-eastern districts there is also a considerable production of gall-nuts, valonia, yellow berries (buckthorn), gum-tragacanth, and scammony, though much of what passes through Aleppo and Alexandretta in these kinds comes from beyond Syrian borders. Colocynth grows in the sandy region of Gaza and Bir es-Seba, and about 1,500 tons are exported annually, chiefly to Germany. The papyrus of Lake Hule (Merom) is made into mats by the Arabs of the district. Gum-arabic is obtained from the acacias to the east of the Dead Sea.

Animals and Animal Products.—The quadrupeds kept are horses, donkeys, mules, camels, buffaloes, kine, sheep, goats, and pigs. The horses in ordinary use are of very fair quality, but pedigree animals are not often seen now, even among the Beduin. Donkeys and camels are the usual beasts of burden, and are found everywhere; they are sometimes used by the fellahin in place of oxen for ploughing. Donkeys are of two kinds, the common sort and the large white Arabian variety, which commands a higher price. Camels are usually bought from the Beduin of the desert, and not home-bred. The best cows are those of Damascus and the Lebanon, the Damascus (Egyptian) variety being the richer in milk; there is also a useful cross between the two. Those found elsewhere are as a rule small and ill-favoured, and give little milk except in the spring. Buffaloes are confined to swampy districts. Sheep, which are mostly fat-tailed, are especially important; besides those bred in the country many come in from

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the north and east, the great centre of distribution being Aleppo. Goats also are kept in large numbers, and the Angora goat occurs occasionally in northern Syria. A few pigs are found in Christian villages. Trustworthy statistics of the numbers of these various animals in the whole country are not to be had. Figures for 1914-15 gave, for the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus, 190,130 horses, mules, and donkeys; 299,325 cattle, including buffaloes; 3,614,976 sheep and goats; and 150,402 camels. On the basis of these returns and of incomplete semi-official statistics for 1909-10, the total number in 1914 of horses, mules, and donkeys may be put roughly at 270,000; of cattle at 500,000; of sheep and goats at 4,800,000; of camels at 200,000; with a combined value of about 265,000,000 frs. These numbers, however, have certainly been much reduced during the war, which has made especially heavy demands on transport animals.

In the vilayet of Damascus and the Lebanon, where fodder is plentiful, milk and its products are obtained chiefly from cows, elsewhere from sheep and goats, which are the source of the large quantities of native butter (*ghi* or *semn*) brought by the nomadic tribes of the desert to Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. An extension of cow-keeping is hindered by the lack of fodder, the poverty of the fellahin, and their inability to co-operate or arrange for the disposal of their milk. Of sheep's wool there is a large production and a considerable export, to which the desert tribes make important contributions. Shearing takes place usually in May or June, the yield per sheep being about 3 kg. Lamb-skins are also exported, but other skins and hides are mostly absorbed by the home market. According to official statistics for 1914-15, the production in the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus of milk, butter, and cheese was 62,536,493 *okes* (79,160 tons); of wool and goats'-hair, 1,826,994 *okes* (2,312 tons); with 447,274 hides and skins. Altogether, including the increment in young, the annual value of the produce of the animals mentioned may be reckoned at about 80,000,000 frs.

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Fowls, turkeys, pigeons, and more rarely geese and ducks, are kept, especially in the vicinity of large towns, but nowhere on an extensive scale. The fowls and ducks, as usual in the East, are small and poor layers, and the industry generally, which might be highly profitable, especially as there is no tax on birds, is in a backward condition. Eggs are, however, exported to a considerable extent, chiefly by Beirut merchants, who buy them up through local agents. Prices *per* 100 range from 2-3 frs. in spring to 5-8 frs. in autumn.

Bee-keeping is carried on in a primitive fashion by the natives, especially in the mountain valleys, where flowers are plentiful. Much better results are obtained by colonists who use European hives.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

Although large proprietorship predominates (*cf.* p. 88), farming on a large scale is the exception. As a rule estates are let and sublet to peasant cultivators, the normal size of individual holdings being roughly reckoned as the extent that can be tilled by means of a pair of oxen, *i.e.*, 100-250 *donum* (about 23-57 acres), though smaller farms are common.

The cultivation of these modest holdings proceeds on methods which have changed little with the lapse of centuries. Crops on arable land fall into two classes, winter (wheat, barley, &c.) and summer (sesame, durra, &c.), but the same soil will not produce a double crop except where artificial irrigation is possible. Rotation of crops follows the two-field system, in which the main crop of wheat or barley is sown in alternate years only, the land, in the intermediate years, being either left fallow or put under a crop of different type, such as sesame, durra, leguminous plants or roots. Such rotation, though not providing for winter fodder, is adapted to the natural requirements of the soil, but needs to be supplemented by adequate manuring, the absence of which is the chief defect in native cultivation. Animal manure is unavailable in any large

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quantity, partly because the animals are mostly on pasture, partly owing to its use as fuel. Artificial manures, which have been proved by experiment to be beneficial and remunerative, are beyond the reach of the fellah, whose tenure, moreover, is not commonly such as to encourage him to sink any savings in the improvement of his land. The result is progressive impoverishment of the soil. No great importance is attached to the removal of stones, which do not hamper the native plough and sickle. On the hill-slopes, especially in the Lebanon and in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, terraces are often built to prevent the erosion of the thin layer of soil in the rainy season. This terrace-building descends from remote antiquity, and was much more highly elaborated in the past than now. Planting of trees is generally neglected, except in the immediate neighbourhood of towns and villages, and the more extensive plantations are generally owned by large proprietors or town capitalists. Here again development is hindered by poverty and the prevailing conditions of tenure. In the Lebanon, however, and about Damascus, tree culture is successfully carried on by small farmers, as also in the Jewish colonies.

The agricultural implements in common use are extremely primitive, though better adapted to local conditions than is often supposed. Ploughing must be completed as soon as possible after the first rains, and the light iron-tipped wooden plough does its work quickly, and is readily drawn by a pair of oxen, which are cheaper to keep than horses or mules; it penetrates only a few inches, but if the ground is to retain its moisture and to produce summer crops, this loosening of the upper layer is better than deep ploughing. Reaping with the sickle suits the stony soil, which in Syria is only too common. There is less to be said for the ox-drawn threshing sledge, which is wasteful. But it has the merit of cheapness, and is said to break up the hard straw well, while the time and labour involved in its use are of no great consequence to the native after his crops have been reaped. European machines and

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implements, which have been introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, can be employed advantageously in certain conditions, which, however, are by no means always present.

Owing largely to the exhaustion of the soil, productivity is comparatively low except in especially favoured districts. On the unmanured lands of the fellahin the yield of wheat may be reckoned at eight to tenfold; of barley, beans, lentils, and peas at ten to fifteenfold; of sesame at forty to fiftyfold; of durra at sixty to eightyfold. Under native cultivation a hectare (2½ acres) of land of best quality in the neighbourhood of Jaffa produces only about 1,540 kg. of wheat or 1,760 kg. of barley, though yields of 2,000 and 2,880 kg. respectively are obtained by the better methods of the Jewish colonists. A typical holding of 100 *donum* (23 acres) of medium quality cultivated with grain by a fellah and his wife gives in an average year a net income of about 750 frs., and this is not more than doubled on the best land; with the usual rent, the profit would be reduced by about 40 per cent. In the Jewish colonies of Galilee, where working expenses are heavier, the net income per hectare for grain cultivation is even lower than on the fellahin holdings, but much better results are obtained by German colonists near Jaffa, who supplement grain by production of milk, vegetables, and fruit. The relatively poor returns obtained from pure agriculture have led the colonists and others who can command the capital to turn to plantations of oranges, vines, and other fruit trees. On land of medium quality in the Jaffa district the net annual return per hectare of oranges is 557 frs., of almonds 267 frs., of apricots and peaches 196 frs., of olives 170 frs., and of vines 214 frs; the profit on these forms of cultivation works out at 10-11 per cent. on the capital outlay, and this may probably be reckoned as the average return on fruit-tree culture elsewhere in Syria.

Irrigation and drainage. In the hot dry months of summer irrigation is necessary for oranges, lemons,

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apples, pears, bananas, sugar-cane, hemp, cotton (in Palestine), and many vegetables (not, however, for water-melons, pumpkins, tomatoes, marrows, aubergines, or onions). It may be performed in three ways: (1) by leading water from rivers, as in the Damascus plains from the Barada and other streams, in the Buka'a from the Litani, and at Homs, Hama, and Antioch from the Orontes; (2) by raising water from wells by means of the ancient waterwheel worked by animals; (3) by mechanical pumping, either from rivers of which the bed is too deep for the first method, or from wells. Suction pumps driven by petrol or gas engines were introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, and have been spreading to the native cultivators; wind-motors are used at a number of stations on the Hejaz Railway, and by some German colonists. Irrigation from wells is practised chiefly in the coastal plain between Gaza and Haifa, where water is commonly found at about sea level, and wells rarely attain a depth of 50 metres. Recently much deeper excavation has been tried in higher localities; water is obtained from wells of over 90 metres on the spur of Mount Carmel, and has been reached by mechanical boring at twice that depth in Judaea. An elaborate riverside pumping station has been set up by a German company on the banks of the Auja, whence water is supplied to about 1,500 *donum* (340 acres) of land at the Jewish colony of Petach Tikwa. A more extended use of this river has been projected, and would not be difficult, while other irrigation schemes, more or less practicable, have also been mooted. The Jordan, however, like some other Palestine rivers, has too deep a bed to lend itself very readily to such projects. Much remains to be done in the way of economising the country's winter surplus by means of reservoirs or dams, a method far more developed in early times than at present.

Drainage on a small scale by laying pipes or planting eucalyptus trees has been carried out by colonists in Palestine; the extensive marshes on the coastal plains

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and about Lake Hule (Merom) could only be reclaimed by more elaborate and costly works.

(c) *Forestry*

It has been estimated that 88 per cent. of the forests of Turkey are State-owned, and except in the Lebanon there is certainly little private property in the forests of Syria. According to statistics of the year 1907-8 the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut contained only 2,000 hectares (about 4,950 acres) of privately-owned forest; on the other hand, in the Lebanon, which those statistics do not include, the forests are entirely owned either by private persons or by village communities. With regard to the present extent of forests, official statistics for 1915 assign to the vilayet of Aleppo 135,000 hectares, to Damascus 61,000, to Beirut 55,000, to the Lebanon 60,000, a total of 311,000 hectares (1,200 sq. miles). Some reduction has no doubt taken place in consequence of the heavy demand for timber and fuel occasioned by the war. The 1907-8 statistics, which do not seem very trustworthy, represent the forests of the Aleppo vilayet as consisting of 53 per cent. of pine or fir, and 34 per cent. of oak; those of the Beirut vilayet of 75 per cent. of pine or fir, and 21 per cent. of oak; and those of Damascus entirely of oak. In the Lebanon also pine and oak predominate. Oaks, of which there are several varieties, tend to be rather stunted. Other trees found are carob, pistachio, sumach, cypress, plane, poplar, and lastly eucalyptus, which has been planted in large groves by Jewish settlers, especially about Kaisarie. The cedars of Lebanon are reduced to a few small groups.

The forests have been subject to Government control since 1870, and two schools, an upper and a lower, from which the local inspectors, keepers, and other officials are drawn, have been maintained at Constantinople. These officials, however, were more interested in increasing revenues than in arresting the advance of

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deforestation, which has been most rapid along the coast, in the neighbourhood of towns, and wherever railways or roads facilitate transport. Profits were obtained by putting up the forestry rights to auction or allowing villagers to cut trees on payment of certain dues; and tithe is paid on wood sold by private or corporate owners. Much damage has been done by fire as well as by indiscriminate felling. A great hindrance to the growth of trees are the flocks of goats which keep down all young wood within reach, and saplings are often felled merely for the sake of fodder. Sheep-farmers too are hostile to trees, on which wool is lost by rubbing. Quite recently steps have been taken to place the forestry of the Empire on a better footing. An Austrian expert has been called in to advise, a better inspection service instituted, and exploitation regulated by new enactments. One of these (1917) provides that foreign companies receiving concessions must offer half their shares for a period of three months to Ottoman subjects.

Timber from the forests is used mainly for fuel, either raw or in the form of charcoal; rough planks, posts, &c., are also made, but the better qualities of wood for building and cabinet-making are imported. In 1907-8 the output of timber in the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut was worth 6,573,168 piastres (1,645,000 frs.); with the addition of the production of the Lebanon, of wood used privately by villagers, and various by-products (gall-nuts, pine seeds, sumach leaves, &c.), the annual value of the forests may be put at three or four million francs.

(d) *Land-Tenure*

Agricultural methods and conditions have depended in no small degree on the complicated system of land-tenure in Turkey, which is described at length in *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 92 *seq.*; the following account summarises the main points.

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Land held by private persons may be of three kinds:—

Miri, the property of the State. The crown domains, though retaining their old name, were declared State property on the re-establishment of the constitution in 1908.

Mulk, private freehold.

Vakuf, land vested in religious or charitable institutions.

Of these mulk is of comparatively small extent, private property being found chiefly in the areas of towns and villages, where individual freeholds are limited to half a *donum* (1/9 acre) in addition to the site built upon. Practically the whole of the cultivated area consists of either miri or vakuf. Miri is held by individuals, but the State ownership involves certain restrictions upon its disposal, which, however, were lightened in 1913. It may now be freely sold, leased, or mortgaged, except to foreign companies, but cannot be disposed of by will, lapsing in case of failure of legal heirs to the State, to which it also reverts if left uncultivated for three successive years. Until 1913 the tenant was not even permitted free agricultural use of his land, permission being necessary for planting trees or vines, as well as for the erection of buildings; but these disabilities are now substantially removed. Of vakuf land, which is under the supervision of a special Ministry, there are different varieties, depending partly on the terms of the original dedication. Both mulk and, with the consent of the State, miri can be converted into vakuf, and the previous owner or tenant may retain the usufruct with its free disposal, or both ownership and usufruct may become vested in the institution concerned. In the latter case the land is usually let for periods not exceeding three years.

Apart from these legal distinctions, agriculture has been greatly affected by certain other fundamental facts, to which brief reference must be made.

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The existing land-register, which was drawn up fifty years ago, is very inexact with regard both to measurements and boundaries, and enjoys no public confidence. A proper survey and valuation was decreed in 1913, but has not yet been begun in Syria.

In the next place, a primitive system of collective tenure still prevails at many villages, though individual indebtedness has of late not infrequently led to partition. Under this system the land is reapportioned among the families of the village every two years, a practice resulting in stereotyped cultivation, and leading the temporary holders to minimise their outlay of both capital and labour.

Apart from communal land, much is concentrated in a few hands. Vakuf accounts for a good deal. Another large section, including the greater part of the Jordan valley, consists of domains belonging to the late Sultan, which have lapsed to the State and are commonly leased in small plots in return for one-fifth of the produce paid in kind. Moreover, the old miri land has to an increasing extent passed into the hands of large proprietors, who, as a rule, do not farm it themselves, but let it on similar terms to small cultivators. The plain of Esdraelon, for instance, is now entirely owned by a few town landlords. These large proprietors are apt to regard their estates merely as an investment, and the fellahin, or peasant cultivators, are always liable to be evicted when a favourable opportunity for realisation offers. It is also customary, in order to obviate any prescriptive rights, to change tenants at intervals. A frequent cause of land passing into capitalist hands is the oppression of the tax collector, from which the fellah seeks relief, either by disposing of his holding to a local effendi, or by turning it into vakuf. In Turkey the burden of direct taxation falls mainly upon the land (*cf.* p. 138), and is aggravated by the tax-farming system, which involves much extortion and oppression.

A large proportion of the fellahin, therefore, are in no sense proprietors, but merely cultivators with a

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limited, and often highly precarious, tenure. In 1907 it was estimated that in Judaea 50 per cent., in north Syria 20-30 per cent., in Galilee 20 per cent., and in the Hauran 15 per cent. only of the land was the property of the actual occupiers. A recent official report of the vilayet of Damascus puts the small holdings there at 25 per cent. Fruit plantations often belong to large owners; the orange-groves of Jaffa, for example, are mostly owned by town effendis. On the other hand, many of the silk cultivators of the Lebanon are small independent proprietors.

The price of agricultural land varies greatly with its quality, position, facilities for irrigation, and the kind of culture to which it is suited. It is highest in the Lebanon, where returning emigrants increase the demand: unplanted land of average quality will there fetch from 600 frs. to 1,000 frs. per *donum*, while for the same area planted with mulberries, 1,000-1,200 frs., or with oranges, 1,500-3,000 frs. may be paid. Irrigated fruit gardens at Homs are worth 1,000-1,500 frs. the *donum*. Land suitable for orange-plantation, but depending on pumped water, fetches in the Jewish and German colonies 300 frs. Grain land of the best quality costs in Palestine 30-50 frs. per *donum*, in north Syria 10-30 frs. Value is reduced by distance from a town, and especially by proximity to the desert, where there is danger of Beduin incursions; land may be had, for instance, on the eastern borders of the Aleppo vilayet for ½-5 frs. the *donum*. In Palestine prices have risen in consequence of the spread of the colonies, which have taken up more than a tenth of the cultivable area. Land which has lapsed to the State is often bought up by capitalists very cheaply.

(3) Fisheries

The coasts are not well adapted for the development of an important fishing industry. There is neither great abundance nor great variety of fish; owing to shallow water the fishing boats which, as

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usual in the Mediterranean, are small sailing vessels, have to go a long way out; in winter there are frequent storms, while the summer heat interferes with transport and limits consumption to the vicinity of the coast.

No fish exist in the Dead Sea; in the other inland lakes, especially Tiberias, Hule, and the Amuk lake near Antioch, they are plentiful, as likewise in the rivers. They are taken by net, line, and dynamite, but for the most part are only consumed locally. In the lake of Amuk, however, fish are killed by dynamite in January and February for the Aleppo and Damascus markets; in 1912 the catch there was 200,000 kg. There is practically no curing industry.

Fishing is a State monopoly. Ten piastres are paid for a permit, and there is a tax of one-fifth the value of the catch in the sea, large lakes, and rivers flowing into the sea, and one-tenth in the smaller lakes and other rivers. These taxes are assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt, and are farmed out.

The sponge fishery on the northern part of the coast has declined greatly of late, apparently owing to emigration of the divers. Where thirty years ago 400 boats were producing sponges to the annual value of 800,000 frs., there are now no more than about 30 boats and a production of 50,000 frs. The fishing season is from the middle of May to the end of October. No diving dress is worn by the fishermen, who jump into the sea with a stone to take them to the bottom. Besides a tax of £T 3 on each boat, one-fifth of the sponges are taken by the Government.

Though the murex is still found in Syrian waters, the once famous purple industry has died out.

(4) Minerals

(a) *Mining Laws*

For a full account of these see *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 98 *seq.* The regulations now in force date from 1913, when the enactments of

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1887 and 1906 were revised. They apply to all mineral obtained below ground, as well as to substances dug up in the open, and under minerals are included mineral springs, water containing salt, salt beds, &c. A permit is required for preliminary prospecting, even on land already in the possession of the prospector. Applications for prospecting rights are made to provincial governors, and if approved are granted on designation of a surety and after a payment of £T5-15, according to the extent of the concession. The permit, however, is still subject to the approval of the Ministry of Forests and Mines, against whose decision there is a further appeal. Prospecting rights, when finally obtained, last for one year, with a possible extension to a second, and may be transferred. An export of 100 tons of the mineral is allowed, or more in special circumstances. The next step is the definitive application for the concession proper; it follows a prescribed form, and if made on behalf of a company, this must be certified to be composed of Ottoman subjects. On the authorities being satisfied that all is in order, the firman is issued to the concessionnaire on a payment, in proportion to the importance of the undertaking, of £T50-200 (for open digging, £T4). Concessions for underground mining usually run for 99 years, and can be inherited or otherwise disposed of. After the firman has been granted, the concessionnaire becomes liable to two taxes, a fixed annual sum of 10 piastres per hectare payable to the landlord, who is commonly the State, and a percentage of the gross output, varying from 10 per cent. to 20 per cent. for closed mines, and from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. on products obtained in the open. Work must be begun within two years, subject to an extension of six months for special reasons, the concession then lapsing if the mine is still unworked. A responsible agent must be appointed; and except engineers and superintendents, the workmen must be Turkish subjects. Plant and work are subject to official inspection.

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Quarries are regulated by a special ordinance. They may be worked under permits granted in the same way and on similar terms as prospecting permits for mines, a firman being unnecessary.

(b) *Resources and Output*

Syria is commonly supposed to be rich in minerals, but, though there have been many mining projects, the actual output is worth perhaps barely 2,000,000 frs. a year, quarries included. In 1907 the gross revenue to the Government from mines and quarries (salt workings excluded) was 24,135 frs.; in 1908 (without Jerusalem) 37,091 frs. The following notes refer chiefly to minerals which are being or have recently been exploited.

Asphalt. The principal mine is that of Hasbeya, on the slopes of Mount Hermon, which has been worked intermittently for a number of years. About 100 tons, of the value of 50,000 frs., is the average output, which is exported to Hamburg. Asphalt is also obtained in smaller quantities from the Dead Sea (where it is found floating on the surface, and is collected by the Arabs, who pay for a permit) and from the vicinity of Latakia, but a concession held by a Greek for mines at Kefrie and other villages in this district was revoked in 1917 on the ground that no mining was being done. An asphalt and lignite mine near Jezzin, for which a concession was granted some forty years ago, is not being worked.

Lignite has been obtained during the war in the Lebanon district to the amount of about 100 tons a day. It is found in various places, but occurs in thin seams, is of poor quality, and in normal times would hardly repay working, except perhaps at Haitura, near Jezzin. According to a recent report (1918), coal has begun to arrive in Beirut from a mine at Bhamdun, twelve miles to the south-east.[1]

[1] It is reported that there is an important coal deposit 50 miles south-east of Aleppo.

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Petroleum and *lubricating oil* are said to be obtained in small quantities from bituminous rock at El-Makarin, near Mzerib (the yield from twelve retorts being 180 kg. daily), and at Nebi Musa, south of Jericho, where there appears to be a spring. Borings at El-Makarin had been carried to a depth of 166 metres in 1912-3 by the Syrian Exploration Co. Concessions in the kaza of Ajlun (south-east of Lake Tiberias) have been the subject of negotiations between the British and Turkish Governments; other concessions for petroleum, &c., about Kurnub, south-west of the Dead Sea, were recently purchased by the Standard Oil Co., whose operations were, however, suspended during the war. Between twenty and thirty prospecting licences for petroleum, bitumen, or asphalt were issued between 1910 and 1913.

Salt. The salt produced in Syria comes principally from the lakes of Jebbul, east of Aleppo, which are under the management of the Ottoman Public Debt. Crystallization takes place during the summer, and is promoted by the diversion of the two streams by which the lake is fed. In 1911-12 the output was 12,080,217 kg.; in 1912-13, 9,303,392 kg.; the ordinary sale price at the place of production being 0·4 piastres (9 centimes) the kilogramme.

Chrome Ore. Three mines near Latakia were worked in 1904-7 under a prospecting licence, and 1,089 tons extracted. A concession was applied for, but the mines are no longer exploited.

Phosphates. A concession in the neighbourhood of Es-Salt was obtained in 1911 by a Turkish-Italian company, the terms including a loan of 12,500,000 frs. from the company to the Government for a branch railway from Es-Salt to Amman, and for harbour-works at Haifa. The project, however, came to nothing. The phosphates are said to lie close to the surface, and it has been estimated that with 100 workmen a daily production of 100 tons might be possible.

Iron mines in Syria are said to have been under the control of the German Eisenindustriegesellschaft.

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Deposits of iron are known in several localities, but do not appear to merit extensive working. At Kesruan in the Buka'a the natives were extracting ore in a primitive fashion in 1909.

Stone and *marble* of different kinds are quarried at many places. Mill-stones of basalt from the Hauran are used in water-mills throughout the country. Potter's clay is obtained about Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramle, &c., but is not of very high quality.

(5) Manufactures

Metallurgy. The metallurgical industry depends upon imported material, and is not of much significance. Its chief centre is Damascus, where the annual production of articles of copper and brass, plain hammered or inlaid with silver, is worth one to one-and-a-half million francs, about one-half being exported; metals are also inlaid on wood. There is a small output of a similar kind at Jerusalem. Machinery works with metal foundries are established in Jaffa, Beirut, and Haifa; repairing workshops, where smithy work is done, are found in most of the larger towns, and primitive smithies in the villages.

Chemical industry. There is a small factory at Beirut, but a chemical industry can hardly be said to exist in Syria; chemicals are imported.

Textiles are one of the few industries that can claim any real importance.

Silk spinning. Spinning machinery was first set up in 1840, and until the end of last century the industry, supported by French capital, enjoyed a progressive development, but decreasing profits owing to foreign competition have since led to a decline (*cf.* p. 94). The old hand-spindle has not yet quite disappeared. Silk spinning is centred in the Lebanon, where in 1912 there were 155 factories, as against 39 elsewhere. More than half the silk produced in the country comes from the Lebanon, and both there and in the adjoining districts of the Beirut vilayet the

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bulk of it is spun on the spot between July and November. Further north, about Antioch and Latakia, the cocoons are merely dried, either by the old method of steaming and exposure to the air, or in hot air chambers, and so exported. The spinning establishments are mostly small, employing from 30 to 100 persons, who sit at basins and guide the threads from the cocoons to the spindles; only a few factories belonging to Lyons firms are fitted up with modern plant. Possessing little capital, the native manufacturers are largely dependent upon advances made to them by French importers. The number of persons who were engaged in spinning before the war is estimated at 10,000-12,000, mostly Christian women or girls. Wages are low, the equivalent of about 30-90 centimes for a twelve-hour day, and half as much for children. The future of the silk industry is doubtful, especially if the Lebanon remains deprived of its former privilege of immunity from tithe and trades-tax.

Weaving. All silk of better quality is normally exported either as raw silk or as dried cocoons. What is rejected goes to the native looms, supplemented by Chinese silk. Cotton, and, to a less degree, wool, are also woven, the yarns being imported. Weaving is a home industry in a double sense, as it supplies primarily local needs and is carried on by workers who have two or three wooden hand-looms in their houses, or a dozen or so in small buildings called *kaiserliks*. The output is limited and labour poorly paid, grown silkweavers earning 1-2 frs. a day, cotton-weavers half that sum, boys 15-50 centimes; women are hardly employed, except in Aleppo and the Lebanon. Cloths of pure silk, cotton, and wool are produced, and also mixtures of these, the kind and quality varying at the different centres, of which the chief are Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Aintab, the Lebanon, Hama, and Gaza. At Aleppo in 1909 there were 5,500 looms for cotton, and 4,500 for silk, or silk and cotton, but a more recent report gives the numbers

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as 3,000 and 1,200 respectively; the only carpet factory was closed some years ago. At Homs before the war about 10,000 weavers were engaged, some employers having as many as 200, and profits of from 15 to 20 per cent. were obtained. Homs cloths are finer and dearer than those of Aleppo, and have a good sale in Egypt as well as in Turkey. The Egyptian market is further supplied by Damascus, where mixtures of silk and cotton are a speciality, and some 5,000 weavers are normally employed, including 1,000 wool weavers. Aintab, where there are about 4,500 weavers, chiefly produces cheap cotton cloths which have a large sale, but also manufactures low-grade rugs and the goat-hair cloths of which Beduin tents are made. Cottons are the staple product of the 2,000 Lebanese looms, which, however, in consequence of the claims of the silk industry, are not fully engaged throughout the year. At Gaza with Mejel there are about 550 hand-looms, producing cotton cloth. The annual value of the total output is estimated at thirty to forty million francs. Further development of the industry has been impeded by the absence of co-operation and organisation, the predominance of the primitive hand-loom, with its restricted output, and the competition of foreign cotton cloth. Some Jacquard machines are in use at Aleppo and Damascus, but power-looms have not so far been introduced with success. The new customs tariff (p. 135) is designed to meet foreign competition.

Knitting. Cotton socks and stockings are made in a number of towns, especially at Aleppo and Damascus; 5,000-6,000 machines were in use at Aleppo and 1,500 or more at Damascus. Like weaving, this is essentially a home industry, and the women and children engaged turn out from one dozen to three dozen pairs, and earn 40-60 centimes, daily. The annual output is valued at 10,000,000 frs.

Lace-making and *embroidery* are in the main Christian or Jewish industries, practised chiefly at Aintab (where they were started by American mission-

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aries, and before the war employed three or four thousand women and girls), but also in the Lebanon, at Jerusalem, Nazareth, Jaffa, Aleppo, and other places.

There are also a number of miscellaneous industries, of which the following deserve mention:—

Oil and soap production. Olive oil. Most of the presses in use are still of the primitive wooden kind, and slow and wasteful in working, though during the last 20 years many have been replaced by iron screw-presses or hydraulic machines; in 1911 there were already about 80 of the last in the Lebanon. The number of oil presses in the country is not ascertained, but may well be 600-800, employing on an average 10 workmen each. There is also a large native factory at Tripoli engaged in the chemical extraction of oil from the refuse olive cake, which when not so utilised is burnt as fuel. A second factory of this kind was installed shortly before the war at Beirut by an English firm. The extraction of edible oil must take place very soon after the olives are gathered, the tendency to ferment being accelerated by the native method of knocking the berries from the trees with sticks. Less than half of the 22,000 tons produced annually, representing a value of some 25,000,000 frs., is fit for food or export, the remainder being used for soap. The oil is at present hardly equal in quality to the best European.

Sesame oil is produced as an article of food at Aleppo and Damascus, but chiefly in the mutessariflik of Jerusalem, where there are some forty small factories at Jaffa, Ludd, Jerusalem, Ramle, &c., each capable of treating 150-200 kg. of sesame daily, from which about 45 per cent. of oil is extracted by primitive methods. Better results are obtained by two Jewish factories at Jaffa, working with hydraulic presses. Unpressed sesame is made into a popular sweetmeat. The pressed cake is used as fodder, and also by the poor for food.

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Volatile oils are produced on a small scale in different localities from mimosa, thyme, geranium, orange-blossom, and aniseed; they are used in a perfume factory at Tripoli, and in another at Jaffa, and are also exported. Oil from the bay berry is extracted in considerable quantities about Antioch and in the south of the Aleppo vilayet for use as an ingredient of soap.

Inferior olive oil is used for making soap, and the centres of this large industry are naturally in the chief olive districts, the Lebanon, and in or about Aleppo, Antioch, Damascus, Tripoli, Nablus, and Jaffa. The factories are mostly quite small, many having a single boiler, and only a few in the Lebanon and Tripoli districts have iron pans, the others using receptacles of stone or brick with an iron plate at the bottom. Owners often work not on their own account, but for regular customers who provide the oil. Modern methods are followed in two factories (Russo-Jewish and German) at Haifa. The total number of factories is about 150, with an annual output of some 20,000 tons, which is partly exported to other parts of the Turkish Empire, and also to Egypt and Cyprus. Besides olive oil, the ingredients used are caustic soda, carbonate of soda (for which the ash of a plant called *killi*, found about Tadmur and Es-Salt, is often substituted), bay oil, lime, and talc, the mixtures varying slightly in different localities. The soap is cooled on an earthen floor, where it is cut into squares, and turns out very hard, a quality which recommends it to native taste. In some years the supply of oil is not equal to the demand, and is supplemented from outside. Experiments with imported vegetable oils (cotton seed, coco-nut, and groundnut) have also been made, but the results are not greatly liked.

Milling, &c. Mills driven by motor, steam, or water-power are met with all over the country; the windmills introduced in the middle of last century have been given up. The old water-mills, which sometimes work as many as fifteen sets of mill-

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stones, still preponderate. Steam and motor mills are usually small, working with one or two pairs of stones, which grind 200-500 kg. an hour; large up-to-date installations are quite exceptional. The two most important are at Beirut, where the milling industry is of recent growth, and has been encouraged by the railway, which has facilitated the transport of wheat from the Hauran. At Damascus, on the other hand, which once supplied the Lebanon, there has been a corresponding decline, as is also the case at Jerusalem, which, owing to the Haifa railway, no longer receives the same quantity of grain from across the Jordan. Milling in the coastal district is, however, especially open to the competition of European flour. Village mills commonly work for hire, grinding the corn brought for a small money fee or a percentage of the flour.

Of wheat products other than flour, starch, which is used for native foods and sweetmeats, is made in a number of small factories at Aleppo and Damascus, which turn out 2,000,000-3,000,000 kg. a year; there is some export to other parts of Turkey and to Egypt. Macaroni, for which the hard Syrian wheat is particularly well suited, is made in a German factory at Jaffa, and at Jerusalem and Beirut, but is not in demand except among Europeans.

Wine and spirit industry. The fabrication of alcoholic liquor is subject to a duty of 15 per cent. of the value of the product, one-half being repayable on exportation. Both the native *raki* and ordinary wine are made; the former, most of which is consumed locally, chiefly in the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets; the latter, which is mostly exported, in the Lebanon, the vilayet of Beirut, and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem. The largest producers of wine are the Society of Jewish Vine-growers at Rischon le Zion near Jaffa, who own capacious cellars at that village and at Sichron Jacob, near Haifa, and annually make 30,000-40,000 hectolitres of wine and spirits from the grapes

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of the neighbouring Jewish vineyards. Smaller quantities are produced at Shtora on the east slopes of the Lebanon, by the German colonists of Sarona and the Haifa district, at Latrun, and elsewhere. In 1914-15 the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets produced respectively 56,000 and 21,000 hectolitres of grape liquor, mainly *raki*. The total annual production of wine, *raki*, &c., is about 130,000 hectolitres, worth upwards of five million francs.

Tobacco-making and cigarettes. Except in the Lebanon, the preparation of these has been monopolised by the Régie des tabacs, which has a large factory at Damascus, and another at Aleppo. That at Damascus employs 200 workpeople, and turns out about 430,000 kg. of cigarettes and cigarette tobacco a year. In the Lebanon there are some 20 factories, with an annual output worth about 10,000,000 frs.

Leather industry. The most important tanning centre is Aintab, where large numbers of goatskins are turned into the red or yellow leather used in Turkey and Egypt for native slippers; some of the yellow goes to Tunis. In 1909 about 150 tanneries were engaged, their output being worth about 3,000,000 frs. Both goatskins and sheepskins are tanned at Homs, Hama, and Damascus; cow-hides chiefly at Beirut and Zahle. At the last place, where in 1910 there were about 30 small tanneries, a good box-calf is made, to the annual value of about 1,500,000 frs. Saddlery and shoemaking flourish at Damascus; in other towns shoemaking has much declined, owing to the growing taste for the European article.

Dyeing is carried on extensively in northern Syria, especially at Aleppo and Damascus, and in a minor degree at Aintab, Homs, Hama, and Beirut; small dyers, too, are found in many villages. Both woven cloth and yarns are dyed, the dyes employed being Indian and synthetic indigo, alizarin (madder) red, and aniline, all of which, except the natural indigo,

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come from Germany. Indian and synthetic indigo, which are largely used, are now commonly mixed. The work is carried on by hand in small buildings, the dyers earning 50 centimes to 1½ francs a day.

Building is in a backward condition. There are no large contractors, and skilled workmen are found only in the towns, the villager being commonly his own architect and builder. Masons and bricklayers are efficient, but plasterers, carpenters, and other subsidiary workers, are generally inferior. The industry is at a standstill during the wet winter months. Of materials, iron girders, wood, cement, and tiles are imported, burnt bricks are made at Beirut and in the Lebanon, and the production of concrete has lately been developed by Jews or Germans at Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias, and Aleppo. Lime-burning is carried on in European kilns in the larger towns, and by a primitive method elsewhere.

Carpentry, woodwork, &c. Large workshops for building accessories exist in some of the towns, such as Beirut, Jaffa, and Tripoli, and wooden furniture on western models is also made at Beirut and Jaffa. At Damascus there is still a considerable production of oriental carved or inlaid woodwork, and some export to Europe and Egypt, but this industry has been declining owing to a fall in the demand and to emigration.

Devotional objects. Rosaries, crosses, and other small articles are made in large quantities at Jerusalem and Bethlehem, both for sale to tourists and for export. Some 1,000 workers produce goods to the value of about 2,000,000 frs., the materials used being chiefly olive-wood, mother-of-pearl, silver, and a black stone from the Dead Sea.

Rope and string are made at Damascus and Aleppo, at the former out of the interior fibres of the hemp grown in the locality, the latter deriving the raw material from the Euphrates district to the north-east, and to some extent also from abroad. The methods

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are primitive, and the product, which has a wide local distribution, is extremely cheap.

Matting and baskets. The papyrus of Lake Hule is made into matting by the local Beduin women, and some rough mats and baskets are produced in other parts of the country.

Pottery. The best known is that of Gaza, which has a wide sale. A quantity is also made at Ramle, Jerusalem, Nablus, in the Lebanon, in the Beirut district, and at Damascus.

(6) Power

The use of electricity, which has not long been permitted, has so far made little progress. A power station outside Damascus supplies that city with light, drives street trams and irrigation pumps, and serves the workshops of the Hejaz railway at Kadem Sherif. Beirut, where also there are electric tramways, is partly lit by electricity, and some hotels in Jerusalem and Aleppo have private installations. Electric light is in use at Bir es-Seba, and electric works are reported to be under construction in the Lebanon. A small power station has been set up at the Jewish colony at Mesha.

Water-power is not much utilised, except for mills (p. 116). It supplies electricity at Damascus, and in 1913 a concession was granted for trams and light at Aleppo, for which the power was to be derived from waterfalls near Antioch. According to German reports, falls at Tell esh-Shehab, in the Yarmuk valley, are to supply power for the railway and for lighting Deraa, Tiberias, Haifa, Jerusalem, &c. Several other rivers are well adapted for the production of power, especially the upper Jordan, the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi), on which are Homs, Hama, and Antioch, the Litani, and the Nahr el-Auja, near Jaffa; the Jihan might well be drawn upon for the Killis-Aintab district.

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(C) COMMERCE

(1) Domestic

(a) *Principal Branches of Trade*

Internal commerce is comparatively restricted, since the agricultural population, which forms the greater part of the community, has few wants that are not supplied by its own production. One small miscellaneous store, selling articles of clothing, sugar, coffee, rice, tobacco, salt, and so forth, suffices for the needs of a village. Trade on a large scale is thus seated in the towns, and here also many commodities are supplied direct to the consumer by the producer, who brings in vegetables, milk, fowls, eggs, &c., especially on market days, from the surrounding country. This practice is facilitated by the Oriental mode of grouping sellers of particular products in a distinct part of the bazaar or market.

As regards home produce, internal trade is most actively occupied in supplying the demand of cities and localities which are not self-supporting, and in concentrating any surplus, as well as articles which have a better market abroad, in the hands of exporters. For example, cereals go in large quantities from Homs and Hama to Aleppo, Tripoli, Beirut and the Lebanon, from the Hauran to Damascus and Haifa, from Gaza and Bir es-Seba to Jerusalem and Jaffa. Among native manufactures, oil, soap, textiles, and leather are the most important articles of distribution; tobacco and salt are Government monopolies (*see* p. 128). The chief centres of local supply are commonly also engaged in serving the foreign export houses. It is noticeable that, although, of course, there are large and small dealers, and often intermediaries between them, a strict differentiation between wholesale and retail trade is not observed.

An important and more remunerative department of domestic trade is concerned with the distribution of imports. The two great importing centres are Beirut

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and Aleppo, from which supplies are drawn by the secondary markets in their respective areas, thence descending by further steps to the minor towns and villages. Trade connections of more or less stability are thus established; the interdependence of the chief towns and their special commercial functions are discussed in the following section. The considerable traffic in animals and animal produce handled by the dealers of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus originates to a large extent outside Syrian borders, and must accordingly be included under distribution of imports.

(b) *Towns and Markets*

Commercially two cities have a primary position, Beirut and Aleppo, the former for the middle and south, the latter for the north.

Beirut and area.—Besides supplying the Lebanon interior and inland centres like Damascus and Jerusalem, the importing houses of Beirut serve also the smaller ports Tripoli, Saida, Haifa, and Jaffa, with which there is easy communication, and their respective dependencies. With the development of trade there is a tendency to advance from indirect to direct relationship; Damascus, Jaffa, and Haifa, for instance, have to some extent established independent European connections. Beirut, however, remains the chief emporium for foreign manufactures, especially the valuable textile imports from England. It also has an active export business; its merchants and the local agents of Lyons firms control the silk industry, and wool, barley, eggs, and other produce are collected there for shipment.

Damascus, which is the greatest centre of internal commerce, is the chief of the dependencies of Beirut, though 40 per cent. of its European imports may represent direct trade. Besides its more immediate neighbourhood, Damascus supplies the Hauran and the places further south now served by the Hejaz railway, but goods for these districts will go in increasing quan-

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tity through Haifa. With the growth of means of communication Damascus has declined to some extent as a collecting centre for native produce, but is still an important market for camels, sheep, wool, and butter from the nomadic tribes along the border. There is some traffic with Baghdad, whence Persian rugs and cloaks are brought in exchange for rope, string, silks, and cottons.

Tripoli traders for the most part make purchases at Beirut, or transmit orders through Beirut firms. Goods so ordered are, however, often shipped to Tripoli direct, and the railway to Homs has brought the port into greater prominence, both for exports and imports.

Homs, though now connected by rail with Tripoli, and obtaining foreign supplies through that medium, similarly remains to a large extent dependent upon Beirut importing houses. It is a prominent market for the nomadic tribes of the Euphrates district, who send in sheep, wool, and butter, Mosul sheep especially coming in large numbers for subsequent distribution to Damascus, Beirut, and the Lebanon.

Haifa, having become the sea terminus of the Hejaz railway, is rising in importance. It has already emancipated itself in some degree from Beirut, and this process may easily be carried further as the volume of imports for the Hauran and Arabia increases. Haifa also supplies Akka, to which it is now joined by railway, and the inland towns Nazareth, Tiberias, and Safed.

Jaffa, like Haifa, is tending to become less dependent on Beirut, but direct importation is as yet on a comparatively small scale. Jaffa is the great centre of the cultivation and export of oranges. Of its dependents the chief are Gaza, Ramle, and Nablus, the last of which, however, is promoting relations of its own with Beirut, a process likely to be encouraged by the recently established railway connection with Haifa. Gaza is noted both for its exports of barley and as a market for camels.

Jerusalem, though, of course, obtaining its imports through Jaffa, has independent business relations with

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Beirut. Hebron looks to Jerusalem for supplies, and Bir es-Seba has hitherto done so, though this connection is open to disturbance from the new railway giving access to Jaffa. Hebron traders maintain large stores at Tafile, south-east of the Dead Sea, for traffic with the neighbouring Bedouin. The Hejaz railway, which now serves the district east of the Jordan, has helped to reduce the commercial importance of Jerusalem, which previously was not great.

Aleppo and area.—The district dominated commercially by Aleppo extends southwards to Hama, and north and east far beyond the limits of Syria, including Deir ez-Zor, Mosul, Mardin, Diarbekr, and places still more remote. How far the old relations will be changed by the Baghdad railway, to which *Alexandretta* is now linked, remains to be seen. Alexandretta has hitherto been little more than a port and depot for Aleppo, and merchandise passing to or from inland towns is mainly for Aleppo account. At Aleppo itself an active trade subsists both in foreign imports and native products, especially textiles and soap. It is also the chief centre of the large traffic in sheep, cattle, wool, and butter, which are brought from the Euphrates district and beyond, and are distributed in Syria or exported.

Antioch is a considerable seat of industry (silk-weaving and soap-making), but is not otherwise prominent. *Aintab* has several flourishing industries, especially tanning and the manufacture of textiles (for which cotton yarns are largely imported); and it is a small trade centre for the districts to the north and east. Its imports through Aleppo have been on the increase, and the place is rising in commercial significance. *Killis* is of less account, but has a large market for animals.

Hama, which is the chief town of a thriving agricultural district and has a well-established textile industry, is now more dependent on Aleppo for imports than on *Beirut*. A large trade is done with the Beduin tribes to the east, Hama being one of the principal recipients of their produce, especially wool and butter.

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(c) *Organisations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Chambers of Commerce modelled on the one set up in 1880 at Constantinople exist at Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem,[1] but have very few members, and are destitute alike of activity and influence. The Jerusalem Chamber, which dates from 1909, has issued some monthly reports, but shows no other signs of life. Syria is not a congenial soil for such institutions. Diversities of race, of religion, and to some extent of language, militate against co-operation among the mercantile class; moreover, the native is, as a rule, strongly individualistic in character, and partnership seldom extends beyond members of the same family. Local associations for trade purposes are found chiefly among the Jewish and German colonists, *e.g.*, the Jewish societies of wine-producers and of growers of oranges and almonds, and the similar German associations at Wilhelma and Sarona. A successful association established in 1908 by the shoemakers of Damascus for the purchase of leather and other articles is primarily concerned with the promotion of industry rather than of trade.

An institution which, in the past, has been of limited utility, but may, in virtue of newly acquired powers, do much to assist the agricultural class, is the Banque agricole. By a law of 1916 this bank was authorised to undertake the purchase and sale of land, draught animals, seed, and implements, which may be paid for by instalments (*cf.* p. 141). Co-operative credit societies have recently been started at several towns in Palestine with the assistance of the Anglo-Palestine Bank (*cf.* p. 140).

(d) *Foreign Interests*

Foreign enterprise is very prominent in public works, shipping, banking, and insurance, besides en-

[1] According to another recent authority, also at Alexandretta, Tripoli, and Jaffa, and in the Hauran. A measure for the promotion of local Chambers of Commerce has quite lately been introduced by the Government.

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gaging in the business of export and import and various minor departments of trade. French companies are responsible for a large part of the railway system (*cf.* p. 69), the harbour and docks of Beirut, and the lighting by gas and electricity of that city; the water company there too is largely a French concern. A Belgian company, in which the Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft, of Berlin, has a considerable interest, has installed the electric tramway and light at Damascus, and the electric trams at Beirut also were financed by Belgian capitalists. (For the shipping lines, whose agents are established at the principal ports, see p. 85, and for the foreign banks, p. 139.) In the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which has branches in Syria, French influence predominates. Agencies of a number of insurance companies (life, fire, transport) are found in Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tripoli, &c., the principal being British, French, German, Austrian, and American. In miscellaneous trade and commerce the foreign firms are, for the most part, concentrated in the seaports of Beirut, Jaffa, and Haifa, and the three large inland towns, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem; French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Greek houses predominate. English firms usually employ native representatives, and English names such as that of White & Son, engineers and dealers in machinery (Beirut and Aleppo), are rare among local traders. Of American companies, the Singer Sewing Machine Company, who have agents in many towns, the Vacuum Oil Company (Beirut and Aleppo), and the McAndrews & Forbes Company, dealers in liquorice root (Alexandretta and Antioch), are the most important. Like the Vacuum Oil Company, the Russian petroleum company, Nobel Frères, is widely represented. French interests are paramount at Beirut, but are concerned more especially with export trade, above all in silk. A large general business is conducted by what is, perhaps, the most important firm, the Établissements Orosdi Back, which has

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branches at Beirut and Aleppo, besides other places in the East. Elsewhere than at Beirut, German and Austrian firms are prominent, including, besides some large commercial houses, a number of minor traders such as hotel-keepers, tailors, clockmakers, jewellers, chemists, stationers, &c. These are especially numerous at Jaffa, near which are the German colonies Wilhelma and Sarona, at Haifa, and Jerusalem. Italian and Greek traders also, especially the latter, are sometimes engaged in comparatively petty business.

(e) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

Of these the most obvious, perhaps, is the agency of Consular representatives, who are maintained in the more important trading centres, and may be of great assistance not only to their nationals on the spot, but also in keeping home manufacturers and exporters in touch with local conditions. Their influence is increased when, as in the German system, the Consular service forms part of the Diplomatic Corps. Secondly, commerce is naturally promoted by easy means of transit, and in Syria especially by shipping facilities. It is noteworthy that several of the foreign mail services are supported by subsidies from their respective Governments. Again, in a country where business depends so largely on credit (*cf.* p. 142), banking establishments can play an important part in the promotion of trade. Syrian importers not only need credit themselves, but as a rule have to grant it to their large customers, who issue negotiable promissory notes. The Deutsche Palästina Bank has of late been extremely active in extending its sphere in Palestine and pushing German interests. Commercial travellers and local commission agents are particularly important. The scarcity and ineffectiveness of British travellers, and the advantages secured by those of other nations, are emphasised in many Consular reports. Excursions of actual exporters and importers have been promoted by the German Government. A great deal of trade is

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done through commission agents, and the number of foreign agents, especially Germans, residing in the chief centres is highly significant. Representatives of British firms are hardly ever themselves British born. Adaptation of business to native requirements is another point which foreign manufacturers are accustomed to study to better advantage than our own. Favourable terms of credit are of primary importance. Much, too, may be gained by a readiness to consult popular taste and by intelligibility in correspondence, catalogues, and quotation of prices. French is the language generally understood; the metric system is used in commercial transactions; and c.i.f. quotations are commonly expected. In Palestine German interests have a strong support in the colonies at Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, and are also served to some extent by the Jewish colonies, whose members are commonly German-speaking and not seldom tinged with German *Kultur*. The Zionist movement is openly advocated in Germany as a means of spreading Teutonic influence —an aspect of the question which in this country is not sufficiently appreciated. The various educational, religious, and charitable institutions—British, American, French, German, &c.—have no direct concern with trade, though they may do something by means of creating an "atmosphere." Papers and periodicals, which are read a good deal in the more Europeanised towns, are by no means negligible. The *Deutsche Levante Zeitung*, for instance, has quickly found a public among the merchants of the Levant, and is said to have done good service to German trade.

(f) *Monopolies*

The salt monopoly is assigned to and managed by the Ottoman Public Debt, which has two administrative centres, Aleppo for the vilayet of Aleppo, and Beirut for the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus and the mutessariflik of Jerusalem, with depôts in numerous places. In 1913-14 the amount sold in the administrative area

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of Beirut was 13,455,000 kg., fetching, at pre-war prices, about 1,500,000 frs., so that the sale in the whole country may well approximate to 2,500,000 frs. To the Lebanon the monopoly has not applied, salt being sold by the Public Debt to dealers and others in amounts of not less than 50 kg.

The conditions of the tobacco monopoly, which has been in the hands of the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman since 1883, were revised in 1914. Except in the Lebanon, which has hitherto been excluded from its operations, the Régie has the sole right to control and purchase all tobacco grown, to collect duty on imported and exported tobaccos, and to manufacture and sell tobacco in its various forms. Cigarettes, tobacco, &c., are sold at fixed prices and only on licensed premises, whose holders receive a commission. Tombac, or water-pipe tobacco, which is both imported from Persia and grown in the country (p. 92), is also controlled, but is subject to special regulations. Imported tombac pays a duty of 4 piastres per kg.; that grown at home, so far as not bought by the Régie, may be sold or exported, paying duty at the same rate. The annual value of the tobacco and tombac normally sold is perhaps fourteen to fifteen million francs.

(2) Foreign Trade

No very clear statistics of foreign commerce are available. The official statistics include Adalia and Mersina with the Syrian ports, and the trade of these two places does not concern Syria, though it is true that it is not large. Secondly, these statistics confine themselves to trade with foreign countries, excluding the considerable traffic with other parts of the Ottoman Empire, and so do not do full justice to the country as an entity. They can, however, be supplemented to some extent from British Consular reports where the figures are collected for the several ports, though unfortunately not on a consistent system, those for Beirut, Tripoli, Haifa, Latakia, and Saida giving quantities only and

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not values. Moreover, imported goods are often transshipped at the larger for the smaller ports (especially at Beirut), and not only are these goods reckoned in the returns for both ports but they are treated at the minor port as of Turkish origin. It is also to be remembered that the Consular statistics refer to sea trade only, and that in them, as well as in the official returns, a certain amount of the traffic to and from Alexandretta is not really Syrian.

(a) *Exports*

Statistics.—Of the tables given below in the Appendix, Table II summarises the official statistics for 1910-11, a fairly typical year, in which there was an average harvest and an absence of foreign trouble. Table III shows the values of the exports, classified according to destination, from the three principal ports, Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa, during the years 1910-12. Similar figures for the minor ports are not available, but those given may be taken as fairly representative. Table IV contains classified totals with percentages, for the same three ports in the typical year 1910.

The sum of the values in Table II is 398,374,279 piastres, or approximately £3,622,000. Exports from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa to other parts of the Turkish Empire, which, as already explained, are not included in Table II, amounted in 1910 to £626,249, and for the whole of Syria may be put roughly at £700,000. But against this must be set the values of those exports included in Table II which are really of non-Syrian origin, so that the total value for 1910 may be reckoned at approximately $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling.

Syrian exports consist in the main of the vegetable and animal products of the country, and tend to fluctuate with them. Of the expanding branches the most conspicuous is the export of oranges from Jaffa, which advanced steadily from 744,463 cases in 1909 to 1,608,570 cases in 1913. Exports of oranges and lemons

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from Tripoli, Saida, and Beirut have not shown a corresponding growth, there being a difference of only about 50,000 cases between 1909 and 1913, but a further development of the exports from that region appears likely with the extension of this form of culture, which is tending to replace that of mulberry trees. Tobacco-planting is similarly increasing, with a corresponding effect on export, which from the Beirut-Tripoli-Latakia district amounted to 986 tons in 1913, as against 671 tons in 1912 and 689 in 1911. Silk production, on the other hand, in spite of the excellence of the silk, is generally regarded as on the wane, although in the year before the war a good crop and a large French demand led to an increased export. The export figures for cocoons and raw silk in 1910-13 were :—

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	bales	5,075	3,997	2,760	10,900
Alexandretta ..	tons	328	353	258	328

Beirut exports of native silk or part-silk fabrics, however, had a marked decline in 1913, reaching only 3,198 bales, or less than half the average for the three preceding years. Exports of wool, which now go mostly from Tripoli, have advanced materially during the same period, as shown by the following figures :—

——		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	bales	4,411	10,023	10,750	19,300
Alexandretta ..	tons	555	349	165	42

If a ton is taken as roughly equivalent to three bales, the combined figures in bales will be 6,076, 11,070, 11,245, 19,426. Soap production is only partly depen-

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dent on the home olive crop, and does not vary much; the export figures show an upward tendency:—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Beirut and Tripoli ..	cases	15,550	16,830	12,010	17,750
Jaffa and Alexandretta	tons	4,890	5,116	8,325	6,657

Exports of wine from Jaffa have also risen, the amounts in 1909-12 being 2,289, 3,807, 5,180, and 4,477 tons respectively. Shipments of liquorice from Alexandretta are much influenced by freightage rates, the actual production being fairly constant. There is still a small export of egg-yolk and albumen from the same port, but it has almost ceased further south, where eggs are now sent out whole. The export of lace to America, previously valued at about 1,000,000 frs. annually, was stated in 1915 to have ceased, owing to deterioration in the quality.

Countries of destination.—As shown in Table IV (p. 153), France, Egypt, and other parts of the Turkish Empire are Syria's best customers. Besides the bulk of the silk, which goes to Lyons, France takes chiefly cereals, sesame, wool, skins, and eggs. Egypt imports a large variety of Syrian products—barley, durra, leguminous produce, cattle, sheep, dried apricots, wine, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, tobacco, soap, leather, silk and cotton textiles—and much miscellaneous produce goes also to parts of Turkey, especially barley, pistachio nuts, dried apricots, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, melons, wool, soap, skins and leather, silk and cotton fabrics. England takes large quantities of oranges, which are shipped mostly to Liverpool, barley, durra, leguminous produce, pistachio nuts, Latakia tobacco, and wool; the United States liquorice, pistachio, and devotional objects. To Austria go sesame, figs, cotton, and hides; to Germany sesame and skins; to Italy wheat, cotton, and wool; and to Russia oranges and lemons.

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(b) *Imports*

Statistics.—On the defects of the published statistics see above, p. 129. The Appendix contains tables corresponding to those given for exports, Table V containing the official figures for 1910-11; Table VI, which is based on Consular reports, showing the value of goods received at the three ports in 1910-12, classified according to the country of their origin; Table VII giving similarly classified totals and percentages for the year 1910.

The chief imports are :—

1. Flour and certain articles of food which are not produced in the country, *e.g.*, rice, sugar, coffee. Flour ground by the native mills is not suited for fancy baking, and in some years is insufficient for ordinary needs. Imports of flour, sugar, rice, and coffee (non-Arabian) in the years 1910-12 were as under :—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.
Flour	kg.	24,508,000	21,392,000	11,718,000
Sugar	„	21,777,000	24,240,000	13,801,700
Rice	„	23,849,000	19,667,000	11,963,000
Coffee	„	1,465,800	1,328,160	1,345,920

The decreases noticeable in 1912 may be largely put down to the general depression caused by the Balkan War, following on the war with Italy. In the case of flour there had been some overstocking at Jaffa in previous years.

2. Coal and petroleum. The figures for 1910-12 were :—

—		1910.	1911.	1912.
Coal	tons	79,045	66,476	82,980
Petroleum ..	„	28,872	28,525	17,335

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Beirut and Haifa import about 70 per cent. of the coal, and Beirut about 30 per cent. of the petroleum.

3. Wood, cement, tiles, and other building materials. Wood is largely used for box-making, as well as for building and on the railways, and its import at Jaffa rose, with the growth of orange exports, from 13,400 cubic metres in 1910 to 26,210 in 1913. Some 25,000 tons are received at the other ports. Imports of tiles declined between 1910 and 1912, but their value in any case is not very considerable.

4. Iron and other metals, metal implements, machinery, &c.—an important class. Metal (chiefly iron) imports for the years 1910 to 1912 were 18,226, 17,292, and 17,089 tons respectively, apart from large quantities of manufactured ware. The machinery received in 1910, including locomotives, motors, agricultural machines, pumps, sewing machines, &c., amounted, according to the official statistics, to 3,340 tons, with a value of 3,850,000 frs.

5. Textiles. These are by far the largest item, accounting, according to the official figures for 1910-11, for over 40 per cent. of the entire value of the imports. Cotton fabrics and yarn form the principal division in this class; the figures for these, with woollens, in 1910-12 were as follows :—

——	1910.	1911.	1912.
Alexandretta .. tons	3,289	2,543	3,484
Beirut and Jaffa.. bales and cases	29,356	31,701	23,799

The red fezes everywhere worn all come from abroad, and ready-made clothing is also imported in considerable quantity. Other commodities for which the country is entirely dependent on foreign supplies are paper, chemicals, dyes, hardware, glass, and matches.

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Countries of origin.—Proportional values are shown in Table VII. The United Kingdom is the chief contributor, largely in virtue of cotton yarns and fabrics, about 60 per cent. of the quantity received coming from England. Besides these, British imports consist mainly of woollens, stockings, sacking, coal, machinery, and chemicals. Cotton yarns and sacking also come from India, together with rice and indigo; rice is also sent by Egypt. The chief contributions of other countries are:—

Turkey: Tobacco, coal, wood, and coffee (Arabia).
France: Flour, silken and woollen fabrics, tiles, cement.
Austria: Sugar, iron, metalware, woollens and other textiles, fezes, ready-made clothing, wood, cement, paper, glass, matches.
Italy: Cottons, matches.
Germany: Iron and metalware, machinery, coal, dyes, drugs.
Russia: Flour, sugar, alcohol, petroleum, wood.
Belgium: Iron, metal-ware, cement, glass, chemicals.
Rumania: Flour, petroleum.
United States: Petroleum, machinery.
China: Silk.
Brazil: Coffee.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

The 8 per cent. *ad valorem* duty established for all parts of Turkey in 1861-2 was raised by agreement with the Powers to 11 per cent. in 1907 (except for Egyptian goods, for which the old rate was maintained), and by the independent action of the Ottoman Government to 15 per cent. in 1914, and 30 per cent. in 1915. In 1916 the old system was superseded by an elaborately graduated tariff, to be revised at the end of three years, which aims at the protection of home products and industries, actual or potential, and their

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encouragement by the admission, free or under low duties, of necessary machinery and raw materials. Textiles, leather products, furniture, woodwork, and paper are among the highly taxed articles. The duties assigned are throughout maxima, which are subject to modification by special agreement.

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The commercial and other privileges known as Capitulations, which in relation to Great Britain had existed since 1675, were abolished by the Turkish Government in 1914. Treaties of commerce arranged with the Capitulatory Powers in 1861-2 were subsequently denounced by Turkey, but without being formally renewed they continued to be followed tacitly. Negotiations entered into for new treaties were without result, except in the case of Germany, with whom an agreement was signed in 1890; a stipulation was, however, added that the provisions and tariff should not come into force without the consent of Germany unless they were applied to other countries also, and the treaty consequently remained in abeyance. A new treaty with Germany has now been made, together with further conventions, regulating the functions of Consuls and other international matters, formerly governed by the Capitulations. With certain non-capitulatory Powers —Greece, Persia, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia— agreements were reached some years ago conceding most-favoured-nation treatment; and a treaty was made in 1896 with Japan under which Consuls were reciprocally established and the right given to free exchange of commerce. With Bulgaria relations of free trade have subsisted, except for certain goods defined by a convention of 1906, but previous arrangements have, for the most part, been nullified by the events of the past few years, and Turkey's relations with other countries will require a comprehensive readjustment after the war.

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(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

Budget.—For the public finance of Turkey, which includes that of Syria, see *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 115. Individually considered, Syria's financial situation contrasts very favourably with that of the Empire as a whole, local revenues being considerably in excess of the expenditure, as is seen in the following figures, taken from *La Syrie de demain*, by M. Moutran (1916), and based upon the previous Budget:—

——	Revenue.	Expenditure.
	Frs.	Frs.
Aleppo	20,275,673	7,954,573
Beirut	31,919,329	8,804,400
Damascus..	15,568,401	16,902,682
Jerusalem..	4,630,015	2,373,991
Lebanon	1,100,458	1,062,761
Total	73,493,876	37,098,407

Here expenses exceed receipts in one province only, Damascus, and this small deficit is handsomely repaired by the favourable balances elsewhere; especially in the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut.

Of the total revenue, the bulk is accounted for by the following principal items[1]:—

	Frs.
Taxes on land, animals, trades, and in lieu of military and other services	18,657,600
Tithe	21,019,401

[1] These figures do not include the Lebanon, which had a different system, but, on the other hand, include Deir ez-Zor, the total revenue of which was only 450,000 frs. more than that of the Lebanon.

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	Frs.
Import, export, transit, and other dues	11,297,002
Sale of salt and tobacco	5,487,317
Hejaz Railway	4,459,125
Stamps	3,296,268
Posts and telegraphs	2,060,754
State domains, State and private forests, mines, quarries, fishing, and hunting	2,185,980

M. Moutran estimates the expense of an efficient internal administration at 64,290,758 frs., including in this sum 15,000,000 frs. as Syria's share of the interest on the Public Debt, 5,000,000 frs. for interest on a preliminary loan of 100,000,000 frs., and 1,760,000 frs. for a foreign resident with a staff of commandants, inspectors, &c., leaving a balance of over 9,000,000 frs.

Taxes.—See *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 129. It will suffice here to note the heavy pressure on land, which has to pay not only the tithe,[1] now amounting to 12·63 per cent. of the crop, but also a direct tax of 4 per cent. of the value of the land (an increase of 6 per cent. is made where no tithe is payable). Taxes on wine production, in conjunction with the tithe, reach 29·63 per cent. of the gross produce. The agricultural class is further burdened with the cattle tax, from which only animals under two years and two draught animals *per* cultivator are exempt. (For the tobacco and salt monopolies *cf.* p. 128.)

(2) *Currency*

The currency of Syria is, of course, that of the Ottoman Empire, being based on the Turkish pound (£T) or lira, which has the nominal value of 100 gold

[1] The Lebanon and the less settled districts to the east of the Jordan and the south of Judaea have not paid tithe, but a fixed tax instead.

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piastres—a sub-unit which does not exist as a coin. There are gold coins of 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 piastres; silver of ½, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 piastres (1 mejidieh); nickel of ⅛, ¼, ½, and 1 piastre (5, 10, 20, and 40 paras). In practice, Turkish gold is seldom seen, the commonest gold coin being the French 20-franc piece, which = 87½ gold piastres (£1 = 110 piastres, £T1 = 18*s.* 0¾*d.*). Besides the silver and nickel coins, the old Turkish beshlik and ½ beshlik, of an alloy of silver and copper, equivalent to 2½ and 1¼ piastres, and the metallik (also alloy) of ¼ piastre or 10 paras, and multiples and sub-divisions of the latter, circulate widely. In foreign commerce prices are quoted in francs, and franc-pieces are also in use. There is a good deal of false coin about the country.

Apart from the official values, for trading purposes various local rates were commonly used in expressing prices. Thus, while in Constantinople £T1 was reckoned at 108 market piastres, at Tripoli it was 123, at Aleppo 127, at Jaffa 141; and so firmly rooted were these current local rates that they came to be recognised even in the accounts of the banks. In 1916, however, order was introduced by a measure fixing the lira for all purposes at 100 piastres. For further information about this reform and the Turkish currency generally, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 129. Another innovation made during the war is less fortunate. Until 1914 the only notes in circulation were those of the Ottoman Bank. Since then the country has been flooded with paper of denominations down to 1 piastre, which, in spite of pains and penalties, the population persist in discounting heavily. In Syria, Government paper has been passing at about ¼ to ⅕ of its face value.

(3) *Banking*

Banks.—Seven banking companies are represented in the country:—

(i) Imperial Ottoman Bank. Branches at Aintab, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Beirut, Damascus, Haifa,

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Hama, Homs, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Saida, Tripoli. The existing concession of this institution, which originated in a private British concern, but is now largely under French control, terminates in 1925. It acts for the Government in financial matters, and before 1914 it alone had the right to issue notes, which, however, were payable only at Constantinople and were never popular in the provinces; in 1913 the amount issued (against which metal in the ratio of 1 to 3 must be held) was only about £T1,100,000. But the Bank remains free to conduct business of all kinds on its own account, and hardly occupies the position of a national bank in the ordinary sense, though taking the lead in fixing rates of exchange and discount. It has been active in promoting trade by advances upon goods (see below). A new national bank, called the Crédit National Ottoman, has lately been founded at Constantinople.

(ii) Banque de Salonique. Branches at Beirut and Tripoli; nominally a Turkish company, but really a Jewish concern under Austrian influence.

(iii) Banque Commerciale de Palestine. A small Ottoman company formed in 1911, and carrying on business in Jerusalem only.

(iv) Anglo-Palestine Company. A Jewish bank, with headquarters in London, which started operations in Palestine in 1903; it has been suspended by the Turkish Government since the outbreak of the war. The company has branches at Beirut, Gaza, Haifa, Hebron, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and small agencies in the principal Jewish colonies. To facilitate advances to persons of small means it has adopted the principle of co-operative credit, and a number of societies have been started, especially among the Jewish agricultural population, to take advantage of this.

(v) Crédit Lyonnais. Branches at Jaffa and Jerusalem, with agencies at Beirut and elsewhere. The business of the bank has been reduced to a minimum during the war.

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(vi) Deutsche Orient Bank. Branch at Aleppo; the bank was established at Constantinople in 1906 (see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 134).

(vii) Deutsche Palästina Bank. Branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, Tripoli. This company, which dates from 1899, and has shown much activity, has important branches at Berlin and Hamburg. A fusion with the Deutsche Orient Bank is to take place after the war.

Besides these companies, there are numerous private banks in the large towns, especially Beirut and Aleppo, which do a considerable amount of minor discounting, besides undertaking deposits and current accounts. In Aleppo, for example, eight or nine firms of good standing are to be found, with a score or more of less solid establishments.

The State-supported Banque agricole, which has a number of branches, exists for the special end of making advances to cultivators for agricultural purposes. Credits are given at the rate of 6 per cent. on suitable security. Facilities for credit were appreciably extended by a law of 1916, which removed previous restrictions as to the amount and term of loans, and legitimised advances on grain, besides including in the bank's sphere of operations the purchase and sale of land, agricultural implements, animals, and seed.

Extent and methods of business.—The volume of banking business, notwithstanding the number and diffusion of the establishments engaged, is not very great; for the public companies it has been estimated that the amount involved, including deposits and current accounts, ranged before the war from £T3,000,000 to £T4,500,000. The united working capital of banks of all kinds at Aleppo was put in 1913 at 22,000,000 frs., and their annual profit at about 2,000,000 frs. Such figures indicate a comparatively low stage of development. The banks take little part in financing companies or taking up concessions.

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Their business may, for the most part, be summed up under the following heads:—

(*a*) Collection of values of imported goods.

(*b*) Discounting bills of exchange and promissory notes. The rate of discount is limited by law to 9 per cent. In 1910 the banks of Beirut agreed on the rates of 6½ per cent. for first-class banks, 6¾ for those of second-class, 7 per cent. for first-class merchants, 7-8 per cent. for others.

(*c*) Advances on real property and on goods. The former have lately been made easier by a law sanctioning mortgages in the names of the specially licensed banks, but except those granted by the Banque agricole they are as yet exceptional. Advances on goods, on the other hand, are very frequent, and may be divided into three classes: (1) Advances on staple products, grain, wool, &c., or on merchandise. Some depôts for deposits of this kind are kept by the banks, but there are no storage companies, and accommodation is limited. 75 per cent. of the value is the recognised allowance, and interest at 5½-6½ per cent. is charged, besides fees for insurance, storage, &c. (2) Advances upon imports which have been ordered, but have not yet arrived. These are paid for wholly or in part on receipt of the bills of lading by the bank, which then takes over the goods on arrival, and releases them as the advances and the bank's own charges are paid off. This system is in use chiefly at Beirut and Aleppo. (3) Advances upon exported goods, the bank receiving the documents after shipment.

(*d*) Current accounts and deposits This class of business is increasing, at any rate in the larger towns and for private account. As there are no public savings banks, the ordinary banking establishments are the only available medium.

(4) *Influence of Foreign Capital*

The notorious dependence of Turkey on foreign capital has been fully shared by Syria, which, as already indicated (p. 125), is both commercially and

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industrially under no small obligations to assistance from without. Until recently the only railways were French. Oversea communications are still practically monopolised by foreign shipping. The one modern port is a foreign enterprise, and the country looks to similar support for further improvements to its harbours. Other important public works due to extraneous money are the electric tramways, the lighting and water supply of Beirut, and the electric trams and light at Damascus. Large undertakings of this character have, as a rule, been left hitherto to the foreigner, though since the beginning of the war there has been a tendency in Turkey generally to greater enterprise on the part of native capitalists. In finance, all the larger banking concerns are foreign, even that which has played the part of the official national bank being only thinly disguised; on the importance of the banks in the commercial system see p. 127 and p. 139 above. The insurance business has been entirely in the hands of alien companies.

A stagnating agriculture, affecting the prosperity of the whole country, has received some stimulus in Palestine. from the Jewish and German colonies, and such advances as have been witnessed in the last decade or two are in no small degree the effect of their example. The spread of the colonies has also led to a substantial advance in the market value of agricultural land in their neighbourhood. Another of the few native industries of significance, the culture and spinning of silk, has rested largely upon French support, the enforced withdrawal of which during the war has been followed by a marked decline in production. Materially, the beneficial influence of external resources has thus been strongly felt, and they have been a not less potent factor in the promotion of the health and education of the people through the hospitals, schools, and other institutions which have been established and maintained by foreign benevolence.

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(5) *Principal Fields of Investment*

Communications.—On the possibilities of the development of railways and ports, *cf.* pp. 77 and 84. Though essential needs are fairly well satisfied by the existing railway system, there is room for improvement, especially by the extension of local branch lines. With regard to ports, the construction of suitable works at Jaffa, Haifa, and Alexandretta is urgently demanded. For the last of these the Baghdad Railway Company holds the concession; for Jaffa and Haifa (with Tripoli) a concession was granted in 1913 to France, and some preliminary financial arrangements were made which have now lapsed in consequence of the war.

Mining.—The prospects here are very uncertain, and further scientific investigation is required. Explorers have noted the occurrence of metals, &c., at various points, but the possibility of their being profitably exploited is not established. Fuel is a vital want, but so far neither coal nor petroleum has been obtained in any quantity. That a profitable oilfield exists within the borders of Syria has yet to be proved; recent expert examinations of concessions in the neighbourhood of Latakia and to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea were not of a very hopeful character. The potentialities of the phosphate deposits of the latter region (*cf.* p. 111) are also not yet fully ascertained.

Electricity.—In the absence of combustibles, the utilisation of water-power, for which sufficient opportunities exist (*cf.* p. 120), should be especially fruitful. Of the larger towns only Beirut and Damascus are at present supplied with electricity.

Agricultural development.—Both in drainage and irrigation much remains to be done. On the coast about Alexandretta and between Jaffa and Gaza, as well as inland north of Antioch and about the Lakes of Hule and Tiberias, large tracts of land might be reclaimed. Cultivation is also capable of appreciable extension and improvement by irrigation, either by pumping, in

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which the use of water-power would play a prominent part, or by means of the ancient system of reservoirs. Acquisition of land by private companies is restricted by the existing law, and anything tending to the expropriation of the peasantry is to be deprecated.

Building, &c.—As has been already remarked (p. 119), there are at present no large local contracting establishments, although there appears to be an opening for such. The possibilities of the country as a health resort, which it is well fitted to become by virtue both of its climate and the presence of a number of hot springs, are as yet undeveloped. More adequate storage accommodation in the commercial centres, perhaps also provision for cold storage in connection with one or more of the shipping lines, are other needs.

Miscellaneous industries.—Various branches of industry, for which the raw material is or can be produced in the country, appear capable of introduction or development and improvement. Milling and oil-pressing, for example, need to be further modernised. With an extension of the cultivation of sugar-cane or beet, sugar manufacture might become profitable, and there is an abundance of material for the production of alcohol, which at present is largely imported. If cotton were more widely grown, it is possible that cotton-spinning might be successful; for wool-spinning there is already in the country an ample supply of raw material. The weaving industry, however, is hardly likely to expand very much except under the protection of a tariff. There is no obvious reason why the demand for such things as cement, tiles, and glass should not now be satisfied on the spot. Tiles and similar products have lately been manufactured to some extent locally, but a glass factory started at Damascus in 1909-10 was a failure. The utilisation of the papyrus beds of northern Galilee for paper manufacture has been suggested. Further attention might well be directed to the preservation of fruit, vegetables, and fish, and the production of perfumery.

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(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Syrian industry, as appears from the foregoing review, is at present very one-sided. Apart from agriculture, only silk-spinning in the Lebanon, the textile industry in the same district and at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and the production of olive oil and soap at Antioch, Tripoli, Jaffa, &c., can be said to have attained any real significance. Mining is negligible, and the absence of a home supply of both coal and petroleum has been a serious hindrance to the development of manufactures. The country therefore depends greatly upon foreign imports, and its purchasing power is much affected by the quality of the harvest and similar natural factors. Agriculture, upon which everything else hangs, has been handicapped by lack of security, adverse conditions of land tenure, and a vicious system of taxation, and has remained, except in certain favoured districts, in a backward condition. The removal of these blighting influences is the prime need. Among more special means of agricultural improvement, drainage and irrigation have already been referred to (p. 101). The various forms of arboriculture successfully practised in the Jewish settlements might be extended with advantage; in the uplands of Judaea, in particular, an adequate yield is hardly to be obtained from cereals. An assured market is, however, a necessary preliminary; the dangers of neglecting this precaution have been well seen in the experiences of the Jewish colonists in wine production. Within certain limits (*cf.* p. 100) something may be hoped from a more extended use of machinery.

Trade and commerce have naturally been profoundly affected by the war. In some directions, indeed, the country has profited; for instance, in the improvement of roads, more especially in the south. But there is a longer tale of loss. Apart from such obvious results as the withdrawal of labour, the losses both of men and animals and in parts the serious depopulation due to

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famine and disease, or the felling of olives and mulberry-trees for fuel, grave dislocations have been caused by the interruption of overseas communications. On the one hand, the supply of many commodities, some of vital importance, has been cut off; on the other, several of the most flourishing industries have temporarily lost their market; for example, the Lebanese silk and the oranges of Jaffa. The orange plantations have, moreover, been much damaged by the failure of irrigation consequent on the deficiency of petrol.

Some possibilities of commercial development have been briefly discussed in the section on openings for investments (p. 144 above). In general, the industrial and commercial future of Syria is closely bound up with political conditions. In Palestine the situation would be transformed by Jewish immigration on a large scale, while dependence in any way upon the British Empire would no doubt greatly strengthen the ties with Egypt, which are already close.

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APPENDIX

Table I.—Tonnage of Steamships cleared at Principal Ports

(A) Beirut

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian.. ..	219,508	214,368	180,130	273,859
British	317,661	359,649	323,677	305,820
French	394,601	399,555	354,052	476,505
German	66,549	61,474	67,965	93,962
Italian	287,193	161,010	36,164	250,167
Ottoman.. ..	47,145	39,756	2,099	20,986
Russian	235,614	198,629	188,005	245,415
United States ..	62,158	53,764	38,206	37,430
Others	70,858	47,286	42,996	43,447
Total	1,701,287	1,535,491	1,233,294	1,747,591

(B) Alexandretta

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian.. ..	113,443	106,331	103,840	120,180
British	156,206	166,918	175,776	172,246
French	55,564	62,391	41,459	54,667
German	14,109	24,454	41,631	51,847
Italian	78,725	29,505	—	41,889
Russian	160,202	138,043	158,521	201,032
Others	53,253	45,077	34,417	33,833
Total ..	631,502	572,719	555,644	675,694

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(c) El-Mina (Tripoli)

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	206,124	198,155	216,806	229,033
British ..	183,419	209,335	204,591	213,459
French ..	143,592	124,905	133,716	191,830
German ..	12,186	37,485	70,618	88,079
Italian ..	105,497	68,322	17,502	158,617
Russian ..	179,496	139,625	168,383	197,016
Others ..	65,840	45,689	47,567	13,803
Total ..	896,154	823,516	859,183	1,091,837

(d) Haifa

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	98,254	209,146	207,149	236,536
British ..	167,701	233,378	201,197	189,961
French ..	69,038	76,080	43,725	49,310
German ..	17,817	21,389	29,848	49,418
Italian ..	82,633	33,169	12,032	65,462
Russian ..	278,246	144,408	166,441	193,518
Others ..	57,755	32,690	24,953	9,175
Total ..	771,444	750,260	685,345	793,380

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(E) JAFFA

Nationality.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Austrian ..	178,674	211,729	213,679	228,456
British ..	250,926	292,785	315,876	270,361
French ..	191,899	192,560	161,560	213,202
German ..	84,128	60,167	85,673	78,656
Italian ..	140,669	56,171	6,964	104,265
Russian ..	184,713	156,699	174,526	212,469
Others ..	84,382	55,350	55,806	52,906
Total ..	1,115,391	1,025,461	1,014,084	1,160,315

(F) GAZA, LATAKIA, AND SAIDA

Port.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1913.
Gaza ..	..	9,434	6,730	8,007
Latakia ..	169,816	120,341	128,147	180,808
Saida ..	61,166	22,945	25,925	49,762

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TABLE II.—Summary of Exports for the Year 1910–11.

Commodity.	Alexandretta (including Adalia and Mersina).		Beirut.		Other Ports.		Total.	
	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.
Live animals ... ... (head)	(178,754)	29,917,302	(1,901)	850,100	(2,123)	227,835	(182,778)	30,995,237
Animal provisions	500,179	4,519,924	735,503	6,703,812	1,195,891	3,286,584	2,431,573	14,510,320
Cereals	10,988,619	16,322,760	4,347,240	4,347,624	18,723,396	21,072,157	34,079,255	41,742,541
Fruit, vegetables (fresh or preserved) ...	5,900,972	6,083,057	3,405,111	9,458,995	33,102,941	29,760,307	42,409,024	45,302,359
Trees, kernels, seeds, plants	5,960,961	3,532,927	125,743	406,062	162,319	164,030	6,249,023	4,103,019
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c.	30,190	48,458	397,462	1,006,145	153,786	348,014	581,438	1,402,617
Sugar and sugar products	184,797	811,226	102,487	341,779	10,745	30,292	298,029	1,183,297
Tobacco, tombac	41,932	524,150	123,735	1,543,700	1,323,944	16,550,000	1,489,611	18,620,850
Alcoholic liquor and mineral water ...	19,100	40,941	610,595	775,361	4,036,951	3,976,267	4,666,646	4,792,569
Oil and oil products	162,293	1,335,483	227,612	1,309,386	5,994,943	24,225,173	6,384,848	26,870,042
Ivory, offal, bones, and other animal products, burning material	2,818,121	1,501,737	208,699	2,383,328	1,518,441	721,412	4,543,261	4,606,477
Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter	1,406,638	3,049,380	34,789	65,064	1,424	11,190	1,442,851	3,125,634
Drugs, perfumes, &c.	12,494,763	8,591,089	829,442	2,161,032	74,281	197,839	13,598,486	10,949,960
Gum, glue, asphalt, &c.	236,335	1,392,731	101,670	660,875	5,175	11,878	343,180	2,065,484
Ore, metal, metal work	6,386,513	1,883,158	257,722	1,219,598	63,196	202,197	6,687,431	3,104,919
Wood and woodwork	4,898,636	1,701,638	278,067	771,820	256,884	330,517	5,433,587	2,803,975
Skins, leather, &c.	437,722	3,776,609	673,709	4,342,442	143,994	843,325	1,255,425	8,962,376
Textiles, raw and manufactured	9,051,883	77,600,714	3,201,065	79,056,070	298,638	14,889,622	12,551,586	171,546,406
Miscellaneous	7,611	29,167	135,795	763,135	50,858	893,895	194,274	1,686,197
Total	61,707,265 (61,707 metric tons.)	162,462,449 (£1,476,931)	15,814,446 (15,814 tons)	118,169,296 (£1,074,266)	67,117,817 (67,117 tons)	117,742,534 (£1,070,386)	144,639,528 (144,639 tons)	398,374,279 (£3,621,584)

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TABLE III.—Comparative Table of Exports (in £) from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910–12.

Destination.	Alexandretta.			Beirut.			Jaffa.		
	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.
United Kingdom	24,722	14,228	19,543	70,500	41,000	31,500	173,085	185,000	190,000
British Colonies (India) ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	698	9,000	10,500
Turkey	525,234	397,218	308,282	18,000	19,000	10,000	83,015	78,000	95,000
Austria	22,142	11,643	13,395	2,300	1,500	1,300	12,103	21,000	24,500
Russia	15,385	20,781	22,574	3,100	4,200	3,500	29,589	33,000	45,000
Germany	18,761	25,539	30,170	1,900	1,000	1,000	8,384	17,000	21,000
France	189,086	178,414	133,491	672,000	431,500	423,800	22,255	46,000	50,000
Egypt	322,730	209,005	258,767	17,000	22,000	23,000	277,328	270,000	290,000
Belgium	3,022	50,868	41,404	2,500	1,100	1,000	1,101	15,000	12,000
Italy	38,645	50,453	860	3,000	2,200	..	15,332	12,000	6,000
United States	137,454	84,022	190,960	21,000	17,000	21,000	4,272	10,000	11,000
Other countries	3,844	2,153	1,001	11,200	10,000	9,500	8,983	14,660	19,162
Total .. £	1,301,025	1,044,324	1,020,447	822,500	550,500	525,600	636,145	710,660	774,162

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TABLE IV.—Totals of Comparative Export Values from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

Destination.	Value.	Percentage.
	£	
United Kingdom	268,307	9·7
British Colonies (India) .. .	698	
Turkey	626,249	22·7
Austria	36,545	1·3
Russia	48,074	1·8
Germany	29,045	1·1
France	883,341	32
Egypt	617,058	22·4
Belgium	6,623	0·2
Italy	56,977	2
United States	162,726	5·9
Other countries	24,032	0·9
Total	£2,759,675	

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TABLE V.—Summary of Imports for the Year 1910–11.

Commodity.	Alexandretta.		Beirut.		Other Ports.		Total.	
	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.	Quantity.	Value.
	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.	Kg.	Piastres.
Live animals ... ... (head)	(955)	261,025	(1,093)	302,073	(2,286)	782,212	(4,334)	1,345,310
Animal provisions	293,867	1,699,419	390,969	1,981,996	466,532	1,777,209	1,151,368	5,458,624
Cereals	4,179,276	4,720,975	18,122,533	19,474,282	37,690,591	38,992,344	59,992,400	63,187,601
Fruit, vegetables (fresh and preserved) ...	739,996	908,044	1,088,584	1,165,846	2,505,110	1,470,629	4,333,690	3,544,519
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c.	485,665	2,720,581	1,528,766	8,877,877	790,068	4,546,565	2,804,499	16,145,023
Sugar and sugar products	8,522,204	14,241,458	11,037,227	20,089,135	11,365,100	19,865,340	30,924,531	54,195,933
Tombac	...	...	724,247	7,157,881	...	...	724,247	7,157,881
Alcoholic liquor, mineral water	833,186	1,660,107	1,475,059	2,896,843	1,093,079	2,357,919	3,401,324	6,914,869
Oil and oil products	7,888,123	6,045,480	15,144,252	12,962,064	19,219,189	12,365,236	42,251,564	31,372,780
Dung, offal, bones, and other animal produce; burning material	14,325,664	2,536,511	43,447,087	8,122,356	9,150,551	2,385,482	66,923,302	13,044,349
Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter	1,463,210	6,037,546	1,810,933	4,810,835	2,913,734	4,777,528	6,187,877	15,625,909
Drugs, perfumes, &c.	104,670	1,208,959	506,514	3,221,443	87,683	833,468	698,867	5,263,870
Explosives, arms	574,988	2,981,612	280,787	3,546,193	335,005	1,845,227	1,190,780	8,373,032
Earth, stone, and products	8,666,459	3,066,493	25,136,398	13,283,247	17,687,092	5,432,681	51,489,949	21,782,421
Metals and metal work	24,300,701	24,795,879	12,202,550	26,367,332	14,256,356	19,007,181	50,759,607	70,170,392
Wood and woodwork	2,483,251	1,282,499	18,131,847	7,987,210	20,442,119	8,987,878	41,057,217	18,257,587
Rags, paper, and products	70,902	2,136,869	1,714,388	4,530,153	929,754	2,600,023	2,715,044	9,267,045
Skins, leather, &c.	346,910	3,728,431	1,631,071	19,902,675	508,075	4,072,380	2,486,056	27,703,486
Textiles, raw and manufactured	5,639,217	62,479,644	5,352,331	234,548,426	2,267,665	21,294,099	13,259,213	318,322,169
Rubber and products	40,770	319,785	116,139	2,055,528	22,995	386,599	179,904	2,761,912
Machinery, carriages	4,465,237	14,323,157	1,131,164	7,046,155	1,149,533	5,378,672	6,745,934	26,747,984
Clocks, musical instruments, &c.	2,943	151,831	79,617	1,888,052	19,810	423,878	102,370	2,463,761
Fezes, hats, feathers, &c.	44,354	1,873,052	45,314	2,551,144	9,643	320,144	99,311	4,744,340
Objects of art, scientific instruments ...	103,305	632,983	318,827	2,725,361	42,990	759,295	464,822	4,117,639
Jewellery, hardware, &c.	34,725	3,194,550	181,699	4,709,170	46,458	1,382,255	262,882	9,285,975
Miscellaneous	53,023	283,457	504,068	3,503,237	185,737	1,129,938	742,828	4,916,632
Total	**85,662,646 (85,662 metric tons)**	**163,290,347 (1,484,457l.)**	**162,102,371 (162,102 tons)**	**495,706,514 (3,870,059l.)**	**143,184,569 (143,184 tons)**	**163,174,182 (1,483,401l.)**	**390,949,586 (390,949 tons)**	**752,171,043 (6,837,918l.)**

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TABLE VI.—Comparative Table of Imports (in £) at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910–12.

Country of Origin.	Alexandretta.			Beirut.			Jaffa.		
	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.	1910.	1911.	1912.
United Kingdom	547,853	445,405	572,788	933,500	902,000	748,500	128,730	146,000	155,000
British Colonies (India) ..	..	..	..	45,000	31,000	23,000	3,105	49,000	54,000
Turkey*	284,565	286,338	266,042	110,000	78,000	47,500	328,965	340,000	305,000
Austria	159,527	100,438	86,738	165,000	172,500	134,500	83,840	114,000	126,000
Russia	25,376	32,012	28,168	94,000	76,000	62,000	97,000	108,000	110,000
Germany	48,940	38,571	71,035	178,000	145,000	129,000	68,615	74,000	80,000
France	170,599	120,627	87,637	150,000	130,000	121,000	103,000	112,000	84,000
Egypt	33,018	29,980	50,925	27,000	23,000	29,500	58,095	70,000	61,000
Belgium	46,094	41,413	33,676	67,500	55,000	71,000	49,185	60,000	54,000
Italy	75,400	87,623	440	257,000	190,000	47,000	24,940	16,000	5,000
United States	5,911	8,351	7,387	23,200	15,750	11,000	10,400	25,000	12,000
Roumania	..	..	..	61,000	72,000	48,000	..	22,000	17,000
Other countries	1,601	4,377	4,810	42,000	30,200	25,500	46,575	33,910	27,019
Total .. £	1,398,884	1,145,135	1,209,646	2,153,200	1,920,450	1,497,500	1,002,450	1,169,910	1,090,019

* See note in Table VII.

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TABLE VII.—Totals of Comparative Import Values at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

——	Value.	Percentage.
	£	
United Kingdom	1,610,083	35·3
British Colonies (India)	48,105	1
Egypt	118,113	2·6
Turkey*	723,530	15·9
Austria	408,367	9
Russia	216,376	4·8
Germany	295,555	6·5
France	423,599	9·3
Belgium	162,799	3·6
Italy	357,340	7·8
United States	39,511	0·9
Roumania	61,000	1·3
Other countries	90,176	2
Total	£4,554,554	

* The imports from Turkey are exaggerated, consisting partly of foreign goods re-shipped at Beirut. Approximately one-half of the Turkish imports at Jaffa are of foreign, and mainly British, origin.

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Maps

Syria and Palestine are covered by four sheets (Beirut, I. 36; Damascus, I. 37; Cairo, H. 36; El-Jauf, H. 37) of the International Map (G.S.G.S., No. 2758) published by the War Office, on the scale of 1:1,000,000.

A special map of "Syria" (including Palestine) has also been issued by the War Office, on the scale of 1:2,000,000 (G.S.G.S., No. 2904; December 1918).

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ZIONISM

Chronological Summary

720 B.C. Ten Tribes transplanted by Sargon.
606–588 B.C. Remaining two Tribes exiled to Babylon.
536 B.C. Cyrus sends Jews back to Jerusalem.
175 B.C. Maccabean rebellion.
70 A.D. Destruction of the Temple.
1563. Joseph Nasi colonizes Tiberias.
Jews from Spain and Portugal at Safed.
1799. Napoleon promises to give the Holy Land to the Jews.
1800–6. Pamphlets by Bickeno, Witherby, and Mayer.
1827. Sir Moses Montefiore's first visit to Palestine.
1838. Lord Shaftesbury suggests to Palmerston the settlement of the Jews in Palestine.
1843. The Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine (afterwards the Palestine Colonization Fund).
1843. The Society for the Promotion of Jewish Agricultural Labour in the Holy Land.
1874. Sir Moses Montefiore's seventh and last visit.
1878. The Anti-Semitic movement begins in Germany.
1880. Anti-Jewish pogroms begin in Russia.
1882. Pinsker's pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation*, leads to the foundation of the 'Chovevi Zion' (Lovers of Zion).
c. 1888. Baron Edmond de Rothschild begins to establish agricultural colonies in Palestine.
1896. Theodor Herzl's pamphlet, *A Jewish State*.
1897. First Zionist Congress at Basle. The Basle Programme drawn up.
1901. Abdul Hamid refuses to grant a charter for a Jewish settlement in Palestine.
1903. Joseph Chamberlain offers territory in Uganda to the Zionists.
1904. Death of Herzl.
1905. The Uganda offer is declined by the Seventh Congress.
1913. Eleventh and latest Zionist Congress.
1917. Declaration by David Alexander and Claude Montefiore on a Jewish National State.
1917. Mr. Balfour promises to facilitate 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'.
1918. Conquest of Palestine by General Allenby.
Zionist Commission sent to Palestine.

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§ 1. Zionism in the Bible

A Zionist is something more than an 'advocate of colonizing of Palestine by modern Jews' as he is defined in the Oxford dictionary. Whether he looks forward to a 'political' or to a merely 'cultural' Jewish occupation of Palestine, whether he is himself religious or non-religious, or even anti-religious, he has been imbued by the history of his race with a passionate love of the Zion of Scripture; and from this common sentiment Zionism draws its best energy.

Though it is less than twenty-five years since Theodor Herzl in his *Jewish State* suggested Zionism as a solution of the Jewish question, it is also the oldest nationalist movement in history. The earliest books of the Bible make Palestine the rallying-point of Israel and the Nations. Moses, Isaiah, Malachi, all preached the love of the Holy Land. The Zionism of the Bible is far anterior to the exile of Israel—even the first exile. It dates back to the prehistoric days of Israel in Egypt; and Moses was the first Zionist. The Promised Land of the Patriarchs is the country where 'I will make of thee a great nation . . . and I will bless them that bless thee . . . and in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed'.[1] Jacob is to be brought back to this land, this fruitful land of 'the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine'.[2] During the Exodus, Moses warns his people that, when their children 'walk contrary', God will 'bring the land into desolation, and . . . scatter them among the nations . . . And yet for all that . . . will remember the covenant of their ancestors' and restore them.[3]

The dispersion of Israel among the nations was long anterior even to the destruction of the first Temple; its literature is not limited to the Bible and the Hebrew Prayer Book, nor its history to Palestine. Much of the yearning for Palestine in the Psalms and elsewhere is not the lament of the exile or captive, but the expres-

[1] Genesis xii. 2, 3. [2] Ibid. xxvii. 28.
[3] Leviticus xxvi. 21, 32, 33, 44, 45.

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sion of the emotion of the self-banished trader and colonist. In 720 B. C. the Assyrians under Sargon conquered the Ten Tribes and transplanted them eastwards to the Far East, to Armenia, Persia, Afghanistan, perhaps to India, China, and Japan. Joel, Micah, and Hosea prophesied in those times and predicted that 'many nations shall come and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways, and we will walk in his paths: for the law shall go forth out of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.[1] . . . Thou wilt perform the truth to Jacob, and the mercy to Abraham, which thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old.'[2] 'Be glad then, ye children of Zion . . . the floors shall be full of wheat, and the vats shall overflow with wine and oil.'[3]

'I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel, and they shall build the waste cities, and inhabit them; and they shall plant vineyards, and drink the wine thereof; they shall also make gardens, and eat the fruit of them. And I will plant them upon their land, and they shall no more be plucked up out of their land which I have given them, saith the Lord.'[4]

Isaiah (750–695 B. C.), in whom, of all the prophets, the union of the real with the ideal is most clearly marked, is essentially Messianic. The earlier chapters reflect the world war of the time, Assyria at its zenith, Babylon becoming its menace, Egypt, Tyre, and Syria doomed. But 'the Lord shall set his hand again the second time to recover the remnant of his people, . . . from Assyria, and from Egypt, . . . and from the islands of the sea. And he shall set up an ensign for the nations, and shall assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah from the four corners of the earth.'[5] The later chapters of the book attributed to Isaiah deal with the conditions towards the close of the Babylonian Captivity a couple of centuries later, but they proclaim even more triumphantly the Restoration

[1] Micah iv. 2. [2] Ibid. vii. 20. [3] Joel ii. 23, 24.
[4] Amos ix. 14–15. [5] Isaiah xi. 11–12.

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of Israel. 'Say ye to the daughter of Zion, Behold, thy salvation cometh . . . And they shall call them, The holy people, The redeemed of the Lord: and thou shalt be called, Sought out, A City not forsaken.[1] . . . And ye shall be comforted in Jerusalem.[2] . . . And they shall bring all your brethren for an offering unto the Lord out of all nations, upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts, to my holy mountain Jerusalem.'[3] 'For the Lord shall comfort Zion: he will comfort all her waste places; and he will make her wilderness like Eden, and her desert like the garden of the Lord; joy and gladness shall be found therein.'[4] The conquest of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar led to a further deportation; and many of the remaining two tribes were exiled to Babylon in three batches in 606, 599, and 588. The number of actual exiles does not seem to have been very large, but it included 'all the princes, and all the mighty men of valour, even ten thousand captives, and all the craftsmen and smiths: none remained, save the poorest sort of the people of the land.'[5] Most went eastward to Mesopotamia with Jeremiah and Baruch and Ezekiel, but some fled southward to Egypt.

After seventy years, a partial return took place. The resettlement of Palestine, started by Cyrus and continued by Darius, is of peculiar interest at the present time.

§ 2. Home Rule in Palestine under the Persians and Greeks

The Persian Empire, towards the end of the sixth century B. C., was mighty and enlightened, and therefore tolerant. The return from Babylon was never more than partial; the Persian Jews were prosperous and contented, and many of them highly placed. Cyrus in 536 called upon God's people—'his God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, which is in Judah, and build the house of the Lord . . . And whoso-

[1] Isaiah lxii. 11–12. [2] Ibid. lxvi. 13. [3] Ibid. lxvi. 20.
[4] Ibid. li. 3. [5] 2 Kings xxiv. 10–16.

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ever remaineth in any place where he sojourneth, let the men of his place help him with silver, and with gold '.[1] In response to the call, 42,000 Jews under Zerubbabel and Jeshua the High Priest returned from captivity. In the reign of Darius a second batch under Haggai, the prophet, returned in 519, when the second Temple was built; a third of some 1,500, in the reign of Artaxerxes in 458, under Ezra; and a fourth in 445, under Nehemiah. A continuation of Nehemiah's narrative can be traced in the Elephantine papyri down to 419 and perhaps later. These remarkable documents show the relations between the Jews who had returned to Zion and those of the Diaspora, who had remained in the lands of their birth and their civil allegiance.

The colonists, who had rebuilt the Temple and deemed it necessary to fortify Jerusalem, found themselves in a minority. They had to deal with the local intrigues of the Samaritan opposition; and the difficulties they had to contend with are set forth by Haggai and Zechariah, who comforted the settlers when they were discouraged. Nehemiah was a Persian official, and his interest had been aroused by the sad reports concerning the Jews who had returned to Jerusalem, how they were 'in great affliction and reproach: the wall of Jerusalem also is broken down'.[2] He persuaded Artaxerxes to send him 'unto Judah, unto the city of my fathers' sepulchres, that I may build it'.[3] He succeeded in rebuilding Jerusalem, despite the intrigues and even the armed force of the local Persian officials, and especially of the Samaritans. Like Ezra, his predecessor, he had to complain of the spiritual indifference of his co-religionists; and he instituted reforms. The Samaritan opposition was routed, and, notwithstanding the persistence of a certain amount of intermarriage,[4] never again recovered its influence in Jerusalem, though the erection of a temple at Elephantine seems to point to some sort of compromise between Jew and Samaritan in Egypt.

[1] Ezra i. 3–4.
[2] Nehemiah i. 3.
[3] Ibid. ii. 5.
[4] Ibid. xiii. 3.

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Alexander the Great, in his conquests, spared Jerusalem and much favoured the Jews; and, when he founded Alexandria in 332, many Jews settled there. These Egyptian Jews developed a high culture of their own and gradually became contented with Ptolemaic and Roman rule. But the Palestinians were stauncher; and when, in 175 B. C., Antiochus Epiphanes endeavoured to precipitate their hellenization, the Maccabean rebellion enabled the Jews to recover their independence and become independent for a couple of centuries. To this period the latter part of Zechariah refers. The Diaspora, who had emigrated, will be brought back again out of Egypt and Assyria into the land of Gilead and Lebanon.[1]

Yet, even in its most prosperous time, Palestine was peopled by only a minority of the Jews. Most of them spread into Galilee, Syria, Egypt, and beyond the seas, so that in the second century B. C. the Jewish Sibyl says of the Diaspora, 'Every land is full of thee and every sea', and Strabo, Philo, Seneca, and the author of the Acts of the Apostles prove that the Jewish race was disseminated in their time over the whole of the civilized world. Philo says that in Egypt alone there were a million Jews, an eighth of the population.

The Maccabeans preserved the independence of Palestine, in spite of the growing imperialism of Rome, until Pompey took Jerusalem in B. C. 63. After this date the local rulers of the Idumaean dynasty (established by Herod in 37 B. C.) were always in the position of 'client-kings' under the Roman government. Judaea itself became under Augustus a 'second-class' Roman province. Internal dissensions produced the insurrection which ended with the destruction of the Temple in 70 A. D. Under Hadrian, A. D. 130, the Jews again rebelled. Jerusalem was destroyed and rebuilt by the Emperor as a Roman colony under the name Aelia Capitolina. No Jews were allowed to reside in it. Thus all hopes of Jewish independence were for the time destroyed.

[1] Zech. x. 10.

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§ 3. After the Roman Conquest

The Romans planted colonies in Palestine with the express intention of preventing the political regeneration of the Jew. But, excluded from Palestine, the Jews strove in the first place to establish, upon the ruins of Hellenism, actual commonwealths in Cyrene, Cyprus, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. There were repeated insurrections of the Jews under several Roman emperors. In the fourth century the Emperor Julian actually contemplated restoring Palestine to the Jews. The passionate longing for Palestine has always remained a Jewish characteristic. It permeates the Apocrypha and writings of the Rabbis. It is the *leitmotif* of the Jewish national fasts and the Hebrew Prayer Book. Every Jewish sermon and every Talmudic discussion, every occasional prayer, ended with the stock formula, 'May the redeemer come unto Zion!' Daily the Jews pray, 'O bring us in peace from the four corners of the earth, and make us to go upright to our land'.

In the solemn and ancient liturgy of the Day of Atonement, to this very day, the Jews all over the world pray that the redemption may succeed a League of Nations:

> Now, therefore, O Lord our God, impose thine awe upon all thy works .. . that all creatures may fear thee . . . that they may all form a single league to do thy work with a perfect heart. . . .
>
> Give then glory, O Lord, unto thy people, praise to them that fear thee, hope to them that seek thee, and free speech to them that wait for thee, joy to thy land, gladness to thy city, a flourishing horn unto David thy servant, and a clear shining light unto the son of Jesse, thine anointed, speedily in our days.
>
> Then shall the just also see and be glad . . . while all wickedness shall be wholly consumed like smoke, when thou makest the dominion of arrogance to pass away from the earth.
>
> And thou, O Lord, shalt reign, thou alone, over all thy works on Mount Zion, the dwelling-place of thy glory, and in Jerusalem, thy holy city.

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Throughout Christian times the Jews have clung to the firm belief in their ultimate return to the Holy Land. Such belief has induced them to lend credence to pseudo-Messiahs, who claimed to be their deliverers appointed to bring about the promised Messianic Kingdom. Some of these were impostors, others self-deluded. Josephus tells of those in the first century; others were Bar Kokba under Hadrian, Moses of Crete in 446, Serenus, a Syrian in the eighth century, David Alroy of Bagdad (the hero of Disraeli's novel of that name) in the twelfth, Abulafia of Messina in 1299, Asher Lemmlein of Istria in 1502, David Reubeni of Cranganore, India, in 1524, and Sabbatai Zevi of Smyrna in 1666. Sabbatai's adventures created a tremendous stir in western Europe; and, although he eventually became an apostate to Islam, he had a line of successors in whom the strange sect of Dunmeh, who live in Salonika, continue to believe. In fact there have been, throughout the centuries, periodic Zionist agitations which have convulsed Jewry; and repeated failures have but strengthened its faith in the final restoration.

§ 4. The Reformation

The invention of printing, the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition, the translation of the Bible, and the Reformation were great events which acted and reacted on Jew and non-Jew alike. The work of the Reformers was furthered by the Rabbis, who helped and taught the Bible translators and Protestant Reformers. With the spread of the Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, religious enthusiasm, coupled with mysticism of an extravagant type, became increasingly prevalent in England, Holland, Denmark, and Germany.

The leading Protestant theologians were on terms of intimacy with Jewish scholars, and searched the Hebrew scriptures with great care and zeal. Sects such as the Anabaptists and Independents became more and more Jewish in their line of thought. . . . Books were written with a view to reconcile the Jewish

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and Christian beliefs as to the Messiah. At the time of the return of the Jews to England (1655), several Christians declared themselves to be Messiahs of the Jewish nation and imagined a Jewish kingdom of which they were to be the King. Many kept the Jewish seventh day Sabbath, and we are told of certain Quakers called Sabbatharii, that they were so pious that they killed a cat for eating a mouse on Saturday. Tovey tells us that the Anti-Semites of the time declared that the Jews saw in Cromwell their Messiah.[1]

This Messianic extravagance had its counterpart among the Jews in a renewed belief in quite a series of pseudo-Messiahs; but these, instead of being merely unsuccessful leaders of Jewish rebels against their oppressors, were now men who numbered distinguished Gentiles among their friends or followers and had diplomatic relations with the princes of their time. Their resistless call to their adherents was the announcement that they would bring Israel back to the Promised Land. Nor was it only mystics or impostors that cherished this hope. Thus Joseph Nasi, Duke of Naxos, a Turkish statesman, originally a *maranno* fugitive from Portugal, persuaded Sultan Soliman II in 1563 to give him Tiberias and the neighbourhood for colonization by the Jews.[2] He introduced the mulberry and culture of silk into Palestine, and started a trade in cloth with Venice. He invited all persecuted Jews, especially in the Papal States, to become farmers or artisans in the new Jewish community. And, although his particular colony had no great success, it was undoubtedly the first practical step to the repopulation of Palestine by the Jew.

Side by side with those colonists, there came to northern Palestine a number of mystics and legists impelled by a religious craving, and seeking to forget the horrors of the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal. Schechter, in his *Studies in Judaism*,[3] paints

[1] L. Simon, *Aspects of the Hebrew Genius* [Introduction by E. N. Adler, xix]. London, 1910.

[2] E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans l'Orient*, II. p. 736. Paris, 1850.

[3] Second Series, p. 202.

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a vivid picture of these pilgrim fathers in a chapter entitled 'Safed in the Sixteenth Century'. He translates the words of one of the greatest of them, Rabbi Joseph Caro:

> After nearly fifteen hundred years of living in the exile and persecution, God remembered unto his people his covenant with their fathers, and brought them back from their captivity, one of a city and two of a family, from the corners of the earth to the land of glory, and they settled in the city of Safed, the desire of all lands.

Safed was preferred to Jerusalem because both the Jews and the Turks of Jerusalem were at the time more exacting and even hostile to alien immigrants. The Jewish community in Safed soon grew to over a thousand families and exceeded that of Jerusalem; and its spiritual wealth—for it was famous for its Kabbalists—was a greater magnet than the importance of its wool trade. The distinction between the business or agricultural Jew and the scholar or saint, who cares nothing for material gain, and is satisfied with his share of the *Halukah* provided by the charitable Jews of Europe and America, has subsisted to this very day.

§ 5. The French Revolution

In the eighteenth century imaginative and emotional religion tended to be superseded or overshadowed by Rationalism. Jews were as 'enlightened' as Gentiles; and the scientific movement of the time found expression in the French Revolution. Montesquieu, the philosopher, commenced the enfranchisement of the Jew; Mirabeau, the patriot, carried it on; and Napoleon completed it. It was this that led to the eventual emancipation of the Jews of western Europe and a renaissance of Jewish literature under Mendelssohn. The Mendelssohnian school brought about a great linguistic change. The vernacular took the place of Hebrew. The Bible first, and then text-books of science and art, history and geography, poetry, and even novels, were written in German but printed

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in Hebrew letters, so that the Jew of the time, illiterate except as to Hebrew, should be able to read them. But the Mendelssohnians were also assimilationists, and thus introduced the only vital change into Judaism since the conquest of Jerusalem by the Romans. Till their day, no Jew had doubted that the dispersion was only temporary and 'the restoration of the national polity might be expected at any moment'; he had looked upon himself as a temporary settler in the land where he happened to live, and indeed, at any rate in Germany, he had been physically separated by the walls of his Ghetto from the society and culture of the non-Jew. Many Jews, especially in Germany, carried away by the glamour of their new citizenship, left the fold altogether. It was the age of *Massentaufen* (baptisms *en masse*). Others abandoned their tribal nationalism and went so far as to eliminate from the prayer book of 'reform' Judaism all references to the hope of a return to the Holy Land and to substitute for a Messiah belief in an ideal Messianic destiny of the spirit common to Israel and mankind. But the mass of Jewry has remained true to its Prayer Book and its Bible. Nevertheless, the Jews in the first half of the nineteenth century were, perhaps, less concerned with Palestine than were non-Jews. The Jewish problem of the day seemed to be in process of solution. Little or nothing was to be heard even of schemes for colonizing Jews outside Palestine. Such had formerly advocated Jewish settlements on the 'Wild Coast' (1654), in the West Indies (1659), and in South America (1749)—the last under the sovereignty of Marshal de Saxe. The colonial scheme of Mordecai Noah of Philadelphia (1785–1851) was made memorable by the support given to it by President Adams.

Mendelssohn himself was hardly an assimilationist. In 1770, consulted as to a scheme for the resettlement of Jews in Palestine, he opposed such an idea only because the Jews were too scattered and feeble, the expense would be too great, and the Powers would never consent. Napoleon in 1799, when on his Syrian

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campaign, issued a proclamation to the Jews, calling upon them to join his army, and promising to give them the Holy Land. This campaign failed, but in 1807 Napoleon again proposed a solution of the Jewish question—from the opposite angle—by summoning the *Sanhedrin*, which was to regulate Jewish custom and fit the Jews for French nationality.

Christians during this period were less lukewarm; and some there were who, believing the Biblical promises, sought to tempt the Jews back to the land of their fathers, generally with the expectation, express or implied, of their ultimate conversion to Christianity. Thus in 1806 a pamphlet[1] addressed to the Jews, after an examination of the prophecies under both Christian and Jewish dispensations, proceeds, 'As there is every reason to suppose that the restoration of the Jews is nigh at hand, I shall now conclude this address by congratulating them on the happy prospect before them in the beautiful language of Ezekiel', and so forth. Bickeno's 'Restoration of the Jews—the Crisis of all Nations' appeared in 1800, and Witherby's 'Attempt to Remove Prejudices concerning the Jewish Nation' in 1804, the latter being a plea both for the Jews' restoration to Palestine, and for their civil equality outside Palestine.

Once admitted to the society of the Gentile, as a citizen with all civil rights, the Jew could not help taking his place in literature and even in general politics. Cumberland's 'Jew' is no longer the crafty and cruel Shylock of dramatic tradition, but a good-hearted philanthropist, benevolent though rich. Byron's 'Hebrew Melodies' bewail the homelessness of Israel. The heroine of Scott's *Ivanhoe* is a Jewess, a perfect heroine of romance. Disraeli reflects—perhaps also deflects—the views of his time and his own impressions of a three years' visit to the East (1830–1) when he makes out of his aristocratic hero 'Tancred' a sort of prototype of Herzl, who tries to realize the Messianic ideal of and in Palestine.

[1] L. Mayer, *Restoration of the Jews*, 3rd ed. London, 1806.

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§ 6. Montefiore, Shaftesbury, and Mordecai Noah

In 1827 the famous centenarian Sir Moses Montefiore paid the first of his seven pilgrimages to Palestine. His wife's diary pictures the ruin and abject misery produced by tyranny and misrule, but ends with a note of hope for the 'return to Zion with songs'. The conquest of Syria by Mehemet Ali in 1832 caused Jew and Gentile to turn their thoughts to Palestine. Many Jews flocked thither, and we are told of 30,000 Polish Jews who petitioned Tsar Nicholas to be allowed 'to proceed to Palestine in a body and await there during three years the coming of the Messiah'. Before 1840 there were supposed to be forty thousand Jews settled, especially in the four 'holy' cities, Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and Tiberias, mostly poor and dependent on their richer brethren in Europe for support. In 1838 Sir Moses paid his second visit with the special object of submitting to Mehemet Ali a scheme for Jewish colonization in Syria. During this journey he investigated the prospects of local agriculture.[1] After nine years, Mehemet Ali was ousted from Syria, which was restored to the Porte, largely owing to the armed intervention of Great Britain.

Already in 1838, Lord Shaftesbury[2] was 'anxious about the hopes and destinies of the Jewish people. Everything seems ripe for their return to Palestine.' He prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, suggesting their settlement there under the guarantee of the Great Powers. These views he elaborated in an anonymous article in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1839. Palmerston was not unfriendly, but there was no Jewish organization capable of handling so big a matter, and so the ambitious project

[1] The Appendix to Lady Montefiore's *Notes from a Journal* (London, 1844) contains Extracts from Reports, Letters, and Addresses on Agriculture in the Holy Land presented to Sir Moses during his sojourn there.

[2] Hodder's *Life and Work of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury*, i. 310, quoted by N. Sokolov in his work, *The History of Zionism* (2 vols., 1919.).

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was whittled down to the official protection by England of Jews in the East. And yet this concession has proved by no means insignificant, for it is the logical precursor of Mr. Balfour's Declaration of November 1917.

The American Mordecai Noah had been reluctantly obliged to abandon his scheme for the constitution of a Jewish colony in the State of New York, and had gravitated towards Palestine. He agreed with a 'continental Jew' who in 1844 wrote to the *Voice of Jacob*, 'We would willingly emigrate, we would go to America, to Texas, but most willingly to Palestine under English protection'.

Noah had become a warm advocate of the restoration of Israel to Palestine when in October 1844 he delivered an eloquent address in New York, in which he urged his countrymen that it was the duty of Christians to help the Jews to regain the land of their fathers. The *Spectator* in 1845 (quoted in the *Voice of Jacob* of August 1, 1845) supports the scheme in the following terms:

> The enterprise which seems to be laying strong hold of the imaginations of a large portion of the European Jews appears at first sight feasible enough. The population of Syria has been reduced to a tithe of what the country could easily support; whole districts are uninhabited. With the permission of the Ottoman Government, the Jews wishing to colonize in Palestine could easily find lands. The old constitutional mode of government and taxation in Turkey favours the formation of a number of agricultural settlements. The Divan declares how much tribute each village or district has to pay, leaving the principal inhabitants to apportion the contribution of each individual and holding them responsible for the whole. The same parties exercise the internal police of their community, subject to the surveillance of the higher authorities. The institutions of the Ottoman Empire would afford the Jewish colonists large scope of local self-government. Were a number of Jewish agricultural settlements established at moderate distances from each other, the superior intelligence, industry, and wealth of their members would lend them importance and their numbers and union deter alien tribes from aggression. Secure themselves, they would as it were inoculate the population of Syria with steady industrious habits. The Ottoman Govern-

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ment would be a gainer every way, were it to invite the immigration of such colonists by granting them considerable immunities. At present it cannot preserve order in Syria; that Pashalic costs money instead of yielding tribute. The Jews would form the nucleus of an industrious, orderly population, consisting of men who have been trained to live as citizens—who know the value of domestic peace assured by laws—and are not likely to become the tools of ambitious Pashas aspiring to independence. In the present temper of the Jews, a large body of immigrants might apparently be attracted to Palestine, were the Ottoman Government to enter into a definite contract with them and induce England—or a Committee of European Powers—to become guarantees for its observance.

The British public was intensely sympathetic to the idea of Palestine for the Jews. *The Times* of March 9, 1840, reported an earlier memorandum to the Powers suggesting the restoration of the Jews to Palestine. *The Times* of August 26 printed this memorandum in full, together with encouraging replies from most of the sovereigns addressed. It also contained a letter by 'An English Christian' appealing to the British people to buy Palestine for the Jews.

Henry Hawkes, on the occasion of the Chief Rabbi Herschel's death in 1842, preached a sermon on the *Position of the Jews*, 'speaking comfortably to Jerusalem' and claiming for them equal rights of citizenship.

> The time is ripe: no ungenerous policy, no exclusive irreligion can stand against you. There is a moral power, accumulated, ever more accumulating, that will work with you in the bosom of our own Christian nation, philanthropists the most mighty in divine energies. Let not our past injustice discourage you; we are ready for better things: work with us to their accomplishment.[1]

Herschel himself had figured in 1838 in Henry Innes's 'Letter to the friends in Scotland of God's ancient people the Jews, including a correspondence with Dr. Herschel the Chief Rabbi of the Jewish Synagogues in London'. Innes believed in 'Israel's

[1] *Position of the Jews.* A Sermon, by Henry Hawkes (London, 1843).

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return from his dispersions', but imagined that conversion to Christianity was the condition precedent.

In 1844 a clergyman named Crybbalt convened a meeting in the Hanover Square Rooms for the formation of the "British and Foreign Society for promoting the Restoration of the Jewish Nation to Palestine"; another clergyman, named Bradshaw, in *A Tract for the Times*, asked Parliament to grant four millions if the churches collected one million for such restoration. Next year E. L. Mitford, of the Ceylon Civil Service, in 'An Appeal on behalf of the Jewish nation, in connexion with British Policy in the Levant', asked for their re-establishment in Palestine 'as a protected state, under the guardianship of Great Britain', with a view to 'their final establishment as an independent state'. In 1845 Colonel George Gawler, founder and second Governor of South Australia, advised 'the foundation of the most important colony that the world will perhaps ever witness' in his 'Tranquillization of Syria and the East. Observations and Practical Suggestions in furtherance of the Establishment of Jewish Colonies in Palestine; the most sober and sensible remedy for the miseries of Asiatic Turkey'. In 1849 he accompanied Montefiore to Palestine, and in 1853 renewed his proposals that Jewish settlements there should be promoted by England, which 'does most urgently need the shortest and safest lines of communications. . . . Egypt and Syria stand in intimate connexion. A foreign hostile power mighty in either would soon endanger British trade.' [1]

§ 7. Jewish Emancipation in England

Not till after a generation of heated controversy did even England admit Jews to Parliament. In this controversy Macaulay took a leading part. His

[1] Some of these facts are condensed from Sokolov's *History of Zionism*, and A. M. Hyamson's *British Projects for the Restoration of Jews to Palestine*, published in the twenty-sixth publication of the American Jewish Historical Society (1918).

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maiden speech, delivered in the House of Commons in 1830, was in favour of Grant's Bill for the Removal of Jewish Disabilities. 'On every principle of moral obligation', he said, 'the Jew has a right to political power.' His famous essay on the 'Civil Disabilities of the Jews' appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* of January 1831. His argument against the idea that Jewish Nationalism unfits the Jews for complete civil rights outside Palestine is worth quoting.

> But it is said, the Scriptures declare that the Jews are to be restored to their own country; and the whole nation looks forward to that restoration. They are therefore not so deeply interested as others in the prosperity of England. It is not their home, but merely the place of their sojourn, the house of their bondage. This argument, which first appeared in *The Times* newspaper[1] . . . belongs to a class of sophisms by which the most hateful persecutions may easily be justified. To charge men with practical consequences which they themselves deny is disingenuous in controversy; it is atrocious in government. . . . People are now reasoning about the Jews as our fathers reasoned about the Papists. . . . The Christian believes, as well as the Jew, that at some future period the present order of things will come to an end. Nay, many Christians believe that the Messiah will shortly establish a kingdom on the earth. . . . Now wherein does this doctrine differ, as far as its political tendency is concerned, from the doctrine of the Jew? If a Jew is unfit to legislate for us because he believes that he or his remote descendants will be removed to Palestine, can we safely open the House of Commons to a fifth monarchy man, who expects that before this generation shall pass away, all the kingdoms of the earth will be swallowed up in one divine empire?

Nearly thirty years elapsed before Jewish emancipation in England was accomplished,[2] but during that period Macaulay's essay undoubtedly played a great part in converting public opinion. In 1847 the *Quarterly Review* published an article setting forth the case against the Jewish claim, but the whole argument is directed towards rebutting that of the essay. The

[1] May 3, 1830.

[2] On July 26, 1858, Baron Lionel de Rothschild took his seat in due form in the House of Commons.

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advocates of emancipation frankly confessed their belief that, once given equal civil rights, the Jews would soon be completely assimilated.

About this time various institutions were founded in connexion with Palestine which showed the lively interest of the public. Such were—

The Association for Promoting Jewish Settlements in Palestine (1843), afterwards the Palestine Colonization Fund;

The Society for the Promotion of Jewish Agricultural Labour in the Holy Land (1843);

The Palestine Society;

The Syria Society;

The Syrian Improvement Committee (before 1863);

The Jerusalem Water Relief Society (1864);

The Palestine Exploration Fund (1865), and similar Societies in France, Germany, and Russia.

Of some of these committees Montefiore was a member; and, though some Zionists have been inclined to look upon him as an opposing influence, as the protagonist of the philanthropic school, there can be no doubt that in the nineteenth century Palestine owed most to him for the beginnings of its colonization. Cobbett's taunt that 'the Israelite is never seen to take a spade in his hand' had made a deep impression upon him, and he determined to do his best to encourage agriculture and handicrafts among his brethren, especially in Palestine. Colonel Churchill wished to re-establish a Jewish kingdom in Palestine. Montefiore, though he threw cold water on the idea on the ground that the times were not ripe, entrusted the Colonel on his return to the East with a fund for the encouragement of thrift among the Jews of the Holy Land; he sent a printing-press to Jerusalem, started a linen factory, and supplied various committees there with agricultural implements and even with cattle. In 1849 Colonel Gawler accompanied him on another visit to the Holy Land. In 1854 he and Chief Rabbi Nathan Adler appealed to the Jews of England for funds to relieve distress in Palestine due

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to the failure of the harvest and the crisis caused by the Crimean War. The Holy Land Relief Fund then constituted is still in existence. Having raised upwards of £20,000 and having also just received a legacy of $50,000 for the benefit of Palestine Jews from Judah Touro of New Orleans, Sir Moses went out again to Palestine in May 1855. On his way he obtained from the Sultan a firman permitting the purchase of land, and bought land at Jaffa and Jerusalem on which he planted gardens, erected a windmill, opened a girls' school, and established agricultural colonies at Safed and Tiberias. In 1874 correspondence between Montefiore, Colonel Gawler's son, the Haham Bashi of Jerusalem, and many of the local Jews, was published by the Jewish Board of Deputies 'on the Promotion of Agriculture and other Industrial Pursuits' in the Holy Land; and in the same year Sir Moses made his seventh, and last, pilgrimage to Jerusalem. He suggested sanitary improvements, housing of the working classes in garden cities where olive-trees, vines, and vegetables should be grown, and loan societies to enable colonists to purchase land; and he bade them 'begin at once'. The Sir Moses Montefiore Testimonial Committee, founded in 1878 to commemorate his centenary, adopted some of these suggestions; and the neat little houses outside the Jaffa gate have been erected by building societies which it constituted. Montefiore's noble life kindled the imagination of his co-religionists throughout the world, created quite a literature concerning him in many languages, and, although the glamour attached to his activities is now somewhat out of fashion among Zionists, undoubtedly led to an ever-increasing faith in Palestine as the country for the Jewish colonist. In 1876 George Eliot's *Daniel Deronda* appeared—a famous novel in which both emancipation and nationalism are claimed for the Jew. Mordecai is the prophet of the hope that 'our race shall have an organic centre, a heart and brain to watch and guide and execute; the outraged Jew shall have a defence in the court of nations'.

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§ 8. Anti-Semitism and Modern Zionism

But Zionism would never have attained its present overwhelming grasp of the minds and hopes of the vast majority of Jewry but for the outbreak of Anti-Semitism and the clouding of the prospects of Jews, alike emancipated, half-emancipated, and not emancipated at all.

The beginning of the nineteenth century, as has been seen, was still influenced by the liberal ideas of the Revolution. Prejudice there was against the Jew, but it was merely incidental. In 1848 the Continental Jew fought for freedom with all his heart and soul. Even in the three Prussian Wars, which culminated in Sedan and the foundation of the German Empire, Jews had shed their blood for their fatherland and were not subjected to deliberate and organized persecution and attack. But 1870 turned the Prussian heads. Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96), a Saxon renegade to Prussia, became the chief panegyrist of the House of Hohenzollern and the militarism for which it stood. In his chair at the University of Berlin and in the Reichstag he pleaded eloquently for the narrowest German nationalism. He vehemently supported the Government in its attacks upon the Socialists and Poles, upon the Catholics and the Jews. The Jews have had to suffer from Anti-Semitism ever since 1878; and Treitschke was one of the few men of eminence who gave his support to the attacks upon them which began in that year.

The virus soon spread throughout Europe. In the East it led to the pogroms in Russia which started in 1880 and have recurred about every ten years. In England, Goldwin Smith raised the question 'Can Jews be patriots?' in 1878; then ensued a series of articles in which Hermann Adler was the apologist. The contagion spread a little later even to liberal France, where, in 1886, Drumont wrote *La France Juive*, preached that all French misfortunes were due to the Machiavellian Jew, and,

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to keep the ball rolling, founded *La Libre Parole*. Drumont is the father of the Anti-Semitism of the Dreyfus trial of 1898.

A whole literature arose around Anti-Semitism in general and the Dreyfus trial in particular. The Jews did not confine themselves to apologetic propaganda. Their leaders, in the more enlightened countries of the West, formed institutions with the express object of protecting their less-favoured co-religionists from oppression and injustice. But above all 'Zionism' came into being as a positive remedy for the alleged homelessness of the disfranchised Jew. The term appears to have been first used in 1886, but was popularized by Herzl ten years later.

§ 9. The Origin of Modern Zionism

Already in 1862, Moses Hess, one of the early leaders of the Social Democratic movement in Germany, wrote a book, *Rom und Jerusalem*, in which he discussed the Jewish problem. Persecution of the Jew throughout the world had convinced him that Jews were likely to remain strangers wherever they dwelt, that emancipation was difficult to reconcile with Jewish national feeling, and that a Jewish Nationality was the only solution of the problem. But the views of Hess fell upon deaf ears among Western Jewry; and emancipation still appeared to them the preferable solution.

Dr. Leon Pinsker of Odessa, in a pamphlet, *Auto-Emancipation*, published in 1882 and translated into Hebrew and most of the European languages, urged that Jews must help themselves. Writing under the stress of the Russian pogroms he declared that 'neither miracles from above, nor the kindness of Gentiles, nor the progress of nationalism would solve the Jewish problem. They could only become a living nation by beginning to live as a nation and strive for the realization of their national aspirations. . . . A home must be found for oppressed Jews, especially Russian Jews.' His chief disciple, the well-known Hebrew writer and

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philosopher, Asher Ginzberg, known as 'Ahad Ha'am' ('one of the people'), has, since 1889, suggested a rather more idealistic solution. Palestine, as a home for Jews, must also be a new moral centre for spiritual inspiration and guidance. His views have been adopted by large numbers of the Zionists themselves; and, indeed, he would probably now describe himself as a Zionist, though he does not see eye to eye with the bulk of the modern leaders of Zionism.

The Russian movement, 'Chovevi Zion' ('Lovers of Zion'), was undoubtedly inspired by Pinsker and Ginzberg, and gathered momentum and force in Odessa and southern Russia and the pale of Jewish settlement, whence it spread to western Europe.

In England it acquired considerable importance by reason of the position of its adherents and the enthusiasm of its chief, Col. A. E. Goldsmid. Its constitution was drafted by E. N. Adler and settled by the Right Hon. Arthur Cohen, Q.C., a nephew of Sir Moses Montefiore. Its objects were expressed to be:

(*a*) To foster the national ideal in Israel.
(*b*) To promote colonization of Palestine and neighbouring territories by Jews, by establishing new colonies, or assisting those already established.
(*c*) To diffuse the knowledge of Hebrew as a living language.
(*d*) To further the moral and material status of Israel.

Its organization took a somewhat military form, being governed by 'Head-quarters Tent' and various Local Tents in the metropolis, provinces, and colonies. The Head-quarters Tent was presided over by a Chief and each Local Tent by a Commander. For some years it published a quarterly magazine, *Palestine*, edited by Dr. S. A. Hirsch. In 1892 it began to purchase land in Palestine; but its international action was in the hands of a Central Committee at Paris, a Committee in Odessa, and an office at Jaffa for the purchase and sale of land and negotiation with the Turkish authorities for facilitating Jewish colonization. 'Chovevi Zion', though in the year 1897 it was administering half a dozen colonies, building agricultural dwellings,

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subsidizing and assisting libraries and schools, never achieved more than a *succès d'estime*. Still, it undoubtedly paved the way for modern Zionism; and Herzl could not have achieved his phenomenal success if these 'Lovers of Zion' had not prepared the soil.

Meantime two individual Jews had, by their reasoned munificence, achieved far more than Montefiore in turning their co-religionists to agriculture. Baron Maurice Hirsch (1831–96) founded the Jewish Colonization Association (commonly known as 'Ica'), and endowed it with over ten millions sterling. Its original object was to relieve the oppressed Jews—primarily those of Russia and Rumania—by encouraging emigration to its colonies in the Argentine, Brazil, Canada, and the United States. The Baron, however, did not favour Palestine as a field for colonization, because he feared that Russia would become the predominant power there. Baron Edmond de Rothschild has for the last thirty years unostentatiously, but on a scientific basis, also devoted millions to the establishment of agricultural colonies exclusively in Palestine, and especially for viticulture, and he had succeeded before the war in putting his colonies on a self-supporting basis. The 'Ica' is administered by delegates of the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Alliance Israélite of Paris, and Jews of Frankfort, Berlin, and Brussels. A few years ago it undertook for Rothschild the management of his Palestine colonies, so that, although not a Zionist organization, it has great interests in the Holy Land.

§ 10. Herzl

Throughout the nineteenth century, Palestine had commanded the increasing attention of the Jews; but it lacked the vivifying touch of a genius who was to make it monopolize their hopes and ambitions.

Such a genius was Herzl, 'the tall figure with the black-bearded Assyrian head that drew all eyes'. He was the founder of the modern idea of Zionism, and in the brief space of ten years from the publication of

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his *Jewish State* was able, by his fascinating personality, which impressed itself upon high and low, Jew and Gentile, Court circles and the proletariat of the Russian Ghetto, to bring the secular aspirations of Jewry into the sphere of practical politics. He gathered round him the philosopher, the student, the oppressed, the dissatisfied, and the enthusiast, into a sort of Cave of Adullam.

At first he was looked upon askance by the great bulk of Western Jews, who, in easy circumstances and sometimes in high positions, were well on the way to assimilation in the countries of their birth and adoption. Even in eastern Europe, ultra-orthodox Jews viewed his projects with disfavour, because they feared that his schemes were independent of religious ideals, and saw in him a political enthusiast but not a descendant of the prophets. They could not recognize in the courtly and well-spoken journalist anything approaching their traditional picture of a Messiah or even his precursor. Herzl's most famous saying was that the return to Zion would be preceded by the return to Judaism.

§ 11. The Zionist Congresses

Public interest in the movement was also kept alive and keenly stirred by the annual meeting of Zionist Congresses during the holiday season, and generally in Switzerland. These were attended by ever-increasing numbers of Jews from all parts of the world, and flattered both participants and spectators by their resemblance to the parliament of a constitutional State.

The first, second, and third were held at Basle in August 1897, 1898, and 1899. Mr. Sokolov, a publicist of Warsaw, one of the prominent leaders of the Zionists and a member of the 'Inner Actions Committee' at the outbreak of the war, gives the following picturesque description of the Congress:

> I still see that odd motley gathering—Rabbis and University professors, medical men and engineers, lawyers and littérateurs, mathematicians, chemists, bankers, merchants, trades-

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men, University students, agriculturists, book-keepers, clerks —all professions and occupations. Orthodox Jews, moderate Conservatives, Chassidim, reformers, freethinkers, Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Galician Straimlech, and Parisian top-hats, German preachers, Lithuanian Rectors of Yeshiboth, Capitalists and Socialists, philanthropists and *Bettelstudenten*, from Polish plains and Swiss mountains, from Lithuanian *Ghetti* and Vienna 'Rings', speaking Russian, Polish, German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian, Arabic, Dutch, Bulgarian, Serbian, Danish, Yiddish and Hebrew, all had come there united by one will, unfurling one banner, forgetting at once all their differences, all their communities' petty questions, all their family worries, all their personal troubles, inspired by one idea, devoted to one great cause, reasoning, arguing, discussing, with a power of conviction and enthusiasm as if this question of a home for the nation were the most personal, the most vital question to every one of them.

The second Congress was notable for an eloquent address by Max Nordau. In burning words he attacked the Anti-Semitism of the Gentile, and the lukewarmness of the rich and 'cultured' Jews who remained in Babylon. The fourth Congress was held in London in 1900 at the Queen's Hall. The fifth and sixth were again held in Basle in 1901 and in July 1903. At all of these Herzl presided. In 1901 he was still hopeful of persuading the Sultan to grant a Jewish charter to Palestine, and he visited Constantinople twice in that year. The Sultan Abdul Hamid expressed his sympathy but did not grant the charter. The key-note of the Congress of that year (at which thirty English delegates attended) was the desirability of obtaining concessions in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund, of which more hereafter, was organized for the purchase of land. At the sixth Congress, in 1903, Herzl had to admit the failure of his Turkish negotiations; and the emigration of persecuted Jews to Egypt and to Uganda was suggested as a temporary measure.

Lord Cromer was most sympathetic to the former scheme, and the latter was offered to the Zionists by Joseph Chamberlain, then Colonial Secretary, who had just returned from South Africa. Chamberlain's offer was enthusiastically welcomed by a section of the

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Zionists and by all with gratitude. It was a *beau geste* on the part of the Government, and a recognition that Herzl and his following were regarded seriously in serious quarters. The Chamberlain scheme of territory within an English Colony was too tempting and too flattering to be summarily rejected; and, though Herzl said that the Jewish people could have no other ultimate goal than Palestine, and that immigration elsewhere could only be subsidiary, it was at his recommendation that the Congress resolved to send out an expedition to East Africa to investigate the Uganda proposal.

The Russian Zionists, however, regarded the scheme as treason to Zionism, and under the leadership of Ussishkin held a counter-Congress in Palestine in the Colony of Zichron Jacob and another in Charkov in November 1903, which presented an ultimatum to Herzl calling upon him to abandon the scheme.

The press throughout Europe, and especially in England, devoted much space to the subject, and the bibliography of Zionism has been rapidly increasing ever since.[1] In April 1904 a *modus vivendi* was found by a conference of the Greater Actions Committee, which, while taking cognizance of the Palestinian work of the Inner Actions Committee, assented to the dispatch to Uganda of a Commission of Enquiry, but left the final decision to the next Congress. It was at this juncture, when there was this cleavage in the ranks of the Zionists, that Herzl died suddenly, a comparatively young man, on July 3, 1904.

The report brought back by the Commission to Uganda was not a favourable one. The seventh, or 'Sabbath', Congress was held at Basle in July 1905 under the presidency of Max Nordau, and attended by delegates from twenty-two countries. The Jewish Territorial Organization (generally known as 'Ito')

[1] Thus Thomsen's *Palästina-Literatur* contains 84 entries between 1895 and 1904, and 311 entries, including 40 newspapers and magazines, for 1904–9. See also Zeitlin's *Bibliotheca Sionistica*, 1852–1905, limited to Hebrew books on Zionism.

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had been founded some months previously by Israel Zangwill and others, who remained members of the Zionist body; but at this Congress such of the Zionists as were 'territorialists' and favoured a colony in Africa or elsewhere were beaten hip and thigh, for the Congress voted all extra-Palestinian work as outside its programme. The proceedings were of a somewhat turbulent nature. A suggestion that the Zionists should be ruled by a triumvirate consisting of Nordau, Marmorek, and Wolffsohn was rejected, the presidency being conferred upon Wolffsohn of Cologne and the seat of administration shifted from Vienna to his city. The Inner Actions Committee, whose president was *ex officio* head of the Zionists, was enlarged from five to seven members resident in Cologne, Berlin, The Hague, Charkov, Paris, and London. In the Greater Actions Committee there were five English delegates, including Zangwill and Gaster.

Of 350 Russian delegates attending this Congress, 300 voted against East Africa. They were what is known as 'Zione Zion', whose one object was Palestine and who claimed that the Jews already resident there must be consulted. Zangwill and the 'Ito' formed a constitutional opposition. The 'Jewish Colonial Trust' was constituted as a financial organization for securing funds for the development of colonization and agriculture in Palestine. In England the 'London Zionist League' was started as a sort of counterpoise to the 'Ito'.

The Actions Committee endeavoured to arrange a conference with other Jewish bodies to see if they would undertake the African scheme; but the 'Ica' and the Alliance Israélite refused, on the ground that the report was unfavourable; while the members of the Anglo-Jewish Association who attended the conference objected to the alternative offered as being, in the circumstances, too speculative. And so the Uganda scheme fell to the ground.

In August 1907 the eighth Congress was held at The Hague, under the presidency of Wolffsohn. A new

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constitution was adopted, under which Congresses were to meet every other year, with a conference in the years intervening. The Greater Actions Committee was to consist of (*a*) twenty-three members elected by Congress on the nomination of standing Committees; (*b*) the Presidents of the Executives of the National Federation and of other Federations; (*c*) the Chairmen of Council and Directors of the Jewish Colonial Trust, the Anglo-Palestine Co., and the Jewish National Fund; (*d*) the Chairmen of the Board of Arbitration and the Congress Council. The leadership was to be with the Deputy President and three other members of the Actions Committee.

Wolffsohn's health was breaking down, and he offered to resign; but the Congress decided to make no change in the presidency till their next meeting. The Russian delegates, under Ussishkin, sought to capture the movement. They were all for political work, and wished the seat of administration to be removed from Cologne to Paris or Berlin, but did not carry their point. Wolffsohn was a practical Zionist, and belonged to the more sober section who thought that the preparation of the people and the land for colonizing was the practical work for Palestine. This mode of economic penetration was a reversion to the Palestinian activities of the 'Chovevi Zion' type.

At the biennial conference held in July 1910 a suggestion that the Administration should be strengthened by an Advisory Board consisting of Nordau, Sir Francis Montefiore and Tchlenov, a leading Russian Zionist, fell through, as each of these gentlemen declined to act. Nordau was beginning to create an opposition to the Wolffsohn leadership.

In August 1911 the tenth or 'Jubilee' Congress was held at Basle, under the presidency of Nordau. Here the cleavage between the political Zionists and the cultural Zionists became accentuated, but, on the whole, the tendency was rather to the Palestinian ideals of the 'Chovevi Zion'. A decided movement ensued for the re-establishment of Hebrew as a living

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language; and some interest was shown in Jewish emigration outside Palestine to relieve the economic pressure arising out of persecution. A symptom of the cleavage in Zionist ranks was evidenced in the English law courts, where an attempt, opposed by Zangwill in person, was made to restrain the Jewish Colonial Trust from colonizing elsewhere than in Palestine, Syria, Asiatic Turkey, Sinai, and Cyprus. Four hundred delegates from 28 countries attended this Congress, which was chiefly memorable for the progress made by the 'Mizrahists', a section which insisted on the religious side of Zionism as of at least equal importance to the political.

Meantime the differences between Wolffsohn, who was the leader of the cultural Zionists, and the acting President Nordau, who was leader of the political opposition, grew more bitter. Nordau took the opportunity offered him, when he presided at a Herzl Memorial Meeting at Paris in August 1913, while pronouncing an impassioned eulogy of Herzl, to attack Wolffsohn, to defend political Zionism, and explain his own abstention from the forthcoming Congress.

In September 1913 the eleventh and latest Congress was held at Vienna, under the presidency of Wolffsohn. The proceedings at this Congress were disorganized and the Zionists as a body were disappointed and discouraged. It was a triumph of practical over political Zionism. There was a dispute between Nordau and the Executive over the choice of a leader. Tchlenov, the Russian Zionist, was unacceptable, and so was Ussishkin; finally Wolffsohn succeeded in retaining his leadership of the party for a while.

The chief practical outcome of the Congress was the emergence of a Jewish University in Jerusalem. Such a University had formed part of the original programme of 1901, but had been left in the background, as it was feared that it might divert energy from the really urgent agricultural work in Palestine. It was now argued, however, that it might prove valuable because it would bring educated people into Palestine

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and advance friendly relations between the Arabs and the Jews, and that the students whom it educated would go out into the world and spread Palestinian ideals among their co-religionists. Even Nordau did not deny that it was practical to make agricultural, economic, and educational experiments in the Holy Land, such as model farms, a Herzl forest, co-operative societies, and a University. But he urged that, although such practical work had so far only resulted in changing the position of 50,000 Jews out of the ten millions in dire need of immediate help, it did none the less prove a theory, and largely and nobly benefit the whole of Jewry by its value and example.

If you go to Palestine (said Nordau) and see a house with a tidy appearance, and ask, Whose house is this? you will be answered, 'It is that of a Jew and a Zionist'. If you see people who are decently clothed, who hold their heads high, who sedulously cultivate the soil; and if, in the midst of deserts where there is no shade, you light upon a place where there are trees, and you ask who planted these trees, again you will be told 'a Jew and a Zionist did this work'. This creates an impression and is a herald of Jewish capacity and dignity.

Wolffsohn died in September 1914. During his illness the leadership of the movement was vested in the Inner Actions Committee, consisting of Warburg, Tchlenov, Sokolov, Hantke, Lewin, and Jacobson, and the administration had been shifted for a while from Cologne to Berlin under Sokolov's management; but the outbreak of the Great War made it necessary for the Zionists to leave Berlin. The members of the Inner Actions Committee went to Copenhagen, and then to New York, where a Provisional Actions Committee, or Emergency Executive, was organized under the chairmanship of Louis D. Brandeis, now a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States. His *Jewish Problem and How to Solve It*[1] is one of the most striking Zionist pamphlets which have appeared. He claims that Zionism is not incompatible with

[1] Zionist Essays Publication Committee, New York, 1915.

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patriotism, that it has brought inspiration to the Jews in the Diaspora, and that three million American Jews —a fifth of all the Jews in the world—may well insist that

Jews are a distinct nationality, of which every Jew, whatever his country, his station or shade of belief, is necessarily a member. Let us insist that the struggle for liberty shall not cease until equality of opportunity is accorded to nationalities as to individuals. Let us insist also that full equality of opportunity cannot be obtained by Jews until we, like members of other nationalities, shall have the option of living elsewhere or of returning to the land of our forefathers.

§ 12. The Basel Programme

The First Zionist Congress established the Zionist Organization and laid down its programme, known as the Basel programme, in the following terms:

Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion on suitable lines of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent where necessary to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

As has been seen, the second and fourth parts of this programme almost monopolized attention in the earlier years. But, later on, after political conditions had changed in Turkey, the first and third parts of the programme assumed greater importance. Practical work in Palestine and the education of the national sentiment in the younger generation came to the front.

§ 13. Organization

The Zionists form an organized democratic electoral system. All Jews become members on payment of

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a nominal fee called 'shekel' (in the equivalent of currency, one shilling, franc, or mark). Each member who has paid a shekel for two successive years has one vote, and every group of 200 shekel-payers has the right to elect a delegate to the Zionist Congress.

A delegate must be not less than 24 years of age; a deputy is generally chosen to take his place in case of unavoidable absence from the Congress.

The Congress is the legislative body of the Zionist Organization. The delegates choose from among themselves a 'Greater Actions Committee', of not less than 21, nor more than 60, members.

The Congress then elects from out of this Committee a small Executive Committee of six. Finally the Congress elects a Chairman of the Executive Committee, who is also the President of the Congress, and the Head of the whole Organization. Dr. Theodor Herzl was the first Head until his death in 1904. He was succeeded by David Wolffsohn, whose powers theoretically devolved upon the Inner Actions Committee but were in fact exercised by Dr. Haim Weizmann, a Professor of Science in the Victoria University, Manchester, who possessed great tact and force of character. The head-quarters of the organization were originally Vienna, where Dr. Herzl lived, later Cologne, then Berlin, and, since the war, Copenhagen, New York, and London. The aim of the movement has been to move the head-quarters to Palestine as soon as conditions permit, because no other country can be more than an accidental and temporary head-quarters. The most convenient centre for the majority of Zionists would be in Russia, for, though the fame of the Organization is West European, its life-blood and strongest membership consists of Russian Jews. Berlin was only chosen because of its proximity to Russian Jewry. The Congresses would also have been held in Russia, if the situation of Russian Jewry had been better, and public meetings had not been forbidden by law.

The adherents of the movement are formed into Societies, which in each country are nominally controlled by a local Zionist Federation, or a Zionist

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Separate Union, consisting of not less than 3,000 members. These Federations and Separate Unions are responsible to head-quarters for administrative work, e. g. distribution and collection of the shekels, arrangement of elections, reception of leaders and arrangement of propaganda tours, and publication of Zionist literature in the language of the country. Among the more important Separate Unions are the 'Mizrahi', strictly observant Zionists, the 'Poáli Zion', who are Socialists as well as Zionists, and two bodies of Zionist working men united in friendly and benefit societies—the Order of Ancient Maccabeans in England and the Order of Knights of Zion in America.

This Organization has been in existence since the first Congress in 1897, and many improvements have been effected at later Congresses. As a form for the general body of Zionist workers it is excellent, but its extent has never fulfilled the hopes or expectations of its founder Herzl. He tried to bind together the whole of Jewry in the Organization, but unfortunately Jewry was, and still is, to a large extent only nominally one people. The fragments in the different countries still consider themselves more or less independent of all other fragments. English Jews, speaking generally, are more English than Jews, and refuse to become members of any other semi-political organization. They have their votes as British citizens. Their 'Jewishness' can find sufficient scope in a limited religious observance, and they cannot see any reason to become adherents of the Zionist Organization.[1]

Apart from the active group of Zionist leaders who carry on the Herzl tradition and the Basle programme of practical politics, the 'Mizrahists' represent the religious element in Zionism as opposed to the secularist and Socialist 'Poáli Zion'. Nearly all the Zionists of Holland, all the Russian Rabbis, probably a majority of the Russian Zionists, and many of those of Germany (especially Frankfurt) belong to the former group.

[1] See *Zionism: its Organization and Institutions*, by S. Landman. (London, 1915.)

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The latter, or the 'pig and plough' Zionists, are agricultural, scientific, non-religious, perhaps anti-religious. Their chief adherents are the students and radicals, the intellectuals of the United States as well as Russia. The most forceful and energetic Zionist leaders belong to them. The long duration of the war and the vast upheavals of the Jewish populations of Eastern Europe have made it difficult to estimate the relative strength of the two parties. Probably the majority rests with the secularists; but, merely on grounds of policy, they would be badly advised ostentatiously to eliminate religion. It is said that a father of a boy at the Jaffa gymnasium, who asked the authorities to see to it that he was confirmed, was met with a blank refusal on the ground that they had nothing to do with religious matters. The Commission recently sent out to Palestine under the auspices of the British Government contained no member of the Mizrahi party. A Jewish Palestine without Judaism is unthinkable; and it cannot be denied that many, perhaps desirable, adherents to the cause have been frightened away because of its lack of spirituality.

§ 14. The Jewish National Fund

The Jewish National Fund was organized with a view to develop the systematic colonization activity in Palestine. Its establishment originated at the first Zionist Congress (1897), when Professor Shapira of Heidelberg proposed that donations should be collected from Jews of all parts of the world in order to create a 'General Jewish Fund', of which two-thirds were to be devoted to the purchase of land, and one-third to its maintenance and cultivation. Such land was to be mainly rural, suitable for colonization, and never to be sold, but let only to Jews upon hereditary lease. Four years later, at the fifth Congress, a Jewish National Fund was constituted as a limited liability company, with its control vested in the Zionist Congress and its mandatories as the chosen representatives of the Jewish

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people. Under its memorandum and articles of association only 75 per cent. can be invested in Palestine, and the balance must be reserved in cash or realizable securities. Its bankers are the Jewish Colonial Trust, Ltd. It professes to meet the needs of three-fourths of the Jewish population of the world, i.e. about 6,000,000 in Russia, 1,000,000 in Galicia and the Bukovina, 250,000 in Rumania, 150,000 in the East of London, and 3,000,000 in the United States. These live in 'densely concentrated settlements', display an almost uniform mode of living, and speak the same tongue (Yiddish).

A quarter of the Russian Jews are artisans who are practically excluded from the factories of the country; and even where, as in Poland, Jewish business men of the middle class exist, their living is 'threatened by a boycott organized by the autochthonous population in order to displace the Jewish middle class by their own, which is still in the course of formation'. In consequence of the war, hundreds of thousands of Jews in the regions in which the war has been raging have been reduced to beggary and will be compelled to emigrate. The claim that Russia itself, once the restrictions of right of domicile are abolished, would become a sort of Paradise for the Jews is untenable, 'in the light of the fact that anti-semitism is prevalent even in the countries where there are no Jewish masses.' In the ten years after 1892 over 120,000 Galician Jews out of a population of 850,000 emigrated to America. Between 1881 and 1908 about a million and a half Russian Jews emigrated thither. Even there overcrowding and cases of much poverty and distress are found. The American Department of Labour (*Bulletin*, 1908) describes the position in which the Jewish domestic workers live as 'quite terrible', and states that they are condemned to work under the worst conditions.

Since 1908 many Jewish emigrants have been diverted to Palestine under the auspices of the Zionists, and it is hoped that, with a brighter future opening out

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for Palestine, such emigration will be largely increased. The Zionist Fund already amounts to over 12,000,000 francs, and this too is expected to be largely increased. Up to 1914 the capital of the National Fund invested in Palestine amounted to £195,000. In a second edition of a pamphlet on the Fund (No. 1 of the National Fund Library recently issued), it is stated that during the eight months of the year 1917, notwithstanding the colossal disadvantages under which it laboured, its revenue exceeded £50,000, derived as to 531,000 francs from Russia, 214,000 from North America, 18,000 from Holland, 15,000 from England, 15,000 from Canada, 14,000 from the Argentine, 40,000 from South Africa, Switzerland, Greece, East Asia, France, Sweden, Egypt, Denmark, Belgium, Australia, and Italy, and from 'other countries', presumably central Europe, 453,000 francs.[1]

§ 15. Zionism and the Jewish Community

During the war, there have been cross-currents in Jewry which have resulted in a distinct triumph for the Zionists. The Palestine question is one of the great problems for the Peace Congress. The Governments of the Allied Powers, especially Great Britain, the United States, France, and Italy, are believed to see its solution in some government by or for the Jews. Most Zionists hope for this under the aegis of Great Britain. The great Jewish communal bodies, especially in England, have kept aloof from the Zionists. Russian pogroms and Rumania's disregard of the Treaty of Berlin inspired them with horror and indignation. But the Zionists, somewhat unfairly, taunt them because their feelings of generosity and philanthropy had diverted the Hirsch millions to South America rather than to Palestine, because their philanthropy was blind, and they seemed opposed to any scheme which went beyond almsgiving. As a matter of fact

[1] See *The Jewish National Fund*, by Adolf Böhm, 2nd ed. The Hague, 1917.

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such communal bodies have done good and great work for their brethren. The co-operation of English and French Jews in the Damascus affair of 1840, when the Jewish quarter was sacked and Montefiore, Crémieux, and Munk were delegated to Alexandria and Constantinople, to intervene for their oppressed co-religionists, marked a turning-point in Jewish history. It was the first time that Western Jews had worked together for the protection of Jewish interests all over the world. A more recent instance of persecution, the forced abduction and baptism of Mortara in Rome, led to the establishment in 1860 at Paris of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. And, when the position of this international body was threatened by the Franco-Prussian War, it was deemed advisable to found in England the Anglo-Jewish Association to carry on the work. The Association started as an English branch of the parent institution, but has, ever since 1871, maintained a separate existence, though the two have always preserved friendly and indeed intimate relations. Its successive presidents have been Jacob Waley, Baron H. de Worms, Sir Julian Goldsmid, M.P., and Claude G. Montefiore.

The Jewish Board of Deputies was founded in 1846 to watch the interests of the Jews of Great Britain and Ireland. Originally composed only of 'Deputies of the Portuguese Nation', it now consists of representatives of various Metropolitan and Provincial Synagogues, and may be taken to be fairly representative of the Jewish community in this country, although a considerable number of Jews resident in England are not members of such Synagogues. Among its presidents have been Sir Moses Montefiore, his nephews, J. M. Montefiore, Sir Joseph Sebag Montefiore, and Arthur Cohen, Q.C., D. L. Alexander, K.C., and now Sir Stuart Samuel. The Board is concerned, *inter alia*, with the protection of rights of the Jews in this country in respect to such matters as marriages, Sabbath observance, &c. But, especially in Sir Moses' time, it never failed, in cases of emergency, to invite

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and beg the intervention of the Government when foreign Jews were being flagrantly persecuted.

The Anglo-Jewish Association was founded in 1871, to continue the work of the Alliance Israélite Universelle, which, before the Franco-Prussian War, had interested itself in the welfare of persecuted Jews all over the world. Its aims were 'to aid in promoting the social, moral, and intellectual progress of the Jew', and 'to obtain protection for those who may suffer in consequence of being Jews'. Accordingly, when any grave case of persecution arose, the Anglo-Jewish Association, like the Board of Deputies, sought the intervention of the British Government. This produced a certain amount of overlapping; and, from the year 1886, the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association appointed a 'conjoint' committee of both bodies to deal with the British Government in such cases. Its meetings were presided over alternately by the presidents of its constituents, and its political secretary was Mr. Lucien Wolf. This Conjoint Committee was composed of leading English Jews, and its relations with the British Government were always highly satisfactory. The Foreign Office never turned a deaf ear to its representations; and the Jews gratefully acknowledged that the Government could always be relied upon to bring its powerful influence to bear in lessening, and often preventing, the sufferings of Jewish victims of persecution. The Committee was in close touch with similar Jewish committees abroad, especially the American Jewish Committee, and its labours were attended with considerable success, so that, before the war, they had almost persuaded the Governments of Russia and Rumania to relax their Anti-Semitic legislation and administration. When the war broke out everything was altered. The persecuting Governments became our friends, and Palestine was a most important factor in the war policy of the Allies. To Zionists and non-Zionists alike the future of the country had become a matter of vital interest. On October 1, 1916, the

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Conjoint Committee submitted to H.M. Government the following formula in regard to Jewish interests in Palestine:

In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain or France at the close of the war, the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community. The Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary.

Meantime the Zionists had entered into direct relations with the Foreign Office, and attempts were not wanting to bring the Conjoint Committee into line with them. But its formula fell short of the Basle programme, and no agreement could be arrived at. The Conjoint Committee instructed their two presidents to make the following public statement of their views as to Jewish resettlement and their objections to the Nationalist policy of the Zionists:

In view of the statements and discussions lately published in the newspapers relative to a projected Jewish resettlement in Palestine on a national basis, the Conjoint Foreign Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association deem it necessary to place on record the views they hold on this important question.

The Holy Land has necessarily a profound and undying interest for all Jews as the cradle of their religion, the main theatre of Bible History, and the site of its sacred memorials. It is not, however, as a mere shrine or place of pilgrimage that they regard the country. Since the dawn of their political emancipation in Europe, the Jews have made the rehabilitation of the Jewish community in the Holy Land one of their chief cares; and they have always cherished the hope that the result of their labours would be the regeneration on Palestinian soil of a Jewish community worthy of the great memories of their environment, and a source of spiritual inspiration to the whole of Jewry. Accordingly, the Conjoint Committee have welcomed with deep satisfaction the prospect of a rich fruition of this work, opened to them by the victorious progress of the British Army in Palestine.

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The 'Cultural' Policy.—Anxious that on this question all sections and parties in Jewry should be united in a common effort, the Committee intimated to the Zionist organizations as far back as the winter of 1914 their readiness to co-operate with them on the basis of the so-called 'cultural' policy which had been adopted at the last two Zionist Congresses in 1911 and 1913. This policy aimed primarily at making Palestine a Jewish spiritual centre by securing for the local Jews, and the colonists who might join them, such conditions of life as would best enable them to develop the Jewish genius on lines of its own. Larger political questions, not directly affecting this main purpose, were left to be solved as need and opportunity might render possible. Unfortunately, an agreement on these lines has not proved practicable; and the Conjoint Committee are consequently compelled to pursue their work alone. They are doing so on the basis of a formula adopted by them in March 1916, in which they proposed to recommend to His Majesty's Government the formal recognition of the high historic interest Palestine possesses for the Jewish community, and a public declaration that at the close of the war 'the Jewish population will be secured in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty, equal political rights with the rest of the population, reasonable facilities for immigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges in the towns and colonies inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary'.

That is still the policy of the Conjoint Committee.

Meanwhile the Committee have learnt from the published statements of the Zionist leaders in this country that they now favour a much larger scheme of an essentially political character. Two points in this scheme appear to the Committee to be open to grave objections on public grounds.

Nationality and religion.—The first is a claim that the Jewish settlements in Palestine shall be recognized as possessing a national character in a political sense. Were this claim of purely local import, it might well be left to settle itself in accordance with the general political exigencies of the reorganization of the country under a new sovereign power. The Conjoint Committee, indeed, would have no objections to urge against a local Jewish nationality establishing itself in such conditions. But the present claim is not of this limited scope. It is part and parcel of a wider Zionist theory which regards all the Jewish communities of the world as constituting one homeless nationality, incapable of complete social and political identification with the nations among whom they dwell; and it is argued that for this homeless nationality a political centre and an always available homeland in Palestine are necessary.

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Against this theory the Conjoint Committee strongly and earnestly protest. Emancipated Jews in this country regard themselves primarily as a religious community, and they have always based their claims to political equality with their fellow-citizens of other creeds on this assumption, and on its corollary—that they have no separate national aspirations in a political sense. They hold Judaism to be a religious system with which their political status has no concern; and they maintain that, as citizens of the countries in which they live, they are fully and sincerely identified with the national spirit and interests of those countries. It follows that the establishment of a Jewish nationality in Palestine founded on this theory of Jewish homelessness must have the effect throughout the world of stamping the Jews as strangers in their native lands, and of undermining their hard-won position as citizens and nationals of those lands. Moreover a Jewish political nationality carried to its logical conclusion must in the present circumstances of the world be an anachronism. The Jewish religion being the only certain test of the Jew, a Jewish nationality must be founded on, and limited by, the religion. It cannot be supposed for a moment that any section of Jews would aim at a commonwealth governed by religious tests and limited in the matter of freedom of conscience; but can a religious nationality express itself politically in any other way? The only alternative would be a secular Jewish nationality recruited on some loose and obscure principle of race and ethnographic peculiarity; but this would not be Jewish in any spiritual sense, and its establishment in Palestine would be a denial of all the ideals and hopes by which the revival of Jewish life in that country commends itself to the Jewish consciousness and Jewish sympathy. On these grounds the Conjoint Committee deprecate most earnestly the national proposals of the Zionists.

Undesirable privileges.—The second point in the Zionist programme which has aroused the misgivings of the Conjoint Committee is the proposal to invest the Jewish settlers in Palestine with certain special rights in excess of those enjoyed by the rest of the population, these rights to be embodied in a Charter and administered by a Jewish Chartered Company. Whether it is desirable or not to confide any portion of the administration of Palestine to a Chartered Company need not be discussed; but it is certainly very undesirable that Jews should solicit or accept such a concession on a basis of political privilege and economic preferences. Any such action would prove a veritable calamity for the whole Jewish people. In all the countries in which they live the principle of equal rights

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for all religious denominations is vital for them. Were they to set an example in Palestine of disregarding this principle, they would convict themselves of having appealed to it for purely selfish motives. In the countries in which they are still struggling for equal rights they would find themselves hopelessly compromised, while in other countries where those rights have been secured they would have great difficulty in defending them.

The proposal is the more inadmissible because the Jews are, and will probably long remain, a minority of the population in Palestine, and because it might involve them in the bitterest feuds with their neighbours of other races and religions, which would seriously retard their progress, and would find deplorable echoes throughout the Orient. Nor is the scheme necessary for the Zionists themselves. If the Jews prevail in a competition based on perfect equality of rights and opportunity, they will establish their eventual preponderance in the land on a far sounder foundation than any that can be secured by privileges and monopolies.

If the Conjoint Committee can be satisfied with regard to these points they will be prepared to co-operate for securing for the Zionist Organization the united support of Jewry.

(Signed) DAVID L. ALEXANDER,
President, Board of Deputies of British Jews.
CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE,
President, Anglo-Jewish Association.

London, *May 17th*, 1917.

This statement appeared in *The Times* of May 24, 1917, and raised a storm of protest in the Jewish community. Among the dissentients who wrote to *The Times* were the Chief Rabbi, Lord Rothschild, and a member of the Conjoint Committee, E. N. Adler, who pointed out that the statement did not represent the views of the majority either of Jews or non-Jews or even of the constituent assemblies which the Conjoint Committee represented. The Jewish Board of Deputies denounced the treaty with the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Conjoint Committee came to an end. After considerable discussion, its place was taken by a 'Joint Committee' with a mandate to represent its constituents on all matters except Palestine; but in November 1918 this embargo was removed, and it is hoped that, in view of

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the moderation of present Zionist demands, these may be supported, or at any rate not opposed, by the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association. The irreconcilables formed themselves into a 'League of British Jews' so as to protect each other against the insinuation that they are aliens in the land of their birth, and that, as Jews, they cannot be Englishmen! The League is believed to have achieved no great success; and the Zionists, while denying that there is any ground for their fears, retort that those who wish to stay in the wilderness may stay there.

In Germany the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden* was founded in 1901 for the relief of oppressed Jews abroad, and ultimately ousted the German branch of the Alliance Israélite. The *Hilfsverein* founded and supported schools in Palestine, and, largely owing to the liberality of two of its prominent members, Herr Jacob Simon and Dr. Paul Nathan, acquired very considerable influence there. At first it encouraged the use of the Hebrew language as the vehicle of instruction, but eventually it demanded, perhaps at the instigation of the Wilhelmstrasse, that Hebrew should for the most part be replaced by German. This method of German propaganda was attacked in August 1913 by a meeting of the Palestinian Teachers' Union held in Jaffa. Over a hundred teachers from all parts of Palestine attended, and almost unanimously passed a resolution that 'the principles of national education demand that all subjects of instruction shall be taught in the Hebrew language, and this meeting pledges the members of the Teachers' Union to fight with all energy against the instruction of secular subjects in a foreign language'.[1] In January 1914 the new Haifa Technical Institute, which drew its support from Jewry all over the world, especially from America, Russia, and Germany, was threatened with ruin by the bitter controversy which ensued. A suggested compromise only succeeded in fanning the indignation

[1] *The German Attack on the Hebrew Schools in Palestine*, by Israel Cohen (London, 1918).

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of the Zionists and young colonists and students of Palestine. Imposing demonstrations against the *Hilfsverein* were made in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa, and also in Europe and the United States. Many of the teachers in the *Hilfsverein* schools resigned their posts or were dismissed. The war put an end to the controversy by stopping educational activities in Palestine for the time; but, as Mr. Israel Cohen observes,

> It is not unreasonable to suppose the change of policy of the *Hilfsverein* was due to secret pressure exercised by the German Government, with a view to making the Jewish schools nurseries of Prussian *Kultur*. This sinister intention was ignominiously defeated through Palestinian Jewry rising to the defence of the Hebrew language as of its most holy possession.

§ 16. The Future of Palestine

After the conquest of Palestine by General Allenby, the British Government lost no time in taking steps to fulfil the promise made by Mr. Balfour in his declaration of November 2, 1917. The declaration ran as follows:

> His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

This Declaration has since been endorsed by the Governments of France and Italy. President Wilson has also publicly expressed his sympathy with the British Government's Declaration.

The Government authorized the Zionist Organization to send out to Palestine a commission, representative of English, American, French, and Russian Jewry, to investigate and work out ways and means for the establishment of the Jewish national home. The commission went to Palestine accompanied by Major the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, M.P., as their liaison

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officer with the British authorities of Palestine. It returned in October 1918, but Zionists have so far done little to set forth a practical scheme for the administration of Palestine under their auspices.

The Jews of Palestine divide themselves into two very distinct sections. The old inhabitants are descendants of refugees from Spain and Portugal who began to settle there early in the sixteenth century, and of successive generations of pilgrims who had gone there to study and live a life of contemplation and die in the land of their fathers. These are persons of not much initiative and largely dependent on a somewhat mischievous system, known as *Halukah* ('distribution') because the money collected for Palestine among the Jews of Europe and America was distributed between them. *Halukah* benefits correspond with the allowances made to 'remittance men' in the Colonies.

The second class, however, consists of genuine colonists, agriculturists, students, and even painters and sculptors, who have come to Palestine during recent years from Russia, Rumania, and elsewhere, some of them the victims of persecution, seeking a refuge anywhere, but others drawn to Palestine and Palestine only by the ideals of the Chovevi Zion and the Zionists. They came from love of the country, and a real desire to revive it, and make it again a land of milk and honey. To this class also a considerable number of the officers and men of the Jewish regiments which served in Palestine are likely to belong.

An interesting suggestion for the new Zionist situation is set forth in a communication to the *Jewish Chronicle* of November 15, 1918. The letter assumes that Palestine is to be under British suzerainty, but to be forthwith administered by a 'Jewish Commonwealth'. Inasmuch as the Jews are at present by no means a majority of the population, the principle of self-determination cannot yet apply; but it is admitted to be essential that such a Commonwealth must be acceptable to the present inhabitants, and that no landowner should be expropriated. It suggests that such

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a Jewish administration would be acceptable to the Arabs and would possess their confidence. The writer attaches great importance to the name of the country. He thinks it should be called 'Israel', and the inhabitants 'Israelites', whether they profess the Jewish religion or not. Hebrew is to be the language of the country, the governor a Jew, preferably one who has distinguished himself as an administrator in the British Empire. The governor is to be assisted by a State Council, partly nominated and partly elected. There is to be complete religious toleration, but Jewish law is to be the fundamental law of the land, and Jewish Sabbaths and Holy Days are to be the recognized days of rest.

This scheme seems somewhat premature, but, so far as the Arabs are concerned, the son of the King of the Hejaz, the Emir Feizul, is reported to have stated in London on December 11 that

> Arabs are not jealous of Zionist Jews and intend to give them fair play, and the Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas. Turkish intrigue in Palestine has raised jealousy between the Jewish colonists and the local peasants; but the mutual understanding of the aims of the Arabs and the Jews will at once clear away the last trace of this former bitterness.

Dr. Weizmann himself, on his return from Palestine, has reported to the Zionists in such wise as to disappoint some of the keenest nationalists among them. They fear that the future condition of Palestine, as he foreshadows it, is by no means ambitious enough. They are inclined to regard his proposals as merely colonization and 'the settling on the land of a number of peasants, presumably those who are unable to live in other countries, and who would be glad to go to Palestine on charity lines'. He is not sufficiently nationalist for them, and they fear that his Zionism is merely that of the old Chovevi Zion philanthropist. They ask whether this is not precisely the formula of the Conjoint Committee of March 3, 1916, which

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claimed for the Jewish population of Palestine liberty and political rights and reasonable facilities for emigration and colonization, and such municipal privileges as are shown to be necessary. And they ask, therefore, what need there has been for the acute differences of opinion which have, for the last year, divided the Anglo-Jewish community into two camps, Zionists on the one hand, and their opponents on the other. As a matter of fact, the expression of such doubts is no discouraging feature. It rather seems to show a tendency to *rapprochement* between the two schools. Extremists on both sides will have to give way.

Jewish opinion would prefer Palestine to be controlled for the present as a part, or at any rate a dependency, of the British Empire; but its administration should be largely entrusted to Jews of the colonist type, who have already made such notable improvements in the cultivation of the soil, notwithstanding the almost hopeless difficulties imposed upon them by their former corrupt Turkish rulers. Zionists of this way of thinking believe that, under such conditions, the Jewish population would rapidly increase until the Jew became the predominant partner in the combination.

The Hebrew language is already spoken in many parts of Palestine by thousands of inhabitants and by more people than any other language except its sister-tongue—the Arabic. For the adoption by non-Jews of a Jewish dialect Zionists can point to the instance of Salonika, where Spanish Jews form about half the population and their *Ladino* or Spanish Hebrew has been to some extent adopted as the language of commerce by Jew and non-Jew alike.

Outside Jewry, an overwhelming mass of public opinion would appear to favour Jewish administration in Palestine, not that it could ever provide a home for the millions of Jews in eastern Europe, but because it would satisfy their secular aspirations, raise their sense of dignity and self-respect, and relieve, to some extent at least, the pressure of the congested districts in which circumstances have forced them to congregate.

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